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The purpose of this work is to examine critically the use of criminal sanctions in the 
enforcement of environmental law in South Africa.  The two principal issues considered 
are, first, whether criminal sanctions are the best enforcement instrument and, if not, what 
alternative enforcement tools exist.  Second, the thesis considers ways in which the use of 
criminal sanctions can be made more effective in those cases where it is found that 
criminal sanctions do have a role to play. 
In determining the object of criminal law in the context of environmental regulation, it 
is concluded that the primary aim is deterrence.  The question that this raises is whether 
deterrence can adequately be achieved through use of alternatives to the criminal 
sanction. 
A comprehensive analysis of South African environmental legislation reveals an 
overwhelming reliance on the command and control approach to regulation, with criminal 
sanctions being used in almost all cases as the primary enforcement mechanism. It is 
argued that there are several shortcomings of criminal law that militate against its use as 
the default enforcement mechanism and the conclusion reached is that they should be 
reserved for the most serious contraventions of the environmental law.  The thesis 
examines several viable alternatives to criminal sanctions, both administrative and civil, 
and makes recommendations as to how these can be used effectively instead of criminal 
sanctions. 
Following this initial conclusion, the focus then shifts onto how the use of criminal 
sanctions can be improved in those (serious) cases for which they should be reserved.  It 
is agued, first, that the use of strict criminal liability is not necessary.  This is followed by 
an examination of vicarious and corporate liability where recommendations are made for 
ways in which these aspects can be improved.  The issue of sentencing environmental 
crime is then considered and it is argued that penalties are largely adequate but 
suggestions are made as to innovative sentencing options.  Finally, several procedural 
improvements are put forward. 
In conclusion, a model enforcement chapter for environmental legislation is mooted, 
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If somebody in South Africa emits effluent into a river, that person must comply with 
standards provided by regulations in terms of the National Water Act.1  These 
standards set down maximum permissible levels for various substances in the effluent.  
If the person fails to comply with these standards, should he or she be prosecuted for a 
criminal offence?  Alternatively, is there another way by which the transgression can 
be addressed? 
In a second example, an employer at an industrial chemical reprocessing plant 
orders employees of his company to clean out the sludge at the bottom of a 25,000 
gallon storage tank which has contained cyanide and phosphoric acid. The employer                             
took no steps to provide the employees with safety training or protective equipment. 
One of the employees is overcome by hydrogen cyanide gas, collapses in the tank and 
suffers severe brain damage.  Should this employee be prosecuted for a criminal 
offence?  If so, and if he is convicted, what sort of penalty should be imposed? 
These are the sorts of questions that have been faced by regulators since 
environmental law began to burgeon from the early 1970s.  Traditionally, the usual 
mode of enforcing regulatory provisions, including environmental legislation, has 
been the so-called ‘command and control’ model, which approximates the Austinian 
vision of law as a series of commands backed up by threats.  The law may, for 
example, provide that nobody may litter and back up this prohibition by providing for 
a certain penalty (usually fine or imprisonment) for contravening the provision.  
According to this approach, the producer of effluent who breaches the National Water 
Act regulations in the first example above should be prosecuted. 
Recently, however, there has been significant movement away from reliance on the 
command and control model to more participatory models that often involve the use 
of economic inducements of various types to persuade, rather than force, the regulated 
community to carry out the desired behaviour.  According to this approach, the 
effluent producer may be required to pay some sort of charge or fee for exceeding the 
                                                          
1  Act 36 of 1998. 
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maximum emission standard, thereby avoiding the cost and inconvenience for 
everyone involved of a criminal prosecution. 
On the other hand, most people would agree that the employer in the second 
example should be subject to criminal prosecution and that he should be subject to a 
harsh penalty.  This is, in fact, what happened in the case upon which this example 
was based.  In the United States of America, in May 2000, the owner of an industrial 
chemical reprocessing plant in Idaho, was sentenced to 17 years in prison for 
knowingly endangering an employee’s life. The sentence was at the time the harshest 
ever imposed for an environmental crime, and the offender was the only employer 
ever convicted on federal charges of knowingly exposing a worker to hazardous 
waste.2 
These two examples highlight a number of issues relating to the use of criminal 
sanctions in enforcing environmental law.  These issues can essentially be reduced to 
two fundamental questions.  First, when is it appropriate to use criminal sanctions and 
when would it be better to use alternatives to criminal sanctions in order to ensure 
compliance with the law?  Once this has been decided, the second question is, what 
does the regulator need to do to ensure that criminal sanctions, when they are used, 
are most effective?  In other words, how does one ensure the highest possible 
conviction rate without unnecessarily infringing the rights of the offender and, in 
addition, are the objectives of the use of criminal sanctions met by the sentencing of 
environmental offenders? 
These questions form the essential focus of this thesis.  They raise a host of other 
sub-issues that require discussion, many of which are problems of regulatory 
enforcement generally, not just for environmental legislation.  Regulation of the 
environment, however, does raise important issues that are unique to that particular 
enterprise. 
The question of the enforcement of environmental law is not only of academic 
interest.  Despite the growing number of environmental laws, particularly in this and 
other less-developed countries, there is frequently aired discontent with the apparently 
lax way in which they are enforced.3  This is the principal impulse behind this thesis – 
                                                          
2  http://www.ens.lycos.com/ens/may2000/2000L-05-01-09.html (accessed 18 July 2001). 
3  See, for example, Cheryl Loots ‘Making environmental law effective’ (1994) 1 SAJELP 17; Peter 
Lazarus, Iain Currie & Rob Short ‘The legislative framework: Environmental law, investment and 
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how can enforcement of environmental law be made more thorough?  If the reason for 
lack of enforcement is a combination of lack of political will, lack of resources and 
similar shortcomings on the part of the regulator in a particular jurisdiction, there is 
not a lot of scope for improving the situation by amending the law, which would 
render a study such as this of little practical usefulness.  If, however, the way in which 
the law provides for enforcement is cumbersome, time-consuming and thereby 
amounts to a disincentive for regulators to use it, then an analysis of how to improve 
the enforcement provisions of environmental legislation is a fruitful exercise. 
This thesis will show that this is, in many cases, true of South African legislation – 
it is just not worth the regulators’ while to enforce it by means of criminal sanctions, 
which are often the only enforcement devices provided for.  Therefore, the analysis in 




The thesis deals with the protection of the environment through the use of criminal 
sanctions.  In order to address the two questions identified above, it will be necessary 
first to decide the reason for environmental protection.  This will determine the aims 
behind environmental legislation, which in turn informs the purposes of enforcing that 
legislation.  If the goal of environmental legislation were to prohibit completely all 
pollution, for example, then any act of pollution would be prohibited, ranging from 
breathing (adding carbon dioxide to the atmosphere) and flushing waste down the 
toilet, to the emission of toxic chemicals into the air or water.  It is more likely, 
however, that environmental legislation is aimed at drawing a boundary-line between 
types of pollution that are acceptable (breathing, for example) and those that are not.  
Enforcement strategies have to take this boundary-line into account, as well as the 
line, if any, between those prohibited acts that are serious and those that are less 
serious. These issues are canvassed in more detail later in this introductory chapter. 
Once we have decided why and the extent to which it is necessary to protect the 
environment, the next preliminary question that has to be decided relates to the use of 
criminal sanctions in enforcement.  If we are eventually to determine the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
industrial practice’ in Lael Bethlehem & Michael Goldblatt (eds) The Bottom Line: Industry and the 
Environment in South Africa (1997) 9 at 9-10. 
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circumstances in which criminal sanctions as opposed to other alternatives ought to be 
used, it is necessary to consider why regulators would use criminal sanctions.  In other 
words, the purposes or aims of criminal law will be considered.  Of particular 
importance to this topic is the characteristics of criminal law that distinguish it from 
other means of enforcement: what can criminal sanctions achieve that cannot be 
achieved by, say, civil liability?  This subject will be covered in Chapter 2. 
Having established why criminal sanctions are used, and before examining more of 
the practicalities of using them, and since the basis of the discussion in the rest of the 
thesis will be South African environmental law, Part Two of the thesis will examine 
the status quo in South Africa.  It will be shown that South African environmental 
legislation is, for the most part, firmly rooted in the ‘command and control’ paradigm, 
with few exceptions.  This is dealt with in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and will involve an 
analysis of all national legislation and selected provincial and local laws. 
In order to facilitate this analysis and the later discussion, the constitutional 
framework within which the South African criminal law operates will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.  These issues will be referred to frequently later in the thesis when 
considering various options that may improve on the current situation. 
The first of the two basic questions identified at the beginning of this Chapter will 
be answered in Part Three.  In order to determine when to use criminal sanctions and 
when to use alternatives, first (in Chapter 7) it will be useful to consider the strengths 
and weaknesses of using the criminal law, bearing in mind the objectives of criminal 
law identified in Chapter 3.  While the strengths of criminal law relate mainly to what 
distinguishes criminal law from other modes of enforcement, there are several 
weaknesses that can be identified in the use of criminal sanctions.  Several of these 
are universal – affecting the use of criminal sanctions in all (or at least most) 
countries.  Others, however, are more prevalent in South Africa or countries that share 
with South Africa certain characteristics like limited government resources. 
Chapter 8 will then examine the various alternatives that there are to the use of 
criminal sanctions, including administrative remedies, civil remedies and economic 
instruments.  Once the strengths and weaknesses of criminal law are identified, 
together with the alternatives, the question of when to use criminal law can be 
answered.  It will be argued in this thesis that criminal sanctions should not be used as 
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a matter of course but rather reserved for use in serious or repeat offences.  This 
argument will be expanded on considerably in Part Three. 
Once the circumstances in which criminal sanctions are useful have been 
established, the focus then turns onto how to make the criminal sanctions that are used 
most effective.  To this end, Part Four of the thesis examines the following devices 
that are used to facilitate the prosecution of environmental offenders: 
 strict liability (Chapter 9); 
 vicarious liability (Chapter 10); 
 liability of corporate officers (Chapter 11). 
Considerable analysis will be carried out into the use of these devices in other 
countries in order to ascertain to what extent similar approaches could be utilised in 
South Africa. 
Whereas the first section of Part Four deals with issues relating to conviction, the 
latter part also examines the sentencing of environmental offenders.  Here the analysis 
will consider what appropriate sentencing is in the traditional sense (fines and 
imprisonment), as well as more creative sentencing devices often used in other 
jurisdictions.  This is dealt with in Chapter 12. 
Part Four concludes with Chapter 13, dealing with various practical problems 
identified in Chapter 6 as affecting the use of criminal sanctions.  The discussion 
covers various ways by which these practical problems may be addressed, for instance 
by means of using in-house counsel to prosecute environmental offences rather than 
public prosecutors. 




Two further preliminary issues must be addressed at this stage.  First, since the focus 
of this thesis is on the enforcement of environmental legislation, it is necessary to 
consider what qualifies as environmental legislation.  Second, the scope of the 
comparative analysis will be defined. 
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2.1 What is environmental legislation and what is not? 
 
There is not a universally accepted definition of the scope of environmental law.4  For 
purposes of this work, the pragmatic so-called ‘subject matter’ approach to 
environmental law will be used.5  This approach would regard as environmental 
legislation any legislation that regulates environmental management or, more 
specifically, the areas of conservation of natural resources, pollution control and waste 
management (and the impacts of pollution and waste on public health) and land use 
control, specifically land use planning.6  There would be universal agreement on most 
statutes that would fall under this umbrella – for example, the National Environmental 
Management Act,7 the National Water Act,8 the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention 
Act;9 and various provincial enactments dealing with land use planning. 
There are, however, some grey or, as Hart would call them, penumbral areas where 
there is less consensus.  Does legislation that deals with the exploitation of the 
environment qualify as environmental legislation?  Does legislation dealing with the 
conservation of human-made objects qualify?  Does legislation regulating the safety 
of the work environment qualify? 
In this thesis, an inclusive approach is adopted that includes legislation that 
impacts negatively on the environment (for example, the Minerals Act10); legislation 
dealing with the built environment (for example, at least in part, the National Heritage 
Resources Act11); and legislation regulating the work environment (the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act,12 for instance).  In each case, only those aspects of the 
legislation that are relevant to environmental management will be considered. 
                                                          
4  See Michael Kidd Environmental Law – A South African Guide (1997) 4-8. 
5  See Kidd op cit at 4. 
6  See Kidd (ibid); Gregor I McGregor Environmental Law and Enforcement (1994) at 1; and Michael 
C Blumm (ed) Environmental Law (1992) at xi. 
7  Act 107 of 1998. 
8  Act 36 of 1998. 
9  Act 45 of 1965. 
10  Act 50 of 1991. 
11  Act 25 of 1999. 
12  Act 85 of 1993. 
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The ambit of the analysis of the use of criminal sanctions in South African 
environmental legislation is explained in further detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
2.2 Scope of comparative analysis 
 
In analysing the use of criminal sanctions for the purposes of environmental 
protection in other jurisdictions, the major focus will be directed at those countries 
whose criminal law systems are based on the Common Law: the United Kingdom, the 
United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  The reason for this is 
that South African criminal law, although it does have considerable Roman-Dutch 
origins, is similar in respect of many of the fundamental principles to the law in these 
countries. 
There are other countries who have criminal law regimes based on the Common 
Law (many African countries, for example) that are not listed here but they are largely 
excluded, firstly, on the pragmatic basis of lack of available current material and also 
because the systems used in those countries often do not differ noticeably from the 
law in the countries listed above.  From time to time, mention will be made of 
approaches adopted in other countries – those with civil law systems or Asian legal 
systems, for example – where methods or devices used provide interesting lessons for 
South Africa. 
 
3 Environmental Protection: Why and How? 
 
Although environmental legislation has been in existence for centuries, legislation 
designed to deal with environmental problems on a comprehensive front is really only 
a creation of the last thirty years.  The growth of environmental law was a result of 
concern about environmental problems arising from unrestricted industrial growth and 
similar developments, and increased scientific ability to identify these problems and 
their possible future effects.  Seen in this light, the aim of environmental law must be 
protection of the environment.  There are a number of different philosophies as to why 
the environment should be protected13 and to discuss this question in any detail would 
                                                          
13 See, for example, Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton International Environmental Law (1991) 9-18;  
Michael Kidd Environmental Law: A South African Guide (1997) at 14-17. 
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leave no time to deal with the main topic at hand.  Most, if not all, environmental 
legislation throughout the world was devised in order to address the need to conserve 
resources for the benefit of humans, both living now and future generations, and to 
protect human health.  The rationale is therefore anthropocentric and utilitarian.14  
Such an approach would include economic justifications for environmental 
regulation.15  
This rationale is important in determining precisely what is meant by ‘protection’ 
of the environment.  The degree of protection afforded by the anthropocentric, 
utilitarian rationale entails the notion of sustainable use of natural resources and 
control over pollution in the sense that this envisages a line being drawn between 
acceptable and unacceptable pollution, given that total prevention of pollution is 
impossible.  The determination of what is acceptable and unacceptable is important in 
assessing what controls to use in ensuring adherence to the defined standards.  In 
short, then, ‘protection’ is not to be understood in an absolute sense, but rather as 
contingent on policy goals, both national and international. 
If this is considered in the context of regulation and compliance with regulatory 
instruments, certain difficulties are presented.   Consider, for example, the difference 
between a common law crime, say theft, and an environmental regulatory offence, say 
exceeding an emission standard.  On the one hand, theft is considered to be a crime 
whether the accused person has stolen two million rand or a slab of chocolate.  The 
nature of the stolen item will probably influence the sentence, but not the question of 
guilt.  Also, the decision may well be taken not to prosecute the person who took the 
chocolate due to the somewhat trivial nature of the stolen item, but that does not 
detract from the fact that, were the offender to be prosecuted, he or she would be 
charged with theft. 
On the other hand, the emission offence is somewhat more difficult to quantify.  
First, in setting emission standards, the legislator is saying that some emissions are 
acceptable, whilst others are not.  Whereas theft is a crime, whatever is stolen, 
emission of a pollutant into a watercourse may be an offence or not depending on a 
line drawn by the legislator which is possibly somewhat arbitrary.  Much 
                                                          
14 See RF Fuggle and MA Rabie Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) at 8. 
15  See, for example, RH Coase ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 1 Journal of Law and Economics 
1. 
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environmental legislation, particularly that aimed at addressing pollution and human 
exposure to harmful substances, is the result of a risk assessment followed by policy 
decisions as to how to manage such risk.16  The extent to which such decisions are 
based on solid scientific analysis, however, is not clear and there may well be some 
arbitrariness about the lines that are drawn.  The emission standard is most likely set 
on the basis of an assessment of the assimilative capacity of the environmental 
medium in question which cannot be scientifically precise, given the number of 
variables involved. 
The fact that there is frequently such a fine line between economically productive 
behaviour which is desirable particularly in developing countries such as South 
Africa, and behaviour which constitutes an offence, can be problematic.  One of the 
consequences of this is that it is often difficult to foster public attitudes sympathetic to 
the legislature in proscribing certain environmental offences.  It also must influence 
the manner in which offences are sentenced – it is surely unacceptable to punish 
severely a polluter who marginally exceeds the line between what is acceptable and 
what is not.  Yet public attitudes would almost certainly favour severe punishment of 
a polluter who deliberately dumps hazardous substances without regard to public 
health or the environment. 
It is these sorts of considerations that will be examined in more detail later in the 
work.  What is necessary to examine further, for now, however, is on what basis 
decisions are made to draw lines between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour as 
regards the environment.  It is submitted that such decisions are, or ought to be, 
grounded on the concept of sustainable development. 
Probably the most well-known definition of sustainable development is from the 
report Our Common Future (also known as the Brundtland Report).17: ‘Sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.  If we 
consider the rationale for environmental legislation in the light of this concept, the 
idea should be to ensure that development, which causes pollution and uses natural 
resources, is carried out sustainably.  This means that development should consume 
                                                          
16  See Richard L Revesz Foundations of Environmental Law and Policy (1997) Chapters 3 and 4 and 
sources therein cited. 
17  World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). Our Common Future (1987) at 43. 
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resources and introduce pollutants to the extent that the resources of Earth for future 
generations will not be exhausted or degraded beyond repair. 
The lines that legislators draw, therefore, are drawn with this notion in mind.  For 
example, a certain amount of pollution can adequately be assimilated without 
infringing on the environmental rights of future generations.  Anything over this 
identified amount is unacceptable, either in itself (a major oil spill, for example) or 
because it is seen as being one contributory source to a bigger problem, albeit 
relatively minor in itself. 
Sustainable development, then, holds the key to the rationale for environmental 
law.  What is the purpose of this work is to examine the best manners by which 
people can be encouraged to remain within the lines drawn by legislators with the aim 
of sustainable development in mind.  It is acceptable for people to use natural 
resources and it is acceptable for people to emit pollutants into the environment.  The 
bounds of acceptability, however, are, by and large, set down by legislation.  One of 
the ways in which persons are kept within those bounds is by means of the threat of 
criminal sanctions.  There are, however, other means of ensuring people’s compliance 
with environmental legislation.  Probably the most important initial question that 
needs and answer, then, is what is special about criminal law – what are the aims of 
criminal law and what parts of these objectives cannot be satisfied by alternative 





The Aims of Criminal Law 
 
What are the aims of criminal law?  This is a question often neglected by authors of 
criminal law textbooks, and even when not neglected, the answer can be unsatisfactory.  
Smith and Hogan, for example, in one of the best-known expositions of criminal law, 
suggest that ‘it is not easy to state confidently what are the aims of the criminal law at the 
present day’.1   Despite this being an apparently tough task, it is necessary, in assessing 
how criminal sanctions ought to be used in the enforcement of environmental law, to 
consider what the purpose of criminal law is. 
In order to do this, the question is first considered in general terms, followed by 
consideration of whether the general aims of criminal law apply equally in the case of 
environmental crime which, in many instances, consists of what are known as ‘regulatory 
offences’. 
 
1 The purpose of criminal law 
 
The basic purpose of the criminal law is often expressed as being the prevention of harm 
to society.  For example, 
‘The overall aim of the criminal law is the prevention of certain kinds of behaviour which society 
regards as either harmful or potentially harmful.  The criminal law is applied by society as a defence 
against harms which injure the interests and values that are considered fundamental to its proper 
functioning.’ 2 
The aim of environmental legislation – protection against a certain type of harm that 
society regards as fundamental to its proper functioning - has been addressed in Chapter 
1.  But statements like that quoted above give only part of the answer.  Society also uses 
                                                          
1  JC Smith and B Hogan Criminal Law 7 ed (1992) at 3. 
2  Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers & Stanley Yeo Australian Criminal Justice 2 ed (1999) at 2.  See also 
Wayne R La Fave Criminal Law 3 ed (2000) at 7 and 10; Charles E Torcia Wharton’s Criminal Law 15 ed 
(1993) at 2; John C Klotter Criminal Law 2 ed (1986) at 2. 
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other devices as a defence against the sort of harms described above. The real question, 
therefore, is what distinguishes criminal sanctions from other modes of enforcement? 
According to Henry Hart, ‘what distinguishes a criminal sanction from a civil sanction 
and all that distinguishes it … is the judgment of community condemnation which 
accompanies and justifies its imposition’.3  A crime, therefore, is ‘conduct which, if duly 
shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral 
condemnation of the community’.4  Frase expresses a similar view that ‘what principally 
distinguishes the criminal sanction is its peculiar stigmatising quality’.5 
The stigmatising quality may be, at least according to the views expressed above, the 
only distinguishing feature of criminal sanctions, but the principal diagnostic feature of 
the criminal sanction, that which a layperson would identify, is that it involves the threat 
of ‘unpleasant physical consequences, commonly called punishment’.6  According to 
Hart, 
‘these added consequences take their character as punishment from the condemnation which 
precedes them and serves as the warrant for their infliction.  Indeed, the condemnation plus the 
added consequences may well be considered, compendiously, as constituting the punishment.  
Otherwise, it would be necessary to think of a convicted criminal as going unpunished if the 
imposition or execution of his sentence is suspended’.7 
Hughes expresses a similar view when he states, 
‘It is not possible to explain [punishment] in terms of a special kind of deprivation; rather, it can 
only be understood in the light of special reasons for imposing a deprivation.  Whether a deprivation 
is punishment depends upon the way in which the reason for its imposition is understood by society 
at a particular time, and upon how close that understanding comes to the central perception that 
                                                          
3  Henry M Hart Jr ‘The aims of criminal law’ (1958) 23 Law and Contemporary Problems 401 at 404. 
4  Hart op cit at 405.  See also Paul H Robinson Criminal Law (1997) at 5; Robinson ‘The criminal-civil 
distinction and the utility of desert’ (1996) 76 Boston Univ LR 201 at 205-6. 
5  Richard S Frase ‘Criminalization and decriminalization’ in Sanford H Kadish (ed) Encyclopedia of 
Crime and Justice (1983) Vol 1 438 at 439. 
6  Hart op cit at 405. 
7  Ibid. 
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constitutes the core of the crime.  This perception involves the identification of a serious accusation, 
proof of which elicits a demand for a censorious and retributive response’.8 
Both authors raise the idea that punishment consists of some kind of deprivation plus a 
societal attitude that regards the deprivation as punishment.9 But would a civil penalty or 
sanction (at least a serious one) not engender a similar response from society?  If so, what 
distinguishes a civil penalty, in theoretical terms,10 from a criminal penalty?  If civil 
penalties share the same societal response as criminal penalties, the only difference is that 
civil penalties cannot include imprisonment.  Another distinguishing feature of the 
criminal law, therefore, is that it is the only mechanism by which a person can be 
subjected to imprisonment.11  In the absence of community condemnation and the 
possibility of imprisonment for contravention, however, the only feature which 
distinguishes ‘minor’ regulatory offences from civil wrongs is the decision by the 
lawmaker that they ‘shall be criminal offences, attended by criminal procedures and 
triable in criminal courts’.12 
Let us, however, return to the notion of punishment.  If criminal law is concerned with 
the imposition of punishment, the question is still begged of why punishment is imposed. 
The justification for the infliction of punishment is a debate which has concerned 
philosophers for centuries and is one which is central to consideration of the use of 
criminal sanctions in the enforcement of environmental law.  Essentially, the debate is 
between retibutivists and utilitarians, the latter including those who see the purpose of 
punishment as being deterrence.  This is not the place to cover the debate in detail, but it 
is useful to consider in broad terms the current state of thinking about the aims of 
                                                          
8  Graham Hughes ‘The concept of crime’ in Sanford H Kadish (ed) Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 
(1983) Vol 1 294 at 299. 
9  See also Mark A. Cohen ‘Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and 
Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes’ (1992) 82 Journal of Criminal 
Law 1054 at 1057. 
10  Obviously there are a number of distinguishing features from the point of view of procedure and rights 
of the person subject to the sanctions.  These are considered in more detail later in the thesis. 
11  And, in some jurisdictions, more severe sanctions such as capital punishment. 
12  Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (1991) at 2. 
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punishment.  Most South African criminal lawyers express the view that punishment is 
applied for purposes of retribution.13  According to Rabie and Maré, 
‘As long as criminal punishment is regarded as an instrument through which society expresses its 
condemnation and disapproval of the offender’s act, and is associated with the authoritative 
infliction of suffering on account of a crime which has been committed, retribution is the only true 
theory of punishment.  It is only with reference to retribution that the criminal sanction can be 
adequately distinguished from other sanctions.  In short, criminal law - and punishment, with which 
it is inextricably interwoven - derives its very essence from retribution’.14 
The acceptability of this view, however, depends on whether the crimes being 
punished are that which would attract society’s ‘condemnation and disapproval’.  This 
would certainly be true for common law crimes like murder, theft and rape, but is it true 
of environmental crimes? We will return to the justification for punishment in the next 
section, when considering the question in the context of environmental crime. 
Finally, in considering general justification for criminal law, there may, in addition, be 
a further purpose for criminal law. According to many commentators, criminal law not 
only reflects public morality and norms, but can also be used to contribute to the 
fashioning of norms.15  According to Cohen, ‘some scholars have argued that the criminal 
sanction serves [this] purpose - to shape preferences and "educate" the public (i.e., 
potential violators) about the moral consequences of their actions’.16 Yet it is important 
that this objective is not taken too far.  As Packer states,  
                                                          
13  This view is not necessarily shared by criminal lawyers from other countries.  Ashworth, for example, 
states that ‘the overall or justifying aim of the criminal law is general prevention or deterrence – to induce 
people, by the threat and imposition of punishment, not to cause harms of certain kinds’ (Ashworth op cit at 
11). See also La Fave op cit at 3. 
14 Rabie and Strauss Punishment: An Introduction to Principles 5 ed by MA Rabie and MC Maré (1981) 
at 46-7.  See also Jonathan Burchell and John Milton Principles of Criminal Law 2 ed (1997) at 49.  
15 See Susan Hedman ‘Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law’ (1991) 58 
George Washington Law Review 889 at 891 and references cited there. 
16 Cohen op cit at 1060. 
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‘it is by no means clear that we can persuade the public to view conduct as wrongful by making it 
criminal. If we make criminal that which society regards as acceptable, either nullification occurs or, 
more subtly, people’s attitude towards criminality undergoes a change’.17  
The views outlined above are based on what me may call ‘mainstream’ legal 
philosophy.  There is, however, another perspective that may be worth considering here, 
and that is the economic theory of criminal law.  Probably the best known exposition of 
economic theory is that posited by Richard Posner, who argues that the major function of 
criminal law in a capitalist society is to prevent people from bypassing the system of 
‘voluntary, compensated exchange’, or ‘the market’.18  Many instances of bypassing the 
market could be deterred by the law of delict, but ‘the optimal damages that would be 
required for deterrence would so frequently exceed the offender’s ability to pay that 
public enforcement and non-monetary sanctions such as imprisonment are required’.19  
The significance of this view is that the criminal sanction should be reserved for only 
those cases where non-criminal modes of enforcement (including delict and interdicts) 
are inadequate.  The economic approach has great relevance to environmental offences, 
which are often the by-products of socially-beneficial activities.  This will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section. 
The above discussion provides some idea of how criminal law theorists view the aims 
of criminal law in general terms.  What is of more immediate concern for present 
purposes, however, is whether these purposes are compelling when used to justify 
criminal enforcement of environmental offences. 
 
2 The purpose of criminal sanctions in the enforcement of environmental law 
 
In considering the aims of criminal law, many commentators feel it necessary to make 
qualifications to their general justification when it comes to so-called regulatory 
                                                          
17 Herbert L Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) at 359.  See also Ashworth op cit at 28, 
Findlay et al op cit at at 12-13; P Robinson and J Darley Justice, Liability and Blame (1994). 
18  Richard A Posner ‘An economic theory of the criminal law’ (1985) 85 Columbia LR 1193 at 1195. 
19  Ibid. 
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offences.20  The general thrust of these views is that regulatory offences are less serious 
than other crimes.  Where do environmental offences fit in to the picture? 
Surveys have been conducted in several countries which have indicated that people in 
those countries regard environmental crime, where human health is put at risk, as 
seriously as they do crimes like armed robbery.21   There have been no equivalent surveys 
in South Africa, but it is doubtful that public attitudes are the same here as in more 
developed countries.  Certainly people in South Africa would be outraged by pollution 
offences where people were killed, or where there was a clear and immediate health risk, 
but without any obvious threat to human health it is unlikely that there would be strong 
antipathy towards pollution offences, even if intentionally committed.  This is in part due 
to a relatively undeveloped ‘environmental ethic’ amongst the South African population, 
but is also attributable to the huge problem of the general prevalence of crime in the 
country.  It is understandable that people are not going to be channelling their disapproval 
towards polluters and other environmental offenders when there are hosts of murderers, 
rapists, car hijackers, armed robbers and the like committing crimes daily without 
apprehension. 
                                                          
20  Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells & Dirk Meure Reconstructing Criminal law (1990) 5; Ashworth op cit at 51; 
Findlay et al op cit at 6; Hughes op cit at 296. 
21 In a survey conducted by the US Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin (January 
1984), cited by Judson W Starr ‘Countering Environmental Crimes’ (1986) 13 Boston College 
Environmental Affairs LR 379 at 379-80, 60,000 people were asked to rank the severity of particular 
crimes.  In seventh place, after murder, but ahead of heroin smuggling and skyjacking, was environmental 
crime.  According to the study, industrial criminal polluters are considered to be worse in the public's eye 
than armed robbers or those who bribe public officials.  See also Environment Opinion Study Inc A Survey 
of American Voters: Attitudes towards the Environment (1990) cited by Susan Hedman ‘Expressive 
Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law’ (1991) 58 George Washington Law Review 889 at 
889.  Similar findings were made in Australia: see Duncan Chappell & Jennifer Norberry ‘Deterring 
Polluters: The Search for Effective Strategies’ (1990) 13 University of New South Wales Law Journal  97 at 
98: 2,500 Australians questioned about their attitudes to 13 offences including murder, heroin trafficking, 
and a factory knowingly discharging polluted wastes in a way that contaminated a city's water supply 
leading to the death of 1 person. Pollution was ranked as  the third most serious crime. 
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Public attitudes towards environmental crime are important because the retributive 
theory of punishment is basically grounded on public sentiment.  Hence retribution may 
explain visiting criminal sanctions on serious environmental crimes that lead to public 
outrage, but does it really make sense to regard punishment of a person who has exceeded 
an emission limit by a slight amount to be based on retribution?22 Smith has suggested, 
correctly it is submitted, that ‘at the moment environmental crimes are punished chiefly 
because of the potential for social harm that they pose, not because of deep underlying 
conceptions of moral wrongfulness of conduct on individual victims’.23  Much of the 
reason for this is that the harm sought to be prevented is often harm caused by accretion – 
where individual offenders contribute to the overall harm by numerous individual 
contributions.24 This means that, often, the actual harm done by the person who infringes 
a regulation is, in itself, ‘miniscule or nonexistent’.25  Yet another factor that would serve 
to influence the public’s attitude towards environmental wrongs is that many corporate 
activities prohibited by regulation (including environmental offences) are not easily 
distinguishable from business activities that are tolerated, and in some cases even lauded, 
by the community.26 
The question of public attitudes towards environmental crime is, it is submitted, 
closely linked with the time-honoured distinction between offences which are regarded as 
mala in prohibita and those which are seen as mala in se.  The former are regulatory 
offences (also referred to as public welfare27 or economic offences) which are identified 
                                                          
22  See Kathleen F Brickey ‘Environmental crime at the crossroads: The Intersection of environmental and 
criminal law theory’ (1996) 71 Tulane LR 487 at 489, where she says, ‘Although few would object to 
criminally prosecuting midnight dumpers, there is a vague sense of uneasiness about the extent to which the 
intersection of criminal law and environmental law is appropriate in the context of less egregious conduct’. 
23 Susan L Smith ‘An Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove: Redefining the Role of Criminal Prosecution in 
Creating an Effective Environmental Enforcement System’ (1995) 19 Criminal Law Journal 12 at 18. 
24  Gerhard OW Mueller ‘An essay on environmental criminality’ in Sally M Edwards et al Environmental 
Crime and Criminality: Theoretical and Practical Issues (1996) 3 at 21. 
25  Hughes op cit at 296. 
26  SH Kadish ‘Some observations on the use of criminal sanctions in enforcing economic regulations’ 
(1963) 30 Univ of Chicago LR 423. 
27  Francis B Sayre ‘Public Welfare Offences’ (1933) 33 Columbia LR 55 at 68. 
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by, inter alia, the fact that the prohibited conduct lacks moral turpitude.28  Many 
environmental offences would fall under this category of statutory offence.  According to 
Packer, ‘there is essentially only one reason why the criminal sanction is invoked to deal 
with so-called economic offences and that is deterrence’.29  This idea is supported, 
perhaps from a less theoretical and more empirical perspective, by Chambliss. He 
suggests, based on observation of different types of offences, that ‘instrumental’ offences 
– those where the offender commits the offence as a means to an end, rather than as an 
end in itself (an ‘expressive’ offence) – are more likely to be deterred by punishment.30  
Many environmental offences would be instrumental –pollution often occurs, for 
example, as a side effect of production and to save costs. 
The significance of this view is that, other than for those environmental offences 
which give rise to society’s moral condemnation or disapproval, and for which retribution 
may be regarded as a legitimate justification for invoking the criminal law, criminal 
sanctions are used in response to all other environmental offences as a deterrent.31  It is in 
the light of this consideration that the role of criminal law in protection of the 
environment should be evaluated. 
If the criminal sanction is used for the purposes of deterrence, the idea is that the 
offender and the general public are to be deterred from committing environmental 
offences.  These two purposes are encapsulated in the ideas of special or specific 
                                                          
28 JRL Milton and MG Cowling South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol III: Statutory Offences 
(1988) Chapter 1 at 8.  See also Mueller op cit at 8. 
29 Herbert L Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) at 356. 
30  William J Chambliss ‘Types of deviance and the effectiveness of criminal sanctions’ (1967) Wisconsin 
LR 703. 
31  See Chappell & Norberry op cit at 102: ‘Belief in deterrence underlies political and judicial, as well as 
public, approaches to pollution offences’ (expressing an Australian view).  For most authors in the United 
States, this point is not made explicitly, but frequent comments are made about the deterrent effect of 
environmental criminal law which suggests that this is the underlying rationale: see, for example, Susan L 
Smith ‘Doing time for environmental crimes: The United States approach to criminal enforcement of 
environmental laws’ (1995) 12 Environmental Planning & Law Jnl 168 at 168-9; Richard J Lazarus 
‘Assimilating environmental protection into legal rules and the problem with environmental crime’ (1994) 
27 Loyola of LA LR 867 at 883. 
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deterrence (deterrence of the individual in question) and general deterrence (deterrence of 
society at large).  It is widely recognised that deterrence, both specific and general, 
depends on a combination of the following factors: the likelihood of apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction and significant penalty.32  Effective enforcement is important 
when deterrence is the goal, and the public must be aware of penalties being utilised since 
‘ultimately, one cannot fear what turns out to be a paper threat’.33 Moreover, laws that are 
not enforced promote ‘cynicism and disrespect for the law, particularly the criminal 
law’.34 At the same time, it is important that the threatened penalty corresponds with the 
harm sought to be prevented. If relatively minor offences are punished by heavy 
penalties, this will lead to disrespect for the law, especially in a society where there is a 
perception that ‘real’ criminals are either avoiding arrest and prosecution altogether, or 
are being treated leniently by the legal system.  On the other hand, if penalties are too 
low, the goals of deterrence will be undermined, especially in the case of corporate 
offenders. As Lazarus suggests, ‘absent the possibility of criminal sanctions, particularly 
those directed at individuals, companies may view sanctions for violating environmental 
laws as mere costs of doing business’.35 
Deterrence, however, is not the sole preserve of the criminal law. As Hedman says, 
‘innovative civil penalty schemes ... can deter polluters at least as effectively as and at 
lower cost - both in terms of economics and civil liberties - than criminal laws’.36  The 
factors that she raises, economics and civil liberties, will be discussed in a later Chapter,37 
but the point she makes, which cannot be faulted, is that the use of criminal sanctions in 
the enforcement of environmental law must be justified by more than simply reasons of 
                                                          
32  C Reasons ‘Crimes against the environment: Some theoretical and practical concerns’ (1991) 34 
Criminal Law Quarterly 86 at 97; See also David Farrier ‘In search of real criminal law’ in Tim Bonyhady 
(ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change (1992) 79 at 96. 
33 Smith op cit n23 at 14.  See also Farrier op cit at 86. 
34  Sanford M Kadish ‘The crisis of overcriminalization’ (1967) 374 Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 157 at 160.  See also Ashworth op cit at 28. 
35 Lazarus op cit at 880. 
36 Hedman op cit n5 at 896. 
37  Chapter 7. 
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deterrence, because other mechanisms can also deter.  It may be argued that South Africa 
does not have a well-developed system of civil or administrative penalties, but that does 
not dilute the persuasiveness of Hedman’s argument.  If such tools can also fulfil the 
deterrence objective, why not use alternatives to the criminal sanction, especially if they 
do not suffer from the same drawbacks that criminal sanctions do? 
Perhaps the economic approach can provide an answer to this question. Environmental 
offences are often by-products of activities that society does not wish to prohibit entirely.  
In these cases, if sanctions are overly harsh, there is a risk that people (certainly those that 
are risk-averse) will curtail their activities to avoid penalty, with the result that there is 
less than the socially desirable amount of the desired activity.  In order to appreciate fully 
this view and its significance for regulatory offences, the distinction drawn by economists 
between ‘conditionally’ and ‘unconditionally’ deterred activities is instructive: 
(T)he function of legal remedies, viewed in an economic perspective, is to impose costs on people 
who violate legal rules.  This is as true of simple damages for breach of contract as it is of 
imprisonment for rape.  The difference is that the deterrent purpose in the first case is only 
conditional.  We want to deter only those breaches of contract in which the costs to the victim of the 
breach are greater than the benefits to the breaching party.  The correct amount of deterrence is 
obtained by requiring the breaching party to pay the victim’s costs. . . .  But society does not want to 
deter only those rapes in which the displeasure of the victim is shown to be greater than the 
satisfaction derived by the rapist from his act.  A simple damages remedy would therefore be 
inadequate.38 
Regulatory offences are usually ‘conditionally deterred’, since the underlying activity 
from which the offence originates is beneficial to society.  Economists are concerned that 
excessive sanction will lead to ‘overdeterrence’ of activities that society does not wish to 
prohibit entirely.  Looked at from a slightly different perspective, it is possible to view 
this as distinguishing between activities that society wishes to price as opposed to those 
that it wishes to prohibit or sanction.39 
Economists tend to ignore the moral component of criminal law (the societal attitude 
towards criminal law discussed above) and see the only difference between civil and 
                                                          
38  Richard A Posner Economic Analysis of Law (1972) at 357-8. This passage does not appear in later 
editions. 
39  Robert Cooter ‘Prices and sanctions’ (1984) 84 Columbia LR 1523. 
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criminal sanctions as being incarceration.  As Cohen says, ‘a dollar fine costs the firm 
one dollar whether it is called a “cleanup cost”, “restitution”, “civil penalty” or “criminal 
fine”’.40  For economists, then, if incarceration is not justified, non-criminal modes of 
enforcement are preferable, given that there are several costs to criminal sanctions that 
are not incurred by alternative means.  In addition, care should be taken that the 
consequences (whether civil or criminal) of conditionally deterred activities (which 
would cover most environmental offences) are not set at levels that would tend to 
overdeter.41 
It has been argued that retribution and deterrence are both relevant to differing degrees 
in justifying enforcement of environmental laws through criminal sanctions, in part 
depending on the nature and seriousness of the particular offence.  What about the 
educative or expressive function of criminal law?  In South Africa, this function of 
criminal law in the environmental context is not likely to justify criminalization of 
offences that would not also be justified by arguments of retribution or deterrence.  
Where it does have a role to play, it is submitted, is in creating more uniformity in public 
attitudes towards environmental crimes.  Certain crimes, which would be regarded in 
other countries as very serious, would, for various reasons, probably only be regarded as 
serious by certain sectors of South African society today. By visiting criminal sanctions 
on serious environmental offences (as justified also by arguments of retribution and 
deterrence), public attitudes could be shaped in such a way that people who would not at 
the moment regard such offences as serious might change their viewpoint.  
Recognising that criminal law also has an expressive function will probably not have a 
significant effect on the practical approach to criminalisation that is chosen.  The reason 
for this is that the educative role of the criminal law operates in a similar fashion to the 
deterrent effect.  The imposition of small penalties for minor offences is not going to 
serve either purpose.  Smith expresses this point aptly when she states, 
‘Criminal prosecutions can have a profound educative or preference-shaping effect - reinforcing 
public values that equate deliberate environmental offences with serious offences against persons - 
and thus creating a corporate and public environmental ethic that promotes voluntary compliance.  
                                                          
40  Cohen op cit at 1066. 
41  See Cohen op cit at 1102. 
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Criminal prosecutions accomplish these tasks in the United States for one reason: corporate 
managers and directors who do not ensure environmental compliance by their organisations can be 
placed in a federal penitentiary for two or more years’. 42 
The expressive justification for criminal law, then, does not take us any further than 
the deterrence justification does in the South African context.  If deterrence can be 
provided by means other than the criminal sanction, should these alternative means not be 
utilised?  It will be shown later that there are significant shortcomings associated with use 
of the criminal law, which suggests that, if the sole purpose of enforcement is deterrence, 
the replacement of criminal sanctions with other enforcement mechanisms is advisable. 
There is significant support among criminal law theorists for movement away from 
reliance on criminal sanctions in the case of regulatory-type offences, particularly those 
where the harm involved is relatively insignificant.43  This is not to say that there is no 
role for the criminal law – criminal sanctions will be important at least in those cases 
where there are serious or repeat contraventions of the law or other aggravating factors.44  
This issue will be canvassed more fully in Chapter 8.  Before continuing with the 
analytical aspects of this thesis, however, we now turn to examination of the current 
position in South Africa.  Chapter 3 considers the constitutional framework within which 
criminal law and procedure operates in South Africa.  This will help to inform the 
analysis in Chapter 4 of the criminal provisions in South Africa’s environmental 
legislation. 
 
                                                          
42 Smith op cit at 12-13. 
43  Frase op cit at 446; Ashworth op cit at 51; Findlay et al at op cit at 6; Brickey op cit at 511.  See also J 
Rowan-Robinson and P Watchman Crime and Regulation (1990). 
44  See Frase op cit at 447. 
Chapter 3  
 
Criminal law and the Constitution 
 
Before the introduction of the new Constitutional dispensation, the ruling constitutional 
doctrine was one of parliamentary sovereignty.  Consequently, the legislature, in 
attempting to avoid undue difficulty in securing the conviction of accused persons, often 
relied on various presumptions in order to require the accused to disprove something 
rather than to put the state to the burden of proving the same element of the defence.  As 
will be shown in the next Chapter, South African environmental legislation is riddled 
with such devices. 
The new Constitution,1 however, entrenches in the Bill of Rights various accused 
persons’ rights, which place these presumptions on very shaky ground.  This Chapter 
examines in detail the Constitutional requirements relating to accused persons, 
particularly in respect of legislative presumptions but also in respect of other aspects that 
may affect the criminal enforcement of environmental law.  Essentially the central 
question that needs answering in this Chapter is whether the provisions in environmental 
legislation that relate to the criminal prosecution of offenders conform with the 
Constitution or not.  This Chapter considers the issues in general.  Chapter 5 consists of 
an analysis of South African environmental legislation in which the constitutionality of 
the specific legislation in question will be one of the considerations raised. 
 
1 The Bill of Rights 
 
The two sections in the Bill of Rights around which the discussion in this Chapter will 
turn are sections 35 and 36.  They read as follows: 
 
Arrested, detained and accused persons  
35. (1) Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right   
                                                 
1  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
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a. to remain silent;  
b. to be informed promptly   
i. of the right to remain silent; and  
ii. of the consequences of not remaining silent;  
c. not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence against that 
person;  
d. to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible, but not later than   
i. 48 hours after the arrest; or  
ii. the end of the first court day after the expiry of the 48 hours, if the 48 hours expire outside 
ordinary court hours or on a day which is not an ordinary court day;  
e. at the first court appearance after being arrested, to be charged or to be informed of the reason for 
the detention to continue, or to be released; and  
f. to be released from detention if the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions.  
(2) Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right   
a. to be informed promptly of the reason for being detained;  
b. to choose, and to consult with, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
c. to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the state and at state expense, if 
substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
d. to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, 
to be released;  
e. to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the 
provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical 
treatment; and  
f. to communicate with, and be visited by, that person's   
i. spouse or partner;  
ii. next of kin;  
iii. chosen religious counsellor; and  
iv. chosen medical practitioner.  
(3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right   
a. to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it;  
b. to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence;  
c. to a public trial before an ordinary court;  
d. to have their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay;  
e. to be present when being tried;  
f. to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
g. to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state and at state expense, if 
substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly;  
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h. to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings;  
i. to adduce and challenge evidence;  
j. not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence;  
k. to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the 
proceedings interpreted in that language;  
l. not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or 
international law at the time it was committed or omitted;  
m. not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously 
been either acquitted or convicted;  
n. to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed punishment for the 
offence has been changed between the time that the offence was committed and the time of 
sentencing; and  
o. of appeal to, or review by, a higher court.  
(4) Whenever this section requires information to be given to a person, that information must be given in a 
language that the person understands.  
(5) Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the 
admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of 
justice.  
 
Limitation of rights  
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including   
a. the nature of the right;  
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c. the nature and extent of the limitation;  
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any 
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
 
According to de Waal et al,2 there are four main ways in which the Bill of Rights impacts 
on the criminal justice system: 
                                                 
2  Johan de Waal, Iain Currie & Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 4 ed (2001) at 585. 
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1.  The circumstances under which a person may be punished.  For example, punishing 
sodomy offends against the right to equality since it discriminates unfairly on the basis 
of sexual orientation.3 
2.  Certain rights like privacy, dignity and freedom place limits on how crime may be 
investigated. 
3.  Section 35, dealing with the rights of accused and detained persons, address the 
fairness of the criminal trial and the procedure followed in the trial. 
4.  The right not to be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
affect the sentencing options available to criminal courts. 
 Of these 4, the first and fourth are of little if any relevance to environmental crime.  The 
issues relating to investigation of crime are universally applicable, but  are unlikely to 
have a significant impact on the constitutionality of existing environmental legislative 
provisions.  The third point, however, is very significant.  As pointed out in the 
introduction to this Chapter, there are many presumptions in environmental legislation 
that may fall foul of section 35.  This will form a major part of the examination in this 
Chapter. 
 
2 The constitutionality of legislation 
 
Since the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, any law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid.4  If it is alleged that a particular enactment is 
unconstitutional (and therefore invalid), the Court will follow a two-part inquiry: first, 
does the provision under scrutiny infringe the Bill of Rights?  If so, the Court must 
consider the second question – is the infringement nevertheless permissible in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution, the so-called limitations clause.  The applicant bears the 
onus of establishing the first question and, if successful, the state (or whoever is relying 
                                                 
3  Section 9(3). 
4  Section 2. 
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on the legislation) must then satisfy the limitations test.  The process is well described by 
Ackermann J in Ferreira v Levin NO:5 
The task of determining whether the provisions of [an] Act are invalid because they are inconsistent 
with the [Bill of Rights] involves two stages, first, an enquiry as to whether there has been an 
infringement of the … right; if so, a further enquiry as to whether such infringement is justified 
under … the limitation clause.  The task of interpreting the … rights rests, of course, with the 
Courts, but it is for the applicants to prove the facts upon which they rely for the claim of 
infringement of the particular right in question.  Concerning the second stage, [it] is for the 
legislature or the party relying on the legislation to establish this justification, and not for the party 
challenging it, to show that it was not justified. 
Whether individual provisions in environmental legislation are infringements of the 
Constitution will be considered in Chapter 5.   This will necessarily have to be carried out 
on a provision-by-provision basis.  The rights which are most likely to be infringed by 
environmental legislation, particularly section 35, and the manner in which they have 
been interpreted by the Courts, will be examined in further detail later in this Chapter. 
As far as the limitation enquiry is concerned, however, the approach that the Courts 




The reason why there is a limitation enquiry is that not all infringements of rights in the 
Bill of Rights are unconstitutional.  If an infringement can be justified in terms of section 
36, the provision will pass constitutional muster.  It must be borne in mind, however, that 
section 36 (the limitations clause) sets down quite stringent requirements that have to be 
satisfied for an infringement to be seen as a justified limitation of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.  These requirements will now be considered in further detail. 
According to section 36(1), the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.  There are two elements to this test – the first is that it must be a law of general 
                                                 
5  1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at para 44. 
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application, the second that it must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
 
3.1 Law of general application 
 
The Courts have not laid down a definitive interpretation of what a ‘law of general 
application’ is.  Based on certain judicial dicta, de Waal et al suggest that this 
requirement is not a ‘particularly exacting’ requirement,6 but that it merely requires the 
following: 
‘Besides a requirement that the rule has the character of law, that it derives from a source with 
lawful authority to issue the rule, and a formal requirement that the law is clear, accessible and 
precise, the rule must also apply generally in the sense of not being unequal or arbitrary in its 
application’.7 
This approach does not make it clear whether an administrative act qualifies as ‘law of 
general application’, but the case of Premier of Mpumalanga v Executive Committee of 
the Association of Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal8suggests 
that administrative action that is not legislative in character cannot qualify as law of 
general application.  It may also indicate that departmental guidelines or directives lack 
the generality sufficient to pass the test.9 
As far as environmental legislation is concerned, where there may be some scope for 
dispute in the light of this requirement is in respect of permit or licence conditions.  In 
some areas of environmental law, significant regulation of activities is exercised by 
means of conditions in authorisations.  For example, the manner in which the operator of 
a waste disposal site carries on the operations of the site is prescribed by the permit 
issued by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry in terms of section 20 of the 
Environment Conservation Act.10  The Act itself merely prohibits the operation of a 
                                                 
6  De Waal et al op cit at 151. 
7  De Waal et al op cit at 152. 
8  1999 (2) SA 91 (CC). 
9  See de Waal et al at 153-4; Stuart Woolman ‘Limitation’ in M Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (1999 update) at 12-29. 
10  Act 73 of 1989. 
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disposal site without the necessary permit.  Would the conditions in such a permit qualify 
as law of general application? 
It is submitted that they would – the permit conditions have the character of law since 
the legislation under which the permit is issued usually requires compliance with the 
conditions, and the formal requirements are likely to be satisfied in that the conditions are 
made known to the affected individuals. Provided that the conditions are not unequal in 
application or arbitrary, it would appear that they would satisfy this requirement.  In any 
event, the question is somewhat academic in that the permit conditions would be unlikely 
to contain anything that infringed the Constitution – this would be more likely to be in the 
principal Act itself. 
 
3.2 Reasonableness and justifiability in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom 
 
Section 36 sets out certain ‘relevant factors’ to be taken into account in determining this 
leg of the limitation enquiry.  This list is not exhaustive.  The factors are: 
a. the nature of the right;  
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c. the nature and extent of the limitation;  
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
These factors correspond with the considerations expressed by the Constitutional Court in 
S v Makwnayane,11 which decided the matter on the basis of the interim Constitution, 
where the Court suggested that the limitation test should involve the question of 
proportionality.12  This test has been summarised as follows in a later decision: 
‘In sum, therefore, the Court places the purpose, effects and importance of the infringing legislation 
on one side of the scales and the nature and effect of the infringement caused by the legislation on 
                                                 
11  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 
12  See para 104. 
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the other.  The more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds 
of justification must be’.13 
The five factors listed in section 36 are all factors which must be considered in order 
to perform this balancing act.  Each is now considered in turn: 
 
(a) the nature of the right. 
 
The first consideration concerns the right that is being infringed.  This factor indicates 
that some rights weigh more than others.  If the right being infringed is one of the 
‘weightier’ rights, this will require a more substantial justification for its infringement 
than would be the case with another right.14  For example, in Makwanyane, the 
Constitutional Court expressed the view that ‘rights to life and dignity are the most 
important of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights’.15   
 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation 
 
The operation of this factor is well described by de Waal et al as follows: 
‘At a minimum, reasonableness requires the limitation of a right to serve some purpose.  
Justifiability requires that purpose to be one that is worthwhile and important in a constitutional 
democracy.  A limitation of rights that serves a purpose that does not contribute to an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom cannot therefore be justifiable’.16  
According to Woolman, if the purpose of the limitation cannot justify the infringement of 
the right in question, that resolves the limitation enquiry against the limitation. It will not 
be necessary to consider the other factors.17 Purposes that the Constitutional Court has 
held to be justifiable include the protection of the administration of justice;18 the general 
                                                 
13  S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) at para 18. 
14  See Woolman op cit at 12-48 – 12-49. 
15  S v Makwanyane (supra) at para 144. 
16  De Waal et al op cit at 158. 
17  Woolman op cit at 12-49. 
18  For example, Shabalala v Attorney-General (Transvaal) 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC).  See de Waal et al 158-
9. 
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prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of crime;19 and the upholding of the 
provisions of the Constitution.20  These purposes are all potentially relevant to 
environmental legislation. 
 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation 
 
This factor is relatively self-explanatory: a serious infringement of a right requires more 
justification than a relatively minor one.  Any infringement of rights ought not to be more 
extensive than is justified by the objective that the limitation seeks to achieve. 
 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose 
 
A limitation must have a rational connection to its purpose.  If a law does not serve, or 
only partially serves, the purpose that it is stated to have, then it will not justify a 
limitation of rights.  For example, in Makwanyane, one of the main objectives of the 
death penalty, the constitutionality of which was being challenged in this case, was 
argued to be general deterrence.  Since it was not possible for the defenders of the death 
penalty to indicate a connection between the death penalty and general deterrence, the 
Court was not satisfied that there was adequate relation between the limitation on the 
right to life (amongst others) and the purpose of the death penalty.21 
 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
 
This factor pursues the proportionality theme.  If less restrictive means – that is, means 
that either do not infringe the right or infringe it to a lesser extent - will be as effective as 
the limitation, then the limitation will not be justified. 
 
                                                 
19  For example, S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC).  See de Waal et al at 159. 
20  For example, South African National Defence Force Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 
(CC).  See de Waal et al at 159. 
21  S v Makwanyane (supra) at para 184. 
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4  Rights of arrested, detained and accused persons 
 
The rights set out in section 35 of the Constitution may impact on environmental 
legislation’s criminal enforcement provisions in the following areas:22 
1. the gathering of evidence through search and seizure; 
2. statutory presumptions infringing the right to be presumed innocent, to remain silent 
and not to testify; 
3. the right to challenge evidence in cases where scientific evidence may be adduced by 
means of affidavit or certificate; and 
4. the right against self-incrimination. 
Each of these will be examined in turn. 
 
4.1 The gathering of evidence through search and seizure 
 
Several environmental offences require for their proof either the search of the alleged 
perpetrator’s person, vehicle, buildings or land, or the seizure of certain items, or both.  
For example, the capture of certain species of fauna is prohibited under several 
enactments.  If a person is suspected of having captured such species, it may be necessary 
to search that person’s premises to establish if she has specimens in her possession.  If so, 
the authorities would probably need to seize the specimens in question as evidence for a 
possible trial.  Such search and seizure, however, must conform to the requirements of the 
Constitution. 
It is not only section 35 that is relevant to search and seizure – section 35(5) provides 
that evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be 
excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be 
detrimental to the administration of justice – but also the right to privacy in section 14: 
Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have   
                                                 
22  This is not to say that the other requirements of section 35 (for example, the right to legal representation 
and the right to be informed of this right) are not relevant in the prosecution of environmental offences.  
The four areas identified for further examination may possibly be infringed by current environmental 
legislative provisions and it is for this reason that they have been singled out. 
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a. their person or home searched;  
b. their property searched;  
c. their possessions seized; or  
d. the privacy of their communications infringed.  
Search and seizure would in most cases infringe section 14, depending on the meaning of 
‘property’ and ‘possessions’.  Search and seizure would, therefore, need to satisfy the 
limitations clause.23  The general rule for legitimate search and seizure is that they must 
be conducted in terms of legislating clearly empowering the right to search and seize, and 
they must be aimed at achieving ‘compelling public objectives’.24  They must also, as a 
rule, be authorised by a warrant issued by an independent authority, who must be 
persuaded by evidence under oath that there are reasonable grounds for conducting the 
search.25 
In providing for search and seizure, the empowering legislation must clearly identify 
the purpose of the search and seizure and provide lucid guidelines identifying the 
parameters of the powers.  Wide, discretionary powers to search and seize were struck 
down in the case of Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa.26  This 
does not mean that the functionaries have no discretion – the paramount factor is that the 
purpose of the statute is clearly identified, in which case certain discretionary powers 
may be countenanced.27 
In Park-Ross v Director, Office for Serious Economic Offences,28 the Cape High Court 
laid down criteria for reasonable searches and seizures in the investigation of a criminal 
offence: 
1. The power to authorise a search and seizure should be given to an impartial and independent 
[judicial authority] who is bound to act judicially in discharging that function. 
                                                 
23  Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 2000 (10) BCLR 
1079 (CC) at para 20. 
24  De Waal et al op cit at 277. 
25  South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2000 (10) BCLR 1131 (T) at 1165A. 
26  1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC).   
27  De Waal et al op cit at 278. 
28  1995 (2) SA 148 (C). 
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2. The evidence must satisfy the [judicial authority] that the person seeking the authority has 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed. 
3. The evidence must satisfy the judicial authority that the person seeking the authority has 
reasonable grounds to believe, at common law, … that something that will afford evidence of an 
offence may be recovered. 
4. There must be evidence on oath before [the judicial authority].29 
Warrants are not always necessary.  There are two situations where their absence may be 
legitimate.  First, in a situation where a warrant would have been issued had application 
been made, but where the object of the search or seizure would be frustrated by a delay, a 
warrant is not necessary.  Provision for this is often made in legislation.30  Second, the 
exercise of periodic regulatory inspections of business premises in order to enforce so-
called public welfare laws, of which environmental laws are a prime example, do not 
require warrants.31 
  As far as the requirement for reasonable grounds for conducting the search is 
concerned, if there is a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed, this 
would satisfy the requirement.32  The Constitutional Court has said that not all searches 
are subject to the requirement that there be a reasonable suspicion of an offence having 
been committed.33 Ultimately, however, the criterion of reasonableness is the determining 
factor. 
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs relates to the constitutionality of search 
and seizure provisions.  A second important consideration is whether evidence gleaned 
from search and seizure operations has been lawfully gathered and whether such evidence 
is admissible.  Section 35(5) of the Constitution is important in this situation – it requires 
that the court must exclude evidence obtained in a manner which violates a right in the 
Bill of Rights if the admission of the evidence would render the trail unfair or otherwise 
be detrimental to the administration of justice.  If the search is lawful (empowered by 
legislation and carried out with the necessary warrant), there will be no problem with the 
                                                 
29  At 170A-C, citing Hunter v Southam Inc (1985) 14 CCC (3d) 97 SCC. 
30  For example, s 21(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
 31  De Waal et al op cit at 281. 
32  Hyundai (supra) at para 28. 
33  Ibid. 
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admissibility of the evidence so gathered.  If, however, the search is unlawful, then the 
question of whether the right to privacy has been infringed becomes critical.  Not every 
search and seizure will infringe the right to privacy – the test is whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the searched area and the seized item.34  
This expectation exists for the person and the home, but is not necessarily present for 
other possessions.  For example, as far as motor vehicles are concerned, it has been 
suggested that ‘the licensing requirement and the extensive regulation of vehicles result 
in a significantly reduced expectation of privacy’.35  Even if there is an infringement f the 
right to privacy, however, evidence gathered as a result of such infringement will only be 
excluded if admission of the evidence would render the trail unfair or otherwise be 
detrimental to the administration of justice. 
There have been cases where the Courts have decided that there was an infringement 
of the right to privacy but that nevertheless the evidence so gathered was not 
inadmissible, because of the particular circumstances of the case.  In S v Madiba,36 Hurt J 
interpreted section 35(5) as follows: 
A trial in which a judge is bound by the absence of any discretion to close the door on evidence on 
the basis that it was procured in circumstances constituting a relatively unimportant infringement of 
a fundamental right may plainly be as unfair in a trial in which he admits evidence procured in 
deliberate disregard of an important right, it seems to me that the section was plainly aimed at 
imposing a duty on the court, in the course of a trial, to make a decision which is fair to both sides 
and not aimed only at considerations of fairness or advantage to the accused.37 
In the circumstances, the Court decided that ‘the extent of the infringement of the right to 
privacy was such as to pale into insignificance compared with the importance of 
achievement of the object which the police had in the course of their duties’.38 
                                                 
34  De Waal et al op cit at 283. 
35  Nico Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1999) at 101. 
36  1998 (1) BCLR 38 (D). 
37  At 44G-H. 
38  At 45D. 
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4.2 Statutory presumptions infringing the right to be presumed innocent, to remain 
silent and not to testify 
 
Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right to be presumed 
innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings.39  These rights may 
be infringed by statutory presumptions that require the court to presume the existence of a 
certain fact if another fact is proved.  Often, such presumptions cast the onus of 
disproving the presumed fact upon the accused – so-called ‘reverse onus’ provisions.  
There are certain clear principles that have been laid down by court decisions dealing 
with such presumptions, but, at the same time, an unambiguous general approach to 
presumptions has not been forthcoming.  In order to draw the general conclusions that are 
possible, it is necessary to examine the jurisprudence.  This will be done chronologically. 
The first of the cases to deal with the constitutionality of presumptions was S v Zuma 
and others,40 a ‘sound and elegantly reasoned decision’.41  Under challenge in this case 
was section 217(b)(2), which provided that a confession would be presumed to have been 
made freely and voluntarily unless the contrary was proved.  This is a good example of a 
reverse-onus provision, or one ‘where the presumed fact must be disproved on a balance 
of probabilities instead of by the mere raising of evidence to the contrary’42: the onus is 
on the accused to show that the confession was not freely and voluntarily made. 
The unanimous judgment of the Court was delivered by Kentridge AJ, who considered 
the ‘rational connection’ test used in the United States43 and decided that it was a ‘useful 
                                                 
39  Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. 
40 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
41  David Zeffertt ‘Law of Evidence’ (1995) Annual Survey of South African Law at 665. 
42  R v Downey (1992) 90 DLR (4th) 449 at 456. 
43  In Tot v The United States 319 US 463 (1943), the Supreme Court decided that the test for presumptions 
would be ‘rational connection between the facts proved and the fact presumed. . . .  But where the inference 
is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them it is not 
competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the procedure of the courts’ (at 467-8).  Later, 
in Leary v United States 395 US 6 (1969), the Court stated: ‘a criminal statutory presumption must be 
regarded as “irrational” or “arbitrary” and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with 
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screening test, but not a conclusive one’.44  Instead, Kentridge AJ preferred the approach 
of the Canadian Supreme Court, because of the Court’s ‘persuasive reasoning’ and the 
similarity of the limitations clauses of the two countries’ constitutions,45 and he 
accordingly adopted the reasoning of the Canadian Court in Downey,46 where the court 
per Cory J set out the principles applicable to reverse-onus provisions.  The two 
principles in particular held by Kentridge AJ to be applicable47 are: 
‘I. The presumption of innocence is infringed whenever the accused is liable to be convicted despite 
the existence of a reasonable doubt. 
II. If by the provisions of a statutory presumption, an accused is required to establish, that is to say 
to prove or disprove, on a balance of probabilities either an element of an offence or an excuse, then 
it contravenes [the Constitutional presumption of innocence].  Such a provision would permit a 
conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt.48 
The Court held in casu that the practical effect of the presumption was that the accused 
may be required to prove a fact on the balance of probabilities in order to avoid 
conviction.49 In other words, there could be a conviction despite the existence of 
reasonable doubt.  This amounted to an infringement of the right to be presumed 
innocent.  The provision was also not saved by the limitations clause, since the objectives 
behind the presumption were not compelling.  According to Kentridge AJ, ‘the argument 
from convenience would only have merit in situations where accused persons plainly 
have more convenient access to proof, and where the reversed burden does not create 
undue hardship or unfairness’,50 which was not the case here. 
The Court also stresses that it is just this presumption that is declared invalid by this 
judgment: 
                                                                                                                                                 
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it 
is made to depend’ (at 36). 
44  At para [21]. 
45  Ibid. 
46  (Supra). 
47  At para [35]. 
48  Downey (supra) at 461. 
49  At para [27]. 
50  At para [38]. 
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It is important, I believe, to emphasise what this judgment does not decide.  It does not decide that 
all statutory provisions which create presumptions in criminal cases are invalid.  This Court 
recognises the pressing social need for the effective prosecution of crime, and that in some cases the 
prosecution may require reasonable presumptions to assist it in this task.  Presumptions are of 
different types.  Some are no more than evidential presumptions, which give certain prosecution 
evidence the status of prima facie proof, requiring the accused to do no more than produce credible 
evidence which casts doubt on the prima facie proof. …This judgment does not relate to such 
presumptions.  Nor does it seek to invalidate every legal presumption reversing the onus of proof.  
Some may  be justifiable as being rational in themselves, requiring an accused person to prove only 
facts to which he or she has easy access, and which it would be unreasonable to expect the 
prosecution to disprove. Or there may be presumptions which are necessary if certain offences are to 
be effectively prosecuted, and the State is able to show that for good reason it cannot be expected to 
produce the evidence itself. This is not such a case.  Nor does this judgment deal with statutory 
provisions which are in form presumptions but which in effect create new offences.51 
The next decision by the Constitutional Court was in S v Bhulwana.52  The 
presumption under attack in this case, in the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act53 was to the 
effect that, if in the prosecution of any person for an offence relating to dealing in certain 
substances, including dagga, it is proved that the accused  was found in possession of 
dagga exceeding 115 grams; it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the 
accused dealt in such dagga.  Having decided that the provision in question imposed a 
reverse onus, and not an evidential burden, the Court (per O’Regan J), decided that the 
provision did infringe the presumption of innocence and was not rescued by the 
limitations clause.  The Court decided that it was not possible to ‘read down’ the 
presumption as an evidential burden.  In this regard, O’Regan J stated that it was not 
necessary for the Court to decide on the proposition that the imposition of an evidential 
burden upon the accused would give rise to no constitutional complaint.54 
                                                 
51  At para [41]. 
52  S v Bhulwana, S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) sa 388 (CC).  
53  Act 140 of 1992.  Section 21(1)(a)(i). 
54  At para [29]. 
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This decision was followed in S v Julies,55 where the slight difference was that the 
case concerned possession of mandrax and not dagga.  The Court did not lay down any 
further applicable principles. 
In S v Mbatha,56 the constitutionality of section 40(1) of the Arms and Ammunition 
Act57 was considered.  This section provides: 
‘Whenever in any prosecution for being in possession of any article contrary to the provisions of this 
Act, it is proved that such article has at any time been on or in any premises, including any building, 
dwelling, flat, room, office, shop, structure, vessel, aircraft or vehicle or any part thereof, any person 
who at that time was on or in or in charge of or present at or occupying such premises, shall be 
presumed to have been in possession of that article at that time, until the contrary is proved’. 
Following the approach used in earlier cases involving presumptions, discussed above, 
the Court held, not surprisingly, that the provision infringed the right to be presumed 
innocent.  As far as the limitation test was concerned, the Court was sympathetic to the 
seriousness of the problem of control of firearms in the country, but felt that, on balance, 
the provision did not satisfy the limitations test.  The Court, per Langa J, held that there 
was no logical or rational connection between the facts proved and the presumed facts,58 
and that it was possible for the objectives of the legislation to be met by means less 
invasive of an accused person’s rights – an evidentiary burden, for example.59 
In S v Ntsele,60 the Constitutional Court followed a similar approach to find invalid a 
presumption in the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act61 to the effect that a person in charge 
of lands on which dagga plants were found was presumed to be dealing in those plants, 
confirming a decision to this effect by the Natal High Court. 
This approach was continued in Scagell v Attorney-General of the Western Cape.62  
The impugned provisions in this case were in section 6 of the Gambling Act.63  The 
                                                 
55  (1996) 4 SA 313 (CC). 
56  S v Mbatha, S v Prinsloo 1996 (2) SA 464 (CC). 
57  Act 75 of 1969. 
58  At para [21]. 
59  At para [26]. 
60  1997 (11) BCLR 1543 (CC). 
61  140 of 1992. 
62  1997 (2) SA 368 (CC). 
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provisions in question, as well as the principal offence created by subsection (1), read as 
follows: 
‘(1) Subject to the provisions of ss (2), no person shall permit the playing of any gambling game 
at any place under his control or in his charge and no person shall play any such game at any place 
or visit any place with the object of playing any such game. 
(3) When any playing-cards, dice, balls, counters, tables, equipment, gambling  devices or other 
instruments or requisites used or capable of being used for playing any gambling game are found at 
any place or on the person of anyone found at any place, it shall be prima facie evidence in any 
prosecution for a contravention of ss (1) that the person in control or in charge of such place 
permitted the playing of such game at such place and that any person found at such place was 
playing such game at such place and was visiting such place  with the object of playing such game. 
(4) If any policeman authorised to enter any place is wilfully prevented from or obstructed or 
delayed in entering such place, the person in control or in charge of such place shall on being 
charged with permitting the playing of any gambling game, be presumed, until the contrary is 
proved, to have permitted the playing of such gambling game at such place.   
(5) Upon proof at the trial of any person charged with contravention of ss (1), that any gambling 
game was played or intended to be played, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that 
such game was played or intended to be played for stakes. 
(6) Any person supervising or directing or assisting at or acting as banker, dealer, croupier or in any 
like capacity at the playing of any gambling game at any place and any person acting as porter, 
doorkeeper or servant or holding any other office at any place where any gambling game is played, 
shall be deemed to be in control or in charge of such place. 
The Court held that subsection (4) infringed the presumption of innocence and, given the 
absence of any compelling evidence as to how it assisted the police in investigating such 
offences, was not saved by the limitations clause. 
Subsection (3) casts an evidentiary burden, and this presented the fist opportunity for 
the Constitutional Court to consider the validity of such a provision.  This operates in 
such a way as to require the accused person to raise ‘evidence sufficient to give rise to a 
reasonable doubt to prevent conviction’.64  O’Regan J stated that section 6(3) ‘does not 
give rise to the possibility that an accused person may be convicted despite the existence 
of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt’.65  The sweeping nature of section 6(3), which 
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could have the effect of persons being charged with an offence and ‘put on their defence 
merely upon proof of a fact [for example, possession of a pack of cards] which itself is 
not suggestive of any criminal behaviour’,66 was held to be in breach of the right to a fair 
trial.  As Schwikkard points out, the effect of this decision is that the subsection was 
declared invalid because it could lead to a person being convicted despite the existence of 
reasonable doubt, which contradicts the judge’s comments about evidentiary burdens in 
general made earlier.67 
An evidentiary burden may well, however, infringe the presumption of innocence by 
relieving the prosecution of its duty to prove all the elements of the offence charged.   
This, as well as the possibility of conviction in the presence of reasonable doubt, could 
both be constitutional shortcomings of evidentiary burdens.  However, the fact that an 
evidentiary burden is less of an infringement of the presumption of innocence than a full 
reverse onus is could be an important factor in ascertaining whether the infringement met 
the requirements of the limitations clause.68 
As for section 6(5), the subsection appears to be tautologous.  The presumption would 
only arise once the fact that is presumed (the presence of a stake) has already been 
proved, which means that there is no danger that a person could be convicted on the basis 
of the subsection despite the existence of a reasonable doubt.  As the Court points out, 
‘the fact that s 6(5) appears to be ineffective does not automatically give rise to 
constitutional complaint’. 
Finally, subsection (6) was also found not to infringe the Constitution.  The Court 
found that the word ‘deemed’ indicated that the presumption was irrebuttable, but that the 
subsection had the effect of a definition, and did not relieve the prosecution of proving all 
the elements of the offence.69   
                                                 
66  At para [16]. 
67  PJ Schwikkard Presumption of Innocence (1999) at 117. 
68  See Schwikkard op cit at 131. 
69  At para [30]. 
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The united front presented by the Constitutional Court in presumption cases up until 
this stage began to crumble in S v Coetzee.70  Two sections in the Criminal Procedure 
Act71 were under scrutiny: sections 245 and 332(5).  They read as follows: 
245: If at criminal proceedings at which an accused is charged with an offence of which a false 
representation is an element, it is proved that the false representation was made by the accused, he 
shall be deemed, unless the contrary is proved, to have made such representation knowing it to be 
false. 
332(5): When an offence has been committed, whether by the performance of any act or by the 
failure to perform any act, for which any corporate body is or was liable to prosecution, any person 
who was, at the time of the commission of the offence, a director or servant of the corporate body 
shall be deemed to be guilty of the said offence, unless it is proved that he did not take part in the 
commission of the offence and that he could not have prevented it, and shall be liable to prosecution 
therefor, either jointly with the corporate body or apart therefrom, and shall on conviction be 
personally liable to punishment therefor. 
The Court unanimously decided that section 245 was unconstitutional, following the 
same line of reasoning adopted in earlier cases.  They were also ad idem that the 
presumption relating to ‘servants’ in section 332(5) was invalid as well.  That, however, 
is where the consensus ended. 
The majority of the Court held that section 332(5) failed constitutional muster, but this 
result came via several different routes.  Langa J found that ‘whether s 332(5) creates a 
form of statutory liability, with a shift in onus in respect of a part thereof or a new crime 
with a special defence, the proof of which rests on the defence, the final effect is the 
same’: a breach of the presumption of innocence.72  He also decided that it was not saved 
by the limitations clause, the Court not being convinced as to the possibility of achieving 
the objective of the legislation by other means.  He found that it was not possible to sever 
words from the subsection to render it valid, which was an approach adopted by some of 
the other judges. 
Mahomed DP, Kriegler J concurring, held that the subsection was a breach of the 
presumption of innocence, since ‘if at the end of the case the court has a reasonable doubt 
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as to whether or not the accused took part in the commission of the offence by the 
corporate body, or a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the accused could have 
prevented the commission of that offence, the court would nevertheless be required to 
convict such an accused’.73  The learned judge continues to find that the wide ambit of 
the subsection fails to save it under the limitations clause.  Consequently, he decided that 
it was unnecessary to decide whether the subsection infringed the right to freedom in 
section 11 of the interim Constitution, in respect of its possible interpretation (as per 
Kentridge AJ’s judgment) as a strict liability clause. 
Didcott J, in a separate judgment, concurs with the decisions of Langa J and Mahomed 
DP.  Sachs J, also in a separate judgment, essentially concurs with Langa J but he takes 
the analysis somewhat further. 
Kentridge J’s is the first judgment that disagrees with the majority.  He views s 332(5) 
as creating a form of vicarious liability which allows the accused to raise the defence of 
due diligence.  He suggests that, in the absence of the sub-phrase in the subsection 
beginning with the word ‘unless’, the section would impose a form of strict liability, 
which would not infringe the presumption of innocence or the accused’s right to silence, 
although it may infringe the right to freedom in section 11.74 
As far as this is concerned, Kentridge AJ concludes that section 322(5) is designed ‘to 
induce those who control corporate bodies to ensure that those bodies keep within the 
law’,75 and that 
A corporate body can act and thus commit criminal offences only through human agents, but the 
identity of those agents cannot always be ascertained. Moreover the agent through whom the 
criminal offence is committed may hold a lowly position. In view of the dominant role played by 
corporate bodies in modern society it seems to me to be a legitimate objective of government to 
ensure that the persons who control such bodies are not entirely immune from criminal liability for 
offences committed by servants of that body in furtherance of its objectives. An absolute liability for 
the crimes of the corporate body would be so extreme as to be regarded by reasonable persons as 
unfair or oppressive. But the subsection is not absolute. It provides a defence for the controllers of 
the corporate body which, as I have already pointed out, is considerably less burdensome than the 
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requirement of proof of due diligence referred to in the Canadian cases. I see nothing unfair in 
placing that limited burden upon the controllers of the corporate body. They are the ones who may 
be expected to be aware of the internal workings of the corporation. They are the ones in the best 
position to give evidence of their own lack of participation and knowledge. The prosecutor does not 
know what goes on in the boardroom; the director does. The provision ensures or attempts to ensure 
that a person in the position of director of a company will understand that he has responsibility for 
its conduct. The inducement to responsible corporate conduct is enhanced by placing personal 
criminal liability on the shoulders of those in control, subject to a burden of proof not unduly 
difficult for the innocent to discharge. The corporation itself can be punished only by a monetary 
penalty, a penalty which may not seriously affect those in control. 
He accordingly found that the section did not infringe the right to freedom in section 11. 
For essentially the same reason, Kentridge AJ held that, in the event he was mistaken 
as to his conclusions on the section’s infringement of the Bill of Rights, the section would 
nevertheless satisfy the limitations clause.  He held that the limitation effected by section 
332(5) was not only reasonable and justifiable but also necessary because 
any lesser burden of proof such as an evidential burden of proof would not achieve the legitimate 
aims of the legislation. It would be only too easy for an accused, for example by a bare denial, to 
raise some doubt whether he knew of the corporation's offence and could have prevented it. The 
burden of proof which would then revert to the prosecution would be in most cases well-nigh 
impossible to discharge.76    
Kentridge AJ concludes by indicating that the parts of the section that the majority of 
the Court find unconstitutional can be severed, but on this finding he is also in the 
minority.  O’Regan J, whose judgment is discussed below, also holds that severance can 
save the section, but severs different parts than does Kentridge AJ. 
Madala J agrees with Kentridge AJ that the section is not unconstitutional, but for 
different reasons.  He agrees with the majority that the section infringes the presumption 
of innocence, but holds that this limitation meets the requisite limitations test.  His 
reasons are the interest of the state in bringing corporate offenders to book, the director’s 
consent to the responsibilities inherent in that office, and the practical difficulties of proof 
and the high cost of enforcing regulatory mechanisms, which, in his decision, the 
subsection is designed to address.77 
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O’Regan J concurred with Langa J as to the section’s unconstitutionality, but held that 
severance of the infringing words could save the section.  She held that, on her 
interpretation of the section, which was influenced by the interpretation of the Appellate 
Division in S v Klopper,78 the section did not infringe section 11 (the right to freedom).  
In her words 
Imposing criminal liability upon a director who knows of the commission of an offence by the 
company and who is in a position to prevent the commission of that offence but does not do so is not 
in any sense egregious. Actual knowledge coupled with the ability to prevent the commission of the 
offence by a director who is in a position of control in the corporate body renders the failure to do so 
sufficiently culpable to warrant criminal liability.79 
However, she found that the section infringed the presumption of innocence because it 
could lead to an accused’s being found guilty despite the existence of a reasonable doubt 
as to his or her guilt.80  The lack of compelling reasons for this limitation led her also to 
conclude that the section was not saved by the limitations clause. 
Ackermann J and Mokgoro J concurred, both in separate judgments, with O’Regan J, 
save for her finding as to severability of the subsection, where Ackermann J disagreed 
with her. 
It is rather difficult to draw clear principles from this decision due to the Court’s 
marked lack of consensus, not necessarily on the overall findings, but on the manner in 
which the individual justices reached their conclusions.  What is clear is that, once again, 
the Court (or the majority, at least) struck down reverse onus provisions.  There was also 
general consensus that the effect of section 332(5) was that an accused could be 
convicted despite the existence of reasonable doubt.  Other noteworthy aspects of the 
various judgments are as follows. 
Although not all the judges followed this process, it is submitted that analysis of 
section 332(5) was best carried out by means of examining both its compliance with the 
right to freedom, and with the presumption of innocence.  In other words, the Court 
should examine the offence itself, and whether the offence is in compliance with the Bill 
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of Rights (the freedom question) and examine how the offence is prosecuted (the 
presumption of innocence question).  This approach would not be necessary in all cases, 
since in many circumstances it will be only the second question that is relevant. 
Several of the judges dealt with the question of whether the presumption in section 
332(5) was a qualification of or exemption from the main offence – thus constituting a 
defence, or whether it was a separate offence.  It is submitted that the best approach to 
this question is one which was adopted by O’Regan J, who held that it is irrelevant 
whether the presumption is part of a defence or part of the main offence, the crucial 
question is whether reliance on the presumption could lead to conviction despite 
reasonable doubt and/or relieve the prosecution of the duty of proving all the elements of 
the offence.81 
Another consideration that was raised by some of the judges in Coetzee was the 
distinction between regulatory offences and other offences.82  It was argued that the 
presumption was justifiable because it applied to regulatory offences.  In the 
circumstances, this was not a compelling argument.  It is submitted the fact that it is a 
regulatory offence in which a presumption such as the one in section 332(5) is used does 
not affect the question of whether the provision infringes the presumption of innocence, 
but it may well be an important factor in assessing whether it is a justifiable limitation.83  
It could well be argued that the use of such a presumption in a regulatory offence, where 
the stigma of prosecution is less and the penalty unlikely to be severe, coupled with the 
frequent difficulty of proving such offence, is justifiable in the circumstances. 
S v Meaker84is the first of the decisions under scrutiny here which was not decided by 
the Constitutional Court.  It is also the first that considers the question of constitutionality 
of a stature in the context of the 1996 Constitution rather than the interim 1994 
Constitution.  The significance of this difference lies in the limitations test.  There are 
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significant differences between the final and interim Constitutions in this regard.  They 
are: 
1.  Under the interim Constitution, a limitation to a right of arrested persons had, in 
addition to being reasonable and justifiable, also to be ‘necessary’.  This requirement is 
excluded in the 1996 Constitution. 
2.  Under the interim Constitution, no limitation could ‘negate the essential content of the 
right in question’.  This requirement has also been dropped. 
3.   Human dignity has been added to the basis of the society in which the limitation must 
be adjudged reasonable and justifiable. 
4.  The 1996 Constitution lists 5 factors which must be taken into account in determining 
whether the limitation passes the requisite test.85 
In Meaker, the presumption under attack was section 130 of the Road Traffic Act:86   
Where in any prosecution under the common law relating to the driving of a vehicle on a public 
road, or under this Act, it is material to prove who was the driver of the vehicle, it shall be 
presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such vehicle was driven by the owner thereof. 
Cameron J, following the line of Constitutional Court cases, decided that the provision 
did infringe the presumption of innocence.  When it came to the question of limitation, 
however, his approach was a novel one.  According to the Court, the following 
considerations, which may overlap, are relevant: 
1.  Is it in practice impossible or unduly burdensome for the State to discharge the onus of proving 
all the elements pertaining to the offence beyond reasonable doubt…?  Cases envisaged appear 
to include those where: 
1.1 the facts and circumstsances sought to be proved are peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
acused …; and 
1.2 the accused is required to prove only facts to which he or she has easy access, and which it is 
would be unreasonable to expect the prosecution to disprove … 
2. Is there a “logical connection” between the fact proved and the fact presumed … and is the 
presumed fact something which is more likely than not to arise from the basic facts proved …? 
… does application of the presumption entail such interference with “the ordinary process of 
inferential reasoning” as to create “a risk of a conviction despite a reasonable doubt as to guilt in 
the mind of the trier of fact”? 
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3. Does the application of the common-law rule relating to the State’s onus cause substantial harm 
to the administration of justice…?  Cases envisaged appear to include those where the 
presumption is necessary if the offence is to be effectively prosecuted, and the State shows that 
for good reason it cannot be expected to produce the evidence itself… 
4.  Generally, is the presumption in its terms cast to serve only the social need it purports to address, 
or is it disproportionate in its impact…?  Specifically, having regard to its terms and ambit, what 
is the extent of the danger that innocent people may be convicted…? 
5.  Could the State adequately achieve its legitimate ends by means which would not be inconsistent 
with the Constitution in general and the presumption of innocence in particular…?87 
Taking these considerations into account, the Court decided that  
‘section 130 pursues the conviction of road traffic offenders by means of a presumption that 
conduces precisely to that purpose.  It is an eminently reasonable device, which accords with 
practical common sense and in its application produces equitable results.88 
This is the first presumption in this analysis that has passed constitutional muster.  All 
that have been declared invalid to this point have failed the limitations test, but the Court 
in Meaker have set out a sensible approach to the matter and correctly, it is submitted, 
decided that this particular presumption is a limitation on an accused’s rights that is 
acceptable.  If there is any criticism that can be made of this decision, however, it is why 
the Court did not consider the possibility of an evidentiary burden rather than the full 
reverse onus, which would constitute a lesser inroad into the presumption of innocence.89 
S v Mello90 was another case involving a presumption in the Drugs and Drug-
Trafficking Act.91  Section 20 of the Act provided that ‘if in the prosecution of any person 
for an offence under this Act it is proved that any drug was found in the immediate 
vicinity of the accused, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the accused 
was found in possession of such drug’.  The Court unanimously decided that the 
provision infringed the presumption of innocence and that there was no justification for 
the presumption that would satisfy the limitations test.  This decision, then, was in 
keeping with the Constitutional Court jurisprudence up until this point. 
                                                 
87  At 1053B-F. 
88  At 1057J. 
89  See PJ Schwikkard ‘Evidence’ (1999) 12 SACJ 118 at 119. 
90  1998 (3) SA 712 (CC). 
91  140 of 1992. 
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The next case under discussion is not, strictly speaking, one that involves a 
presumption, but the decision does cast further light on the Constitutional Court’s 
approach to the constitutionality of criminal provisions, so it warrants examination.  In 
Osman and another v Attorney-General, Transvaal92 the appellants challenged the 
constitutionality of section 36 of the General Law Amendment Act,93 which provides:  
Any person who is found in possession of any goods, other than stock or produce as defined in s 1 of 
the Stock Theft Act 57 of 1959, in regard to which there is a reasonable suspicion that they have 
been stolen and is unable to give a satisfactory account of such possession, shall be guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction to the penalties which may be imposed on a conviction of theft. 
The challenge was based on the allegation that this provision breached the right to 
silence.  According to the Court, per Madala J, the elements of the offence were (a) the 
accused person must actually be found in possession of goods; (b) a suspicion founded on 
reasonable grounds must exist in the mind of the finder (or possibly some other person) 
that the goods had been stolen; and (c) there must be an inability on the part of the person 
found in possession to give a satisfactory account of such possession.94  The third aspect 
was under attack. 
The Court decided that the provision did not have any effect on the onus of proof and 
the duty of the prosecution to prove the offence.  The accused was not compelled by the 
section to produce any information.  If, however, the accused chose not to speak, then he 
or she would have to bear the risk of such choice, in the face of the evidence that the state 
had led.  The situation was, in effect, the same as any other when the accused chose to 
remain silent – in certain circumstances; the court would be justified in drawing an 
adverse inference from the accused’s failure to provide an explanation that would cast 
reasonable doubt on the state’s evidence.95 
  This decision, while it does not cast any new light on the Court’s approach to 
presumptions, does show how it is possible to formulate an offence in this type of 
situation which does not (on the approach adopted in Osman) fall foul of the Bill of 
                                                 
92  1998 (4) SA 1224 (CC). 
93  Act 62 of 1955. 
94  At para [8]. 
95  See para [23] in particular. 
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Rights.  The decision has been criticised, however, on the basis that the accused’s silence 
‘will always be an item of evidence that will be taken into account in determining 
whether the State has discharged its duty in presenting a prima facie case’.96  It would 
seem, therefore, that the provision under scrutiny in Osman, does infringe the 
presumption of innocence.  Whether it would meet the requirements of the limitations 
clause, however, is not clear. 
In  S v Fransman97the accused was charged with, inter alia, being in possession of an 
unlicensed firearm.  The judgment was in response to an application for discharge.  The 
defence contended that the state had not led any evidence relating to the absence of a 
licence, but were relying on a presumption in section 250(1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act98 to the effect that: 
If a person would commit an offence if he- 
(c) owned or had in his possession or custody or used any article;… 
without being the holder of a licence, permit, permission or other authority or qualification (in this 
section referred to as the ‘necessary authority’) an accused shall at criminal proceedings upon a 
charge that he committed such an offence, be deemed not to have been the holder of the necessary 
authority unless the contrary is proved. 
The defence contended that this presumption was unconstitutional as it infringed the 
presumption of innocence. 
The Court, per Fevrier AJ, held that the presumption was not unconstitutional.  The 
reasons the Court gave were that the state still had to lead evidence that the accused 
possessed the firearm; that it is easy for the accused to discharge the onus by simply 
producing the licence; and that the question whether there is a licence or not is peculiarly 
within the accused’s knowledge.  In the light of this, and the fact of the proliferation of 
unlicensed firearms, the Court decided that the presumption was ‘both rebuttable and 
reasonable’99 
                                                 
96  PJ Schwikkard ‘A dilution of the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent? Osman v 
Attorney-General, Transvaal’ (1999) 116 SALJ 462 at 462-3. 
97  1999 (9) BCLR 981 (W). 
98  Act 51 of 1977. 
99  At 984I. 
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Although the effect of this decision cannot be faulted, it is submitted that the Court 
was wrong in the way it reached the conclusion.  The provision probably does infringe 
the presumption of innocence, but it may well be saved by the limitations clause.  The 
Court, however, did not consider it in this light.100  Nevertheless, this is an important 
decision for environmental legislation, since there are several environmental offences that 
hinge on the possession of a valid licence or authority, and this presumption would assist 
in proving such offences. 
Returning to the Constitutional Court, the case of S v Manyonyo101 follows earlier 
decisions and does not add anything new to the jurisprudence.  The Court was once again 
faced with the constitutionality of provisions in the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act.102  
One of the impugned provisions has already been struck down in the Mello case.  The 
second provision, in section 21(1)(c),103 had been declared invalid by the Northern Cape 
High Court in S v Mjezu.104  The Constitutional Court confirmed this finding, making it 
clear that their decision would be binding on the whole country. 
The final case in this analysis, and one in which there was again some dissent in the 
Constitutional Court, is S v Manamela.105   This case involved a presumption as to onus 
contained in s 37(1) of the General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1955.  The section reads: 
Any person who in any manner, otherwise than at a public sale, acquires or receives into his 
possession from any other person stolen goods, other than stock or produce as defined in section one 
of the Stock Theft Act, 1959, without having reasonable cause, proof of which shall be on such first-
mentioned person, for believing at the time of such acquisition or receipt that such goods are the 
property of the person from whom he receives them or that such person has been duly authorized by 
the owner thereof to deal with or to dispose of them, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to the penalties which may be imposed on a conviction of receiving stolen property 
                                                 
100  See P-J Schwikkard ‘Evidence’ (2000) SACJ 238 at 245. 
101  1999 (12) BCLR 1438 (CC). 
102  Act 140 of 1992. 
103  This subsection reads: If in the prosecution of any person for an offence referred to in section 13(e) or 
(f) it is proved that the accused conveyed any drug, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that 
the accused dealt in such drug. 
104  1996 (2) SACR 594 (NC). 
105  2000 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
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knowing it to have been stolen except in so far as the imposition of any such penalty may be 
compulsory.106 
The issue before the Court was essentially the constitutionality of this subsection, 
particularly the phrase placing the onus on the accused to prove, on a balance of 
probabilities, that he or she had reasonable cause to believe that the goods were, in effect, 
not stolen goods. 
The Court considered the clause in the light of the right to silence and the presumption 
of innocence.  The Court held that both rights were infringed by the clause.  As far as the 
right to silence is concerned, the Court held that the effect of the provision was to compel 
the accused to produce evidence.  In the words of the Court, ‘for the accused to remain 
silent is not simply to make a hard choice which increases the risk of an inference of 
culpability’.  The effect would be that the accused would ‘surrender to the prosecution's 
case and provoke the certainty of conviction’.107    The presumption of innocence was 
found to be infringed due to the possibility of an accused being found guilty despite the 
presence of reasonable doubt.108 
 In assessing the justification of the clause in the light of the limitations clause, the 
Court held that ‘there are convincing reasons for an incursion into the right to silence, but 
not for a reverse onus which would unduly increase the risk of innocent persons being 
convicted’.109  The limitation of the right to silence was held to be justified because of the 
extreme difficulty for the state to prove absence of reasonable cause, whereas asking the 
accused, who had already been shown to be in possession stolen goods, to produce 
evidence as to the reasonable cause was not ‘unreasonable, oppressive or unduly 
intrusive’.110 
As for the presumption of innocence, the Court essentially found that the relation 
between the reverse onus and the objective of the legislation were not proportionate and 
they were not convinced that there were not less restrictive means available.  
                                                 
106  Emphasis added. 
107  At para [24]. 
108  Paras [25] and [26]. 
109  At para [37]. 
110  At para [38]. 
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Consequently, the Court declared invalid the phrase ‘proof of which shall be on such 
first-mentioned person’ and added in a new last sentence reading ‘In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary which raises a reasonable doubt, proof of such possession shall 
be sufficient evidence of the absence of reasonable cause’.111  The effect of the judgment 
is thus to cast an evidential burden on the accused, the onus of proof in the strict sense 
resting on the State throughout. 
The minority of the Court,112 however, was of the opinion that the reverse onus 
provision did satisfy the requirements of the limitations clause, essentially finding that the 
majority had overstated the risk of unfair convictions under the subsection.  Moreover, 
the minority were not convinced that the alternative of the evidential burden would ‘still 
fully achieve’ the purpose of section 37(1), which ‘seeks to impose an obligation upon 
members of the public, where stolen goods are acquired otherwise than at a public sale, to 
produce probable proof to escape criminal conviction’.113 
The decision in Manamela does not break any new jurisprudential ground but is 
important in illustrating the way in which the Constitutional Court considers the various 
factors influencing the justification of provisions that infringe fundamental rights.  The 
Court observed in the judgment that ‘this Court has so far not found an impugned reverse 
onus provision to pass constitutional muster’114 and Manamela followed this pattern.  
However, the Court did stress that it ‘has been at pains to articulate that there are 
circumstances in which such measures may be justifiable’115 and that the Court has 
‘expressly kept open the possibility of reverse onus provisions being justifiable in certain 
circumstances’.116  In the light of these comments, the Court gives examples of instances 
in which reverse onus provisions may be justified, which are of broad relevance to 
environmental legislation: 
                                                 
111  Para [59]. 
112  O’Regan J and Cameron AJ. 
113  At para [97]. 
114  At para [27]. 
115  Ibid. 
116  At para [27]. 
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A broad context in which the use of reverse onus provisions might be justified concerns “regulatory 
offences”, as opposed to “pure criminal offences”.  Thus, regulatory statutes dealing with licensed 
activity in the public domain, the handling of hazardous products, or the supervision of dangerous 
activities, frequently impose duties on responsible persons, and then require them to prove that they 
have fulfilled their responsibilities.  The objective of such laws is to put pressure on the persons 
responsible to take pre-emptive action to prevent harm to the public.  Although censure might be 
acute, there is generally not the same stigma or the severe penalties as for common-law offences.  
Similarly, there are cases involving the existence or authenticity of public documents or licences, 
where practicalities and common sense dictate that, bearing in mind the reduced risk of error 
involved, it would be disproportionately onerous for the State to be obliged to discharge its normal 
burden in order to secure a conviction.  Traffic regulation provides a further example, such as when 
a statute states that the owner of a car is presumed to be the person who parked it illegally; in the 
great majority of cases, there is simply no way in which the State could prove who parked the car.117 
This is a clear recognition by the Court that reverse onus provisions in ‘public welfare’ 
offences would stand a good chance of passing constitutional muster. 
  What conclusions can be drawn from this line of cases?  Where there is a 
presumption of the nature of a reverse onus provision, which has the effect of relieving 
the state of its duty to prove all of the elements of the offence and/or where the use of the 
presumption may result in the accused’s conviction despite the presence of reasonable 
doubt, then the presumption of innocence in section 35(3)(h) will be infringed.  The 
decisions discussed above have been consistent as to this aspect. 
The fact that there is an infringement of the presumption of innocence is not the end of 
the matter, however.  It is then necessary to determine whether the limitation is 
acceptable in terms of the limitations clause – section 36.  While the Constitutional Court 
has been consistent as to the principle involved  - that there be a balancing of the relevant 
factors – and the factors to be taken into account, there has been some dissent as to 
exactly how the limitations test is applied, notably in Coetzee and Manamela.  Despite 
the lack of unanimity shown in the odd case, the Constitutional Court has yet to find a 
reverse onus provision valid, although the High Court in Meaker did. 
What a case like Manamela shows, in the face of a convincing minority judgment that 
found the impugned provision to be valid, is that the majority of the Constitutional Court 
                                                 
117 At para [29]. 
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is very strict when it comes to application of the limitations clause.  The reasons for the 
limitation will have to be compelling indeed for that limitation to pass muster.  On the 
other hand, the Court appears, on the basis of Manamela, to be prepared to countenance 
an infringement of section 35 rights by means of an evidentiary burden rather than a 
reverse onus. 
A number of considerations followed by the Court in these cases have been identified 
as Chaskalson118 as being among the more important considerations in the evaluation of a 
reverse onus provision, and it is useful to list these here: 
(1) Whether the mischief aimed at by the reverse onus is one of social importance. 
(2) The severity of the offence and the consequences for the accused if convicted. 
(3) Whether the offence is “truly criminal” or merely “regulatory” in nature. 
(4) Whether the effect of the presumption is to cast upon the accused an evidentiary burden or the 
full burden of proof… 
(5) The significance of the fact to be assumed.  Is it an essential ingredient of the offence or a 
defence, excuse or exception? … 
(6) The relative ease with which the prosecution and defence respectively can discharge the 
evidential burden or burden of proof…. 
(7) Whether the presumption operates whenever the presumed fact is in issue or only upon proof of 
other basic facts … 
(8) The likelihood in the ordinary course that the issue would be in dispute…. 
(9) Having regard to all the circumstances, whether the presumption introduces any real risk of 
conviction of an innocent person. 
These considerations will have to be borne in mind when considering the current 
South African environmental legislation and the presumptions contained therein, in the 
following chapters. 
 
4.3 The right to challenge evidence in cases where scientific evidence may be adduced 
by means of affidavit or certificate 
 
Many environmental cases would have as an important element the consideration of 
scientific evidence.  For example, in a case where a particular emission standard is 
                                                 
118  Matthew Chaskalson ‘Evidence’ in M Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law in South Africa (1999 
update) at 26-12 - 26-12B. 
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alleged to have been breached, it would be necessary for the state to produce evidence of 
the concentration of the prohibited substance in the effluent or similar.  In order to 
facilitate this, certain statutes contain provisions allowing for such evidence to be 
produced by affidavit or certificate and provide for its prima facie acceptance.119  The 
question as to whether this type of provision is constitutionally acceptable will now be 
considered. 
The question was considered in S v van der Sandt.120  This was a case involving a 
charge of drunken driving and in issue was section 212(4) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act.121  This subsection allows the submission of a certificate or affidavit as prima facie 
proof of any fact established by any examination or process requiring any skill in various 
scientific fields named in the subsection (like chemistry or ballistics, for example).  The 
defence contended that this section infringed the right to cross-examination and was 
therefore unconstitutional.  The Court disagreed, holding that evidence does not have to 
be presented orally.  In addition, evidence produced in terms of this subsection is usually 
formal evidence that is not challenged and the subsection promotes the efficient 
administration of justice.  In any event, section 212(12) allows the court to call the 
deponent in question to testify orally, and the accused may himself or herself call the 
deponent to testify. 
This decision was followed in S v Sishi,122 where the Court decided that the failure of a 
court to explain fully to an unrepresented accused the effect of the certificate/affidavit 
would be an irregularity undermining the fairness of the trial.   
In essence, the effect of the two cases is that the affidavit or certificate, as the case 
may be, must contain all the necessary information,123 and that the accused must be 
informed that the document is merely prima facie proof of its contents.  The accused may 
                                                 
119  For example, section 23(b) of the Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973. 
120  1997 (2) SACR 116 (W). 
121  Act 51 of 1977. 
122  [2000] 3 All SA 56 (N). 
123  For details of which, see the judgment of Du Plessis J in Van der Sandt (supra) at 138C-J. 
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therefore call the author of the certificate to testify in regard to the facts contained in the 
document in question. 
 
4.4 The right against self-incrimination 
 
In environmental law, the issue of self-incrimination has been examined in the context of 
privilege (particularly corporate privilege) over auditing results.  The basic question that 
is in issue is whether the auditing results that a person accused of an environmental 
offence (most often a company) has itself collected, may be admitted into evidence 
against that person.  For example, results of emission level examinations could 
potentially be used against a company being charged with exceeding the maximum 
emission levels.  This debate is considered further in Chapter 11, but for now it is 
necessary to consider the approach of the South African courts to self-incrimination in the 
context of the constitutional right to a fair trial. 
The real issue here does not concern self-incrimination during the trial, but whether 
the accused’s right may be infringed in the admission of self-incriminating evidence 
gathered before the trial.  This would arise in the context of environmental auditing 
results discussed above.  In Ferreira v Levin NO,124 the Constitutional Court was called 
upon to consider the validity of section 417(2)(b) of the Companies Act.125  This section 
permitted incriminating evidence gathered under compulsion in a liquidation enquiry to 
be used against the person under examination in any subsequent criminal trial.  The 
majority of the Court held that the section was unconstitutional due to the infringement of 
the right against self-incrimination and its failure to be saved by the limitations clause.  
The effect of the decision, however, is not to render liquidation enquiries invalid but to 
prevent the use of information gathered during such enquiries from being used in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.126 
 
                                                 
124 Ferreira v Levin NO & othes; Vryenhoek v Powell NO & others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC). 
125  Act 61 of 1973. 
126  See Frank Snyckers ‘Criminal Procedure’ in M Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(1999 update) at 27-45. 
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The conclusions drawn in this Chapter will be relevant to several matters discussed later 
in this work.  The first of such circumstances will arise in an examination of South 
Africa’s current environmental legislation, which is covered in the next Chapter. 
 
 
Chapter 4  
 
An examination of environmental crimes and their enforcement 
in South Africa: 
Part One – Pre-1994 National Legislation 
 
There are numerous offence provisions in South African environmental legislation but 
reported cases dealing with environmental prosecutions are few.  One of the major 
reasons for this is that there have been so few prosecutions for contravention of 
environmental law in South Africa.  Another reason is that most environmental offences, 
given their relatively small maximum penalties, would be prosecuted in the Magistrates’ 
Courts, for which there are no reported judgments. 
The purpose of the following three Chapters is to examine the way in which South 
Africa’s environmental legislation is intended to be enforced by means of analysis of the 
offence provisions.  If it is possible to draw any general trends, this will be done.  
Available judgments, court reports will be used to demonstrate the way in which certain 
provisions are used in prosecutions.  In addition, and especially where there are no 
available judgments dealing with the provisions in question, suggestions as to the 
strengths and weaknesses of provisions will be made. 
Most statutes contain provisions relating to administration of the Act, and make it an 
offence to do things like obstruct officials and the like.   These offences will not be the 
primary focus of the analysis, which will consider in detail what might be referred to as 
the ‘substantive’ offence provisions.  Where, however, the ‘administrative’ provisions 
contain interesting approaches or where there is an important link between these and the 
substantive provisions, these will be examined in more detail. 
As far as the scope of the analysis is concerned, all national legislation that is directly 
relevant to environmental management will be considered.  This would include the 
obvious enactments dealing with air pollution and water, as well as those dealing with 
subjects like nuclear energy and occupational health and safety, but will exclude 
legislation that could be used for purposes of environmental management like income tax 
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legislation.  The intention is to illustrate the general approach, rather than to ensure that 
no possible enactment avoids scrutiny. 
Provincial and local legislation, on the other hand, will be examined somewhat more 
selectively.  All post-1994 provincial legislation that has come into force will be 
examined.  Older legislation in the four erstwhile provinces was often very similar (one 
thinks, for example, of the nature conservation ordinances), so where such legislation is 
still in force, this will be examined if it can contribute to identification of significant 
general trends. 
National legislation enacted before the arrival of the new Constitutional era in 1994 is 
the subject of this Chapter.  Chapter 5 will cover post-1994 national legislation and 
Chapter 6 provincial and local legislation.  The purpose of splitting these up is mainly 
practical – one Chapter would simply be too unwieldy.  There may, however, be some 
identifiable characteristics of the three categories of legislation so selected. 
 
Analysis of legislation 
 
The legislation will be analysed chronologically. 
 
1 Sea-Shore Act 21 of 1935 
 
This Act is concerned with the use of the seashore, seemingly more with the objective of 
maintaining the access of the general public to the seashore than with the environmental 
integrity of the seashore, but the latter is an objective.  The Act provides for the leasing of 
portions of the seashore for certain activities (for example, boathouses, pipes, sewerage 
lines etc)1 and provides for removal of material from the seashore subject to ministerial 
permission.2  Section 10 empowers the Minister to make regulations dealing with items 
like the use of the seashore and deposit of waste on the seashore. 
According to section 12A (offences and penalties),  
                                                 
1  Section 3(1). 
2  Section 3(2). 
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(1) Any person who-  
(a) uses any portion of the sea-shore or sea of which the State President is by section 2 declared 
to be the owner, for any of the purposes mentioned in section 3 (1), without that portion 
having been leased to him for that purpose; 
(b) removes any material contemplated in section 3 (2) from the sea-shore or sea of which the 
State President is by section 2 declared to be the owner, without a permit granted under 
section 3 (2); or 
(c) contravenes or fails to comply with a condition imposed by or under section 3 (1) or (2), 
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding two years.  
(2) If a person who erected a structure in contravention of subsection (1) is convicted in respect 
thereof under that subsection, the court may order that person to remove that structure at his own 
cost and within such time as the court may determine.  
(3) In the event of a conviction mentioned in subsection (1) the court may, in addition to imposing a 
sentence in respect of the offence and making an order under subsection (2), order the person 
convicted to repair any damage caused to the sea-shore by the act constituting the offence, to the 
satisfaction of the Minister. 
In addition, section 10(2), provides for the penalty for contravention of regulations as 
follows: ‘The regulations may provide that any person contravening or failing to comply 
with any provision thereof shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to such 
fine, not exceeding five hundred rand, or to imprisonment for such period, not exceeding 
one year, as may be specified therein, or to both such fine and such imprisonment’. 
There are two sets of regulations3 that are applicable generally (as opposed to 
regulations made under the Act that apply to specific parts of the seashore, under the 
jurisdiction of local authorities) and that essentially reiterate the prohibitions in the Act 
itself – prohibiting the use of the seashore for erection of structures etc; prohibiting the 
removal of material (sand, shells etc) from the seashore; and depositing 
material/disposing waste on the seashore.  Both sets of regulations prescribe penalties that 
are less than provided for by section 10(2), which was amended in 1984 and hence 
overrides the penalty provisions in the regulations. 
                                                 
3  GN 1720 GG 5542 of 2 September 1955 and GN R2513 GG 7318 of 5 December 1980. 
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The Sea-Shore Act is an example of an enactment that uses the classic ‘command and 
control’ type of enforcement approach, declaring certain activities to be offences and 
providing for a maximum penalty, of the traditional fine and/or imprisonment type, for 
contravention thereof. 
In addition to the standard criminal provisions described above, however, the Act also 
contains a clause allowing the court to order the accused to remove any structure that has 
been erected in breach of the Act,4 and also contains what will be described in this 
Chapter as a ‘remediation clause’, allowing the court to order the accused to repair any 
damage caused to the seashore by his or her illegal act.5  Both these clauses apply only 
once the person in question has been convicted of an offence under the Act, so can be 
regarded as provisions which supplement the criminal sanction, rather than alternatives to 
it. 
There is one reported judgment that concerns a prosecution for contravention of a 
regulation made under section 10 of the Act, but it concerns a regulation setting aside 
portions of the seashore for the exclusive use of one race group under South Africa’s 
erstwhile apartheid policies, rather than illegal damage to or exploitation of the seashore 
and therefore is not relevant to the current enquiry.6 
 
2 Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act 36 of 1947 
 
This Act regulates the use of fertilisers, farm feeds, agricultural remedies and stock 
remedies in South Africa.  Pesticides would be regarded as agricultural7 or stock 
                                                 
4  Section 12A(2). 
5  Section 12A(3). 
6  The case is S v Naicker, S v Attawari 1963 (4) SA 610 (N).  
7  ‘Agricultural remedy’ is defined in section 1 as any chemical substance or biological remedy, or any 
mixture or combination of any substance or remedy intended or offered to be used- 
(a) for the destruction, control, repelling, attraction or prevention of any undesired microbe, alga, 
nematode, fungus, insect, plant, vertebrate, invertebrate, or any product thereof, but excluding any 
chemical substance, biological remedy or other remedy in so far as it is controlled under the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, 1965 (Act 101 of 1965), or the Hazardous 
Substances Act, 1973 (Act 15 of 1973); or 
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remedies.8  It would seem that the primary object of regulation is health and safety, 
although clearly the environmental impact of pesticides is of importance, as will be 
illustrated below. 
The Act regulates these substances by means of providing for registration of the 
products and the users of the products (pest control operators).  The Act also provides for 
the deregistration of products the use (or sale etc) of which is no longer regarded as being 
in the public interest.9  The Act empowers the Minister to prohibit the acquisition, 
disposal, sale or use of fertilizers, farm feeds, agricultural remedies or stock remedies; or 
to make such prohibition subject to conditions specified in the notice or in a permit issued 
by the registrar of fertilizers, farm feeds, agricultural remedies or stock remedies.10  Two 
sets of substances that have been prohibited under this section – firstly, DDT, Dieldrin 
and Aldrin,11 and, second, certain hormonal herbicides,12 were clearly prohibited because 
of their detrimental environmental impact.  The dangers of DDT are well-known,13 and 
the prohibition of hormonal herbicides only in certain specified areas in the KwaZulu-
Natal midlands, followed allegations by vegetable farmers in the region of damage 
caused to their crops by drift of the herbicide.14 
The offences under this Act are as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                 
(b) as plantgrowth regulator, defoliant, desiccant or legume inoculant, 
and anything else which the Minister has by notice in the Gazette declared an agricultural remedy for the 
purposes of this Act: 
8  ‘Stock remedy’ is defined in section 1 as a substance intended or offered to be used in connection with 
domestic animals, livestock, poultry, fish or wild animals (including wild birds), for the diagnosis, 
prevention, treatment or cure of any disease, infection or other unhealthy condition, or for the maintenance 
or improvement of health, growth, production or working capacity, but excluding any substance in so far as 
it is controlled under the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, 1965 (Act 101 of 1965). 
9  Section 7A. 
10  Section 7bis. 
11  GN R928 GG 7566 of 1 May 1981. 
12  GN R2370 GG 13536 of 27 September 1991. 
13  See, for example, http://www.chem.ox.ac.uk/mom/ddt/ddt.html (accessed 2 August 2001); 
http://agen521.www.ecn.purdue.edu/AGEN521/epadir/wetlands/ddt.html (accessed 2 August 2001). 
14  See Michael Kidd Environmental Law: A South African Guide (1997) at 148. 
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2.1 Acquisition, disposal, sale or use of prohibited substance 
 
Offences and penalties are provided for in section 18 of the Act, which contains several 
relatively technical offences relating to registration, hindrance of officials etc.  It also 
includes a prohibition of the acquisition, disposal, sale or use of fertilizers, farm feeds, 
agricultural remedies or stock remedies contrary to a prohibition issued under section 
7bis.15  Section 18 does not explicitly refer to a fault requirement. 
The penalty is a fine not exceeding one thousand rand or imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding two years or both such fine and such imprisonment.16  This penalty was 
introduced by a 1980 amendment to the Act,17 but since then the penalties have not been 
updated, and the original penalty (for certain other offences) has not been amended since 
the Act’s enactment. 
 
2.2 Use of remedy for unintended purpose 
 
An offence under this Act arises where a person uses a remedy for a purpose for which it 
is not intended: there is a prohibition of the acquisition, disposal, sale or use of an 
agricultural remedy or stock remedy for a purpose or in a manner other than that specified 
on the label on a container thereof or on such container.18  The Act provides that any 
person who (sic) agricultural remedies or stock remedies contrary to a prohibition issued 
under section 7bis is guilty of an offence.19  It appears that the word ‘uses’ has been 
omitted.  The offences and penalties section fails to indicate what the penalty is for 
contravention of this prohibition, but the penalties for other offences are either a 
                                                 
15  Section 18(1)(c)bis and (d). 
16  Section 18(1)(l)(ii). 
17  Act 4 of 1980. 
18  GN R1716 GG 13424 of 26 July 1991.  This regulation was made under s 7bis. 
19  Section 18(1)(d). 
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maximum of a five hundred rand fine and/or twelve months imprisonment20 or a 
maximum of one thousand rand fine and/or two years imprisonment.21 
This prohibition was the subject matter of the case of Flexichem CC v Patensie Citrus 
Co-operative Ltd.22 This was a civil case involving a claim for payment for chemicals 
sold by the plaintiff to the defendant.  The defendant refused to pay and wished to return 
the goods to the seller, alleging that the chemicals that had been sold to them were sold to 
them for purposes for which they were not intended.  The substance in question was a 
fertiliser, and it was sold to the defendant for purposes of combating fungus on young 
citrus trees – as a fungicide (agricultural remedy), in other words.  The defendant sought 
to set aside the sale on this basis. 
The court decided that the transaction did involve the sale of a fertiliser as an 
agricultural remedy and that therefore it was a prohibited sale and unlawful.23  In 
deciding whether to set aside the contract, the court held that the peremptory terms of the 
Act in prohibiting not only the ‘contract of sale of chemical substances for use as an 
agricultural remedy in the absence of due registration’, but also the prohibition of ‘the 
initial offer to sell and the subsequent execution of the contract’,24 indicated that the 
intention was to vitiate the contract.  Moreover, upholding the contract would also ‘have 
the effect of furthering the very evil which the Legislature wishes to avoid, namely the 




There is also a forfeiture provision that operates once the accused is convicted.  It 
provides that the court convicting any person of an offence under this Act, may, upon the 
                                                 
20  Section 18(1)(l)(i). 
21  Section 18(1)(l)(ii). 
22  1994 (1) SA 491 (SE). 
23  At 496J. 
24  At 497B. 
25  At 497D. 
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application of the prosecutor, declare any fertilizer, farm feed, agricultural remedy or 
stock remedy in respect of which the offence has been committed and all fertilizers, farm 
feeds, agricultural remedies or stock remedies of a similar nature to that in respect of 
which such person has been convicted, and of which such person is the owner, or which 
are in his possession, to be forfeited to the State.26   
This is a provision of a type often employed in environmental legislation.  There have 
been no Constitutional challenges to forfeiture provisions, so no guidance from the 
judiciary is available. The first part of the forfeiture provision relates to the substance ‘in 
respect of which the offence has been committed’.  This is unproblematic since the state 
has a compelling interest in removing ‘contraband’ from circulation.27 The provision in 
question also, however, requires forfeiture of all substances regulated by the Act ‘of a 
similar nature to that in respect of which such person has been convicted, and of which 
such person is the owner, or which are in his possession’.  The objective behind this is 
unclear, since it targets neither the ‘contraband’ itself, nor the proceeds of the offence.  It 
also seems not to be concerned with what may be called the ‘instrumentalities’ of the 
offence – objects used or involved in the commission of the offence.28  Consequently, this 
portion of the provision may well be problematic.  It could be contended that this is a 
breach of the right to property in the Constitution,29 and, since it does not have any 
apparent compelling purpose, is unlikely to be regarded as a justifiable limitation. 
 
2.4 Miscellaneous provisions 
 
In addition, there are provisions relating to evidence and special defences.  Section 20 
provides that, in any criminal proceedings under the Act, any quantity of a fertilizer, farm 
                                                 
26  Section 18(2). 
27  Similar examples would be weapons or traps used in poaching or (outside the environmental sphere) 
drugs possessed in contravention of narcotics legislation. 
28  For example, firearms used in the illegal shooting of an animal.  See André van der Walt ‘Civil 
forfeiture of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime and the Constitutional property clause’ (2000) 16 
SAJHR 1 at 3. 
29  Section 25 of Act 108 of 1996. 
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feed, agricultural remedy or stock remedy in or upon any premises, place, vessel or 
vehicle at the time a sample thereof is taken pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall, 
unless the contrary be proved, be deemed to be of the same composition, to have the 
same degree of efficacy and to possess in all other respects the same properties as that 
sample.30  Along similar lines, the Act provides for the power to take samples of 
substances regulated by the Act,31 and allows that a certificate stating the result of an 
analysis or test carried out in pursuance of the provisions of the Act and purporting to be 
signed by the analyst who carried out such analysis or test shall be accepted as prima 
facie proof of the facts stated therein.32  A copy of this certificate must be given to the 
accused person at least 21 days before the institution of a prosecution.33 
The presumption as to the prima facie proof of scientific evidence is not likely to be 
problematic since it is similar to section 212(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act that was 
held to be acceptable in S v van der Sandt.34 
Further assistance to the state in prosecuting offences under this Act is a presumption 
to the effect that any statement or entry contained in any book or document kept by any 
manufacturer, importer or owner of a regulated substance, or by the manager, agent or 
employee of such person, or found upon or in any premises occupied by, or any vehicle 
used in the business of such person, shall be admissible in evidence against him as an 
admission of the facts set forth in that statement or entry, unless it is proved that that 
statement or entry was not made by such person, or by any manager, agent or employee 
of such person in the course of his work as manager, or in the course of his agency or 
employment.35 
A special defence relating to mistake of fact is provided for by section 21.36 
                                                 
30  Section 20(1)(a). 
31  Section 15. 
32  Section 20(1)(c). 
33  Section 20(2). 
34  1997 (2) SACR 116 (W).  See discussion above, at Chapter 3 §4.3. 
35  Section 20(1)(d). 
36  The full text of the provision reads: 
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2.5 Vicarious liability 
 
The Act provides for vicarious liability, placing the onus on the manufacturer, importer or 
owner to prove that the manager, agent or employee was acting without the connivance of 
the principal, and that all reasonable steps were taken by the principal to prevent any act 
or omission of the kind in question; and that the activity in question was outside the scope 
of employment of the manager, agent or employee.37  The latter may also be prosecuted 
                                                                                                                                                 
It shall be a sufficient defence for a person charged with the sale of any fertilizer, farm feed, agricultural 
remedy or stock remedy in contravention of section 7 (1) (d) if he proves to the satisfaction of the court- 
(a) that he purchased such fertilizer, farm feed, agricultural remedy or stock remedy under a registered 
name or mark as being the same in all respects as the article which he purported to sell; 
(b) that he had no reason to believe at the time of the sale that it was in any respect different from such 
article; 
(c) that he sold it in the original container and in the state in which it was when he purchased it; and 
(d) that the container thereof complied with the prescribed requirements and was sealed and labelled or 
marked in the prescribed manner with the prescribed particulars. 
37  Section 22(1), which reads in full: 
(1) Whenever any manager, agent or employee of any manufacturer, importer or owner of a fertilizer, farm 
feed, agricultural remedy or stock remedy does or omits to do any act which it would be an offence under 
this Act for such manufacturer, importer or owner to do or omit to do, then unless it is proved that- 
(a) in doing or omitting to do that act the manager, agent or employee was acting without the 
connivance or the permission of the manufacturer, importer or owner; and 
(b) all reasonable steps were taken by the manufacturer, importer or owner to prevent any act or 
omission of the kind in question; and 
(c) it was not under any condition or in any circumstance within the scope of the authority or in the 
course of the employment of the manager, agent or employee to do or to omit to do acts whether 
lawful or unlawful of the character of the act or omission charged, 
the manufacturer, importer or owner, as the case may be, shall be presumed himself to have done or 
omitted to do that act and be liable to be convicted and sentenced in respect thereof; and the fact that he 
issued instructions forbidding any act or omission of the kind in question shall not, of itself, be accepted as 
sufficient proof that he took all reasonable steps to prevent the act or omission. 
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as the manufacturer, importer or owner;38 or in addition to the manufacturer, importer or 
owner.39 
The vicarious liability clause in section 22(1) bears resemblance to section 332(5) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act that was held unconstitutional in S v Coetzee.40  It is likely, 
following this decision, that section 22(1) would also fall foul of the Constitution, there 
appearing to be no reasons, different from those raised in Coetzee, compelling enough for 




In this Act, therefore, there is again the standard ‘command and control’-type provision, 
without alternative modes of enforcement. The penalties have been overtaken by 
inflation, as is the case with several other environmental enactments discussed later in 
this Chapter.  In addition to the standard offence/penalty provisions, there is provision for 
forfeiture of material involved in an offence; presumptions as to the veracity of scientific 
evidence (laboratory analysis); and vicarious liability including reverse onus provisions.  
The presence of a defence allowing the accused to raise mistake of fact strongly suggests 
that the legislature did not intend for liability under the Act to be strict.41 
 
3 Water Act 54 of 1956 
 
The Water Act has been replaced by the National Water Act.42  There were no reported 
judgments relating to criminal prosecutions under the 1956 Act, although there were 
prosecutions in the Magistrates’ Courts.  This Act will not be discussed here since 
offences relating to water are now provided for by the new Act, which is discussed in the 
following Chapter. 
                                                 
38  Section 22(2). 
39  Section 22(3). 
40  1997 (3) SA 527 (CC).  See discussion above, at 42ff. 
41  On strict liability, see detailed discussion in Chapter 9. 
42  Act 36 of 1998. 
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4 Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965 
 
This Act regulates air pollution by addressing noxious and offensive gases (Part II), 
smoke (Part III), dust (Part IV) and emissions from motor vehicles (Part V).  The 
offences under the Act that are directly related to environmental protection (in other 
words, excluding offences relating to obstruction of officials and failure to allow access 
to premises and the like) are as follows:43 
 
4.1 Failure to register premises upon which scheduled processes are carried on 
 
According to section 9 of the Act, 
It is an offence for a person, within a controlled area, to:  
(a)  carry on a scheduled process in or on any premises, unless- 
(i) he is the holder of a current registration certificate authorizing him to carry on that process in 
or on those premises; or 
(ii) in the case of a person who was carrying on any such process in or on any premises 
immediately prior to the date of publication of the notice by virtue of which the area in 
question is a controlled area, he has within three months after that date applied for the issue 
to him of a registration certificate authorizing the carrying on of that process in or on those 
premises, and his application has not been refused; or 
(b)  erect or cause to be erected any building or plant, or  alter or extend or cause to be altered or 
extended any existing building or plant, which is intended to be used for the purpose of carrying 
on any scheduled process in or on any premises, unless he is the holder of a provisional 
registration certificate authorizing the erection, alteration or extension of that building or plant 
for the said purpose; or 
(c)  alter or extend or cause to be altered or extended an existing building or plant in respect of 
which a current registration certificate has been issued unless he has, before taking steps to bring 
about the proposed alteration or extension, applied to the chief officer for provisional registration 
of the proposed alteration or extension or unless such alteration or extension will not affect the 
                                                 
43  For the full list and discussion of offences, see Michael Kidd ‘Pollution Offences’ in JRL Milton and 
MG Cowling South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol III: Statutory Offences (1988). The 
discussion in the current work is based on this chapter. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions  






escape into the atmosphere of noxious or offensive gases produced by the scheduled process in 
question.44   
The penalty for contravention of this provision is, in the case of a first conviction, a 
fine not exceeding five hundred rand or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six 
months, and in the case of a second or subsequent conviction a fine not exceeding two 
thousand rand or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year.45  
The elements of the offence are: (i) in a controlled area (ii) carrying on a scheduled 
process (iii) in or on any premises (iv) without a current registration certificate. 
 
(i)  in a controlled area 
 
A ‘controlled area’ is any area which has under section eight been declared to be a 
controlled area.46  Any area may be declared to be a controlled area by the Minister of 
Health, after consideration of a report by the National Air Pollution Advisory 
Committee,47 and after consultation with the Minister by notice in the Gazette.48  The 
Minister has declared the whole of the Republic to be a controlled area.49 
  
(ii)  carrying on a scheduled process 
 
A ‘scheduled process’ is any works or process specified in the Second Schedule of the 
Act.50  This Schedule comprises a list of 69 processes which are generally regarded as 
producing ‘noxious or offensive gases’.51 Examples are chlorine processes,52 tar 
processes,53 power generation processes,54and paper and paper pulp processes.55 
                                                 
44  Section 9. 
45  Section 46. 
46  Section 1. 
47  Established by section 2. 
48  Section 8. 
49  GN R1776 Reg Gaz 1026 of 4 October 1968. 
50  Section 1. 
51  Section 9 falls under a Part II of the Act headed ‘Control of noxious or offensive gases’.  ‘Noxious or 
offensive gases’ are defined as any of the following groups of compounds when in the form of gas, namely, 
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(iii) on any premises 
 
‘Premises’ means any building or other structure together with the land on which it is 
situated and any adjoining land occupied or used in connection with any activities carried 
on in such building or structure, and includes any land without any buildings or other 
structures and any locomotive, ship, boat or other vessel which operates or is present 
within the area of a local authority or the precincts of any harbour.56 
  
(iv) without a current registration certificate57 
 
The Act provides that the chief air pollution control officer58 shall, after consideration of 
an application for a registration certificate, if he is satisfied that the best practicable 
means59 are being adopted for preventing or reducing to a minimum the escape into the 
                                                                                                                                                 
hydrocarbons; alcohols; aldehydes; ketones; ethers; esters; phenols; organic acids and their derivatives; 
halogens, organic nitrogen, sulphur and halogen compounds; cyanides; cyanogens; ammonia and its 
compounds; inorganic acids; fumes containing antimony, arsenic, beryllium, chromium, cobalt, copper, 
lead, manganese, mercury, vanadium or zinc or their derivatives; cement works fumes and odours from 
purification plants, glue factories, cement works and meat, fish or whale processing factories; and any other 
gas, fumes or particulate matter which the Minister may by notice in the Gazette declare to be noxious or 
offensive gas for the purpose of this Act; and includes dust from asbestos treatment or mining in any 
controlled area which has not been declared a dust control area in terms of section twenty-seven (section 1). 
52  Second Schedule #6. 
53  Second Schedule #16. 
54  Second Schedule #29. 
55  Second Schedule #68. 
56  Section 1. 
57  A ‘registration certificate’ is a registration certificate issued under s 10(2)(a)(i) or s 10(3): s 1. 
58  Appointed under s 6, hereinafter referred to as the chief officer. 
59  Defined in s 1 in respect of the prevention of the escape of noxious or offensive gases, as including the 
provision and maintenance of the necessary appliances to that end, the effective care and operation of such 
appliances, and the adoption of any other methods which, having regard to local conditions and 
circumstances, the prevailing extent of technical knowledge and the cost likely to be involved, may be 
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atmosphere of noxious or offensive gases produced or likely to be produced by the 
scheduled process in question, grant the application and issue to the applicant a 
registration certificate.60  If he is not satisfied, the chief officer shall require the applicant 
by written notice to take the necessary steps within a period specified in the notice to 
meet the objectives stated above.61  Once these requirements have been complied with a 
registration certificate shall be issued in terms of s 10(3). 
The registration certificate typically incorporates guidelines, which have been laid 
down by the Department of Health for the process in question, and which become legally 
binding on the industry once part of a certificate.62 In terms of s 12(1), a registration 
certificate shall be subject to the condition, inter alia, that all necessary measures are 
taken to prevent the escape into the atmosphere of noxious or offensive gases. 
The derisory maximum penalty provided for in the Act for this offence (it has not been 
increased since the Act was promulgated) is one of the main reasons why there have been 
few prosecutions for this offence.63 Indeed, recently the Department of Health, instead of 
prosecuting offenders using the criminal law, have applied to the High Court for 
interdicts against the continuation of carrying on a scheduled process without the 
necessary certificate.  In two reported cases, the Department was successful and the 
offenders were interdicted from continuing their illegal activity.64  This approach is 
clearly effective – the objective of the legislation is better achieved by means of closing 
down polluters than issuing them fines that are likely to have not significant deterrent 
effect. 
                                                                                                                                                 
reasonably practicable and necessary for the protection of any section of the public against the emission of 
poisonous or noxious gases. 
60  Section 10(2)(a)(i). 
61  Section 10(2)(a)(ii). 
62  RF Fuggle & MA Rabie (eds) Environmental Management in South Africa (1996) at 441.  
63  See Fuggle and Rabie op cit at 454. 
64  Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd and another 1996 (3) SA 155 (N) and Minister of 
Health v Drums and Pails Reconditioning CC t/a Village Drums and Pails 1997 (3) SA 867 (N). 
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4.2 Manufacture or import of certain fuel burning appliances and parts therefor 
 
It is an offence for a person to manufacture or import any fuel burning appliance for use 
in a dwelling-house65 which does not comply with the requirements prescribed by 
regulation under section 44; or any part for such an appliance which does not comply 
with the requirements so prescribed, unless he has previously obtained written authority 
for the manufacture or import thereof from the chief officer.66  It is also an offence to fail 
to comply with any conditions set down by the chief officer in such authority.67  
 
4.3 Installation on any premises of fuel burning appliances 
 
It is an offence68 for any person to install or cause or permit to be installed in or on any 
premises- 
(a) any fuel burning appliance,69 unless such appliance is so far as is reasonably 
practicable capable of being operated continuously without emitting dark smoke70 or 
smoke of a colour darker than may be prescribed by regulation: Provided that in applying 
the provisions of this paragraph due allowance shall be made for the unavoidable 
                                                 
65  A ‘dwelling-house’ is any building or other structure intended for use or used as a dwelling for a single 
family, and any outbuildings appurtenant thereto: s 1. 
66  Section 14A(3) read with s 14A(1).  The chief officer may in his discretion grant or refuse such 
authority any such authority shall be subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by regulation under 
section 44 and to such supplementary conditions as may be determined by the chief officer and set out in 
the authority concerned: s 14A(2). 
67  Section 14A(3). 
68  Section 15(6). 
69  ‘Appliance’ means any one mechanical stoker or any one burner on which there may be more than one 
stoker, but does not include a single chimney through which the products of several burners or furnaces 
may be discharged; and ‘stoker’ means any mechanism or other means intended for feeding fuel into any 
place for the purpose of burning it in such place; and ‘burner’ means any furnace, combustion chamber, 
grate or other place to which fuel is fed by one or more stokers or manually for the purpose of burning such 
fuel in such furnace, combustion chamber, grate or other place: s 15(4). 
70  ‘Dark smoke’ means smoke which, if compared in the prescribed manner with a chart of the kind shown 
in the First Schedule, appears to be of a shade not lighter than shade 2 on that chart: s 1. 
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emission of dark smoke or smoke of a colour darker than may be so prescribed during the 
starting up of the said appliance or during the period of any breakdown or disturbance of 
such appliance;71 or 
(b) any fuel burning appliance designed to burn pulverised solid fuel;72 or to burn solid 
fuel in any form at a rate of one hundred kilograms or more per hour;73 or to subject solid 
fuel to any process involving the application of heat,74 unless such appliance is provided 
with effective appliances to limit the emission of grit and dust to the satisfaction of the 
local authority or the chief officer, as the case may be. 
It is also an offence for a person to install any fuel burning appliance of a type referred 
to in the previous paragraph,75 in or on any premises unless prior notice in writing has 
been given to the local authority or the chief officer, as the case may be, of the proposed 
installation of such appliance.76  
The abovementioned provisions do not apply in respect of the installation of any fuel 
burning appliance in any dwelling house;77 or in respect of any fuel burning appliance if 
the installation thereof was commenced or any agreement for the acquisition thereof was 
entered into prior to the fixed date.78  Moreover, a fuel burning appliance which has been 
installed in accordance with plans and specifications approved by the local authority 
concerned, shall not for the purposes of s 15(1) be deemed to have been installed in 
contravention of the provisions of that sub-section.79 
  
                                                 
71  Section 15(1)(a). 
72  Section 15(1)(b)(i). 
73  Section 15(1)(b)(ii). 
74  Section 15(1)(b)(iii). 
75  The wording of the Act is ‘any fuel burning appliance in respect of which sub-section (1) applies’. 
76  Section 15(2) read with s 15(6). 
77  Defined above, n??? 
78  Section 15(3). 
79 Section 15(5), but note that nothing in this sub-section shall be construed as precluding any action under 
ss 17 or 19 in respect of any such fuel burning appliance. 
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4.4 Failure to comply with smoke control regulations 
 
The Act provides for a local authority to make regulations on a number of matters 
relating to smoke control.80  Local authorities are empowered to prohibit certain actions, 
inter alia, the emission of smoke darker than a specified colour,81 the installation in any 
premises of a fuel burning appliance which does not comply with specified 
requirements,82 and the use and sale for use of solid fuel.83  The Act provides that the 
regulations may provide for penalties for any contravention of or failure to comply with 
such regulations, but not exceeding, in the case of the first offence, a fine of two hundred 
rand or, in default of payment, imprisonment for a period of six months and in the case of 
a second or subsequent offence, a fine of one thousand rand or, in default of payment, 
imprisonment for a period of one year.84 
 
4.5 Failure to comply with local authority notice 
 
If smoke is emitted or emanates from any premises in contravention of any regulation 
made under section 18, the local authority concerned may cause to be served on the 
owner or occupier of such premises, a notice in writing calling upon him to bring about, 
within a period specified in the notice, the cessation of the emission or emanation of such 
smoke from those premises.85  It shall be an offence for a person to fail to comply with 
such notice.86  
                                                 
80  Section 18. 
81  Section 18(1)(a). 
82  Section 18(1)(b). 
83  Section 18(1)(c). 
84  Section 18(4). 
85  Section 19(1). 
86  Section 19(5). 
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4.6 Emission of smoke in smoke control zone 
 
It is an offence to contravene or fail to comply with an order under section 20(1).87  This 
subsection provides that a local authority may by order confirmed by the Minister after 
consultation with the National Air Pollution Advisory Committee, and promulgated by 
the Minister by notice in the Gazette, declare the area within its jurisdiction or any part of 
that area to be a smoke control zone,88 and prohibit the emanation or emission from any 
premises in that zone of smoke of a darker colour or greater density or content than is 
specified in the order.89 
 
4.7 Causing a dust nuisance 
 
The Act provides that any person who in a dust control area- 
(a)  carries on any industrial process the operation of which in the opinion of the chief officer causes 
or is liable to cause a nuisance to persons residing or present in the vicinity on account of dust 
originating from such process becoming dispersed in the atmosphere; or 
(b) has at any time or from time to time, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, 
deposited or caused or permitted to be deposited on any land a quantity of matter which exceeds 
or two or more quantities of matter which together exceed twenty thousand cubic metres in 
volume, or such lesser quantity as may be prescribed, and which in the opinion of the chief 
officer causes or is liable to cause a nuisance to persons residing or present in the vicinity of such 
land on account of dust originating from such matter becoming dispersed in the atmosphere, 
shall take the prescribed steps or (where no steps have been prescribed) adopt the best practicable 
means90 for preventing such dust from becoming so dispersed or causing such nuisance.91 
                                                 
87  Section 20(11). 
88  Section 20(1).  For a full list of declared smoke control zones, see PGW Henderson Environmental 
Laws of South Africa (1996) LA-9. 
89  Section 20(1)(b). 
90  ‘Best practicable means’ includes in any particular case any steps within the meaning of that expression 
as defined in section one which may be determined by the chief officer and specified in a notice signed by 
him and delivered or transmitted by registered post to the person who is required to adopt such means: s 
28(2). 
91  Section 28. 
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It is an offence for any person to fail to comply with the above provisions.92  
 
(i)  Dust control area 
 
This offence is applicable only in a dust control area.  A ‘dust control area’ may be 
declared by the Minister after consideration of a report by the National Air Pollution 
Advisory Committee and after consultation with the Minister of Industries, Commerce 
and Tourism, by notice in the Gazette.93  There are currently at present 88 areas which 




‘Nuisance’ is not defined in the Act.  According to common law, a nuisance is an 
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of another person’s land.95 
 
4.8 Failure to comply with dust control notice 
 
Whenever in the opinion of the chief officer dust originating on any land in a dust control 
area and in relation to which the provisions of s 28(1) do not apply, is causing a nuisance 
to persons residing or present in the vicinity of that land, he may by notice in writing 
delivered or transmitted by registered post to the owner or occupier96 of the land require 
such owner or occupier to take the prescribed steps or (where no steps have been 
                                                 
92  Section 28(3). 
93  Section 27(1). 
94  For full list, see Henderson op cit at LA-13. 
95  See JRL Milton ‘Nuisance’ in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa (1983). 
96  No requirement shall be imposed under this section upon an occupier of land who is not the owner 
thereof, unless the chief officer is of the opinion that the dust in question is caused by activities carried on 
by such occupier or that it is equitable, having regard to the duration of the period for which he is entitled to 
remain in occupation of such land or other relevant circumstances, to require him to take any steps or adopt 
any means contemplated in the section: s 29(2). 
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prescribed) adopt the best practicable means for the abatement of such nuisance.97  It is 




As pointed out above, there are several other offences under the Act that relate to the 
administration of the Act and these will not be discussed here.  The Atmospheric 
Pollution Prevention Act also demonstrates the command and control approach, although 
the control likely to be exercised by the paltry penalties is somewhat dubious.  There is 
provision in parts of the Act for abatement control measures to be exercised before use of 
the criminal sanction (see sections 19 and 29) and this is certainly a sensible approach 
since it potentially leads to the cessation of the undesirable activity with minimal 
administrative burden.  The inadequacy of the criminal sanctions provided by this Act 
have, as has been pointed out above, led to the relevant authorities using alternative, and 
seemingly more effective, means (ie an interdict) of ensuring compliance with this Act. 
 
5 Mountain Catchment Areas Act 63 of 1970 
 
The objective of this Act is to provide for the conservation, use, management and control 
of land situated in mountain catchment areas.  The Act empowers the competent authority 
to issue directions relating to  the conservation, use, management and control of land 
within a declared mountain catchment area and the prevention of soil erosion, the 
protection and treatment of the natural vegetation and the destruction of vegetation which 
is, in the opinion of the Minister, intruding vegetation; and any other matter which he 
considers necessary or expedient for the achievement of the objects of this Act in respect 
of such land; and in the case of land outside a mountain catchment area but within five 
kilometres of the boundary of such an area, the destruction of vegetation which is, in the 
                                                 
97  Section 29(1). 
98  Section 29(4). 
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opinion of the Minister, intruding vegetation.99  The Act also provides for fire protection 
committees100 and fire protection plans.101 
Section 14, the penalties provision, provides: 
Any person who- 
(a) contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of this Act or any regulation; 
(b) refuses or fails to comply with any direction; 
(c) obstructs or hinders any person referred to in section 11 in the execution of his duties or the 
performance of his functions; 
(d) damages, or without the permission of the Director-General alters, any fire-belt or any other 
works constructed under this Act; 
(e) contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of a fire protection plan; 
(f) alters, moves, disturbs or wilfully damages or destroys any beacon erected under section 2A (1), 
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand rand or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or to both such fine and such imprisonment. 
These offences are all relatively self-explanatory.  No alternative measures for 
compliance with the Act are provided for, although the principal mode of enforcement is 
probably the issue of directions in terms of section 3. 
   
6 Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973 
 
The Hazardous Substances Act regulates hazardous substances by means of categorising 
hazardous substances depending on the substances’ characteristics and applying 
appropriate regulatory provisions accordingly by means of regulation.102  The Act itself 
largely regulates the sale of Group I and III hazardous substances;103 the letting, use, 
operation, application and installation of Group III, hazardous substances;104 and the 
                                                 
99  Section 3. 
100  Section 7. 
101  Section 8. 
102  Section 29. 
103  Section 3. 
104  Ibid. 
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production, acquisition, disposal, and importation and exportation, of Group IV 
hazardous substances.105 
Group I and II hazardous substances are any substance or mixture of substances 
which, in the course of customary or reasonable handling or use, including ingestion, 
might, by reason of its toxic, corrosive, irritant, strongly sensitizing or flammable nature 
or because it generates pressure through decomposition, heat or other means, cause 
injury, ill-health or death to human beings.106  Group III hazardous substances are 
electronic products declared to be hazardous.107  Group IV hazardous substances 
comprise radioactive material.108 
 The following are offences under the Act (excluding administrative-type offences): 
 
6.1 Selling a Group I hazardous substance without a licence 
 
No person shall sell any Group I hazardous substance unless he is the holder of a licence 
issued to him in terms of section 4(a); and otherwise than subject to the conditions 
prescribed or determined by the Director-General.109  The Minister may declare certain 
                                                 
105  Section 3A. 
106  Section 2(1)(a).  The distinction between Group I and Group II substances appears, from the 
declarations themselves, to be that the former comprise the toxic or poisonous substances whilst the latter 
contain those substances that are hazardous for other reasons.  Group I hazardous substances were declared 
in GN R452 GG 5467 of 25 March 1977, as amended.  Group II hazardous substances were declared in GN 
R1382 GG 15907 of 12 August 1994. 
107  Section 2(1)(b). 
108  Section 1.  The full definition is ‘radioactive material which is outside a nuclear installation as defined 
in the Nuclear Energy Act, 1999, and is not a material which forms part of or is used or intended to be used 
in the nuclear fuel cycle, and-  
(a) has an activity concentration of more than 100 becquerels per gram and a total activity of more than 4 
000 becquerels; or 
(b) has an activity concentration of 100 becquerels or less per gram or a total activity of 4 000 becquerels or 
less and which the Minister has by notice in the Gazette declared to be a Group IV hazardous substance, 
and which is used or intended to be used for medical, scientific, agricultural, commercial or industrial 
purposes, and any radioactive waste arising from such radioactive material’. 
109  Section 3(1)(a). 
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hazardous substances not to be subject to the section and may exempt persons from the 
application of the section.110  There is also a clause excluding the liability of a person 
who sells such a substance within a specified period after the declaration of the substance 
as a Grouped hazardous substance.111  The penalty for this offence is a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or both.112 
 
6.2 Selling, letting, using, operating, applying, installing or keeping installed any 
Group III hazardous substance 
 
No person shall sell, let, use, operate or apply any Group III hazardous substance unless a 
licence under section 4 (b) is in force in respect thereof, and otherwise than subject to the 
conditions prescribed or determined by the Director-General.113  Also, no person shall 
install or keep installed any Group III hazardous substance on any premises unless a 
licence under section 4 (c) is in force in respect of such premises, and otherwise than 
subject to the conditions prescribed or determined by the Director-General.114  The same 
exemptions discussed in the previous paragraph apply.115  The penalty for this offence is 
a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six years or both.116 
 
6.3 Production, acquisition, disposal, and importation and exportation, of Group IV 
hazardous substances without authority 
 
No person shall produce or otherwise acquire, or dispose of, or import into the Republic 
or export from there, or be in possession of, or use, or convey or cause to be conveyed, 
any Group IV hazardous substance, except in terms of a written authority under section 
                                                 
110  Section 3(1A). 
111  Section 3(2). 
112  Section 19(1)(c). 
113  Section 3(1)(b). 
114  Section 3(1)(c). 
115  Sections 3(1A) and 3(2). 
116  Section 19(1)(b). 
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3A(2) and in accordance with the prescribed conditions; and such further conditions (if 
any) as the Director-General may in each case determine.117  There is also an exemption 
clause in this section.118  The prescribed penalty for this offence is a fine or imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding 10 years or both.119 
 
6.4 Furnishing a false or misleading warranty 
 
According to section 14, no person shall be convicted on a charge of selling or 
importing120 a Group I or Group II hazardous substance in contravention of any provision 
of this Act, if he proves that he or his employer or principal acquired or imported the 
grouped hazardous substance in question under a written warranty complying with the 
provisions of section 15 and furnished to him or to his employer or principal; and  in the 
case of a sale of the grouped hazardous substance in question, that he sold it in the 
condition in which he acquired or imported it, or, if it was acquired or imported by his 
employer or principal, that he at no relevant time had reason to suspect that it was in any 
other condition than that in which it was so acquired or imported.  Section 15 provides for 
the formalities in respect of the warranty, including the requirement that it guarantee that 
any substance to which it applies, is not a grouped hazardous substance in respect of 
which any prohibition in terms of the regulations applies.121  Any person who furnishes a 
warranty for the purposes of this Act which is false or misleading in any respect, shall be 
guilty of an offence,122 the penalty for which is a fine or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding two years or both.123 
 
                                                 
117  Section 3A. 
118  Section 3A(5). 
119  Section 19(1)(a). 
120  This is a somewhat strange provision since the import of a Group I or II hazardous substance is not an 
offence in terms of the Act itself and nor is the sale of a Group II hazardous substance. 
121  Section 15(1)(c). 
122  Section 15(2). 
123  Section 19(1)(c). 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions  






6.5 Miscellaneous provisions 
 
There are several further provisions in the Act that relate to or augment the basic 
offence/penalty provisions.  First, there is a vicarious liability clause very similar to that 
in the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act.124  The 
employer, mandatory or principal will be liable for the act or omission which amounts to 
an offence under the Act carried out by an employee, mandatary or agent.125 The onus is 
on the employer, mandatory or principal to prove that the employee, mandatary or agent 
was acting without the connivance of the former, and that all reasonable steps were taken 
by the principal to prevent any act or omission of the kind in question; and that the 
activity in question was outside the scope of employment of the employee.  For the 
reasons set out above, when discussing the similar provision in the Fertilizers Act, this 
provision will probably fall foul of the Constitution.126 
                                                 
124  See above, text relating to n37. 
125  Section 16, which reads in full: 
(1) An act or omission of an employee, mandatary or agent which constitutes an offence under this Act 
shall be deemed to be the act or omission of his employer, mandator or principal, and the said employer, 
mandator or principal may be convicted and sentenced in respect of it unless he proves- 
(a) that he did not permit or connive at such act or omission; and 
(b) that he took all reasonable measures to prevent an act or omission of the nature in question; and 
(c) that an act or omission, whether legal or illegal, of the nature in question did not under any 
conditions or in any circumstances fall within the course of the employment or the performance of 
the mandate or the scope of the authority of the employee, mandatary or agent concerned. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (b) the fact that an employer or principal forbade an act or omission 
of the nature in question shall not by itself be regarded as sufficient proof that he took all reasonable 
measures to prevent such an act or omission. 
(3) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not relieve the employee, manager or agent concerned from 
liability to be convicted and sentenced in respect of the act or omission in question. 
(4) Whenever an employee, mandatary or agent does anything or fails to do anything which would have 
been an offence in terms of this Act if the employer, mandator or principal concerned had done it or had 
failed to do it, such employee, mandatary or agent shall be guilty of such offence. 
126  See above, at 69. 
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Second, there is a forfeiture clause, allowing the court to order the forfeiture to the 
state of any goods used in the commission of the offence.127  This provision applies once 
the accused has been convicted.  As pointed out above,128 the forfeiture of goods that 
constitute the ‘contraband’ in the offence in question is unlikely to be problematic.  This 
provision, however, also clearly considers instrumentalities to be subject to forfeiture as 
well.  It has been suggested that the only real problem with forfeiture of instrumentalities 
is that the forfeiture does not constitute unfair and excessive punishment (in addition to 
the basic sentence).129  In such cases, according to van der Walt, ‘proportionality 
jurisprudence can be employed to indicate whether it is reasonable and justifiable to 
forfeit the property in question, given the court’s findings on the facts, the nature of the 
property forfeited, the guilt of the defendant and the sentence already imposed’.130 
Added to these considerations, is the requirement that there be a necessary connection 
between the use of the instrumentality in question and the commission of the offence.  If 
something is used only incidentally to the commission of the offence, then forfeiture of 
that item will not be countenanced.  In S v Vermeulen, 131 under scrutiny was the Drugs 
and Drug Trafficking Act,132 section 25(1)(b) of which requires mandatory forfeiture of 
‘any animal, vehicle, vessel, aircraft, container or other article which was used for the 
purpose of or in connection with the commission of the offence; or for the storage, 
conveyance, removal or concealment of any scheduled substance, drug or property by 
mans of which the offence was committed or which was used in the commission of the 
offence.  The Court held that the fact that the accused was found with prohibited drugs in 
his motor vehicle did not warrant the forfeiture of the motor vehicle because the link 
                                                 
127 Section 21.  The precise wording of s 21(1) is, ‘the court convicting any person of an offence under this 
Act may declare any grouped hazardous substance, appliance, product, or other object in respect of which 
the offence has been committed or which was used for, in or in connection with the commission of the 
offence, to be forfeited to the State’. 
128  See above, discussion of forfeiture clause in Fertilizers etc Act: at §2.3. 
129  André van der Walt ‘Civil forfeiture of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime and the Constitutional 
property clause’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 1 at 7. 
130  Ibid. 
131  S v Vermeulen 1995 (2) SACR 439 (T). 
132  Act 40 of 1992. 
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between the use of the motor vehicle and the crime was not sufficiently strong.  The 
finding in this case, it is submitted, would apply equally strongly to a permissive 
forfeiture clause. 
Moving back to the Act, one of the difficulties of prosecuting an offence involving 
chemical substances is that it is often necessary to rely on scientific analysis as evidence 
and, if this requires using the analyst as an expert witness, there is the concomitant 
expense that has to be taken into account.  In an attempt to circumvent this, the 
Hazardous Substances Act provides that a copy of any certificate or report by an analyst 
which the prosecutor intends to produce in evidence in any prosecution under this Act, 
shall be served on the accused with the summons,133 and, if the accused has within three 
days after having been so served with a copy of a certificate or report, demanded in 
writing that the analyst who furnished the certificate or report be called as a witness at the 
trial, and has paid or tendered to the prosecutor a sum of money sufficient to defray the 
expenses incidental to the calling and attendance of the said analyst as a witness, and if 
the prosecutor produces the certificate or report in evidence at the trial, the prosecutor 
shall call the said analyst as a witness at such trial.134  The Act gives the accused another 
option of, instead of requiring the calling of the said analyst as a witness, submitting to 
him written interrogatories approved by the court, and such interrogatories and any reply 
thereto, purporting to be a reply from the said analyst, shall be admissible in evidence in 
the proceedings.135  The impact of this is that the accused will either accept the analyst’s 
evidence or, if he wishes to challenge it, he must bear the cost of introduction of the 
evidence in question, rather than the state.  This is a useful provision for this type of case, 
and is unlikely to fall foul of the Constitution given the decision in S v van der Sandt.136 
The Act also provides for several presumptions: 
(1) A copy of or extract from a book, statement or other document, made by an inspector 
under the Act and certified by him to be true and correct, shall, unless the contrary is 
proved, be presumed to be a true and correct copy of or extract from the relevant book, 
                                                 
133  Section 22(3). 
134  Section 22(4). 
135  Section 22(5). 
136  1997 (2) SACR 116 (W).  See discussion above, at Chapter 3 §4.3. 
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statement or other document, and shall on its production in court be prima facie proof 
of any entry to which it relates.137 
(2) A certificate or report on the analysis or examination of a sample and purporting to be 
signed by an analyst, shall on its production in court be prima facie proof of the facts 
stated in it.138 
(3) Any quantity of a substance in or upon any premises at the time a sample of it is 
obtained by an inspector for the purpose of this Act, shall, unless the contrary is 
proved, be presumed to be in the same condition or possess the same properties as 
such sample.139 
(4) A sample of a substance obtained by an inspector for analysis or examination in terms 
of this Act, shall be presumed to have been sold to him by the person selling the 
substance of which it is a sample.140 
(5) If it is proved that any person has manufactured or imported any grouped hazardous 
substance it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he manufactured or 
imported it for use in the Republic.141 
(6) Any substance, appliance or other object found in or upon any premises where any 
grouped hazardous substance is manufactured, treated, packed, labelled, stored, 
conveyed, applied, used, operated or administered, shall, unless the contrary is proved, 
be presumed to be used for, in or in connection with the manufacture, treatment, 
packing, labelling, storage, conveyance, application, use, operation or administration 
of such grouped hazardous substance.142 
(7) Any person who sells, manufactures or imports any substance which contains any 
grouped hazardous substance or in or on which any grouped hazardous substance is 
                                                 
137  Section 23(a). 
138  Section 23(b). 
139  Section 23(c). 
140  Section 23(d). 
141  Section 23 (e). 
142  Section 23(f). 
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present, shall be presumed to sell, manufacture or import, as the case may be, such 
grouped hazardous substance.143 
While some of these presumptions are understandable, the rationale for others is far 
from clear.  Since none of them appear to be presumptions that would relieve the 
prosecution of proving the essential elements of any of the offences under the Act, they 





The offences provided for in the Hazardous Substances Act are the primary mode of 
enforcement.  This is another example of a ‘command and control’ statute.  Liberal use of 
made of questionable presumptions, and there are several other provisions that are 
susceptible to constitutional scrutiny, although several are probably safe from being 
struck down for the reasons given in the detailed discussion in the previous paragraphs. 
 
7 Sea Birds and Seals Protection Act 46 of 1973 
 
This Act provides for the control over certain islands and rocks; for the protection, and 
the control of the capture and killing, of sea birds and seals; and for the disposal of the 
products of sea birds and seals and for related matters.  The terms ‘sea bird’ and ‘seal’ are 
both defined in the Act as comprising certain specified species of sea bird and seal 
respectively.145  The offences provided for by this Act are as follows: 
                                                 
143  Section 23(g). 
144  At least in reported judgments. 
145  A ‘sea bird’ is any penguin (Spheniscidae), gannet (Sulidae), cormorant (Phalacrocoracidae), gull 
(Laridae), tern (Sternidae), pelican (Pelicanidae), albatross (Diomedeidae), petrel (Procellariidae, 
Thalassidromidae or Oceanitidae), dabchick (Podicipidae), ibis (Threskiornithidae), skua (Stercorariidae), 
wader (Charadriidae), oystercatcher (Haematopodidae), phalarope (Phalaropidae), flamingo 
(Phoenicopteridae) or sheathbill (Chionidae).  A ‘seal’ is any Cape Fur seal (Arctocephalus pusillus), 
Antarctic seal, also known as Southern Elephant seal (Mirounga leonina), Leopard seal (Hydrurga 
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7.1 Setting foot or remaining on an island 
 
It is an offence to set foot on or remain on any island, except in the performance of his or 
her duties under the Act or under the authority and subject to the conditions of an 
exemption granted by or under the Act, or of a permit.146  ‘Island’, in terms of the Act, 
means any island or rock or any group of islands or rocks specified in Schedule 1 or any 
island specified in Schedule 2.  Schedule 1 contains a number of islands/rocks, primarily 
off the coasts of the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Namibia.  Schedule 2 consists of 
Marion Island and Prince Edward Island.  The maximum penalty, which is the penalty 
provided for all contraventions of this Act, is a fine not exceeding two hundred rand or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months or both.147  The fault requirement 
is not specified in the Act, but it is submitted that it would probably be intention.  Given 
the purpose of this prohibition, which would appear to be protection of the habitat of 
seals and sea birds, there would not appear to be much reason to prosecute negligent 
contraventions.  Section 3 of the Act has not been considered in any reported judgments.   
 
7.2 Pursuing, shooting at, killing or capturing sea birds or seals 
 
It is an offence, upon any island148 or within the territorial waters or fishing zone of the 
Republic or along the coast of the Republic between the low-water mark and the 
highwater mark, 149 to pursue or shoot at or wilfully disturb, kill or capture any sea bird or 
seal except in the performance of his or her duties under the Act or under the authority 
and subject to the conditions of an exemption granted by or under this Act, or of a 
permit.150  The penalty is as for the previous offence.  The inclusion of the word 
                                                                                                                                                 
leptonyx), Weddel seal (Leptonychotes weddeli), Crabeater seal (Lobodon carcinophagus), Ross seal 
(Ommatophoca rossi) and Southern Fur Seal (Arctocephalus spp. 
146  Section 3(a).  Permits are issued in terms of section 4. 
147  Section 12. 
148  As defined above. 
149  Both terms defined in s 1 of the Sea-shore Act 21 of 1935. 
150  Section 3(b). 
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‘wilfully’ as a qualification to the verbs ‘disturb, kill or capture’ serves to exclude the 
negligent disturbance of a sea bird or seal as an offence.  Whether the exclusion of other 
qualifying adverbs relating to fault means that the other acts prohibited by this section 
(pursuing or shooing at) can be committed negligently or without fault is not clear.  
Whereas it is difficult to conceive of the possibility of negligently ‘pursuing’ something 
(the verb itself connotes intention), shooting at something could conceivably be carried 
out negligently, or even without fault.  This would be subject to the court’s interpretation 
and it is submitted that the express inclusion of the word ‘wilfully’ where it does appear 
suggests that the legislature did not require intention as a requirement for the acts of 
pursuing or shooting at seabirds or seals. 
  
7.3 Damaging or collecting eggs of sea birds 
 
Nobody may wilfully damage the eggs of any sea bird upon any island or collect upon or 
remove from any island any such eggs or the feathers of any sea bird or any guano except 
in the performance of his or her duties under the Act or under the authority and subject to 
the conditions of an exemption granted by or under the Act, or of a permit.151  The 
penalty is as for the previous offences under this Act.  It should be noted that the Act 
once again expressly provdes that the mens rea requirement for this offence is intention 
by use of the word ‘wilfully’. 
 
7.4 Failure to comply with permit 
 
Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any direction in a permit issued or 
lawfully transferred to him or her is guilty of an offence and liable to the same penalty as 
for the offences discussed above.152  Permits under the Act can be granted authorizing the 
                                                 
151  Section 3(c). 
152  Section 12(b). 
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performance of any act which, under the Act, may be performed under the authority of a 




The offences under this Act are the main enforcement mechanism (other than the 
permitting process) provided for by this Act and are relatively self-explanatory.  The 
effectiveness of these compliance mechanisms, however, is likely to be undermined by 
the extremely low maximum penalties provided for by the Act. 
 
8 Lake Areas Development Act 39 of 1975 
 
This Act is concerned with the establishment of lake development areas and the 
institutional structures for management thereof.  There are no prohibitions and offences 
provided for in the Act itself, but there is provision for offences to be created by means of 
regulation.  Section 23(6) provides that any regulation made may prescribe penalties for 
any contravention of or failure to comply with its provisions, not exceeding a fine of two 
hundred rand or imprisonment for a period of one year or both.  It is also provided that 
any regulation may provide that fines collected in pursuance of the regulation shall accrue 
to the Lake Areas Development Board.154 
 
8.1 Offences under regulations 
 
There are two sets of regulations under the Act, one dealing with the Wilderness Lake 
Area155 and one with the Knysna Lake Area.156  Each set of regulations, which are all but 
identical, contain several prohibitions relating to issues such as prohibited developments 
with lake areas, equipment on vessels and contravention of rules for waterskiing.  The 
                                                 
153  Section 4(1). 
154  Section 23(4).  
155  GN R311 in GG 6862 of  22 February 1980. 
156  GN R2774 in GG 10036 of 13 December 1985. 
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maximum penalty for contravention of these offences is as provided in the Act, and 




There is nothing remarkable about the enforcement provisions under the Lake Areas 
Development Act.  Those offences that are provided are applicable only to limited 
geographical areas of the country.     
 
9 National Parks Act 57 of 1976 
 
This Act, according to the long title, consolidates laws relating to national parks.  The 
national parks are possibly the most important (certainly the most high-profile) of the 
protected area system in South Africa, and this Act deals with a variety of issues 
concerning the parks: establishment of parks, issues relating to the National Parks Board 
and its employees, and regulation of activities in national parks.  It is in respect of the last 
aspect that there are several offences that would fall under the umbrella of environmental 
offences.  There is one offence relating to driving of motor vehicles in a park in the Act 
itself and several such offences contained in regulations made under the Act, but these 
will not be discussed here. 
 
9.1 Entry or residence in park without permission 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
enter or reside in a park without the permission of the board or any officer or employee 
authorised to grant such permission.157  Permission may be granted subject to such 
conditions as may be deemed necessary and shall be granted only for certain stated 
purposes, including study or recreation.158  The penalty for this offence is a maximum 
                                                 
157  Section 21(1)(a). 
158  Section 23. 
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fine of R1 000 or, in default of payment of the fine, to imprisonment for a maximum of 
three months or, in the case of a previous conviction under the subsection in question, to 
a fine not exceeding R2 000 or imprisonment for a maximum of six months.159 
In S v Le Roux,160 the issue was whether this offence was one of strict liability.  The 
Court held that it did not provide for an absolute prohibition but that the state must prove 
that the accused’s unintentional crossing of the park boundary was at least due to his or 
her negligence or carelessness.  The Court decided that the accused had been negligent in 
casu. 
  
9.2 Possession of weapon, explosive, trap or poison 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
convey into a park or within a park be in possession of any weapon, explosive, trap or 
poison.161  ‘Weapon’ is defined as any fire-arm (sic) or ammunition for a fire-arm, or any 
other instrument by means of which a projectile can be propelled or used in such a 
manner that any animal can be killed or injured thereby.162  In S v Msubo,163 the Court 
correctly held that a cane knife fell within this definition.164 ‘Trap’ is any device or 
substance with which or by means of which an animal can be captured.165  ‘Poison’ 
includes any substance that can be used to immobilise an animal.166  The penalty is as for 
the previous offence discussed above. 
                                                 
159  Section 24(8). 
160  1969 (3) SA 745 (T). 
161  Section 21(1)(b). 
162  Section 1. 
163  1965 (4) SA 266 (N). 
164  The case did not concern the definition in the National Parks Act, but an identical definition in a Natal 
Ordinance of 1955. 
165  Ibid. 
166  Ibid. 
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9.3 Hunting, killing or injuring any animal 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
within a park hunt or otherwise wilfully or negligently kill or injure any animal.167  
‘Hunt’ is defined as follows: with reference to an animal, to kill, shoot at, capture or 
attempt to capture, or to follow or to search for or lie in wait for with intent to kill, shoot 
or capture.168  In R v Carter,169 it was decided that ‘searching for’ animals does not have 
to take place immediately before the shooting or killing part of the hunt, but that tracking 
down animals several days before intending to execute the hunt qualifies as ‘search 
for’.170 
The penalty for this offence differs depending on the species of animal in respect of 
which the offence is committed.  If it is an animal specified in Schedule 2,171 other than 
an elephant or black or white rhinoceros, the offender shall be liable to a fine of not less 
than R4 000 and not more than R8 000 or, in default of payment of the fine, to 
imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and not more than two years.  In the 
case of a previous conviction, the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment without the 
option of a fine.172 
If the animal is an elephant or rhinoceros, the fine is not less than R30 000 and not 
more than R100 000 or, in default of payment, imprisonment of not less than three years 
and not more than ten years.  The option of a fine may be removed in the case of a 
previous conviction.173  In addition, on first or subsequent conviction, such an offender is 
liable to a further fine not exceeding three times the commercial value of the animal in 
                                                 
167  Section 21(1)(c). 
168  Section 1. 
169  1954 (2) SA 317 (E). 
170  The case did not concern the National Parks Act, but the term, used in the applicable provincial 
ordinance, is the same as that used in the Act. 
171  Schedule 2 is an extensive list of animals containing several mammals, a few fish and reptiles and 
several birds.  It excludes species such as zebra, impala, blue wildebeest and baboon, which would appear 
to be those which are more numerous and not under significant threat. 
172  Section 24(1)(a). 
173  Section 24(1)(b). 
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respect of which the offence was committed.  This could amount to a significant sum: in 
2001, the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Services game auction fetched an average 
price of just under R177 000 for the white rhinoceros and R550 000 for black 
rhinoceros.174   
Finally, if the animal is not on Schedule 2, the fine is not less than R1 000 and not 
more than R6 000.  In default of payment, the imprisonment is for not less than three 
months and not more than eighteen months.  If the offender has been convicted 
previously, then he or she will be liable to imprisonment without the option of a fine.175  
By way of illustration, in S v Sibuyi,176 the accused was found guilty of hunting an impala 
and sentenced to a fine of R1 200 or nine months imprisonment. 
 
9.4 Disturbing any animal 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
within a park disturb any animal.  ‘Disturb’ with reference to an animal, means wilfully 
or negligently to injure, to tease, to alarm, to hinder, to interfere with, to throw an object 
at or to make aggressive.177  Once again, the penalty for contravention of this provision 
depends on the animal that has been disturbed.  Any person who disturbs any elephant, 
rhinoceros, lion, buffalo or baboon is liable to a fine of not less than R300 and not more 
than R1 000 or, in default, imprisonment of not less than one month and not more than 
three months.  In case of previous conviction, the fine is not less than R1 000 and not 
more than R2 000 or, in default, not less than three months and not more than six months 
imprisonment.178 
In the case of an animal not specified in s 24(3), the maximum fine is R300 or, in 
default, imprisonment of no more than one month.  Subsequent offenders are subject to a 
maximum fine of R1 000 or, in default, maximum prison term of three months. 
                                                 
174  KZN NCS website: http://www.rhino.org.za/auction2001.htm (accessed 20 November 2001). 
175  Section 24(2). 
176  1991 (2) SACR 163 (T). 
177  Section 1. 
178  Section 24(3). 
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9.5 Taking, damaging or destroying eggs, nests or honey 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
within a park take, damage or destroy any egg or nest of any bird, or take honey from a 
beehive.179  The penalty for this offence is a maximum fine of R1 000 or, in default of 
payment of the fine, to imprisonment for a maximum of three months or, in the case of a 
previous conviction under the subsection in question, to a fine not exceeding R2 000 or 
imprisonment for a maximum of six months.180 
  
9.6 Causing a veld fire and damaging objects 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
wilfully or negligently cause a veld fire, or any damage to any object of geological, 
archaeological, historical, ethnological, oceanographic, educational or other scientific 
interest, within a park.181  A person convicted of causing a veld fire is liable to a fine of 
not less than R1 000 and not more than R6 000.  In default of payment, the imprisonment 
is for not less than three months and not more than eighteen months.  If the offender has 
been convicted previously, then he or she will be liable to imprisonment without the 
option of a fine.182  Any other contravention of the subsection will attract a penalty of a 
maximum fine of R1 000 or, in default of payment of the fine, imprisonment for a 
maximum of three months or, in the case of a previous conviction under the subsection in 
question, a fine not exceeding R2 000 or imprisonment for a maximum of six months.183 
 
                                                 
179  Section 21(1)(e). 
180  Section 24(8). 
181  Section 21(1)(f). 
182  Section 24(2). 
183  Section 24(8). 
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9.7 Introducing or permitting entry of animal into park 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
introduce any animal or permit any domestic animal to stray into or enter a park.  The 
penalty for this offence is a maximum fine of R1 000 or, in default of payment of the 
fine, to imprisonment for a maximum of three months or, in the case of a previous 
conviction under the subsection in question, to a fine not exceeding R2 000 or 
imprisonment for a maximum of six months.184  
 
9.8 Possession of an animal in a park 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
within a park be in possession of any animal (other than an animal lawfully introduce ed 
into the park), whether alive or dead, or any part of an animal, or remove such animal or 
any part thereof from a park.185  This subsection and section 21(1)(c), which prohibits 
hunting and killing of animals, are the two primary anti-poaching offences.  The penalties 
for contravention of this section are the same as for contravention of s 21(1)(c) (described 
in 9.3 above) if the animal in question is a Schedule 2 animal or elephant or rhinoceros.186  
For any other animal, the penalty is a maximum fine of R1 000 or, in default of payment 
of the fine, to imprisonment for a maximum of three months or, in the case of a previous 
conviction under the subsection in question, to a fine not exceeding R2 000 or 
imprisonment for a maximum of six months.187 
 
9.9 Cutting, damaging, removing or destroying any tree or plant 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
cut, damage, remove or destroy any tree or any part thereof, dry or firewood, grass or 
                                                 
184  Section 24(8). 
185  Section 21(1)(h). 
186  Section 24(1). 
187  Section 24(8). 
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other plant (including any marine plant) in a park.188  There are specific penalties for 
contravention of this section, which, like the offences in respect of animals, differ for 
different categories of plants.  If some commits an offence in respect of a tree or plant on 
Schedule 3,189 he or she will be liable to a minimum fine of R1 000 and maximum of R6 
000 or, in default of payment, not less than three months and not more than eighteen 
months imprisonment.  If there is a previous conviction for this offence, the offender may 
be sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine. 190 
If the plant is not on the Schedule, then the penalty is a fine of not less than R300 and 
not more than R1 500 or, in default, imprisonment of not less than one month and not 
more than four months.  Imprisonment without the option of a fine may be imposed on 
repeat offenders.191 
 
9.10 Removal of seed 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 
within a park remove seed from any tree or other plant without the permission of the 
board or any officer or employee authorised to grant such permission.192  The penalty for 
this offence is a maximum fine of R1 000 or, in default of payment of the fine, to 
imprisonment for a maximum of three months or, in the case of a previous conviction 
under the subsection in question, to a fine not exceeding R2 000 or imprisonment for a 
maximum of six months.193 
 
                                                 
188  Section 21(1)(i). 
189 Schedule 3 contains an extensive list of trees and plants. 
190  Section 24(5). 
191  Section 24(6). 
192  Section 21(1)(j). 
193  Section 24(8). 
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9.11 Feeding an animal 
 
No person other than an officer or employee acting under the authority of the board may 




Over and above any penalty discussed above, any weapon, explosive, trap or poison used 
in contravening any provision of the Act or which forms an element of the contravention 
shall, in addition to any other punishment, be declared forfeited to the State.195  If a 
forfeited weapon is an ‘armament’ referred to in section 32(1) of the Arms and 
Ammunition Act 75 of 1969, it must be delivered to the South African Police Service to 
be disposed of.196 
Moreover, any animal (other than a domestic animal) or article in respect of which the 
provisions of section 21(1)(c) (prohibition of hunting and killing animals – see §9.3 
above), 21(1))(e) (taking or damaging birds’ nests or eggs or honey – see §9.5 above) or 
21(1)(h) (possession of an animal – see §9.8 above) has been contravened shall be 
declared forfeited to the State.197 
In addition, any vehicle198 or vessel199 used in connection with the contravention of 
sections 21(1)(c) or (h) may, if the contravention was wilful, be declared forfeited to the 
State unless it is proved that the person convicted is not the owner of such vehicle or 
                                                 
194  Section 21(1)(k). 
195  Section 24(9)(a). 
196  Section 24(10)(a). 
197  Section 24(9)(a). 
198  Which is defined as any conveyance which can be sued for the transportation of persons or goods on 
land, whether such conveyance is self-propelled or not (s 1). 
199  Which is defined as any conveyance which can be used for the transportation of persons or goods on, in 
or over water, whether such conveyance is self-propelled or not (s 1). 
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vessel and that the owner thereof could not have prevented its use by the person 
convicted.200 
There are several cases dealing with forfeiture in respect of conservation offences that 
are instructive as to how forfeiture is carried out.  These cases do not deal with the 
forfeiture provisions under the National Parks Act, but rather with similar provisions in 
provincial legislation, but the overall principles (and, in many case, the wording of the 
legislation) are the same.  In S v Roos,201 the issue was whether a vehicle would be 
forfeited when the offender was not the ‘owner’ of the vehicle, which he had purchased 
under a hire-purchase agreement (the seller, therefore, being the official owner).  The 
Court held that the vehicle did not ‘belong to’ the possessor for purposes of the forfeiture 
provision.  The ordinance in question contained a provision to the effect that the vehicle 
could be forfeited if the offender was not the owner, unless it could be shown that the 
owner thereof could not have prevented its use by the person convicted.  Clearly this was 
a case where this exclusion would apply. 
In S v Shiers,202 the question was whether a firearm that had not been fired could have 
been ‘used’ in commission of the offence.  The Court held, correctly it is submitted, that 
the firing of the gun was not a prerequisite to its ‘use’ in the commission of the offence. 
On the issue of forfeiture of a vehicle used in illegal hunting, the judgment in R v 
Edy203 is a questionable one.  The Court here held that use of a motor vehicle in matters 
preparatory to the hunting (deriving access to the hunting area, for example) is not use in 
the act of hunting itself.  In this case, the accused had been found in a motor vehicle 
containing hunting torches, one of which was connected to the car’s battery, and with a 
recently-fired rifle and dead antelope in the boot.  The judgment, therefore, is highly 
questionable on the facts.  The wording of section 24(9)(b) of the National Parks Act, 
however, would cover even the situation where a vehicle was used merely to provide 
access to the national park for purposes of hunting, since it speaks of a vehicle used ‘in 
connection with’ the offence. 
                                                 
200  Section 24(9)(b). 
201  1967 (4) SA 320 (T). 
202  1971 (4) SA 244 (RAD). 
203  1957 (2) SA 429 (SR). 
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A final, though a very important, issue to consider is whether these forfeiture 
provisions are constitutional.  As indicated in earlier discussion of forfeiture 
provisions,204 there have been no constitutional challenges on such provisions and the 
forfeiture of illegal articles (for example, drugs or unlicensed firearms) as well as the 
instrumentalities of crime (articles used in the commission of the offence) are usually 
regarded as justifiable inroads into a person’s property rights.  Where there may be a 
possible problem is that the forfeiture of instrumentalities, including a motor vehicle in 
some cases contemplated by the National Parks Act, might be considered to constitute 
excessive punishment.  For example, somebody found guilty of contravening section 
21(1)(e) as a result of negligently killing an animal by knocking it over while speeding in 
a park may be liable to have his or her vehicle forfeited.  Although the Constitution 
forbids ‘cruel’ punishment, it is unclear whether excessive punishment would conflict 
with this right.  The forfeiture clause with respect to vehicles is permissive rather than 
mandatory, so this would probably serve to restrict its application to appropriate 
circumstances.  The forfeiture clause in respect of weapons and other articles or animals 
(other than vehicles) used in commission of an offence is mandatory, but is likely to be 
safe from constitutional challenge due to the public interest involved in ensuring that 
articles used in the commission of crime are removed from the offender.  
 
9.13 Miscellaneous matters 
 
A magistrate’s court has jurisdiction to impose any punishment provided for in section 24 
of the Act.205 
Another provision of relevance to criminal prosecution is that, where a person is 
convicted of an offence for which a minimum sentence is provided, such minimum 
punishment shall not apply to a convicted person under the age of eighteen years.206 
                                                 
204  See § 1.2 (supra). 
205  Section 25. 
206  Section 24(7). 
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The Act contains some interesting provisions relating to powers of search and seizure.  
In addition to the regular powers of search and seizure in terms of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977,207 an officer or employee designated by the National parks Board may 
within a park or at any place within 10 kilometres from the boundary of a park, arrest 
without a warrant any person who is on reasonable grounds suspected of having 
committed an offence under this Act.208   Such an official may also, within a park or at 
any place within 10 kilometres of a park boundary, search without warrant any premises, 
place, vehicle, vessel, tent or receptacle of whatever nature if it is on reasonable grounds 
suspected that there is at or in such premises, place, vehicle, vessel, tent or receptacle any 
animal or article which may afford evidence of the commission of an offence under this 
Act, and may seize any such animal or article wherever found.209 
It is unlikely that this search and seizure provision would present constitutional 
problems.  Despite the fact that the section allows search without a warrant, the nature of 
the circumstances in which such a search would typically be carried out would be such 
that the delay in applying for a warrant would frustrate the enforcement efforts of the 
officials concerned.  The section does explicitly require there to be ‘reasonable grounds’ 
for the suspicion of the presence of an animal or article which may afford evidence of the 
commission of an offence, which would be the requirements for granting of a warrant 
were application to be made for one. 
One final issue that should be mentioned relates to splitting of charges.  A person who 
kills an animal in a park (which is an offence in terms of section 21(1)(c)) and then has in 
his or her possession the carcass (an offence in terms of section 21(1)(h)) has, at least 
technically, committed two separate offences.  It has been held, however, that charging an 
accused with both illegal hunting and possession of the carcass arising out of the same 
factual cause, amounts to improper splitting of charges.210  Although this case involved 
legislation other than the National Parks Act, the offences were substantially the same 
and the overarching principle would certainly be applicable here. 
                                                 
207  Chapter 5. 
208  Section 27(1). 
209  Section 27(2). 
210  S v Mawelele 1990 (2) SA 8 (T). 
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The offences in the National Parks Act are, by and large, straightforward.  The 
enforcement mechanisms used do not involve reverse-onus provisions and the only 
possible problematic provision, it is submitted, is that which deals with forfeiture of 
motor vehicles. The criminal sanctions provisions are the only enforcement mechanisms 
provided for in the Act. 
 
10 Health Act 63 of 1977 
 
The Health Act deals with a wide range of health issues, only some of which fall under 
the category of environmental law.  The only offence under the Act that could be 
regarded as an environmental offence is contained in section 27.  This section provides 
for a notice procedure requiring the recipient to take certain steps.  Non-compliance is an 
offence.  The relevant portion of the section reads: 
(1)  Where in the opinion of a local authority a condition has arisen within its district which is of 
such a nature as to be offensive or a danger to health unless immediately remedied and to which the 
provisions of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965 are not applicable, it may serve a 
written notice on the person responsible for such condition having arisen or the occupier or owner of 
the dwelling in which or premises on which such condition exists, calling upon him to remedy the 
condition within such period as may be specified in such notice. 
(2)  Any person failing to comply with any such notice shall be guilty of an offence. 
The section allows the local authority, in the event of non-compliance by the offender, to 
take the necessary steps itself and to recover the costs of doing so from the person in 
question.211 
The penalty, provided by section 57 for this offence is, for a first conviction, a 
maximum fine of five hundred rand or imprisonment for a maximum of six months or 
both.  A second conviction carries a fine of not more than R1 000 or one year’s 
imprisonment or both.  In the case of a third or subsequent conviction, the maximum fine 
is R1 500 or two years’ imprisonment or both.  These penalties are somewhat on the low 
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side and are unlikely in themselves to pose a considerable deterrent.  Coupled with 
liability for the remedial costs of the local authority, however, and it may be that the 
section does have adequate deterrent effect. 
This type of provision is the ideal environmental law provision.  The initial 
enforcement mechanism is the notice.  The authority concerned requires the person to do 
something to remedy an undesirable state of affairs.  If the notice is heeded, the objective 
of the legislation is served without much burden being suffered by the enforcing 
authority.  Failure to comply with the notice is an offence and non-compliance would, in 
most cases, not be likely to raise difficult problems of proof.  Since the Act also provides 
for the authority to take remedial measures upon default of the person receiving the 
notice, the environment is protected and/or harm mitigated.  There is compliance with the 
polluter pays principle due to the defaulter being responsible for the authority’s costs in 
carrying out the necessary activities. 
This system, which uses criminal law as a back-up to the primary enforcement 
mechanism (the notice) is an efficient one.  The notice would serve to put people on their 
guard and consequently issues of mens rea would not be likely to present problems in 
prosecutions for failure to comply with the notice. 
This provision works along similar lines to the process envisaged in section 28 of the 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (discussed in the following 
chapter), but operates in a far simpler manner.  Another significant difference is that 
section 28 does not provide for criminal prosecution in event of non-compliance. 
There are no reported cases dealing with section 27. 
 
11  Dumping at Sea Control Act 73 of 1980 
 
This Act provides, as the name suggests, for the control of dumping of substances in the 
sea.  It puts into effect for South Africa the requirements of the Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 1972 (the so-
called London Convention).   The main offences under this Act are three types of 
dumping of substances at sea. 
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11.1 Dumping of substances at sea 
 
According to section 2, 
(1) Any person who –  
(a) dumps any substance mentioned in Schedule 1;  
 (b)(i) dumps any substance mentioned in Schedule 2; 
(ii) loads any such substance onto any vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure at 
sea for dumping; or 
(iii) deliberately disposes at sea of any vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure, 
except under the authority of and in accordance with the provisions of a special permit under section 
3;212 or 
(c) (i) dumps any other substance; or 
(ii) loads any such substance on to any vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure at 
sea for dumping, except under the authority of and in accordance with the provisions of a 
general permit under section 3, 
shall be guilty of an offence, unless the substance in question was dumped for the purpose of saving 
human life or of securing the safety of the vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure at 
sea in question or any other vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure at sea or of 
preventing damage to the vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure at sea in question or 
to any other vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure at sea, and such dumping was 
necessary for such purpose or was a reasonable step to take in the circumstances. 
(2) The onus of proving any exception, exemption or qualification contemplated in subsection (1) 
shall be upon the accused. 
(3)  If any person who commits an offence referred to in subsection (1) is not the master or owner of 
the vessel, or the pilot or owner of the aircraft, in question, or person in charge of or the owner of the 
platform or other man-made structure in question, the master of such vessel or pilot of such aircraft 
or person so in charge and, if he is not the owner of such vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-
made structure, also the owner thereof, shall in addition to the person who committed the said 
offence, be guilty of an offence, unless such master or pilot or person so in charge, and such owner, 
where he is not such master or pilot or person so in charge, proves that he did not permit or connive 
at such first-mentioned offence and that he took all reasonable measures, in addition to forbidding it, 
to prevent such offence being committed 
The prohibitions in this section apply in respect of the ‘sea’, which is defined as the 
territorial waters of the Republic213 and includes the sea between the high- and low-water 
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marks.214  The provisions of section 2 in respect of any South African vessel,215 aircraft216 
or citizen, apply mutatis mutandis also on the high seas, including the fishing zone.217 
The Act also applies in respect of the Prince Edward Islands.  
Section 2 provides for three separate offences: (1) dumping a Schedule 1 substance; 
(2) dumping or loading for dumping of Schedule 2 substances without a special permit; 
and (3) dumping or loading any other substance without a general permit. 
 
Dumping a Schedule 1 substance 
‘Dump’ in relation to any substance, means to deliberately dispose of at sea from any 
vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure, by incinerating or depositing in the 
sea and includes the disposal of any vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure 
at sea.218  It does not include to dispose at sea of any substance incidental to or derived 
from the normal operations of any vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure 
and its equipment, other than dispose of any substance from any vessel, aircraft, platform 
or other man-made structure operated for the purpose of disposing of such substance at 
sea.  Nor does it include the lawful deposit at sea of any substance for a purpose other 
than the mere disposal thereof.  Also excluded is the disposal at sea of wastes or other 
matter directly arising from or related to the exploration, exploitation and associated off-
shore processing of sea-bed mineral resources. 
The requirement that the disposal be ‘deliberate’ suggests that the mens rea 
requirement for this offence is intention.  The prohibition relates to substances mentioned 
in Schedule 1, and is an absolute prohibition: these substances may not be dumped under 
any circumstances, save those set out in the exception.  Schedule 1 substances, termed 
prohibited substances, are: organohalogen compounds; mercury and its compounds; 
cadmium and its compounds; persistent plastics and other persistent synthetic materials; 
                                                                                                                                                 
213 As defined in s 2 of the Territorial Waters act 87 of 1963. 
214  Section 1. 
215  Any vessel registered in the Republic in terms of the Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951: s 2(8). 
216  Any aircraft registered in the Republic: s 2(8). 
217  Section 2(6).  ‘Fishing zone’ is as defined in s 3 of the Territorial Waters Act 87 of 1963.   
218  Section 1. 
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high-level radio-active waste or other high-level radio-active matter prescribed by 
regulation with the concurrence of the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs; and 
substances in whatever form produced for biological and chemical warfare. 
The penalty for this offence is a fine not exceeding R250 000 or imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding five years or both such fine and such imprisonment and in addition, 
if the offence was committed over a period of more than one day, a fine not exceeding R5 
000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months in respect of every day during 
which the offence continued.219  The same penalty applies to any master, pilot, owner or 
person in charge mentioned in s 2(3) convicted in terms of s 2(1)(a) where such 
conviction is in pursuance of an offence by any other person.220: 
 
Dumping or loading for dumping of Schedule 2 substances without a special permit 
Schedule 2 substances, termed restricted substances, are: arsenic and its compounds; lead 
and its compounds; copper and its compounds; zinc and its compounds; organosilicon 
compounds; cyanides; fluorides; pesticides and their by-products (those not included in 
Schedule 1); beryllium and its compounds; chromium and its compounds; nickel and its 
compounds; vanadium and its compounds; containers, scrap metal and any substances or 
articles that by reason of their bulk may interfere with fishing or navigation; radio-active 
waste or other radio-active matter (such as are not in Schedule 1); and ammunition. 
A special permit may be granted in terms of section 3, which provides that, after 
consultation with a Standing Committee consisting of persons appointed by the Minister 
of Industries for purposes of this section, the Secretary of Industries may on application 
and after taking into account the factors set out in Schedule 3, grant a special permit 
authorizing the dumping, on such conditions as the Secretary may think fit to attach to 
such permit, of any substance mentioned in Schedule 2; and/or the disposal at sea, on 
such conditions as the Secretary may think fit to attach to such permit, of any vessel,221 
aircraft,222 platform or other man-made structure.223  
                                                 
219  Section 6(1)(a). 
220  Section 6(2)(a). 
221 Waterborne craft of any type whatsoever, whether self-propelled or not: s 1. 
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The penalty for this offence is a fine not exceeding R100 000 or imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding two years or both such fine and such imprisonment and in addition, 
if the offence was committed over a period of more than one day, a fine not exceeding R2 
000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two months in respect of every day 
during which the offence continued.224 The same penalty applies to any master, pilot, 
owner or person in charge mentioned in s 2(3) convicted in terms of s 2(1)(b) where such 
conviction is in pursuance of an offence by any other person.225  
 
Dumping or loading any other substance without a general permit 
‘Any other substance’ means any substance other than those mentioned in Schedules 1 
and 2 and excluding any vessel, aircraft, platform or other man-made structure.  Such 
substance may be disposed of at sea in terms of a general permit granted in the same 
manner as is a special permit.  The general permit is also granted on such conditions as 
the Secretary may think fit to attach to it.   
The penalty for this offence is a fine not exceeding R5 000 or imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding six months or both such fine and such imprisonment and in addition 
if the offence was committed over a period of more than one day, a fine not exceeding 
R500 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 18 days in respect of every day during 
which the offence continued.226 The same penalty applies to any master, pilot, owner or 
person in charge mentioned in s 2(3) convicted in terms of s 2(1)(c) where such 
conviction is in pursuance of an offence by any other person.227  
 
11.2 Contravention of regulations 
 
The Minister may make regulations- 
                                                                                                                                                 
223  Section 3(1)(a). 
224  Section 6(1)(b). 
225  Section 6(2)(b). 
226  Section 6(1)(c). 
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(a)  prescribing the form of applications for permits and other documents which may be 
necessary for the carrying out of the provisions of this Act; 
(b)  prescribing the form of such permits and documents, the periods for which they shall 
be valid and, after consultation with the Minister of Finance, the fees or other charges 
which shall be paid in connection therewith and with the said applications; 
(c)  prescribing the manner in which water or any other substance used for the cleaning of 
any vessel or aircraft may be disposed of; 
(d)  prescribing the signals to be used or displayed with regard to any dumping under a 
special or general permit granted under section 3 (1) (a) (i) or (b); 
(e)  as to any matters which in terms of this Act are required or permitted to be prescribed 
by regulation, 
and, in general, as to all matters which he considers it necessary or expedient to prescribe 
in order that the purposes of this Act may be achieved. 
It is an offence to contravene or fail to comply with the provisions of a regulation.228 
There are regulations229 made in terms of section 8 of the Act that provide for the 
application process for permits.  They also provide for a duty to report any dumping or 
disposal which has been made pursuant to any exception, exemption or qualification 
contemplated in section 2(1).  There are also reporting requirements in respect of 
dumping and disposal that has been the subject of permits in terms of the Act.  Any 
contravention of any provision of these regulations is an offence and subject to the 
penalties provided for in section 8(2) of the Act. 
 
11.3 Procedural Aspects 
 
If any person charged with having committed an offence under s 2(1), as applied by 
section 2(6), is found within the area of jurisdiction of any court in the Republic which 
                                                 
228 Section 8(2) by implication.  This subsection prescribes a penalty not exceeding a fine of R5 000 or 
imprisonment for a period of six months. 
229  GN R1135 GG 11348 of 17 June 1998. 
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would have had jurisdiction to try the offence if it had been committed within the said 
area, the court shall have jurisdiction to try the offence.230   
Moreover, if any person is charged with having committed any offence under this Act 
on or in the sea, any court whose area of jurisdiction abuts on or includes any part of the 
sea may try the charge, and the offence shall, for all purposes incidental to or 
consequential upon the trying of the charge, be deemed to have been committed within 
the area of jurisdiction of the court so hearing it.231  Also, in any prosecution for a 
contravention of this Act based on any act alleged to have been performed in a particular 
area, the act in question shall be deemed to have been performed in such area; and any 
information obtained by means of any instrument or chart used to determine any distance 
or depth, shall be deemed to be correct, unless the contrary is proved.232 
 
11.4 Vicarious liability 
 
Section 2(3) provides for vicarious liability of the owner and master/pilot/person in 
charge of the vessel, aircraft or platform as the case may be.  Liability may be avoided if 
the person in question proves that he did not ‘permit or connive at’ the offence and that 
he or she ‘took all reasonable measures, in addition to forbidding [the conduct in 
question], to prevent the offence being committed’.  Insofar as this section imposes a 
reverse onus on the accused, it would most likely fall foul of the Constitution, if the 





This Act consists largely of the offences described above, which are the only enforcement 
mechanism provided for.  The heavy penalties reflect the seriousness with which the 
                                                 
230  Section 2(7). 
231  Section 7(1). 
232  Section 7(2). 
233  1997 (3) SA 527 (CC). 
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various offences of dumping at sea, especially in respect of the Scheduled substances, are 
seen.  Unfortunately, however, the Act is a very difficult one to enforce from a practical 
point of view, which is perhaps reflected by the apparent lack of prosecutions under this 
Act.   
 
12  Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act 6 of 1981 
 
This Act used to be called the ‘Prevention and Combating of the Sea by Oil Act’ which 
gives a good indication of its purpose.  The Act contains several offences, mainly of a 
technical/administrative nature.  The offences worth examining for present purposes are 
as follows: 
 
12.1 Discharge of oil 
 
This offence is provided for in section 2 of the Act, which has been repealed.234  The 
repealing provision, however, has yet to be out into operation (despite having been 
Gazetted four years ago).  Although the offence remains technically in force, the 
definition of ‘discharge’ in relation to oil has been replaced, making it unlikely that 
section 2(1) will be enforced again before its repeal comes into effect.  For this reason, it 
will not be discussed here. 
 
12.2 Failure to report discharge 
 
                                                 
234  By s 28 of the Shipping General Amendment Act 23 of 1997. 
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When any harmful substance235 has been discharged236 from a ship,237 tanker238 or 
offshore installation239 the master240 of such ship, tanker or offshore installation, or any 
member of the crew of such ship or tanker or of the staff employed in connection with 
such offshore installation, designated by such master, shall forthwith by the quickest 
means of communication available report the fact that such discharge has taken place to 
the principal officer241 at the port in the Republic nearest to where such ship, tanker or 
offshore installation is.242  In addition, if, while it is within the prohibited area,243 a ship 
                                                 
235  Defined as any substance which, if introduced into the sea, is likely to create a hazard to human health, 
harm living resources and marine life, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, 
and includes oil and any other substance subject to control by MARPOL 1973/78 (the convention contained 
in the Schedule to the Marine Pollution (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act of 1986), and mixtures of 
such substances and water or any other substance.   
236  ‘Discharge’ means, in relation to a harmful substance, any release, howsoever caused, from a ship, a 
tanker or an offshore installation into a part of the sea which is a prohibited area, and includes any escape, 
disposal, spilling, leaking, pumping, emitting or emptying and ‘discharge’ when used as a verb has a 
corresponding meaning: s 1(1). 
237  ‘Ship’ means any kind of vessel or other sea-borne object from which oil can be discharged, excluding a 
tanker, whether or not such vessel or object has been lost or abandoned, has stranded, is in distress, disabled 
or damaged, has been wrecked, has broken up or has sunk: s 1(1). 
238  ‘Tanker’ is any seagoing vessel of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and in 
respect of which the provisions of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
1969, are applicable: s 1(1). 
239  An ‘offshore installation’ is a facility situated wholly or partly within a prohibited area and which is 
used for the transfer of harmful substances from a ship or tanker to a point on land or from a point on land 
to a ship or tanker or from a bunkering vessel to a ship or tanker, and includes any exploration or 
production platform situated within the prohibited area and used in prospecting for or the mining of natural 
oil: s 1(1). 
240  ‘Master’ means, in elation to a ship or tanker, any person (other than a pilot) having charge or command 
of such ship or tanker and, in relation to an offshore installation, means the person in charge thereof. 
241  The officer in charge of the office of the Marine Division of the Department of Transport at any port: s 
1(1). 
242  Section 3(1). 
243 Defined as the internal waters, the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone and, in relation to 
an offshore installation, includes the sea within the limits of the continental shelf: s 1(1). 
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or a tanker sustains any damage, whether to its hull, equipment or machinery, which 
causes, or creates the likelihood of, a discharge of any harmful substance from such ship 
or tanker, or having sustained such damage, enters the prohibited area in such damaged 
condition, the master of such ship or tanker, or any member of its crew designated by the 
master, shall forthwith by the quickest means of communication available report to the 
principal officer at the port in the Republic nearest to where such ship or tanker then is 
the fact that such damage was sustained, the nature and location on the ship or tanker of 
the damage, the position at sea where the damage was sustained, the name of the ship or 
tanker, its port of registry, its official number, its position, its course and, if in the 
Republic, its destination, the quantity and type of oil on board and, in the case of a tanker 
to which the provisions of section 13244 apply, the particulars contained in the 
certificate.245  For the purposes of this subsection damage to a ship or a tanker shall be 
deemed to have created the likelihood of a discharge of a harmful substance from such 
ship or tanker if it is of such a nature as to detrimentally affect, in any degree, the ship's 
or tanker’s seaworthiness or efficient working.246 
It is an offence for the master of a ship or a tanker to fail to comply with the above 
provisions or for the master of an offshore installation to fail to comply with the 
provisions of s 3(1).247  The penalty is a fine not exceeding R25 000 or imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding six months or both such fine and such imprisonment.248 
 
12.3 Failure to comply with requirements of Authority 
 
Section 4 deals with the powers of the South African Maritime Safety Authority to 
take steps to prevent marine pollution in cases of actual or likely discharge of 
hazardous substances.  The section provides that  
                                                 
244  This section provides for compulsory insurance for tankers carrying more than 2 000 long tons of oil as 
cargo. 
245  Section 3(2). 
246  Section 3(3). 
247  Section 3(4). 
248  Section 30(2)(a). 
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(1) If any oil is being discharged or is in the opinion of the Authority likely to be discharged 
from a ship or a tanker the Authority may, with a view to preventing the pollution or further 
pollution of the sea by such oil, require the master or the owner of such ship or tanker or both such 
master and owner- 
 (a) (i)  to unload the oil from the ship or tanker or oil from a specified part of the ship or tanker; 
 (ii) to transfer oil from a specified part of the ship or tanker to another specified part of the 
ship or tanker; 
(iii) to dispose of any oil so unloaded or transferred, 
in such manner and within such period as the Authority may direct if he deems fit to do so; 
(b) to move the ship or tanker or cause the ship or tanker to be moved to a place specified by the 
Authority; 
(c) not to move the ship or tanker from a place specified by the Authority, except with the 
approval of the Authority and in accordance with the conditions subject to which such 
approval was granted; 
(d) not to unload any cargo or oil, or any cargo or oil specified by the Authority, from the ship or 
tanker except with the approval of the Authority and in accordance with the conditions 
subject to which such approval was granted; 
(e) to carry out such operations for the sinking or destruction of the ship or tanker, or any part 
thereof, or the destruction of the oil on the ship or tanker, or such quantity thereof, as the 
Authority may specify; 
(f) to steer such course, while the ship or tanker is within the prohibited area, as the Authority 
may specify; 
 (g) to obtain the services of one or more suitable vessels to stand by such ship or tanker during a 
period determined by the Authority; 
 (h) to take such other steps in regard to the ship or tanker or its cargo or the oil therein or both 
the ship or tanker and its cargo or the oil therein as may be specified by the Authority, to 
prevent the discharge or further discharge of oil from the ship or tanker.   
The provisions of sections (1)(a), (d), (g) and (h) shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect 
of hazardous substances discharged or, in the opinion of the Authority, likely to be 
discharged from an offshore installation.249 
If, in the opinion of the Authority, the master and the owner of the ship or tanker in 
question are or would be incapable of complying with such a requirement or could not 
reasonably be expected to comply with such requirement, or the powers conferred upon 
the Authority in terms of s 4(1) are inadequate for the purpose there contemplated, the 
                                                 
249  Section 4(4). 
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Authority may cause any such steps to be taken as he has power to require to be taken in 
terms of the said subsection.250 Any reference to the power of the Authority to require 
steps to be taken in terms of this subsection, includes a reference to the power of the 
Authority in terms of that subsection to require that a specified step be not taken.251 
In addition, if any person performs salvage operations in connection with a ship or 
tanker, any requirement of the Authority in terms of s 4(1) in connection with such ship 
or tanker or its cargo or oil shall also be made known to such salvor, and any such 
requirement that a specified step be not taken shall thereafter, unless the Authority 
otherwise directs, also be binding upon such salvor and any such requirement that a 
specified act be performed shall, unless the Authority otherwise directs, also be construed 
as a requirement in terms of that subsection and binding upon such salvor that no steps be 
taken by such salvor which would obstruct or be likely to obstruct the performance of the 
specified act.252 
It is an offence for any person wilfully to fail to comply with an order or requirement 
of the Authority in terms of s 4(1) and section 4 (2)(c).253  The penalty is a fine not 
exceeding R200 000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or both such 
fine and such imprisonment.254 
 
12.4 Other offences 
 
There are several other offences in terms of this Act, including the following: 
 Failure to comply with an order by the Authority in connection with prevention or 
removal of marine pollution by harmful substances 
 Failure to comply with an order to move a ship or tanker 
 Tanker’s leaving port without an insurance certificate 
 Failure to produce such certificate 
                                                 
250  Section 4(2)(a). 
251  Section 4(2)(b). 
252  Section 4(2)(c). 
253  Section 30(1)(b). 
254  Section 30(2)(d). 
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 Failure to return cancelled certificate 
 Rendering ship incapable of sailing 
 Transferring oil within prohibited area 
 Obstructing Authority in case of default by master or owner  
 Operation of offshore installation without safety certificate 
 Failure to comply with regulations 
These are either peripheral to environmental issues or of a relatively technical nature (or 
both) and will not be discussed in further detail here. 
 
12.5 Procedural Aspects 
 
Jurisdiction of courts 
No prosecution in respect of an offence under this Act shall be instituted except on the 
authority, which may be given in writing or otherwise, of the attorney-general having 
jurisdiction in the area of the court in question.255  Any offence under this Act shall, for 
purposes in relation to jurisdiction of a court to try the offence, be deemed to have been 
committed at any place where the accused happens to be.256  
 
Summary enquiry procedure 
The Act provides that if any person admits to the Authority that he has contravened any 
provision of this Act, or that he has failed to comply with any such provision with which 
it was his duty to comply; agrees to abide by the decision of the Authority; and deposits 
with the Authority such sum as that officer may require of him, but not exceeding the 
maximum fine which may be imposed upon a conviction for the contravention or failure 
in question, the Authority may, after such enquiry as he deems necessary, determine the 
matter summarily and may, without legal proceedings, order by way of penalty the whole 
or any part of the said deposit to be forfeited.257  There shall be a right of appeal to the 
                                                 
255  Section 20(3). 
256  Section 20(4). 
257  Section 30(3). 
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Minister, whose decision shall be final, from such a determination or order of the 
Authority whereby a penalty exceeding R2 000 is imposed, provided such right is 
exercised within a period of three months from the date of such determination or order.  
The imposition of a penalty under s 30(3) shall be deemed not to be a conviction of an 





This Act contains several offences but also has alternative enforcement measures that are 
worth commentary.  First, there are several procedures provided for whereby the 
Maritime Safety Authority can take steps to prevent pollution of the sea by harmful 
substances, including ordering the master or owner of ships to take specified measures.  
Failure to comply with this primary enforcement measure is a criminal offence – so the 
criminal sanctions in this case work as back-up. 
Where the criminal sanctions are utilised, the penalties provided for are substantial, 
reflecting the seriousness of the marine pollution problems (including oil pollution) that 
the Act is designed to address. 
Finally, the summary enquiry procedure in section 30(3) is an interesting provision.  
This is designed to avoid costly and time-consuming court appearances and would serve 
the same deterrent effect as the criminal sanction, whilst still providing some safeguard to 
the offender who has the right of appeal.  It is quite possible that the penalties meted out 
by the Authority could be more stringent than those imposed by a court, given the 
judiciary’s propensity at times not to view environmental offences as serious.  This is 
certainly a provision that could usefully be utilised in other legislation. 
 
13 Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983 
 
                                                 
258  Section 30(5). 
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This Act is concerned with the control over the utilisation of agricultural resources.  It has 
particular focus on conservation of soil, water sources and vegetation.  It also deals with 
combating of weeds and invader plants.  The offences, other than those relating to 
administration of the Act and those that are not directly relating to conservation matters, 
are as follows: 
13.1 Prohibition of the spreading of weeds 
 
Section 5(1) provides that no person shall sell, agree to sell or offer, advertise, keep, 
exhibit, transmit, send, convey or deliver for sale, or exchange for anything or dispose of 
to any person in any manner for consideration, any weed or in any other manner 
whatsoever disperse or cause or permit the disposal of any weed from any place in the 
Republic to any place in the Republic. A ‘weed’ is any kind of plant which has under s 
2(3) been declared a weed, and includes the seed of such plant and any vegetative part of 
such plant which reproduces itself asexually.259  The latest list of weeds includes plants 
such as Triffid Weed, Lantana, Bugweed and Mauritius Thorn.260  In addition, the 
executive officer261 may issue an order on a person either (i) to take certain steps 
(including to return to the place of origin or to remove the weed) a weed from any seed, 
grain, hay or other agricultural product,262 or (ii) to remove a weed that is adhering to an 
animal driven on a public road, conveyed in a vehicle or offered for sale at a livestock 
auction.263 
Contravention of the general prohibition in subsection (1) or failure to comply with an 
order of the executive officer is an offence.264  The penalty is a maximum fine of R5 000 
or two years imprisonment or both for a first conviction.265  A subsequent conviction (for 
                                                 
259  Section 1. 
260  GN R 280 in GG 2166 of 30 March 2001, amending the original list in GN R 1048 of 25 may 1984. 
261  Appointed in terms of s 4. 
262  Section 5(2). 
263  Section 5(3). 
264  Section 5(6). 
265  Section 23(1)(a). 
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the same offence or any other offence mentioned in s 23(1)(a)) attracts a maximum fine 
of R10 000 or imprisonment for not more than four years or both.266 
                                                 
266  Section 23(1)(b). 
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13.2 Failure to comply with control measures 
 
Section 6 provides for the Minister to prescribe control measures in order to achieve the 
objects of the Act.  These measures apply to specified land users.267  They may relate to 
issues like the utilisation and protection of vleis, marshes, water sponges, water courses 
and water sources, and utilisation and protection of vegetation.  Control measures have 
been declared in respect of cultivation of virgin soil, cultivation on land with a slope, and 
protection against erosion amongst other matters.268  Any land user who refuses or fails to 
comply with any control measure which is binding on him or her shall be guilty of an 
offence.  The penalty is as for the previous offence (see 13.1 above). 
In S v Buys,269 the Natal Provincial Division held that negligence was sufficient fault 
for the offence of contravening a control measure.270 
 
13.3 Failure to comply with directions 
 
Section 7 provides for the executive officer by means of a direction to order a land user to 
comply with a particular control measure binding on the user or on the land specified in 
the direction, or if it is in the opinion of the executive officer essential in order to achieve 
                                                 
267  A ‘land user’ is defined in s 1 as the owner of land and includes – 
(a)  any person who has a personal or real right in respect of any land in his capacity as fiduciary, 
fideicommissary, servitude holder, possessor. Lessee or occupier, irrespective of whether he resides 
thereon; 
(b)  any person who has the right to cut trees or wood on land or to remove trees, wood or other organic 
material from land; and 
(c)  in relation to land under the control of a local authority, that local authority, 
but not a person who carries on prospecting or mining activities. 
268  GN R1048 in GG 9238 of 25 May 1984 as amended by GN R267 in GG 10029 of 6 December 1985 
and GN R 280 in GG 2166 of 30 March 2001. 
269  1988 (3) SA 789 (N). 
270  The case involved other issues relating to the regulations in terms of which the control measure was 
declared.  The Court found on these in favour of the State and this was confirmed by the Appellate 
Division: S v Buys 1990 (1) SA 101 (A). 
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the objects of the Act, to perform or not to perform any other specified at on or with 
regard to the land in question.271  A land user who fails to receive a direction served on 
him or her in the prescribed manner is guilty of an offence.  The penalty for this offence 
is a maximum fine of R500 or imprisonment for a period of not more than three months 
or both.272 
A second offence is the refusal or failure to comply with a direction binding on the 
land user in question.  The penalty for this offence is as for the offences described in 13.1 
and 13.2. 
In S v Claassen en ‘n ander,273 the Court was concerned with a direction issued under 
section 3(1) of the Soil Conservation Act,274 the precursor of the Conservation of 
Agricultural Resources Act.  The accused in this case was arguing that he genuinely 
believed that the direction had been suspended because a request had been made to the 
Minister to reconsider the direction.  The Court held that the contravention of the section 
in question required mens rea, which meant that the state was required to rebut the 
accused’s defence beyond reasonable doubt.   
 
13.4 Failure to comply with conditions for assistance in terms of a scheme 
 
Section 8 of the Act provides for schemes which provide financial assistance to land 
users in order to carry out activities aimed at the objectives of the Act, like construction 
of soil conservation works and eradication of weeds.  If a person, after his or her 
application for participation in a scheme has been approved, refuses or fails to comply 
with the provisions of the scheme, he or she shall be guilty of an offence.275  The penalty 
is a maximum fine of R500 or imprisonment for a period of not more than three months 
or both.276 
                                                 
271  Section 7(1). 
272  Section 23(1)(c). 
273  1974 (2) SA 364 (O). 
274  Act 76 of 1969. 
275  Section 9(2)(a). 
276  Section 23(1)(c). 
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Moreover, if a person refuses or fails to satisfy the conditions on which assistance has 
been rendered in terms of a scheme or are in terms of a scheme deemed to have been so 
rendered, is guilty of an offence.  The penalty is as for the offences discussed in 13.1 and 
13.2 above. 
 
13.5 Failure to maintain soil conservation work 
 
Where a soil conservation work has been established, land users on the land in question 
must maintain the work at their own expense.277  The executive officer may order a land 
user to do so if he becomes aware of any refusal or failure to do so.278  Failure or refusal 
to maintain a soil conservation work or to comply with the executive officer’s order is an 
offence.279  The penalty is as for the offences described in 13.1 and 13.2 above. 
 
13.6 Failure to comply with conditions of authorisation 
 
Any person who refuses or fails to comply with the conditions on which any approval, 
authorization or consent has been granted in terms of this Act or a scheme shall be guilty 
of an offence.280  The penalty is a maximum fine of R500 or imprisonment for a period of 
not more than three months or both.281 
 
13.7 Failure to comply with regulations 
 
Section 29, which empowers the Minister to make regulations dealing with various issues 
that are within the objectives of the Act, provides that any regulation may prescribe 
                                                 
277  Section 12(1). 
278  Section 12(3). 
279  Section 12(5). 
280  Section 20(5). 
281  Section 23(1)(c). 
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penalties, not exceeding a fine of R500 or imprisonment for a period of three months or 
both, for any contravention of or failure to comply with its provisions.282 
 
13.8 Presumptions and evidence 
 
The Act provides for several presumptions in respect of any prosecution under the Act.  
First, it is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the applicable provisions of the 
Act apply to the land on or in respect of which the offence concerned has allegedly been 
committed.283  This is a mysterious provision in that it cannot be unduly onerous for the 
state to prove this fact.  Should reliance on the provision lead to an accused’s being 
convicted despite the presence of reasonable doubt as to whether he or she committed the 
offence, it would be unconstitutional.  Since it is difficult to speculate as to how the 
provision might be invoked, it is not possible to declare with any more certainty how this 
presumption might fare in respect of the presumption of innocence. 
There are also two presumptions relating to directions.  The first presumes that a 
document purporting to be certified by the executive officer as a true copy of the original 
of a direction shall be admitted in evidence without any further proof or production of the 
original.284  This appears to be more in the nature of a ‘deeming’ provision than a 
presumption since there is no provision for rebuttal.  This provision must be read in 
conjunction with s 24(c), which provides that it shall be presumed that the direction in 
question was either published in the Gazette or served by written notice on the individual 
in question, as the case may be and in accordance with the executive officer’s 
endorsement on the copy.  The accused may rebut this presumption.  It would seem 
unnecessary for there to be a presumption that a direction was published in the Gazette, 
since this could easily be proved.  In addition, it would be relatively easy to establish a 
system for serving directions that provides proof of such service (in the same way that 
summonses, for instance, are served).  The presumption, then, seems to be questionable. 
                                                 
282  Section 29(3). 
283  Section 24(a). 
284  Section 24(b). 
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The third presumption of interest here is one to the effect that it is presumed, unless 
the contrary is proved, that a soil conservation work which has been altered, removed or 
destroyed, was so altered, removed or destroyed without the executive officer having 
issued an order allowing such action; and by the person who was the land user in respect 
of the land concerned on the date on which the executive officer became aware of such 
alteration, removal or destruction.285  Whilst it would be almost impossible in many cases 
for the state to prove the identity of the person who altered, removed or destroyed a soil 
conservation work, this presumption could operate in such a way as to lead to conviction 
of an innocent land user unable to explain the fate of the soil conservation work on his or 
her land.  The very difficult evidentiary hurdle for the state that would exist without this 
presumption could be obviated by dealing with the problem by means other than the 
criminal sanction.  Why use criminal prosecution when it would be possible simply to 
issue a direction to the land user requiring him or her to take steps to put the soil 
conservation work back to its original state.  The identity of the person responsible for 
damage, alteration or removal would not be important if this was the response used. 
In summary, then, the presumptions in the Act286 are all problematic.  They either 
serve questionable purposes since proof of the presumed fact is not apparently difficult at 
all or, alternatively, difficulties of proof could be avoided by using enforcement methods 




Although the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act does make use of several 
criminal offences, other modes of enforcement are used: primarily control measures, 
directions and schemes.  Criminal sanctions are brought into play if persons fail to 
comply with these measures.  Criminal law is thus used in a subsidiary role as far as these 
                                                 
285  Section 24(d). 
286  There is a further presumption relating to damage, removal etc. of a beacon or mark.  Since this offence 
has not been discussed here, the presumption is similarly excluded from discussion. 
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matters are concerned, but it is the primary mode of enforcement in respect of other 
issues – control of weeds, for example. 
 
14  Marine Pollution (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 2 of 1986 
 
This Act is aimed at giving effect to the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, 1973 and provides for the protection of the sea from pollution by 
oil and other harmful substances discharged from ships.  Although the Act itself contain 
an ‘offences and penalties’ provision, there are no offences explicitly provided for in the 
Act.    Section 3A provides that any person who contravenes any provision of the Act or 
the Convention or who fails to comply with any provision thereof which it is his or her 
duty to comply, shall be guilty of an offence.287  The Convention itself contains no 
provisions that could be contravened by an individual, but there are extensive 
requirements in the Protocol (concerning reports on incidents involving harmful 
substances) and regulations to the Convention for the control of oil pollution; control of 
pollution by noxious liquid substances in bulk and prevention of pollution by harmful 
substances carried by sea in packaged form that contain numerous duties, most of a very 
technical nature that, if contravened by an individual, would amount to an offence in 
terms of section 3A.   
 
14.1 Offences in regulations 
 
The Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships regulations288 curiously provide that 
any person guilty of failing to comply with the regulations is guilty of an offence and 
subject to a maximum fine of R20 000 or two years imprisonment or both, yet the 
regulations contain no substantive provisions that may be contravened!  The Reception 
Facilities for Garbage from Ships regulations289 provide for the power of harbour 
                                                 
287  Section 3A(1)(a). 
288  GN R1490 in GG 14000 of 29 May 1992. 
289  GN R1491 in GG 14000 of 29 May 1992. 
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authorities or terminal operators to provide for or contract for reception facilities for 
garbage from ships.  Regulation 4 makes provision for the Director-General of Transport 
to direct an authority to provide or arrange for the provision of such facilities, where such 
facilities are inadequate.  Failure to comply with such a direction is an offence punishable 




This Act does not add much to the overall analysis.  Of note is the summary enquiry 
procedure which is of almost identical nature to that provided for in the Marine Pollution 
(Control and Civil Liability) Act.291 
 
15 Marine Pollution (Intervention) 64 of 1987 
 
This Act gives effect to the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High 
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties.  The Act contains no offences. 
 
16 Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 
 
According to its long title, the Environment Conservation Act aims at providing for the 
effective protection and controlled utilization of the environment.  It was the principal 
‘framework’ environmental legislation in South Africa from its enactment until early 
1999, when the National Environmental Management Act292 came into force.  The latter 
Act also repealed much of the Environment Conservation Act.  This Act, however, 
contains several provisions dealing with aspects not addressed by other legislation that 
remain in force and for which offences are provided.  These include waste management, 
certain types of protected areas and environmental impact assessment procedures, at least 
                                                 
290  Reg 6. 
291  Act 6 of 1981.  See discussion in §12.5 above. 
292  Act 107 of 1998. 
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for the time being.293  The offences under the Environment Conservation Act are as 
follows: 
 
16.1 Contravention of provision of direction relating to protected natural environment 
 
Section 16 provides for the declaration of any areas to be a protected natural environment 
(PNE).  This does not entail the state becoming the owner of land incorporated into the 
PNE.  According to section 16(2), the competent authority294 may issue directions in 
respect of any land or water in a PNE in order to achieve the general policy and objects of 
the Act.  Every owner of, and every holder of a real right in, land situated within a PNE 
in respect of which directions have been issued, and their successors in title, is subject to 
the provisions of the directions.295  Contravention of a provision of a direction or failure 
to comply with a direction is an offence.296  The penalty is a maximum fine of R8 000 or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or both. 
 
16.2 Offences in respect of special nature reserves 
 
The Minister may, in terms of section 18, declare any land to be a special nature reserve.  
No person shall gain admittance to a special nature reserve or perform any activity in or 
on a special nature reserve.297  The following may be exempted in writing from this 
prohibition: any scientist occupied with a specific project; any officer charged with 
specific duties or any other person desiring to view a special nature reserve on account of 
                                                 
293  The EIA procedures provided for in the Environment Conservation Act (ECA) are to be replaced by 
procedures declared in terms of the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA).  The relevant 
provisions in the ECA have been repealed, but such repeal takes place only when regulations are made in 
terms of NEMA.  This is discussed in more detail below. 
294  This is defined as, in so far as a provision of the Act is applied within or with reference to a particular 
province, the competent authority to whom the administration of this Act has under s 235(8) of the 
Constitution of RSA been assigned in that province: s 1.  
295  Section 16(3). 
296  Section 29(2)(a). 
297  Section 18(6). 
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its special nature or characteristics.  Such exemption is granted subject to a process set 
out in section 18(7) and may be granted subject to conditions.  Contravention of s 18(6) 
(by, for example, entering a special nature reserve while not exempted) or failure to 
comply with a condition of an exemption under s 18(7) is an offence.298  The penalty is as 
for the previous offence. 
 
16.3 Establishing, providing or operating a disposal site without a permit 
 
It is an offence for any person to establish, provide or operate any disposal site without a 
permit issued by the Minister of Water Affairs.299  The penalty is a fine not exceeding 
R100 000 or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or both such fine and such 
imprisonment, and a fine not exceeding three times the value of any thing in respect of 
which the offence was committed.  The same penalty applies for failure to comply with 
any condition of the permit.    The elements of this offence which require explanation, are 
(i) disposal site and (ii) without a permit. 
 
(i)  disposal site 
A disposal site is a site used for the accumulation of waste with the purpose of disposing 
or treatment of such waste.300  Waste, in terms of the Act, is any matter, whether gaseous, 
liquid or solid or any combination thereof, which is from time to time designated by the 
Minister by notice in the Gazette as an undesirable or superfluous by-product, emission, 
residue or remainder of any process or activity.301  The Minister has designated the 
following as waste:  an undesirable or superfluous by-product, emission, residue or 
remainder of any process or activity, any matter, gaseous, liquid or solid or any 
combination thereof, originating from any residential, commercial or industrial area, 
which - 
(a)  is discarded by any person; or 
                                                 
298  Section 29(2)(b). 
299  Section 20(1) read with s 29(4). 
300  Section 1. 
301  Ibid. 
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(b)  is accumulated and stored by any person with the purpose of eventually discarding it 
with or without prior treatment connected with the discarding thereof; or 
(c)  is stored by any person with the purpose of recycling, re-using or extracting a usable 
product from such matter, excluding - 
(i) water used for industrial purposes or any effluent produced by or resulting from 
such use which is discharged in compliance with the provisions of section 21(1) of 
the Water Act, 1956 or on the authority of an exemption granted under section 
21(4) of the said Act; 
(ii) any matter discharged into a septic tank or french drain sewerage system and any 
water or effluent contemplated by section 21(2) of the Water Act, 1956; 
(iii) building rubble used for filling or levelling purposes; 
(iv) any radio-active substance discarded in compliance with the provisions of the 
Nuclear Energy Act, 1982; 
(v)  any minerals, tailings, waste-rock or slimes produced by or resulting from 
activities at a mine or works as defined in section 1 of the Mines and Works Act, 
1956; and 
(vi) ash produced by or resulting from activities at an undertaking for the generation of 
electricity under the provisions of the Electricity Act, 1987.302 
 
(ii)  without a permit 
The requisite permit is issued by the Minister of Water Affairs.  It may be issued subject 
to such conditions as the Minister may deem fit;303 the Minister may alter or cancel any 
permit or condition in a permit;304 and he may refuse to issue a permit,305 provided that he 
may exempt any person or category of persons from obtaining a permit, subject to such 
conditions as he may deem fit. 
 
16.4 Failure to comply with Minister's directions 
                                                 
302 GN 1986 in GG 12703 of 24 August 1990. 
303  Section 20(1)(a). 
304  Section 20(1)(b). 
305  Section 20(1)(c). 
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The Minister of Water Affairs may from time to time by notice in the Gazette issue 
directions with regard to the control and management of disposal sites in general; the 
control and management of certain disposal sites or disposal sites handling particular 
types of waste; and the procedure to be followed before any disposal site may be 
withdrawn from use or utilized for another purpose.306  It is an offence to contravene any 
such direction.307 The penalty is as for the offence discussed above (16.3). 
 
16.5 Unauthorised disposal of waste 
 
It is an offence for any person to discard waste or dispose of it in any other manner, 
except at a disposal site for which a permit has been issued; or in a manner or by means 
of a facility or method and subject to such conditions as the Minister may prescribe.308 




It is an offence for any person to discard, dump or leave any litter on any land or water 
surface, street, road or site in or on any place to which the public has access, except in a 
container or at a place which has been specially indicated, provided or set apart for such 
purpose.309  ‘Litter’ is defined as any object or matter discarded or left behind by the 
person in whose possession or control it was.310  Note that the definition does not depend 
on the state of mind of the person who discards or leaves the object behind. The penalty 
is a fine not exceeding R2 000 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three 
                                                 
306  Section 20(5). 
307  Section 29(4). 
308  Section 20(6). 
309  Section 19(1) read with s 29(3). 
310  Section 1. 
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months.311  The penalty for a continuing offence and order for reparations as set out in ss 
29(6) and (7) and described above (see 16.3) also apply. 
 
16.7 Failure to provide containers 
 
Every person or authority in control of or responsible for the maintenance of any place to 
which the public has access shall at all times ensure that containers or places are provided 
which will normally be adequate and suitable for the discarding of litter by the public.312  
Failure to do so is an offence.313  The penalty is the same as for littering. 
 
16.8 Failure to remove litter 
 
Every person or authority in control of or responsible for the maintenance of any place to 
which the public has access, shall within a reasonable time after any litter has been 
discarded, dumped or left behind at such place (with the inclusion of any pavement 
adjacent to, or land situated between, such a place and a street, road or site used by the 
public to get access to such place) remove such litter or cause it to be removed.314  Failure 
to do so is an offence, for which the penalty is as for the previous offence.315 
 
16.9 Undertaking prohibited identified activities 
 
Section 21 of the Act allows the Minister to identify those activities which in his opinion 
may have a substantial detrimental effect on the environment, whether in general or in 
respect of certain areas.  No person shall undertake an identified activity or cause such an 
activity to be undertaken without the written authorisation of the Minister or competent 
                                                 
311  Section 29(3) read with s 29(5). 
312  Section 19(2). 
313  Section 29(3), read with s 29(5).. 
314  Section 19A, notwithstanding the provisions of s 19(2). 
315  Section 29(3) read with s 29(5). 
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authority.316  Such authorisation will be granted only after consideration of reports 
concerning the impact of the proposed activity and of alternative proposed activities on 
the environment.317  The organ concerned may at his or her discretion refuse or grant the 
authorisation on such conditions as he or she may deem necessary.318  Failure to comply 
with any such condition may result in withdrawal of the authorisation by the organ in 
question.319 
Carrying on any activity prohibited under section 22(1) is an offence.  The maximum 
penalty is a fine of R100 000 or imprisonment for a period of ten years or both and, in 
addition, to a fine not exceeding three times the commercial value of any thing in respect 
of which the offence was committed. 320 The same applies in respect of failure to comply 
with a condition of the authorisation. 
 
16.10  Undertaking prohibited activity in limited development area 
 
Section 23 provides for a competent authority to declare a limited development area.  No 
person shall undertake in a limited development area any development or activity 
prohibited by the competent authority or cause such development or activity to be 
undertaken unless he or she has on application been authorised to do so by the competent 
authority or by a local authority to whom such power has been delegated, on the 
conditions contained in such authorisation.321  The penalty is as for the previous offence. 
 
16.11  Failure to comply with direction relating to environmental harm 
 
Section 31A provides that, if, in the opinion of the Minster or the competent authority, 
local authority or government institution concerned, any person performs any activity or 
                                                 
316  Section 22(1). 
317  Section 22(2). 
318  Section 22(3). 
319  Section 22(4). 
320  Section 29(4). 
321  Section 23(2). 
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fails to perform any activity as a result of which the environment is or may be seriously 
damaged, endangered or detrimentally affected, the Minister, competent authority, local 
authority or government institution, as the case may be, may in writing direct such person 
to cease such activity or to take such steps as the organ in question may deem fit, within a 
period specified in the direction, with a view to eliminating, reducing or preventing the 
damage, danger or detrimental effect.322  In addition, the organ in question may direct 
such person to perform any activity or function at his or her expense with a view to 
rehabilitating any damage caused to the environment as a result of that person’s activity 
or failure to act, to the satisfaction of the organ concerned.323 
Failure to comply with such a direction is an offence,324 the penalty for which is a 
maximum fine of R2 000 or not more than three months imprisonment.325 
 
16.12  Miscellaneous provisions 
 
Section 29, the ‘offences and penalties’ section, contains several noteworthy provisions 
relating to criminal convictions.  If any person convicted of an offence under the Act after 
conviction persists in the act or omission which constitutes the offence, he or she shall be 
guilty of a continuing offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R250 or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 20 days or to both such fine and such 
imprisonment in respect of every day on which he or she so persists with such act or 
omission.326  Moreover, in the event of a conviction in terms of this Act the court may 
order that any damage to the environment resulting from the offence be repaired by the 
person so convicted, to the satisfaction of the Minister concerned.327  Failure to comply 
with such an order entitles the authority in question to take the necessary steps itself and 
                                                 
322  Section 31A(1). 
323  Section 31A(2). 
324  Section 29(3). 
325  Section 29(3) read with s 29(5). 
326  Section 29(6). 
327  Section 29(7). 
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to recover the costs from the defaulting party.328  These provisions are useful and 
correspond with practice in other countries.  Orders of this type are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 8. 
The Act also provides that a magistrate’s court is competent to impose any penalty 
provided for in the Act.329 
Finally, the Environment Conservation Act also contains a forfeiture provision.  A 
court convicting any person of an offence under the Act may declare any vehicle or other 
thing by means whereof the offence was committed or which was used in the commission 
of the offence, or the rights of such person to the vehicle or other thing, to be forfeited to 
the State.330  This does not affect the rights that any other person may have in respect of 
the vehicle or thing concerned, if it is proved that he or she did not know that the vehicle 
or thing was used or would be used for the purpose of or in connection with the 
commission of the offence concerned or that he or she could not prevent such use.331  
This is similar to the forfeiture clause that appears in the National Parks Act, discussed 
above,332 and is a useful complement to the regular criminal sanction.  The possible 
constitutional ramifications of forfeiture clauses are discussed above333 and in the light of 
this it is unlikely that this provision would be problematic. 
 
16.13  Evaluation 
 
The Environment Conservation Act makes use of several enforcement mechanisms in 
addition to criminal sanctions, including various types of authorisation and a direction 
procedure in section 31A.  In addition, it contains provisions providing for augmented 
penalties in the case of continuing violations and for rehabilitation of damage caused by 
an offence.  These are both desirable provisions in environmental legislation. 
                                                 
328  Section 29(8). 
329  Section 29(9). 
330  Section 30(1). 
331  Section 30(2). 
332  See §9.12 (supra). 
333  At §6.5 (supra). 
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The Environment Conservation Act contains a good mix of criminal and non-criminal 
enforcement measures, and the criminal sanctions are meaningful – the maximum fines 
provided for are significant in the case of several offences.  Unfortunately, though good 
on paper, the Environment Conservation Act has been poorly enforced.  For example, 
there are apparently numerous examples of persons who have failed to comply with 
conditions imposed in their section 22 authorisations (authorisation to carry on identified 
activities) who have been allowed to do so with impunity.334  This undermines the law 
and is a situation that needs to be addressed if environmental law is to be taken seriously.  
It is all very well having good laws on paper, but inadequate enforcement is a widely 
perceived (and with ample justification, it would seem) problem that renders the laws 
merely paper laws.   
 
17  Game Theft Act 105 of 1991 
 
The Game Theft Act amends the common law position in respect of ownership of wild 
animals to protect owners of game.  It is aimed at prevention of the theft and unlawful 
hunting, catching and taking into possession of game, and the offences reflect this. 
 
17.1 Entering land with intent to steal game 
 
Any person who enters another person’s land with intent to steal game thereon or to 
disperse335 game from that land shall be guilty of an offence.336  This is essentially a 
trespass offence with the added requirement of ‘intent to steal’.  The latter requirement 
entails the offender intentionally effecting a contrectatio;337 intending to deprive the 
owner permanently of the property; knowing that the property is capable of being stolen; 
                                                 
334  Personal communication with several people involved in these processes. 
335  This means to ‘break up and scatter’. 
336  Section 3(1)(a). 
337  See JRL Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure: Vol III: Common Law Crimes 3 ed (1996) 
at 590-598.  
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and that he or she is acting unlawfully in taking it.338  The penalty is, in the case of the 
court’s being a district magistrates’ court, a maximum fine of R8 000 or two years 
imprisonment in default of payment or both in the case of a first conviction.   A 
subsequent conviction attracts a sentence of a maximum of three years imprisonment.339  
In the case of a regional court, the maximum fine is R40 000 and not more than ten years 
imprisonment or both.340  A court may also order compensation upon conviction for the 
theft of game or malicious damage to property where the property is game.341 
 
17.2 Dispersing or luring away game 
 
Any person who, without entering another person’s land, intentionally disperses or lures 




In a prosecution for an offence under this Act, if it is proved that the accused wrongfully 
and unlawfully entered another person’s land upon which there is game or that he 
wrongfully and unlawfully dispersed or lured away game from another person’s land, it 
shall be presumed that he had the intent to steal game or to disperse or lure away game 
from the land, as the case may be, unless the contrary is proved.343  It is possible that 
reliance on this presumption for the trespass offence may result in the conviction of an 
accused despite the presence of reasonable doubt.  On the other hand, it would be very 
difficult in many cases for the state to prove intent to steal.  Nevertheless, given the real 
possibility of people straying onto land containing game who are unable to rebut the 
presumption, there is a likelihood that this aspect of the presumption would run into 
                                                 
338  Milton op cit at 616. 
339  Section 6(a). 
340  Section 6(b). 
341  Section 7. 
342  Section 3(1)(b). 
343  Section 3(2). 
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constitutional trouble.  The way around the problem could be to reconsider the 
requirements of the offence.  It is submitted that the presumption with respect to the 
second offence (dispersing or luring game) is safer from constitutional challenge but also 
less necessary.  It is submitted that the requirement of intention is not really necessary for 
the offence and its omission would render the presumption unnecessary. 
 
18 Minerals Act 50 of 1991 
 
Although the Minerals Act is concerned with exploitation of natural resources, one of the 
objects of the Act is to regulate the orderly utilisation and rehabilitation of the surface of 
the land during and after mining operations.  There are, therefore, several provisions in 
the Act that can be regarded as environmental law since they are concerned with the 
conservation of a natural resource.  The offences related to these provisions are as 
follows: 
 
18.1 Failure to carry out rehabilitation of surface of land 
 
Section 38(1) requires the holder of a prospecting permit or mining authorisation to carry 
out the rehabilitation of the surface of the land in question in accordance with the 
applicable environmental management programme, if any; as an integral part of the 
prospecting or mining operations concerned; simultaneously with such operations, unless 
determined otherwise by the Director: Mineral Development; and to the satisfaction of 
the Director.  Failure to do so is an offence,344 punishable by a fine (amount not 
specified) or imprisonment of not more than one year or both.345  In addition, such 
offender is subject to a further fine of not more than R1 000 or to further imprisonment 
for not more than five days per day for every day upon which he so contravened the 
provision concerned or failed to comply with it, up to a maximum of six months in total. 
 
                                                 
344  Section 60(1)(a)(i). 
345  Section 61(1)(a). 
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18.2 Failure to submit environmental management programme 
 
Every holder of a prospecting permit nor mining authorisation is required to submit to the 
Director: Mineral Development an environmental management programme in respect of 
the surface of the land in question for his or her approval.  No such operations shall be 
commenced with before such approval is obtained.346  Failure to comply with this 
provision is an offence and the penalty is as for the previous offence. 
 
18.3 Failure to comply with directives/conditions 
 
In terms of section 41(1), the Director: Mineral Development may issue directives and 
determine conditions in relation to the use of the surface of land comprising the subject of 
any prospecting permit or mining authorisation in order to limit any damage to or the 
disturbance of the surface, vegetation, environment or water sources to the minimum 
which is necessary for any prospecting or mining operations or processing of any 
material.347  No person shall contravene or fail to comply with any such directive or 
condition.348  Such failure is an offence and the penalty is as for the offences described 
above. 
                                                 
346  Section 39(1).  Section 39(4) provides for a temporary authorisation pending approval of the 
environmental management programme.  The Director may also exempt a holder from one or more of the 
provisions of s 39(1): s 39(2). 
347  Provided that such directives and conditions shall not be construed as placing the holder of any such 
prospecting permit or mining authorisation in a better position vis-à-vis the owner of such land in relation 
to the use of the surface thereof. 
348  Section 41(2). 
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18.4 Offences under regulations 
 
There is a set of general regulations which include provisions dealing with water 
pollution arising out of mining operations in terms of the Mines and Works Act.349 The 
Mines and Works Act has since been repealed by s 68(1) of the Minerals Act, but the 
latter provides, however, that any regulation made under the repealed Act which was in 
force immediately prior to the commencement of the Minerals Act shall, notwithstanding 
the repeal of the said Act, remain in force until amended or repealed under s 63.350 
The offences provided for in the regulations are as follows: 
 
(a)  Failure to fence off polluted water 
It is provided that water containing poisonous or injurious matter in suspension or 
solution must be effectually fenced off to prevent inadvertent access to it, and notice 
boards shall be put up in suitable places to warn persons from making use of such 
water.351  It is an offence for any person to fail to comply with this regulation.352  The 
penalty is a fine (no amount specified) or imprisonment for a period not exceeding six 
months or both a fine and such imprisonment.353  
 
(b)  Permitting polluted water to escape 
It is an offence for any person to permit to escape water containing any injurious matter 
in suspension or solution without having been previously rendered innocuous.354 The 
penalty is as for the above offence. 
                                                 
349  The original regulations were published in GN R992 in GG 2741 of 26 June 1970.  They have been 
amended several times: see PGW Henderson Environmental Laws of South Africa (1996) at 2-469 for full 
list of amending regulations.  For particular relevance to this discussion, see regulations in GN R 537 in GG 
6892 of 21 March 1980. 
350 Section 68(2). 
351  Reg 5.9.1. 
352  Section 60(2) of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991. 
353 Section 61(1). 
354  Reg 5.9.2. 
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(c) Returning of impure effluent to water 
It is provided that sand may be extracted from the channel of a stream or river as well as 
from a dam, pan or lake, provided that effluent produced from such operations shall not 
be returned to any stream, river, dam, pan or lake unless such effluent conforms to the 
purity standards laid down by the Department of Water Affairs.355 Failure to comply with 
this provision is an offence, and the penalty is as for the previous offence. 
 
(d)  Establishing dumps or slime dams on the bank of watercourses 
It is an offence for any person to establish a sand dump or slimes dam on the bank of any 
stream, river, dam, pan or lake without the written permission of the Inspector of Mines, 
who shall obtain approval therefor from the Government Mining Engineer, and upon such 
conditions as the said Inspector may prescribe.356  The penalty is the same as in respect of 
the previous offence. 
 
(e)  Failure to prevent escape of oil 
It is provided that during prospecting for or recovery of oil, all reasonable measures shall 
be taken, to the satisfaction of the Government Mining Engineer, to prevent the escape of 
oil to the surroundings, either on land or in the sea.357  Failure to comply with this 




The offences under the Minerals Act that can be categorised as environmental crimes are 
somewhat unremarkable.  One comment that could be made, however, is that the 
penalties provided for are mild, given the deep pockets of mining companies and the 
potential for serious environmental damage caused by failure to comply with these 
provisions. 
                                                 
355 Reg 5.14.1 (1980 amendment). 
356  Reg 5.14.3 (1980 amendment). 
357  Reg 5.15 (1980 amendment). 
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19 Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 
 
The purpose of this Act (OHSA) is primarily to provide for the health and safety of 
persons at work and for the health and safety of persons in connection with the use of 
plant and machinery.  It also provides for the protection of persons other than persons at 
work against hazards to health and safety arising out of or in connection with the 
activities of persons at work.  Most offences under the Act are not strictly environmental 
offences, but there are some, relating to health and safety of the general public, that will 
be discussed here. 
 
19.1 Conducting activities which expose public to hazards to health or safety 
 
Section 9(1) provides that an employer shall conduct his or her undertaking in such a 
manner as to ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that persons other than those in 
his or her employment who may be directly affected by his or her activities are not 
thereby exposed to hazards to their health or safety. The duty generally dos not extend to 
employees since they are protected by means of various other provisions in the Act.  The 
duty extends to any member of the public, although those most at risk would be visitors 
to the employer’s premises or neighbours. 
The section speaks of ‘may be directly affected’, meaning that it is not necessary to 
show actual damage or injury but that potential injury would suffice.358  The employer is 
also required to take ‘reasonably practicable’ steps, which is determined by balancing the 
following factors: the severity and scope of the risk; the state of knowledge concerning 
the risk; the ability to remove or mitigate; and the cost of such removal.359  The penalty 
for this offence is a maximum fine of R50 000 or imprisonment for not more than one 
year or both.360  This has been described as ‘ludicrously small’.361   
                                                 
358  MG Cowling ‘Offences relating to health and safety’ in JRL Milton & MG Cowling South African 
Criminal Law and Procedure: Vol III: Statutory Offences 2 ed (1997) at K5-10. 
359  Cowling op cit at K5-7. 
360  Section 38(1)(a). 
361  Cowling op cit at K5-46. 
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19.2 Doing anything threatening the health or safety of any person 
 
Section 38(1)(p) makes it an offence for a person wilfully or recklessly to do anything at 
a workplace or in connection with the use of plant or machinery which threatens the 
health or safety of any person.  The penalty is as for the previous offence. 
 
19.3 Offences under regulations 
 
The Minister of Labour has made regulations for hazardous chemical substances (HCS) 
in terms of section 43 of the Act.362  These regulations require the following: 
 Provision of information and training to employees exposed to HCS; 
 Obedience of persons exposed to HCS to lawful instructions relating to various 
matters, for example cleaning up and disposal of HCS; 
 Assessment of potential exposure; 
 Air monitoring; 
 Medical surveillance; 
 Provision of respirator zone; 
 Keeping of records; 
 Control of exposure to HCS; 
 Provision of personal protective equipment and facilities;  
 Maintenance of control measures; 
 Labelling, packaging, transportation and storage in accordance with SABS 
standards; 
 Effective disposal of HCS. 
The penalty for non-compliance with any of the regulations is an unspecified fine or 
imprisonment for not more than six months.  In the case of a continuous offence, an 
additional fine may be levied of R200 per day on which the offence continues or 
additional imprisonment of one day for each day that the offence continues, with a 
                                                 
362  GN R1179 in GG 16596 of 25 August 1995. 
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maximum of ninety days.363  This corresponds with the provision in the Act for penalties 
in regulations.364 
 
19.4 Vicarious liability 
 
Section 37 provides for vicarious liability as follows: whenever an employee does or 
omits to do any act which it would be an offence in terms of this Act for the employer of 
such employee to do or omit to do, then the employer him or herself shall be presumed to 
have done or omitted to do that act, and shall be liable to be convicted and sentenced in 
respect thereof.  The presumption can be rebutted if it is proved that365 in doing or 
omitting to do the act the employee was acting without the connivance or permission of 
the employer; it was not under any condition or in any circumstance within the scope of 
the authority of the employee to do or omit to do an act, whether lawful or unlawful, of 
the character of the act or omission charged; and all reasonable steps were taken by the 
employer to prevent any act or omission of the kind in question.  It shall not be accepted 
as sufficient proof of having taken all reasonable steps to prevent the act or omission that 
the employer issued instructions forbidding any act or omission of the type in question.366 
In the light of the decision in S v Coetzee,367 this provision may well be problematic.  
A firm opinion on this matter will not be expressed here, however, since the question of 




The above analysis indicates quite strongly that the criminal sanction is the primary mode 
of enforcement utilised in pre-1994 national legislation, strongly indicative of the 
‘command and control’ regulatory approach.  Some enactments do make use of devices 
                                                 
363  Reg 16. 
364  Section 43(4). 
365  The Act does not specify this, but presumably the onus of proving this is on the employer. 
366  Section 37(1). 
367  1997 (3) SA 527 (CC), discussed in Chapter 3. 
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like directives/directions and the like, which is an effective and efficient manner of 
ensuring compliance with the goals of legislation.  Penalties are, by and large, 
unimaginative, although there are several Acts which provide for fines for continuing 
offences and the Sea-Shore Act and Environment Conservation Act provide for 
compensation for damage.   A number of Acts provide for forfeiture of objects used in the 
commission of the offence. 
Not only are the sentencing options frequently not wide, but the maximum penalties 
provided for are often worryingly small, sometimes literally rendering the use of criminal 
sanctions a waste of money (the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act is a case in point). 
Another interesting feature is the summary enquiry procedure provided for in some of 
the marine pollution statutes.  Why this process is not used in more legislation is 
somewhat of a mystery, although there is no record of the procedure having been used as 
yet. 
Bearing these observations in mind, attention will now be given to the post-1994 
national environmental legislation in order to ascertain if similar trends can be found 
there, or whether, in particular, more innovative use has been made of enforcement 
machinery other than the criminal sanction. 
Chapter 5 
 
An examination of environmental crimes and their 
enforcement in South Africa: 
Part Two – Post-1994 National Legislation 
 
1994 saw the onset of a new legal and Constitutional regime in South Africa, with the 
first democratic government elected by the whole population and the adoption of a 
justiciable Bill of Rights in a new Constitution.  The impact of this Constitution on 
criminal enforcement of law has been discussed in Chapter 3.  With the new government, 
new policy priorities have been adopted and several new environmental enactments have 
been promulgated since 1994.  The main impetus in certain instances has been primarily 
environmental, but a common theme in much of the legislation has been the furtherance 
of socio-economic rights of the people and increased equity in access to natural 
resources, particularly in marine resources, forests and water. 
Given the presence of the Bill of Rights, one would expect that compliance and 
enforcement measures in the new legislation would be less reliant on presumptions and 
reverse-onus provisions.  In addition, given worldwide trends away from the ‘command 
and control’ regulatory paradigm, one might also expect that more innovative 
enforcement and compliance instruments would be included in this legislation. 
These expectations will be assessed by examining the legislation, and in particular the 
enforcement and compliance provisions, in more detail below. 
 
Analysis of the legislation 
 
1 Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 
 
This Act is aimed at the provision of extraordinary measures for reconstruction and 
development and contains principles relating to land development.  There are some 
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provisions in the Act dealing with environmental factors that have to be taken into 
account in the development planning process.  There are no offences under this Act that 
could be regarded as environmental offences.1 
 
2 Water Services Act 108 of 1997 
 
This Act is concerned with the provision for the rights of access to basic water supply and 
basic sanitation.  The Act essentially provides a framework for the supply of water 
services, providing for bodies or institutions like water services providers, water services 
authorities and others.  It is not, by and large, directly concerned with environmental 
matters, but there are some features of the Act that could be said to constitute 
environmental law.  The relevant offences in the Act for present purposes are: 
 
2.1  Wasteful use of water 
 
According to section 82(1), no person may continue the wasteful use of water after being 
called upon to stop by the Minister,2 a Province or any water services authority.3  Water 
services authorities are required to make by-laws which provide for, inter alia, the 
prevention of wasteful use of water,4 but the Act does not otherwise provide for the 
wasteful use of water.  The power of the Minister or Province to call upon persons to stop 
the wasteful use of water is not expressly provided for in the Act.  Section 82(1), then, 
appears to be a ‘stand-alone’ provision – it is not providing for an offence arising out of 
failure to comply with another provision in the Act. 
 There is no specific penalty provided in the Act – section 82(2) provides that any 
person who contravenes s 82(1) is guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to a fine 
or to imprisonment or to both such fine and imprisonment. 
                                                 
1  In fact, the only offences relate to the functioning of development tribunals (s 21). 
2  Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry. 
3  A water services authority is a municipality, including a district or rural council as defined in the Local 
Government Transition Act 209 of 1993, responsible for ensuring access to water services (s 1). 
4  Section 21(1)(g). 
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2.2 Prohibited use of water and disposal of effluent 
 
No person may intentionally use water or dispose of effluent in contravention of section 6 
or 7.5  Section 6 provides that no person may use water services from a source other than 
a water services provider6 nominated by the water services authority having jurisdiction 
in the area in question, without the approval of that water services authority.  Section 7 
provides that no person may obtain water for industrial use from any source other than 
the distribution system of a water services provider nominated by the water services 
authority having jurisdiction in the area in question, without the approval of that water 
services authority.7  In addition, no person may dispose of industrial effluent in any 
manner other than that approved by the water services provider nominated by the water 
services authority having jurisdiction in the area in question.8  The penalty is as for the 
previous offence. 
 
2.3 Vicarious liability 
 
According to s 82(3), whenever an act or omission by any employee or agent constitutes 
an offence in terms of this Act, and takes place with the express or implied permission of 
any employer, the employer shall, in addition to the employee or agent, be liable to 
conviction for that offence; or if it would constitute an offence by the employer in terms 
of the Act, that employee or agent shall in addition to that employer be liable to 
conviction for that offence.  This provision may be problematic.  The concept of 
vicarious liability is discussed in Chapter 10. 
 
                                                 
5  Section 82(1)(c). 
6  A water services provider is any person who provides water services to consumers or to another water 
services institution, but does not include a water services intermediary (s 1). 
7  Section 7(1). 
8  Section 7(2). 
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The Water Services Act is concerned mainly with the provision of services and the 
establishment of an institutional framework to this end.  Consequently, the enforcement 
and compliance aspects of the Act are of a somewhat peripheral nature.  Other than a 
questionable vicarious liability clause, there is nothing remarkable about the criminal 
provisions in this Act.  
 
3 Marine Living Resources Act 8 of 1998 
 
The long title of this Act sets out its objectives as to provide for the conservation of the 
marine ecosystem, the long-term sustainable utilisation of marine living resources and the 
orderly access to exploitation, utilisation and protection of certain marine living 
resources; and for these purposes to provide for the exercise of control over marine living 
resources in a fair and equitable manner to the benefit of all the citizens of South Africa.  
To this end, this Act regulates sea fisheries in South Africa and largely replaces the Sea 
Fishery Act 12 of 1988 which was the previous legislation dealing with this matter.  The 
operation of the Act will become apparent from consideration of the offences provided 
for in the Act, which relate to most issues covered in the Act.  The offences are: 
 
3.1 Fishing without permit  (see also s 18) 
 
Section 58(1)(a) provides that any person who undertakes fishing or related activities in 
contravention of a provision of section 13 is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction 
to a fine not exceeding two million rand, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
five years.  Section 13 provides that no person shall exercise any right granted in terms of 
section 189 or perform any other activity in terms of this Act unless a permit has been 
issued by the Minister to such person to exercise that right or perform that activity.  
Section 13(3) provides that the holder of a permit shall at all times have that permit 
                                                 
9  Section 18 deals with the procedure for the granting of rights. 
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available for inspection at the location where the right or activity in respect of which the 
permit has been issued, is exercised.  Read together, then, sections 58(1) and 13 prohibit 
fishing or related activities without a permit.  The elements of this offence are (i) fishing 
or related activities and (ii) without a permit. 
 
(i) fishing or related activities 
‘Fishing’ is defined in s 1 as— 
(a) searching for, catching, taking or harvesting fish or an attempt to any such activity; 
(b) engaging in any other activity which can reasonably be expected to result in the 
locating, catching, taking or harvesting of fish; 
(c) placing, searching for or recovering any fish aggregating device10 or associated gear, 
including radio beacons; 
(d) any operation in support or in preparation of any activity described in this definition; 
or 
(e) the use of an aircraft11 in relation to any activity described in this definition. 
‘Related activities’ is also defined in s 1, as including — 
(a) storing, buying, selling, transshipping, processing or transporting of fish or any fish 
product taken from South African waters up to the time it is first landed or in the 
course of high seas fishing; 
(b) on-shore storing, buying, selling or processing of fish or any fish product from the 
time it is first landed; 
(c) refuelling or supplying fishing vessels, selling or supplying fishing equipment or 
performing any other act in support of fishing; 
(d) exporting and importing fish or any fish product; or 
                                                 
10  This is an artificially made or partially artificially made floating, submerged or semi-submerged device, 
whether anchored or not, intended to aggregate fish, including any natural floating object on which a device 
has been placed to facilitate its location (s 1).  ‘Aggregate’ means ‘collect together’ (The Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary of Current English 7th ed (1982)). 
11  This means any craft capable of self-sustained movement through the atmosphere and includes a 
hovercraft (s 1). 
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(e) engaging in the business of providing agency, consultancy or other similar services 
for and in relation to fishing or a related activity. 
 
(ii) permit 
The different types of permit that are provided for are as follows: 
 Subsistence fishing permit;12 
 Recreational fishing permit;13 
 Commercial fishing permit;14 
 Local fishing vessel licence;15 
 Foreign fishing vessel licence;16 
 High seas fishing licence.17 
 
3.2 Fishing in contravention of conditions of authorisation 
 
It is an offence for ay person to undertake fishing or related activities in contravention of 
the conditions of any right of access, other right, licence or permit granted or issued in 
terms of Part 1, 2 or 3 of Chapter 3,18 or an authorisation to undertake fishing or related 
activities in terms of Part 6 or 7 of Chapter 3, but excluding section 39(5).19  The various 
Parts of Chapter 3 referred to in this offence provide as follows: 
Part 1 Fisheries Planning 
Part 2 Local Fishing 
Part 3 Commercial Fishing 
Part 6 Foreign Fishing 
                                                 
12  Referred to in section 19. 
13  Referred to in section 20. 
14  This is not provided for expressly – but section 21 provides for commercial fishing rights.  Read with 
section 13, there must be a commercial fishing permit. 
15  Section 23. 
16  Section 39. 
17  Section 41. 
18  Section 58(1)(a)(ii). 
19  Section 58(1)(a)(iii). 
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Part 7 High Seas Fishing. 
The penalty is as for the previous offence. 
 
3.3 Contravention of an international management or conservation measure 
 
Any person who contravenes a provision of an international conservation and 
management measure inside or outside South African waters by means of a vessel 
registered in the Republic shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding three million rand.20  The Act defines ‘international conservation and 
management measures’ as measures to conserve or manage one or more species of 
marine living resources contained in international conventions, treaties or agreements, or 
that are adopted or applied in accordance with the relevant rules of international law as 
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, whether by global, 
regional or subregional fishery organisations and which measures are binding on the 
Republic in terms of international law.21  This clearly envisages a number of measures 
provided for by a number of international instruments, which raises the possibility that 
this prohibition may not be sufficiently precise to satisfy the principle of legality.  It 
would have been better, it is submitted, had the Act expressly listed (perhaps in a 
Schedule) the provisions of which contravention is regarded as an offence by this section. 
 
3.4 Contravention of provisions of high seas fishing licence/permit 
 
Any person who contravenes the conditions imposed in a high seas fishing permit or high 
seas fishing vessel licence, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding three million rand.22   
                                                 
20  Section 58(2)(a).  This subsection also prohibits failure to comply with any provision of Part 7 of 
Chapter 3.  This Part deals with high seas fishing.  The contraventions that are contemplated in this Part are 
also prohibited elsewhere – the prohibition of fishing without a permit (discussed above) and contravention 
of section 41 (see below). 
21  Section 1. 
22  Section 58(2)(b). 
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3.5 Fishing without foreign fishing vessel licence 
 
Section 39(1) prohibits any foreign fishing vessel from being used for fishing or related 
activities in South African waters unless a foreign fishing vessel licence has been issued 
to such vessel.  If a fishing vessel is used in contravention of this prohibition or of any 
condition of a foreign fishing vessel licence, the master, owner and charterer of that 
fishing vessel shall each be guilty of an offence,23 and liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding five million rand.24 
Some of the elements of the offence have been described above (the meaning of 
‘fishing’ and the permit requirement).  The offence also envisages the involvement of a 
‘foreign fishing vessel’ and fishing in ‘South African waters’.  Determining the meaning 
of ‘foreign fishing vessel’ requires perusal of four definitions in the Act (s 1).  A foreign 
fishing vessel means any fishing vessel other than a local fishing vessel. A ‘local fishing 
vessel’ means any fishing vessel registered in the Republic which is— 
(a) wholly owned and controlled by one or more South African persons; 
(b) wholly owned by the State; 
(c) wholly owned and controlled by any body corporate, society or other association of 
persons incorporated or established under the laws of the Republic and in which the 
majority of the shares and the voting rights are held and controlled by South African 
persons; or 
(d) wholly owned by a body corporate designated as an authorised body corporate by the 
Minister. 
A ‘fishing vessel’ means any vessel, boat, ship or other craft which is used for, equipped 
to be used for or of a type that is normally used for fishing or related activities, and 
includes all gear, equipment, stores, cargo and fuel on board the vessel; and ‘vessel’ 
includes any canoe, lighter, floating platform, decked boat, carrier vessel, vessel equipped 
with an inboard or outboard motor or any other craft, whether a surface craft or 
submarine. 
                                                 
23  Section 39(5). 
24  Section 50(3). 
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‘South African waters’ means the seashore, internal waters, territorial waters, the 
exclusive economic zone, and in relation to the sedentary species as defined in Article 77 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,25 the continental shelf as 
defined in section 7 of the Maritime Zones Act26 and such waters include tidal lagoons 
and tidal rivers in which a rise and fall of the water level takes place as a result of the 
tides. 
The persons who may be liable for this offence are defined in s 1 as follows: ‘Master’ 
means, in relation to a vessel, aircraft or other craft, the person having lawful command 
or charge, or for the time being in charge, of the vessel, aircraft or other craft, as the case 
may be, including a person who has principal responsibility for fishing on board, but does 
not include a pilot aboard a fishing vessel solely for the purpose of providing navigational 
assistance. ‘Owner’ means any person exercising or discharging or claiming the right or 
accepting the obligation to exercise or discharge any of the powers or duties of an owner 
whether on his or her own behalf or on behalf of another, including a person who is the 
owner jointly with one or more other persons and the manager, director, secretary, or 
other similar officer or any person purporting to act in such a capacity, of any body 
corporate or company which is an owner.  ‘Charterer’ is not defined in the Act, but a 
dictionary definition is the person who hires the ship.27 
The heavy penalty provided for contravention of this provision reflects the serious 
problem of foreign fishing in South African waters and the seriousness with which the 
state views such occurrences.  
 
                                                 
25  ‘Sedentary species’ is defined in the Act (s 1) as organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are 
immobile on or under the seabed, or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed 
or the subsoil.  This accords with the Convention’s definition in Article 77(4). 
26  Act 15 of 1994.  This Act defines the continental shelf with reference to the Convention on the law of 
the Sea.  The Convention’s definition of continental shelf is very long and complicated and it is not 
necessary to reproduce it here: for the definition, see 
http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/ls82_2.htm#article_76_definition_of_the_contin  
(accessed 28 November 2001). 
27  The Concise Oxford English Dictionary of Current English 7th ed (1982). 
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3.6 Possession of prohibited gear 
 
No person shall use, possess or have control of— 
(a) any net or trap, the mesh size of which does not conform to the prescribed minimum 
mesh size; 
(b) any gear which does not conform to the standards that may be prescribed for that type 
of gear; or 
(c) any gear which is prohibited in terms of the Act.28 
‘Net’ means a fabric of rope, cord, twine or other material knotted or woven into 
meshes by which fish can be taken.  A ‘trap’ is an enclosure, not being a net, that may be 
used to take fish.  ‘Gear’ means, in relation to fishing, any equipment, implement or other 
object that can be used in fishing, including any net, rope, line, float, trap, hook, winch, 
aircraft, boat or craft carried on board a vessel, aircraft or other craft.29  The Minister may 
make regulations, inter alia, prescribing fisheries management and conservation 
measures, including mesh sizes, gear standards, minimum species sizes, closed seasons, 
closed areas, prohibited methods of fishing or gear and schemes for limiting entry into all 
or any specified fisheries.30  Chapter 4 of general regulations made under the Act in 1998 
deals in detail with prohibited gear and nets and mesh sizes.31 
The penalty is as for the previous offence and, once again, reflects the seriousness with 
which the authorities view the use of prohibited gear.  Bearing in mind that the fine of 
five million rand is a maximum, not every use of prohibited gear will attract such a 
penalty, but the use of some types of gear (driftnets, for example) is a serious 
environmental problem.32 
 
                                                 
28  Section 45. 
29  Section 1. 
30  Section 77(2)(e). 
31  GN R1111 in GG 19205 of 2 September 1998 as amended by GN R27 in GG 20796 of 14 January 
2000. 
32  See below. 
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3.7 Driftnet fishing 
 
Except on the authority of a permit issued by the Minister— 
(a) no vessel shall be used for or to assist in any driftnet fishing activities; 
(b) no person shall engage or assist in any driftnet fishing activities; and 
(c) no person on board a local fishing vessel or a foreign fishing vessel in respect of 
which a foreign fishing vessel licence has been issued, shall be in possession of a 
driftnet or part thereof.33 
A ‘driftnet’ is a gillnet or other net or a combination of nets, the purpose of which is to 
enmesh, entrap or entangle fish by drifting on the surface of or in the water, irrespective 
of whether it is used or intended to be used while attached to any point of land or the 
seabed or to any vessel. 
  The penalty is as for the previous offence and its seriousness can be explained by the 
serious environmental problem posed by these nets.34  It is a problem that requires severe 
deterrent penalties to curb. 
 
3.8 Fishing within a radius of one nautical mile of a fish aggregating device 
 
No person shall fish within a radius of one nautical mile from a designated fish 
aggregating device without the permission of the Minister and unless in accordance with 
the conditions that he or she may determine.35  The Minister may by notice in the Gazette 
declare any fish aggregating device to be a designated fish aggregating device for the 
purposes of this section.36  The penalty for this offence is as for the previous offence. 
 
                                                 
33  Section 47. 
34  In December 1991 the United Nations General Assembly passed U.N. Resolution 46-215, calling for a 
global moratorium on all high-seas driftnet fishing in the world's oceans and enclosed seas.  For the 
problems of driftnet fishing, see, for example, http://www.earthtrust.org/dnw.html (accessed 28 November 
2001). 
35  Section 48(4). 
36  Section 48(3)(a). 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions  






3.9 Stowage of gear 
 
Gear on board any foreign fishing vessel for which a foreign fishing vessel licence has 
not been issued shall be stowed in the prescribed manner while the vessel is within South 
African waters.37  In addition, if a foreign fishing vessel is licensed to fish by means of a 
particular type of gear in any specific area of the South African waters, it is required to 
stow any other gear on board the vessel in the prescribed manner while the vessel is 
within that area; and must stow all gear on board the vessel in the prescribed manner 
while the vessel is within any other area of the South African waters where it is not 
licensed to fish.38  The Minister has the power to make regulations regulating the 
navigation of foreign fishing vessels through South African waters, having due regard to 
the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; and the manner 
in which gear is to be stowed aboard such vessels.39  There are as yet no regulations 
prescribing how gear is to be stowed. 
The penalty is as for the previous offence. 
 
3.10 Contravention of any other provision of this Act 
 
Section 58 makes it an offence to carry out a number of specified offence, but it also 
provides that contravention of ‘any other provision of this Act’ (that is, other than those 
specified already in section 58) is an offence carrying a maximum fine of two million 
rand or five years imprisonment.40  The offences that are not specified in section 58 are 
(or could be): 
 
                                                 
37  Section 49(1). 
38  Section 49(2). 
39  Section 77(2)(k). 
40  Section 58(1)(b). 
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3.10.1 Contravention of emergency measures 
 
Section 16 empowers the Minister to take certain emergency measures where fish are 
endangered, including suspension of fishing.  The Act does not indicate that failure to 
comply with the emergency measures is an offence, but this could be included in the 
measures when published. 
 
3.10.2 Offences in marine protected area 
 
Section 43 empowers the Minister to declare an area to be a marine protected area.  No 
person shall in any marine protected area, without permission41— 
(a) fish or attempt to fish; 
(b) take or destroy any fauna and flora other than fish; 
(c) dredge, extract sand or gravel, discharge or deposit waste or any other polluting 
matter, or in any way disturb, alter or destroy the natural environment; 
(d) construct or erect any building or other structure on or over any land or water within 
such a marine protected area; or 
(e) carry on any activity which may adversely impact on the ecosystems of that area.42 
The Act does not explicitly make any of these acts an offence, but it would be 
nonsensical for them not be offences. 
 
3.10.3 Use of prohibited fishing methods 
 
In terms of section 44, no person shall -  
(a) use, permit to be used, or attempt to use any explosive, fire-arm, poison or other 
noxious substance for the purpose of killing, stunning, disabling or catching fish, or of 
in any way rendering fish to be caught more easily; 
                                                 
41  In terms of s 43(3). 
42  Section 43(2). 
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(b) carry or have in his or her possession or control any explosive, fire-arm, poison or 
other noxious substance for any of the purposes referred to in paragraph (a);or 
(c) engage in a fishing or related activity by a method or in a manner prohibited by the 
Minister by notice in the Gazette.43 
In addition, no person shall land, sell, receive or possess any fish taken by any means in 
contravention of this Act.44 
Once again, no explicit provision in the Act declares contravention of this section to 
be an offence. 
 
3.10.4 Interference with gear 
 
 
No person shall— 
(a) remove, haul, empty, cast adrift or otherwise interfere with any fishing net, line, pot, 
trap, gear, tackle, or other equipment belonging to any other person without the 
consent of that person; 
(b) place any object in the water, or promote or undertake any activity in a manner so as 
to obstruct a fishing operation being carried out by another person; 
(c) destroy, damage, displace or move or alter the position of any fishing net, line, pot, 
trap, gear, tackle or other fishing equipment, or any buoy, float or other marker 
attached to it; or 
(d) remove fish from any fishing net, line, pot, trap, gear, tackle or other fishing 
equipment belonging to any other person without the consent of that person.45 
This prohibition is not explicitly made an offence in terms of the Act. 
 
                                                 
43  Section 44(1). 
44  Section 44(2). 
45  Section 46. 
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3.10.5 Destruction of evidence 
 
No person who, being on board any vessel being pursued, about to be boarded or notified 
that it will be boarded by a fishery control officer shall throw overboard or destroy any 
fish, fish product, gear, explosive, fire-arm, poison, noxious substance, chart, log book, 
document or other thing to avoid the seizure thereof or the detection of any contravention 
of this Act.46  This prohibition is also applicable to vehicles, aircraft, fish processing 
plants and other premises.47 
The Act does not explicitly make this an offence. 
 
3.11 Contravention of regulations 
 
The general regulations48 made under the Act contain a number of prohibitions.  These 
range from prohibitions from fishing in closed seasons49 to offences relating to gear and 
nets and mesh sizes.50  The regulations provide that contravention or failure to comply 
with any of the regulations is an offence and that the penalty is a fine (unspecified 
amount) or imprisonment for not more than two years.51 
 
3.12 Enforcement powers of fishery control officers 
 
The Act gives fishery control officers extensive powers in respect of enforcement.  They 
have extensive powers of search and seizure, both with and without the necessity of a 
warrant.  The provisions relating to search and seizure would appear to be in compliance 
with the requirements of the Constitution, as they require reasonable grounds or 
                                                 
46  Section 60(1). 
47  Section 60(2). 
48  GN R1111 in GG 19205 of 2 September 1998, as amended by GN R27 in GG 20796 of 14 January 
2000. 
49  Reg 9. 
50  Chapter 4. 
51  Reg 96.  See also s 58(4) in the Act. 
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reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer that an offence has been or is being 
committed, and indicate that the officer may only act where the circumstances are such 
that the delay in requesting a warrant would defeat the object of the exercise.52 
A fishery control officer also has similar powers beyond South African waters in the 




If any person is convicted of an offence in terms of this Act, the court may, in addition to 
any other penalty, order that any fishing vessel, together with its gear, equipment, any 
fish caught unlawfully or the proceeds of sale of such fish or any perishables, and any 
vehicle or aircraft used or involved in the commission of that offence be forfeited to the 
State.54  Provided that the forfeiture is confined to the instrumentalities of the offence or 
the fruits of illegal activities (fish caught without a permit, for example) there would 
appear to be no problem with this provision and it is, indeed, a desirable provision in the 
circumstances.55 
 
3.14 Jurisdiction of courts 
  
Section 70, which speaks for itself, reads as follows: 
(1) Any act or omission in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act which is committed— 
(a) by any person within South African waters; 
(b) outside South African waters by any citizen of the Republic or any person ordinarily resident 
in the Republic; or 
(c) by any person on board any local fishing vessel; 
shall be dealt with and judicial proceedings taken as if such act or omission had taken place in the 
territory of the Republic. 
                                                 
52  Section 51. 
53  Section 52.  The notion of ‘hot pursuit’ is regulated by Art 111 of the UNCLOS. 
54  Section 68. 
55  See discussion in previous Chapter, at §§2.3 and 6.5. 
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(2) Any offence in terms of this Act shall, for purposes in relation to jurisdiction of a court to try the 
offence, be deemed to have been committed within the area of jurisdiction of the court in which 
the prosecution is instituted. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other Act, a magistrate’s court shall have 
jurisdiction to impose any penalty prescribed by this Act. 
This is an important provision, given that many offences in terms of this Act would be 
committed in the ocean, thus presenting possible jurisdiction problems for criminal 
procedural rules that are designed to deal with offences carried out on land. 
 
3.15 Evidentiary matters 
 
There are several provisions dealing with evidence and providing that furnishing of such 
evidence constitutes prima facie proof of the facts therein.  This places the onus of 
disproving the evidence onto the accused, which constitutes an infringement of the 
accused’s rights.  Whether or not the provision in question can be saved by the limitations 
clause is then the issue that has to be resolved.  This is difficult to evaluate outside of a 
particular context in which the issue may be raised, but tentative opinions are expressed 
below: 
 
3.15.1 Documentary evidence 
Chapter 71 empowers the Minister to issue a certificate stating certain specified facts (for 
example, that a particular location or area of water was on a specified date within South 
African waters, or within an area of South African waters subject to specified conditions).  
Such certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts averred therein,56 but the person 
issuing the certificate may be required to give oral evidence.57  The list of matters for 
which such certificate may be made58 do not seem to be such that it would be overly 
                                                 
56  Section 72(1). 
57  Section 72(2). 
58  That –  
(a) a specified vessel was or was not a local fishing vessel or a foreign fishing vessel on a specified date; 
(b) a specified vessel or person was or was not on a specified date the holder of any specified licence, 
permit, authorisation or certificate of registration; 
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onerous for the accused to disprove them.  Nor, on the other hand, does it appear that it 
would be onerous for the State to prove these acts either.  It would seem, then, that the 
rationale of the provision is efficiency and whether that would satisfy the limitations 
clause is debatable. 
 
3.15.2 Certificate as to location of vessel 
A certificate given by a fishery control officer or observer shall be prima facie evidence 
in any proceedings in terms of this Act, of the place or area in which a vessel has been at 
a particular date and time or during a particular period of time.59  The section specifies a 
comprehensive list of information that must be supplied by the officer in question, which 
indicates that the information certified here is akin to technical evidence of the type 
contemplated by s 212(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the constitutionality of which 
was discussed above and was found to be unproblematic.60  It is important that the 
accused be given the option of cross-examining the deponent of the document in 
question, and this is not explicitly provided for by section 73.  It is provided that s 71 
applies, with the necessary changes, to this certificate but it is s 72 that provides for oral 
evidence to be given.  This is a potential problem, unless the right to cross-examine is 
implied in s 73. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(c) an appended document is a true copy of the licence, authorisation or certificate of registration for a 
specified vessel or person and that specified conditions were those of a licence, permit, authorisation or 
certificate of registration issued in respect of a specified vessel or person; 
(d) a particular location or area of water was on a specified date within South African waters, or within an 
area of South African waters subject to specified conditions; 
(e) an appended chart shows the boundaries on a specified date of South African waters, internal waters, 
territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone or any area within such waters or zones which is subject 
to specified conditions; 
(f) a call sign, name or number is that of a particular vessel or has been allotted under any system of naming 
or numbering of vessels to a particular vessel; or 
(g) a particular position or catch report was given in respect of a specified vessel. 
59  Section 73. 
60  See above, Chapter 3 §4.3. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions  






3.15.3 Designated machines 
Section 74 provides for proof of readings given by machines or instruments that have 
been designated by the Minister, provided that the person making the readings is trained 
to dos o and that the machine in question has been checked for correct working order a 
reasonable time before and after the readings made for the case in point.  This is unlikely 
to be problematic, and, indeed, is a sensible section for the reasons given above in 
relation to s 212(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
 
3.15.4 Photographic evidence 
There is a similar provision for photographic evidence with respect to photographs that 
have the date, time and location superimposed onto the photograph at the time the 
photograph is taken.61  Once again, the considerations discussed above would apply. 
 
3.15.5 Observation devices62 
Section 76 provides for designated observation devices and the prima facie proof of 
information produced by such devices.  The evaluation of the designated machines 
provision would apply with equal relevance here. 
 
3.16 Revocation of permit 
 
Where activities have to be carried out in terms of some sort of authorisation - a permit, 
for example – one of the most effective incentives for that person to comply with the 
permit conditions is that the permit can be revoked if he or she fails to comply with those 
conditions.  This is provided for in the Act: section 28 provides that if a holder of any 
right, licence or permit in terms of this Act, inter alia, contravenes or fails to comply with 
a condition imposed in the right, licence or permit; contravenes or fails to comply with a 
provision of this Act; or is convicted of an offence in terms of this Act, the Director-
                                                 
61  Section 75. 
62  Section 1 defines as any device or machine placed on a fishing vessel in terms of this Act as a condition 
of its licence which transmits, whether in conjunction with other machines elsewhere or not, information or 
data concerning the position and fishing activities of the vessel. 
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General may request the holder to show cause in writing, within a period of 21 days from 
the date of the notice, why the right, licence or permit should not be revoked, suspended, 




It is clear from analysis of this Act that the primary modes of enforcement are permit and 
criminal sanctions.  Carrying out of activities without a permit or in contravention of the 
permit conditions is an offence and, in addition, grounds for the cancellation of the 
permit.  The Act does not provide for alternative methods of enforcement, however, 
which might in certain circumstances be much more efficient than criminal prosecution. 
As far as criminal prosecution is concerned, the Act facilitates this for the State by 
providing for several facts to be presumed given in specified circumstances, most of 
which are unlikely to present constitutional problems given the nature of the evidence and 
the ability of the accused to rebut such evidence. 
Another noteworthy aspect of the Marine Living Resources Act is that the maximum 
penalties provided for are significantly large, indicating the seriousness with which 
offences under the Act are seen.  The penalties provided for in this Act are much larger 
than any penalty provided for in pre-1994 legislation. 
 
4 National Water Act 36 of 1998 
 
The long title of this Act provides that the major objective of the Act is to provide for 
fundamental reform of the law relating to water resources.  This Act provides for a 
movement away from the inequitable, riparian rights-based approach to water access to a 
more equitable approach which sees the state as the trustee of water in the Republic.  
Other noteworthy features of the Act are the provision for devolved catchment 
management of water resources and recognition of the water needs of the environment. 
The Act provides for a number of offences.  Those which are not merely 
administrative or not aimed directly at environmental conservation are as follows: 
 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions  






4.1 Use of water otherwise than as permitted 
 
No person may use water otherwise than as permitted under this Act.63   What at first 
glance appears to be a straightforward prohibition becomes considerably more complex 
when the concept of ‘water use’ is examined.   
According to section 21, water use includes - 
(a) taking water from a water resource; 
(b) storing water; 
(c) impeding or diverting the flow of water in a watercourse; 
(d) engaging in a stream flow reduction activity contemplated in section 36;64 
(e) engaging in a controlled activity identified as such in section 37(1) or declared under section 
38(1); 
(f) discharging waste or water containing waste into a water resource through a pipe, canal, sewer, 
sea outfall or other conduit; 
(g) disposing of waste in a manner which may detrimentally impact on a water resource; 
(h) disposing in any manner of water which contains waste from, or which has been heated in, any 
industrial or power generation process; 
(i) altering the bed, banks, course or characteristics of a watercourse; 
(j) removing, discharging or disposing of water found underground if it is necessary for the efficient 
continuation of an activity or for the safety of people; and 
(k) using water for recreational purposes. 
Two important terms used in this section are ‘watercourse’ and ‘water resource’.  A 
‘watercourse’ is a river or spring; a natural channel in which water flows regularly or 
intermittently; a wetland, lake or dam into which, or from which, water flows; and any 
collection of water which the Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, declare to be a 
watercourse, and a reference to a watercourse includes, where relevant, its bed and 
banks.65  A ‘water resource’ includes a watercourse, surface water, estuary or aquifer.66 
                                                 
63  Section 151(1)(a). 
64  A stream flow reduction activity is use of land for afforestation which has been or is being established 
for commercial purposes; and any other activity so declared by the Minister: s 36(1). 
65  Section 1. 
66  Ibid.  An ‘estuary’ is a partially or fully enclosed body of water which is open to the sea permanently or 
periodically; and within which the sea water can be diluted, to an extent that is measurable, with fresh water 
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Section 22 provides for permissible water use.  Any water use requires a licence unless 
it falls into one of the following categories: 
 It is permissible under schedule 1; 
 It is permissible as a continuation of an existing lawful use; 
 It is permissible under general authorisation issued under s 39; or 
 The licence requirement has been dispensed with by the responsible authority.67 
Schedule 1 contains a list of water uses that do not require a licence under s 22.  They 
are as follows: 
 The taking of water for reasonable domestic use in that person’s household, 
directly from any water resource to which that person has lawful access; 
 The  taking of water for use on land owned or occupied by that person, for - 
o reasonable domestic use; 
o small gardening not for commercial purposes; and 
o the watering of animals (excluding feedlots) which graze on that land 
within the grazing capacity of that land, from any water resource which is 
situated on or forms a boundary of that land, if the use is not excessive in 
relation to the capacity of the water resource and the needs of other users; 
 The storing and use of run-off water from a roof; 
 In emergency situations, the taking of water from any water resource for human 
consumption or firefighting; 
 For recreational purposes - 
o use the water or the water surface of a water resource to which that person 
has lawful access; or 
o portage any boat or canoe on any land adjacent to a watercourse in order 
to continue boating on that watercourse; and 
 Discharge - 
                                                                                                                                                 
drained from land (ibid).  An ‘aquifer’is a geological formation which has structures or textures that hold 
water or permit appreciable water movement through them (ibid). 
67  ‘Responsible authority’ is defined in s 1 as, in relation to a specific power or duty in respect of water 
uses, if that power or duty has been assigned by the Minister to a catchment management agency, that 
catchment management agency; or if that power or duty has not been so assigned, the Minister. 
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o waste or water containing waste; or 
o run-off water, including stormwater from any residential, recreational, 
commercial or industrial site, 
 into a canal, sea outfall or other conduit controlled by another person authorised 
to undertake the purification, treatment or disposal of waste or water containing 
waste, subject to the approval of the person controlling the canal, sea outfall or 
other conduit. 
Other permissible water use without a licence is an existing lawful water use.  This is 
as the name suggests and is essentially a water use which took place within two years 
immediately before the date of commencement of the Act, and which is lawful in terms 
of legislation in force immediately before the commencement of the new Act.68  An 
existing lawful water use is not necessarily indefinite in its duration, and such users may 
be required to apply for a licence in terms of the Act. 
The third form of permissible unlicensed water use is water use under a general 
authorisation. A general authorization is made under s 39, which provides that a 
responsible authority may, subject to Schedule 1, by notice in the Gazette (a) generally; 
(b) in relation to a specific water resource; or (c) within an area specified in the notice, 
authorise all or any category of persons to use water, subject to any regulation and any 
conditions imposed under the Act.  A general authorization, then, is akin to a ‘blanket 
licence’, which is granted without the need for those benefiting to apply.  General 
authorizations have been issued and the offences under these authorizations are discussed 
below.69 
It is beyond the scope of this work to consider the notion of water use in detail, but let 
us consider an example to illustrate the possible conceptual difficulties that arise with 
respect to water use.  One of the types of water use included in s 21 is disposing in any 
manner of water which contains waste from, or which has been heated in, any industrial 
or power generation process.  According to Schedule 1, however, discharge of water 
containing waste is a permissible use if such discharge is made into canal, sea outfall or 
                                                 
68  Section 32.  See also ss 33-35. 
69  (Infra) at 173-5. 
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other conduit controlled by another person authorised to undertake the purification, 
treatment or disposal of waste or water containing waste, subject to the approval of the 
person controlling the canal, sea outfall or other conduit.  This scenario would cover most 
industrial wastewater emissions, which are discharged into municipal sewers.  Such 
discharge would typically be regulated by municipal by-laws which would set standards 
for the quality of the wastewater that can be discharged into the sewers.  The upshot of 
this is that persons discharging wastewater under such circumstances would not require a 
licence under the National Water Act but would require the permission of the person in 
charge of the sewer system. 
On the other hand, those persons who discharge waste or wastewater directly into a 
water resource by means of a pipe or conduit or similar manner, would require a licence 
to do this, which would typically set out the standards with which the effluent would be 
required to comply.  A licence would not be required, however, where the discharge fell 
within the ambit of a general authorisation under s 39.  The general authorisation dealing 
with discharge of waste70 requires compliance with certain effluent standards. 
Returning to the offence of water use otherwise as permitted, then, this essentially 
amounts to water use without a licence, where such licence is necessary.  Failure to 
comply with the conditions or standards of an unlicensed water use (under a general 
authorisation, for example) is a separate offence discussed immediately below. 
The penalty for this offence, and for all offences under the Act, is, on the first 
conviction, a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or both a fine 
and such imprisonment and, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction, a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or both.71 
 
                                                 
70  Discussed below, 173-4. 
71  Section 151(2). 
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4.2 Failure to comply with condition attached to permitted water use 
 
No person may fail to comply with any condition attached to a permitted water use under 
the Act.72 Section 29 provides that a responsible authority may attach conditions to every 
general authorisation or licence.  The section contains a comprehensive list of conditions 
which can be imposed for different licences and authorizations.  For example, a permit 
relating to return flow and discharge or disposal of waste may specify a water resource to 
which it must be returned or other manner in which it must be disposed of; specifying 
permissible levels for some or all of its chemical and physical components; specifying 
treatment to which it must be subjected, before it is discharged; and specifying the 
volume which may be returned.73 
The penalty for this offence is the same as for the previous offence. 
 
4.3 Failure to comply with directive 
 
No person may fail to comply with a directive issued under section 19, 20, 53 or 118.  
The latter (s 118) deals with dams that are regarded as safety risks.  This is not directly 
relevant to the current enquiry.  The others are all important provisions for environmental 
law.  The penalty for this offence is as for the previous offence. 
Section 19 deals with the prevention and remedying of effects of pollution.  It places a 
duty on the owner of land, a person in control of land or a person who occupies or uses 
the land on which any activity or process is or was performed or undertaken; or any other 
situation exists, which causes, has caused or is likely to cause pollution of a water 
resource, to take all reasonable measures to prevent any such pollution from occurring, 
continuing or recurring.  Such measures may include measures to - 
 cease, modify or control any act or process causing the pollution; 
 comply with any prescribed waste standard or management practice; 
 contain or prevent the movement of pollutants; 
                                                 
72  Section 151(1)(c). 
73  Section 29(1)(c). 
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 eliminate any source of the pollution; 
 remedy the effects of the pollution; and 
 remedy the effects of any disturbance to the bed and banks of a watercourse.74 
A catchment management agency may direct any person who fails to take the required 
measures commence taking specific measures before a given date; diligently continue 
with those measures; and complete them before a given date.75  Failure to to comply, or 
comply inadequately with this directive allows the catchment management agency to take 
the measures it considers necessary to remedy the situation,76 and to recover all costs 
incurred as a result of it acting jointly and severally from the persons listed in the 
section.77 
Failure to comply with a s 19 directive, them is not only an offence but also lays the 
offender open to liability for the costs incurred in remedying the situation that was the 
subject of the directive.  This is an important provision in that it provides for an effective 
alternative to the criminal sanction that is less onerous to use than criminal prosecution.  
A person who is carrying on an activity that is polluting water may be prosecuted under 
the Act,78 but it may in certain circumstances be more effective for the responsible 
authority to issue a directive under s 19, requiring the person to stop the polluting activity 
                                                 
74  Section 19(2). 
75  Section 19(3). 
76  Section 19(4). 
77  Section 19(5).These persons are –  
(a) Any person who is or was responsible for, or who directly or indirectly contributed to, the pollution or 
the potential pollution; 
(b) the owner of the land at the time when the pollution or the potential for pollution occurred, or that 
owner’s successor-in-title; 
(c) the person in control of the land or any person who has a right to use the land at the time when - 
(i) the activity or the process is or was performed or undertaken; or 
(ii) the situation came about; or 
(d) any person who negligently failed to prevent - 
(i) the activity or the process being performed or undertaken; or 
(ii) the situation from coming about. 
78  See below. 
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and to clean up any pollution that has already occurred, than to resort to prosecution.  Of 
course, the two courses of action are not mutually exclusive.  A person to whom a 
directive has been issued is not exempt from prosecution under the Act. 
Section 20 deals with emergency incidents.  An ‘incident’ includes any incident or 
accident in which a substance pollutes or has the potential to pollute a water resource; or 
has, or is likely to have, a detrimental effect on a water resource.79  ‘Emergency’ is not 
defined.  This section sets out steps for the responsible person to take in the case of an 
emergency incident, including notification of specified officials and clean-up measures.  
The ‘responsible person’ includes any person who is responsible for the incident; owns 
the substance involved in the incident; or was in control of the substance involved in the 
incident at the time of the incident.80  The catchment management agency may direct the 
responsible person to take measures to deal with the incident.  Failure to comply with the 
directive is an offence and it also allows the catchment management agency to take 
measures to remedy the situation, and to claim costs from every responsible person 
jointly and severally. 
Section 53 provides that a responsible authority may, by notice in writing to a person 
who contravenes any provision of Chapter 4 (which regulates water use); a requirement 
set or directive given by the responsible authority under this Chapter; or a condition 
which applies to any authority to use water, direct that person, or the owner of the 
property in relation to which the contravention occurs, to take any action specified in the 
notice to rectify the contravention, within the time (being not less than two working days) 
specified in the notice or any other longer time allowed by the responsible authority. If 
the action is not taken within the time specified in the notice, or any longer time allowed, 
the responsible authority may carry out any works and take any other action necessary to 
rectify the contravention and recover its reasonable costs from the person on whom the 
notice was served; or apply to a competent court for appropriate relief.81  Failure to 
comply with such a directive is an offence.  The observations made above about the 
                                                 
79  Section 20(1). 
80  Section 20(2). 
81  Section 53(2). 
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benefits of using a directive process rather than criminal prosecutions apply with equal 
relevance to this provision. 
 
4.4 Tampering or interfering with waterwork 
 
No person may unlawfully and intentionally or negligently tamper or interfere with any 
waterwork or any seal or measuring device attached to a waterwork.82  A waterwork is 
defined as including any borehole, structure, earthwork or equipment installed or used for 
or in connection with water use.83  The penalty is the same as for the previous offence. 
 
4.5 Refusal to perform duty 
 
No person may intentionally refuse to perform a duty, or obstruct any other person in the 
exercise of any power or performance of any of that person’s duties in terms of this Act.84  
The penalty is the same as for the previous offence. 
 
4.6 Pollution of water resource 
 
No person may unlawfully and intentionally or negligently commit any act or omission 
which pollutes or is likely to pollute a water resource.85  ‘Pollution’ means the direct or 
indirect alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of a water resource so 
as to make it - 
 less fit for any beneficial purpose for which it may reasonably be expected to be 
used; or 
 harmful or potentially harmful - 
o to the welfare, health or safety of human beings; 
o to any aquatic or non-aquatic organisms; 
                                                 
82  Section 151(1)(e). 
83  Section 1. 
84  Section 151(1)(h). 
85  Section 151(1)(i). 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions  






o to the resource quality; or 
o to property.86 
This is a widely-phrased prohibition, if the definition of pollution is taken into 
account.  First, it does not have to be an act that in fact pollutes but merely one which is 
likely to pollute.  Second, whether an act is polluting can be determined either by 
reference to whether the act has rendered the water less fit for its expected use, which 
would require proof of the water quality before the incident, or whether it is harmful or 
potentially harmful.  The mens rea is also made explicit in this prohibition, clearly 
excluding strict liability but providing for a minimum of negligence. 
The penalty is the same as for the previous offence.   
 
4.7 Detrimentally affecting water resource 
  
No person may unlawfully and intentionally or negligently commit any act or omission 
which detrimentally affects or is likely to affect a water resource.87  If the pollution 
prohibition is not wide enough, this prohibition is a very broad back-up.  In this case, it is 
not necessary to prove ‘pollution’ in the sense that is defined but merely detrimental 
effect, which is not defined in the Act and could be very widely construed.  Once again, 
fault is specified as including negligence.  The penalty is as above. 
 
4.8 Failure to comply with temporary restriction 
 
Schedule 3 of the Act sets out the powers and duties of catchment management agencies 
on assignment or delegation.  In terms of item 6 in Schedule 3, if a catchment 
management agency on reasonable grounds believes that a water shortage exists or is 
about to occur within an area it may, despite anything to the contrary in any authorisation, 
by notice in the Gazette or by written notice to each of the water users in the area who are 
likely to be affected - 
                                                 
86  Section 1. 
87  Section 151(1)(j). 
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 limit or prohibit the use of water; 
 require any person to release stored water under that person’s control; 
 prohibit the use of any waterwork; and 
 require specified water conservation measures to be taken. 
Failure to comply with a temporary restriction on the use of water in terms of item 6 of 
Schedule 3 is an offence88 attracting the same penalty as the other offences described 
here. 
 
4.9 Offences under regulations 
 
Various sections in the Act empower the Minister to make regulations dealing with 
various issues.  For example, section 26 deals with regulations relating to water use.  
Section 69 regulates the making of regulations and provides that any regulation made 
under the Act may provide that a contravention of or failure to comply with a regulation 
is an offence and that any person found guilty of the offence is liable to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years.89 
Several sets of regulations have been made under the Act.  We will consider one here.  
General authorizations under section 39 were made in 1999.90  Chapter 3 of these 
regulations deal with the discharge of waste or water containing waste into a water 
resource through a pipe, canal, sewer or other conduit; and disposing in any manner of 
water which contains waste from, or which has been heated in, any industrial or power 
generation process.  This general authorization essentially allows a water user to 
discharge up to 2000 m³ of water per day into a water resource91 provided that the 
discharge complies with limit values (standards) set out in the regulations; and does not 
                                                 
88  Section 151(1)(l). 
89  Section 69(2). 
90  GN 1191 in GG 20526 of 8 October 1999. 
91  The regulations distinguish between two sets of water resources – those which are listed and those 
which are not.  Different limit values apply to listed water resources – special limit values.  General limit 
values apply to the other water resources. 
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alter the natural ambient water temperature of the receiving water resource by more than 
3 degrees Celcius; and that it is not a complex industrial wastewater.9293  The limit values 
contain standards for indicators such as faecal coliforms, chemical oxygen demand, 
heavy metals, pH, phosphorus and so on.  The regulations require the user to carry out 
monitoring of the discharges according to specified criteria and to keep records of the 
discharges.  Such records are to be made available to the responsible authority on 
request.94  Contravention of anything in the general authorisation is an offence and 
subject to the penalty provided for in s 151(2).95 
Prosecution of a person who has failed to comply with the general authorisation by 
exceeding one or more of the limit values requires scientific proof of this fact.  The Act 
does not provide for any presumptions relating to proof of scientific evidence, although s 
212(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act would apply.  Despite the presumption contained in 
s 212(4), however, it would be more difficult to prove contravention of the general 
authorisation than to use the general pollution prohibition in s 151.  This difficulty may 
be ameliorated by requiring the user to keep his or her own records, but whether these can 
be used as evidence against the user is debatable.  The question of self-incrimination in 
this type of situation is discussed in Chapter 10. 
In practice, possibly the best way to deal with infractions of the general authorisation, 
where they are not too serious, would be to use a s 53 directive ordering the offender to 
comply with the regulations.  This directive would be issued after the user’s records 
indicated a contravention.  The question of self-incrimination would not be problematic 
in this situation.  Once the responsible authority was aware of a contravention, it could 
                                                 
92  This is wastewater arising from industrial activities and premises, that contains- 
a) a complex mixture of substances that are difficult or impractical to chemically characterise and quantify, 
or 
b) one or more substances, for which a Wastewater Limit Value has not been specified, and which may be 
harmful or potentially harmful to human health, or to the water resource (identification of complex 
industrial wastewater will be provided by the Department upon written request). 
93  Reg 3.7.1(a). 
94  Reg 3.9. 
95  Reg 3.12. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions  






itself monitor the user’s discharges for a period in order to establish compliance.  
Criminal prosecution could ensue if the user subsequently failed to comply with the 
standards.  The authority would have its own records that could be used as evidence 
without the problem of self-incrimination.  
 
4.10 Miscellaneous provisions 
 
The Act also provides for an enquiry to be made into loss suffered by a person or damage 
caused to a water resource as a result of an offence under this Act.  This occurs upon 
conviction and in the same proceedings.96  Once the Court has done this, it may order 
payment of damages or the costs of remediation of damage, or order that the remedial 
measures be taken.97  This measure is a complementary measure to the criminal sanction, 
not an alternative, since it applies only upon conviction.  It is a useful measure in 
environmental legislation since it is aimed at the remediation of environmental damage.  
A criminal conviction in itself does not directly benefit the environment or address the 
harm done to the environment, yet such a measure does and, for this reason, is welcome.  
Such a measure existed in the 1954 Water Act, the 1998 Act’s precursor, as well.98 
The Act also contains a vicarious liability provision.  Section 154 provides 
Whenever an act or omission by an employee or agent - 
(a) constitutes an offence in terms of this Act, and takes place with the express or implied 
permission of the employer or principal, as the case may be, the employer or principal, as the case 
may be, is, in addition to the employee or agent, liable to conviction for that offence; or 
(b) would constitute an offence by the employer or principal, as the case may be, in terms of this 
Act, that employee or agent will in addition to that employer or principal be liable to conviction for 
that offence. 
Subsection (a) provides for vicarious liability and may be problematic as far as the 
presumption of innocence is concerned.  This issue is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 10.  Subsection (b) may be referred to as a reverse vicarious liability provision 
and this type of provision is also discussed later. There is a similar provision in the 
                                                 
96  Section 152. 
97  Section 153. 
98  Section 171 of Act 54 of 1956. 
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National Environmental Management Act that is discussed in detail below.  In short, it 
would seem that this provision is of questionable usefulness. 
A further provision relevant to enforcement of the Act is section 155, which provides 
that a High Court may, on application by the Minister or the water management 
institution concerned, grant an interdict or any other appropriate order against any person 
who has contravened any provision of this Act, including an order to discontinue any 
activity constituting the contravention and to remedy the adverse effects of the 
contravention.  This is a useful alternative to the criminal sanction and in many cases 
potentially very effective indeed.  If a person is carrying out an activity that is harmful to 
the environment, interdicting him or her from continuing from the activity will serve to 
put a stop to that activity, which is directly in the interests of environmental conservation.  
There is also nothing in the section to prevent this measure being used in addition to 
criminal prosecution.  In other spheres, the interdict has been used as a very effective 
alternative to the criminal sanction – particularly in respect of contraventions of the 




The National Water Act is less reliant on the criminal sanction than other legislation 
studied thus far in this work.  Although the criminal sanction is still an important 
enforcement tool, this Act makes use of permits and other authorizations and a variety of 
directives as a primary mode of compliance.  Moreover, the Act explicitly provides for 
the power of the authority concerned to apply for an interdict requiring cessation of an 
activity that is a contravention of the Act. 
As far as the criminal sanction is concerned, the Act makes use of both primary and 
subsidiary criminal sanctions.100  The former is one where the environmentally harmful 
activity is outlawed directly (for example, pollution of a watercourse is an offence).  A 
subsidiary or secondary sanction is one which is used in circumstances where the primary 
                                                 
99  See discussion above at 73. 
100  See RF Fuggle & MA Rabie Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) at 130. 
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enforcement mechanism is administrative (a licence, for example) and the criminal 
sanction is invoked only where the administrative control fails.  An example would be 
carrying out an activity without the required licence.  Generally speaking, it is easier to 
prove an offence of acting without a licence than an offence defined in terms of 
environmental harm.  Moreover, use of a subsidiary sanction often allows less reactive 
enforcement – the harm need not have materialized before the criminal enforcement kicks 
in. 
The maximum penalty provided for is stringent enough to reflect the seriousness of 
contravention of the Act.  Moreover, the provision relating to compensation is exactly the 
sort of provision that environmental legislation should contain in order to complement the 
criminal sanction.  The one aspect of the National Water Act that may be problematic, 
however, is the vicarious liability provision. 
 
5 National Forests Act 84 of 1998 
 
The National Forests Act is aimed in part at the conservation of natural forests and 
woodlands, but also at the regulation of commercial forestry.  As is the case with several 
post-1994 enactments, the Act also has an important socio-economic focus in that it 
provides for more equitable distribution of the economic, social and environmental 
benefits of forests than was the case in the past.   
There are several important terms used in the Act that it would be useful to define at 
this point, as they are referred to in several of the offences discussed below.  ‘Forest’ is 
defined in s 1 as including a natural forest, a woodland and a plantation; the forest 
produce in it; and the ecosystems which it makes up.   A ‘natural forest’ is defined in s 1 
as a group of indigenous101 trees whose crowns are largely contiguous, or which has been 
declared to be one by the Minister.102  A ‘woodland’ is a group of indigenous trees which 
are not a natural forest, but whose crowns cover more than five per cent of the area 
                                                 
101  Indigenous to South Africa (s 1). 
102  The Minister may declare to be a natural forest a group of indigenous trees whose crowns are not 
largely contiguous; or where there is doubt as to whether or not their crowns are largely contiguous (s 7(2). 
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bounded by the trees forming the perimeter of the group.103  A ‘plantation’ is a group of 
trees cultivated for exploitation of the wood, bark, leaves or essential oils in the trees.104 
A ‘state forest’  
(a) means 
i. State land, other than trust forests, acquired or reserved for forestry in terms of this Act or any 
previous forest legislation, unless it has been released under section 50 (3);  
ii. (State land, other than trust forests, designated as demarcated State forest or a similar 
designation in terms of any previous forest legislation, unless it was withdrawn from 
demarcation and is no longer used for forestry; and  
iii. trust forests; and  
(b) includes--  
i. State plantations, State sawmills and State timber preservation plants;  
ii. land controlled and managed by the Department for research purposes or as a tree nursery;  
iii. areas protected in terms of sections 8 (1) (a) and (b) and 9;  
iv. an area of State land which has been set aside in terms of previous forest legislation for the 
prevention of soil erosion or sand drift;  
v. an area referred to in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) (i) to (iv), the ownership or control of 
which is transferred to a person or organ of State contemplated in section 53 (2) (g) (i);  
 A ‘tree’is any tree seedling, sapling, transplant or coppice shoot of any age and any root, 
branch or other part of it.105  Finally, ‘forest produce’ means anything which appears or 
grows in a forest, including any living organism, and any product of it, in a forest; and 
inanimate objects of mineral, historical, anthropological or cultural value.106 
The Act contains an innovative penalty system, providing for five different categories 
of offences.  Each category attracts a particular penalty.  The offences (other than those 
relating to enforcement107) are as follows: 
 
                                                 
103  Section 1. 
104  Ibid. 
105  Ibid. 
106  Ibid. 
107  Section 64. 
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5.1 Failure to take steps relating to sustainable forest management 
 
Section 4 empowers the Minister to determine and publish standards for sustainable 
forest management and indicate where breach of such standards is an offence.  Where 
such a breach occurs, a forest officer may inform an owner who is in breach of that 
standard by written notice of the nature of the breach; the steps that the owner must take 
to remedy the breach; and the period within which this must be done.108  Failure to take 
such steps is a fifth category offence.109  A ‘forest officer’ is a person so designated under 
s 65, and is the official responsible for much of the enforcement duties in the Act.  An 
‘owner’, for purposes of this section, is a registered owner or, where the registered 
owner110 has transferred control of the forest management unit111 in question to another 
person or organ of State, whether by way of assignment, delegation, contract or 
otherwise, that person or organ of State.112   
 
5.2 Cutting, damaging etc indigenous tree 
 
In terms of s 7(1), no person may cut, disturb, damage or destroy any indigenous, living 
tree in, or remove or receive any such tree from, a natural forest except in terms of a 
licence;113 or an exemption determined by the Minister.  This is the provision that gives 
natural forests their protection under this Act.  Contravention of this provision is a second 
                                                 
108  Section 4(8). 
109  Section 61.  A fifth category offence is one for which imprisonment may not be imposed, but there is a 
maximum fine of R50 000 (s 58(6)). 
110  Registered in the Deeds Registry as owner. 
111 This is defined in s1as an area of land on all or on part of which there is forest and which is managed as 
an integrated unit. 
112  Section 4(1). 
113  Issued under s 7(4) or s 23. 
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category offence.114  None of the terms ‘cut’, ‘disturb’, ‘damage’ or ‘destroy’ are defined 
in the Act, so they must bear their dictionary meanings. 
 
5.3 Cutting, damaging etc forest produce in protected area 
 
In terms of section 8, the Minister may declare115 a State forest or a part of it; purchase or 
expropriate land and declare it; or at the request or with the consent of the registered 
owner of land outside a State forest, declare it, as a specially protected area in one of 
three categories.  The categories are forest nature reserve; forest wilderness area; or any 
other type of protected area which is recognised in international law or practice.116  No 
person may cut, disturb, damage or destroy any forest produce in, or remove or receive 
any forest produce from, a protected area, except in terms of rules made for the 
management of the area;117 in the course of the management of the protected area by the 
responsible organ of State or person; in terms of a right of servitude; in terms of the 
authority of a licence or exemption; or in the case of a protected area on land outside a 
State forest, with the consent of the registered owner or by reason of another right which 
allows the person concerned to do so, subject to the prohibition in section 7 (1).118  Any 
person who contravenes the prohibition on the cutting, disturbance, damage or 
destruction of forest produce in or the removal or receipt of forest produce from a 
protected area referred to in section 10 (1) is guilty of a second category offence.119  The 
penalty is as for the previous offence. 
                                                 
114  Section 62(1).  A person who is guilty of a second category offence may be sentenced on a first 
conviction for that offence to a fine or imprisonment for a period of up to two years, or to both a fine and 
such imprisonment. 
115  The Minister may declare such an area only if he or she is of the opinion that it is not already adequately 
protected in terms of other legislation. 
116  Section 8(1). 
117  In terms of s 11(2)(b). 
118  Section 10(1). 
119  Section 62(2)(a).   
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It should be noted that a forest may be both a natural forest and a protected area in 
terms of the Act.  Although there is some overlap between s 10 and s 7, the latter would 
prevail in the case of a natural forest which is also a protected area.  The effect of this, for 
example, would be that the right of servitude which allows cutting forest produce in terms 
of s 10 would not qualify as an exemption from the prohibition in s 7. 
 
5.4 Contravention of protected area rules 
 
The Minister is required by s 11(2)(b) to make rules for the management of the protected 
area so as to achieve the purpose for which the area has been protected, unless there are 
already suitable rules in place.  Contravention of such rules is a third category offence.120 
 
5.5 Prohibited activities in respect of protected tree 
The Minister may declare a particular tree; a particular group of trees; a particular 
woodland; or trees belonging to a particular species, to be a protected tree, group of trees, 
woodland or species.121  No person may cut, disturb, damage, destroy or remove any 
protected tree; or collect, remove, transport, export, purchase, sell, donate or in any other 
manner acquire or dispose of any protected tree, except under a licence granted by the 
Minister.122  The Minister is required to publish an appropriate warning of this 
prohibition and the consequences of non-compliance annually in the Gazette and in two 
newspapers circulating nationally.123  This is a first category offence,124 the most serious 
of the offences provided for in the Act.   
                                                 
120  Section 62(2)(b).  A person who is guilty of a third category offence may be sentenced on a first 
conviction for that offence to a fine or imprisonment for a period of up to one year, or to both a fine and 
such imprisonment (s 58(3)). 
121  Section 12(1). The Minister may make such a declaration only if he or she is of the opinion that the tree, 
group of trees, woodland or species is not already adequately protected in terms of other legislation (s 
12(2)). 
122  Section 15(1). 
123  Section 15(3)(b). 
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5.6 Prohibited activities in controlled forest areas 
 
If the Minister is of the opinion that urgent steps are required to prevent the deforestation 
or further deforestation of; or rehabilitate a natural forest or a woodland protected under 
section 12 (1) which is threatened with deforestation, or is being or has been deforested, 
he or she may declare it a controlled forest area.125  The Minister may, in respect of such 
area, stop any persons wishing to exercise a right of access126 from entering the area; 
prohibit any person from removing forest produce from the area; prohibit any other 
activity which may cause deforestation or prevent rehabilitation; suspend licences issued 
under this Act in respect of the area; require the owner to take specified steps to prevent 
deforestation or rehabilitate the natural forest or woodland; and require the owner to 
submit and comply with a sustainable forest management plan for the area.127  Any 
person who contravenes a prohibition or any other provision in a notice declaring a 
controlled forest area under section 17 (3) and (4) is guilty of a second category 
offence.128 
 
5.7 Prohibited entry into forest 
 
Any person who without authority, enters or is in an area of a forest which is not 
designated for access for recreation, education, culture or spiritual fulfilment, is guilty of 
a fourth category offence.129  Access to state forests is permitted by s 19.  This access 
                                                                                                                                                 
124 Section 62(2)(c).  A person who is guilty of a first category offence may be sentenced to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period of up to three years, or to both a fine and such imprisonment (s 58(1)). 
125  Section 17(2). 
126  Referred to in s 19. 
127  Section 17(4).  Such provisions are to be published in terms of s 17(3). 
128  Section 62(3). 
129  Section 63(1)(a).  A person who is guilty of a fourth category offence may be sentenced on a first 
conviction for that offence to a fine or community service for a period of up to six months or to both a fine 
and such service (s 58(4)). 
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may be restricted in terms of s 20.  Access to forests other than state forests is regulated 
by s 21. 
 
5.8 Contravention of rules relating to access to forests 
 
Any person who contravenes a rule made by an owner in terms of section 20 (3) or a 
registered owner in terms of section 21 (2), is guilty of a fourth category offence.130  
These sections both deal with rules relating to access to forests. The former relate to state 
forests and the latter forests other than state forests.  These rules may contain matters like 
restrictions on permitted modes of transport and restrictions on fires. 
 
5.9 Making marks or signs 
 
Any person who without authority makes a mark or sign on a rock, building, tree or other 
vegetation in a forest, is guilty of a third category offence.131  It is noteworthy that this 
prohibition does not apply only to state forests but to all forests.  This would cover the 
frequent trend of carving or spraypainting initials or other marks on things like rocks and 
trees in areas to which the public has access.  Although in many cases this is probably 
physically harmless, it is aesthetically displeasing. 
 
5.10 Littering in a forest 
 
Any person who dumps or scatters litter in a forest, is guilty of a fourth category 
offence.132  ‘Litter’ is not defined, and nor are ‘dump’ or ‘scatter’.  It may have been 
better for the Act to distinguish between deliberate dumping of litter (or waste) and 
                                                 
130  Section 63(1)(b). 
131  Section 63(1)(e).  A person who is guilty of a third category offence may be sentenced on a first 
conviction for that offence to a fine or imprisonment for a period of up to one year, or to both a fine and 
such imprisonment (s 58(3)). 
132  Section 63(1)(f).  See above (§5.7) for penalty. 
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littering in the ordinary sense of the word.  Dumping is a much more serious offence and 
ought to attract a more serious penalty than a fourth category offence. 
 
5.11 Cutting, damaging seven-week ferns 
 
Any person who, without a licence or other authority cuts, disturbs, damages, destroys, 
removes or receives seven-week ferns (Rumohra adiantiforme) from any forest, is guilty 
of a first category offence.133  This is the most serious category of offence provided for in 
the Act.  According to the Department of Forestry,134 the rationale behind the offence is 
to protect the seven-week fern because it is endangered, but curiously it does not appear 
on the CITES Appendices of endangered species, nor in South African nature 
conservation legislation.  It may be that the plant is under pressure from collectors, since 
it is used in the florist industry, and this is the reason behind its protection.  Why it 
warrants the most serious offence status, however, is not clear.  Note once again that this 
offence applies to any forest, not just state forests nor protected areas. 
 
5.12 Killing fauna in a forest 
 
Any person who kills any animal, bird, insect or fish, is guilty of a second category 
offence if it is in a protected area and a third category offence if it is in any other area.135  
It is interesting that this prohibition does not stipulate a mens rea requirement, which 
raises the possibility that negligent killing of any fauna could be an offence. 
 
                                                 
133  Section  63(2)(a).  A person who is guilty of a first category offence may be sentenced to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period of up to three years, or to both a fine and such imprisonment (s 58(1)). 
134  Regional Office (KwaZulu-Natal), personal communication. 
135  Section 63(2)(b).  A person who is guilty of a second category offence may be sentenced on a first 
conviction for that offence to a fine or imprisonment for a period of up to two years, or to both a fine and 
such imprisonment. The penalty for a third category offence is set out above (§5.9). 
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5.13 Removal of forest produce 
 
Any person who, without the permission of the registered owner, removes any forest 
produce other than trees referred to in section 62 (1), from a forest other than a State 
forest, is guilty of a third category offence.136  The exclusion of trees referred to in s 62(1) 
is not because those trees can be removed, but because there is a heavier penalty for 
removing them.137  Also, the reason why the offence applies only to forests other than 
state forests is probably because the offences discussed below apply to state forests.   
 
5.14 Licence contraventions 
 
Any person who carries on an activity in a State forest for which a licence is required 
without such a licence is guilty of a third category offence, if the State forest is a 
protected area; and a fourth category offence, if the State forest is not a protected area.138  
Any person who contravenes a condition in a licence, exemption or other authorisation in 
terms of this Act in any protected area is guilty of a second category offence; and in any 
other forest is guilty of a third category offence.139 
Section 23 provides that the Minister may in a state forest, license any of a list of 
specified activities, including the felling of trees and removal of timber; and the cutting, 
disturbance, damage or destruction of any other forest produce.  Section 23(2) prohibits 
anyone from engaging in any activity in a state forest for which a licence is required 
without such a licence, save in specified circumstances where he or she would be 
exempted.140  The Act does not, however, specify that a person must have a licence to 
                                                 
136  Section 63(3).  For penalty see previous note. 
137  See above, §5.2. 
138  Section 63(4).  For penalties, see n133 (supra) for third category offence and n129 (supra) for fourth 
category offence. 
139  Section 63(5).  For penalties, see n133 (supra). 
140  Where he or she he or she is exempted under section 24 (6); he or she is acting in the scope of his or her 
employment or mandate as an officer, employee or agent of the Department; he or she has a right to engage 
in the activity in terms of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions  






carry on any of the activities listed in s 23(1) or, alternatively, that the activities are 
prohibited without a licence.  Since the principle of legality cannot allow a prohibition to 
be implied, this is a loophole in the Act which potentially renders the offence in s 63(4) 
of no effect.  This could be remedied quite easily by amending s 23(1) to read ‘No person 
may in a state forest - (list the activities) without a licence issued by the Minister. 
 
5.15 Miscellaneous Provisions 
 
As indicated above, s 58 deals with sentencing by creating different categories of 
offences carrying different penalties.  The section contains the following additional 
provisions relating to sentencing.  First, a person who is guilty of a second, third or fourth 
category offence may be sentenced on a second conviction for that offence as if he or she 
has committed a first, second or third category offence, respectively.141  It is not 
uncommon for legislation to provide for more serious penalties for repeat offences, and 
the National Forests Act does so in a novel way by using the sentencing categories.   
Second, a court which sentences any person to community service for an offence in 
terms of this Act must impose a form of community service which benefits the 
environment if it is possible for the offender to serve such a sentence in the 
circumstances.142 The circumstances in which community service may be imposed are 
relatively few in the Act, but this provision makes sense in the context of the overall aim 
of environmental law. 
The third provision relating to sentencing that is worth mentioning is the power of the 
court that sentences any person for any offence in terms of this Act, to suspend or revoke 
a licence granted to the offender under section 7 or 23.  For reasons given earlier, the 
suspension of a licence is an important deterrent measure at the disposal of he 
enforcement authorities and this is therefore an important provision. 
As is the case in other environmental legislation, the National Forests Act also 
contains a provision providing for compensatory orders in criminal proceedings.  Section 
                                                 
141  Section 58(5). 
142  Section 58(7)(a). 
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59 provides that a court which convicts a person of an offence in terms of the Act, may 
order the return of any forest produce or protected tree which has unlawfully been 
removed, cut or damaged, to the person entitled to it if it is feasible to do so; and, in 
addition to or instead of such return, the person convicted to pay damages to any person 
who suffered a loss as a result of the offence.  This takes place during the criminal trial 
and an order under this section is executed in the same manner as a judgment of that court 
in a civil case.143  The benefits of this kind of provision have already been discussed 
above and are equally applicable in respect of this section. 
Also, in order to aid compliance, the Act provides for payment of rewards for 
informants: A court which imposes a fine for an offence in terms of this Act, may order 
that a sum of not more than one-fourth of the fine, be paid to any person144 whose 
evidence led to the conviction or who helped bring the offender to justice.145 
Finally, the Act contains powers of search,146 seizure147 and arrest148 for forest 
officers.  These are the standard type of provisions dealing with these matters and do not 
present any obvious problems.  Such empowering of officials who are well-versed in the 
forests legislation is preferable to relying, for example, on the South African Police 
Services, who not only are struggling to keep apace with enforcement of the common 




Although the Act contains an innovative system of penalties, making explicit the 
difference in seriousness of various offences, in other ways the Act conforms to the 
traditional ‘command and control’ enforcement paradigm.  Contraventions of the Act are 
intended to be dealt with primarily by means of the criminal sanction.  Whereas other 
                                                 
143  Section 59(3). 
144  Other than an officer in the service of the State. 
145  Section 60. 
146  Section 67. 
147  Section 68. 
148  Section 69. 
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more recent enactments have made use of directive mechanisms whereby officials may 
order persons to cease certain activities, or to take steps to remedy damage, such 
mechanisms are absent in the National Forests Act.  Many of the offences provided for in 
the Act, given the penalties provided for their contravention, are relatively minor and 
these could surely be dealt with administratively rather than by resort to the cumbersome 
procedure of criminal prosecution. 
 
6 National Veld and Forest Fire Act 101 of 1998 
 
This Act deals with veld and forest fires, matters like the burning of firebreaks, 
establishment of fire protection associations and various other fire safety measures.  
Although the Act does take into account environmental considerations, none of the 
offences provided for are concerned directly with environmental conservation and 
therefore are not relevant to the current enquiry.  
 
7 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
 
The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) is probably the most important 
environmental legislation in South Africa.  It is aimed primarily at co-operative 
environmental governance but contains several important provisions relating to 
environmental offences, although there are no offences created by the Act itself.149  
Chapter 7 of the Act deals with enforcement, compliance and protection and it is part 2 of 
this Chapter that contains the relevant provisions to be analysed here. 
 
7.1 Private prosecutions 
 
Section 33 of NEMA provides: 
(1) Any person may— 
                                                 
149  There is provision in the Act for regulations to be made which provide for offences and penalties: 
section 44(3). 
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(a) in the public interest; or 
(b) in the interest of the protection of the environment, 
institute and conduct a prosecution in respect of any breach or threatened breach of any duty, other 
than a public duty resting on an organ of state, in any national or provincial legislation or municipal 
bylaw, or any regulation, licence, permission or authorization issued in terms of such legislation, 
where that duty is concerned with the protection of the environment and the breach of that duty is an 
offence. 
(2) The provisions of sections 9 to 17 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) 
applicable to a prosecution instituted and conducted under section 8 of that Act must apply to a 
prosecution instituted and conducted under subsection (1): Provided that if— 
(a) the person prosecuting privately does so through a person entitled to practice as an advocate 
or an attorney in the Republic; 
(b) the person prosecuting privately has given written notice to the appropriate public prosecutor 
that he or she intends to do so; and 
(c) the public prosecutor has not, within 28 days of receipt of such notice, stated in writing that 
he or she intends to prosecute the alleged offence, 
(i) the person prosecuting privately shall not be required to produce a certificate issued by the 
Attorney-General stating that he or she has refused to prosecute the accused; and 
(ii) the person prosecuting privately shall not be required to provide security for such action. 
(3) The court may order a person convicted upon a private prosecution brought under subsection 
(1) to pay the costs and expenses of the prosecution, including the costs of any appeal against such 
conviction or any sentence. 
(4) The accused may be granted an order for costs against the person prosecuting privately, if the 
charge against the accused is dismissed or the accused is acquitted or a decision in favour of the 
accused is given on appeal and the court finds either: 
(a) that the person instituting and conducting the private prosecution did not act out of a concern 
for the public interest or the protection of the environment; or 
(b) that such prosecution was unfounded, trivial or vexatious. 
(5) When a private prosecution is instituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the 
Attorney-General is barred from prosecuting except with the leave of the court concerned. 
This is a provision which is in keeping with the tenor of the Act to facilitate public 
participation in environmental decision-making and enforcement. Section 32, for 
example, provides for liberal standing for persons wishing to enforce provisions of any 
law relating to protection of the environment or use of natural resources.  It is most likely 
that members of the public would use section 32 in order to pursue civil remedies (for 
example, applications for interdicts) than resort to a private prosecution.  Where section 
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33 may well have significant utility, however, is in allowing enforcement agencies (the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, for example) to utilise lawyers hired by the 
agency concerned to prosecute contraventions of environmental laws rather than handing 
the matter over to the Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecution as is the case at 
present.  The possibilities in this regard are discussed in more detail in Chapter 13. 
 
7.2 Provisions relating to criminal proceedings 
 
Section 34 provides as follows: 
(1) Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 and 
it appears that such person has by that offence caused loss or damage to any organ of state or other 
person, including the cost incurred or likely to be incurred by an organ of state in rehabilitating the 
environment or preventing damage to the environment, the court may in the same proceedings at the 
written request of the Minister or other organ of state or other person concerned, and in the presence 
of the convicted person, inquire summarily and without pleadings into the amount of the loss or 
damage so caused. 
(2) Upon proof of such amount, the court may give judgement therefor in favour of the organ of 
state or other person concerned against the convicted person, and such judgement shall be of the 
same force and effect and be executable in the same manner as if it had been given in a civil action 
duly instituted before a competent court. 
(3) Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 the 
court convicting such person may summarily enquire into and assess the monetary value of any 
advantage gained or likely to be gained by such person in consequence of that offence, and, in 
addition to any other punishment imposed in respect of that offence, the court may order the award 
of damages or compensation or a fine equal to the amount so assessed. 
(4) Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 the 
court convicting such person may, upon application by the public prosecutor or another organ of 
state, order such person to pay the reasonable costs incurred by the public prosecutor and the organ 
of state concerned in the investigation and prosecution of the offence. 
(5) Whenever any manager, agent or employee does or omits to do an act which it had been his 
or her task to do or to refrain from doing on behalf of the employer and which would be an offence 
under any provision listed in Schedule 3 for the employer to do or omit to do, and the act or 
omission of the manager, agent or employee occurred because the employer failed to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent the act or omission in question, then the employer shall be guilty of the 
said offence and, save that no penalty other than a fine may be imposed if a conviction is based on 
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this sub-section, liable on conviction to the penalty specified in the relevant law, including an order 
under subsections (2), (3) and (4), and proof of such act or omission by a manager, agent or 
employee shall constitute prima facie evidence that the employer is guilty under this subsection. 
(6) Whenever any manager, agent or employee does or omits to do an act which it had been his 
or her task to do or to refrain from doing on behalf of the employer and which would be an offence 
under any provision listed in Schedule 3 for the employer to do or omit to do, he or she shall be 
liable to be convicted and sentenced in respect thereof as if he or she were the employer. 
(7) Any person who is or was a director of a firm at the time of the commission by that firm of 
an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 shall himself or herself be guilty of the said 
offence and liable on conviction to the penalty specified in the relevant law, including an order 
under subsection (2), (3) and (4), if the offence in question resulted from the failure of the director to 
take all reasonable steps that were necessary under the circumstances to prevent the commission of 
the offence: Provided that proof of the said offence by the firm shall constitute prima facie evidence 
that the director is guilty under this subsection.  
(8) Any such manager, agent, employee or director may be so convicted and sentenced in 
addition to the employer or firm. 
(9) In subsection (7) and (8)— 
(a) ‘‘firm’’ shall mean a body incorporated by or in terms of any law as well as a partnership; 
and 
(b) ‘‘director’’ shall mean a member of the board, executive committee, or other managing body 
of a corporate body and, in the case of a close corporation, a member of that close 
corporation or in the case of a partnership, a member of that partnership. 
(10) (a) The Minister may amend Part (a) of Schedule 3 by regulation. 
(b) An MEC may amend Part (b) of Schedule 3 in respect of the province of his or her 
jurisdiction by regulation. 
Each subsection will be examined in turn. 
 
Subsections (1) and (2) 
 
These subsections operate in tandem.  They are applicable to those offences listed in 
Schedule 3 of the Act.  This Schedule is reproduced below, together with reference to 
where the relevant offence is discussed in this thesis. 
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Schedule 3: Part (a): National Legislation 




Act No. 36 of 1947 Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, 
Agricultural 
Remedies and Stock 
Remedies Act 
 
Section 18(1)(l) insofar 
as it relates to 
contraventions of 
sections 7 and 7bis 
 
64 
Act No. 71 of 1962 Animal Protection Act Sections 2(1) and 2A 
 
n/a150  
Act No. 45 of 1965 Atmospheric Pollution 
Prevention Act 
Section 9 71 
Act No. 15 of 1973 Hazardous Substances 
Act 
Section 19(1)(a) and 
(b) insofar as it relates 
to contraventions of 
sections 3 and 3A 
 
81-3 
Act No. 57 of 1976 National Parks Act Section 24(1)(b) 94 
Act No. 63 of 1976 









Act No. 63 of 1977 Health Section 27 103 
Act No. 73 of 1980 Dumping at Sea Control 
Act 




Act No. 6 of 1981 Marine Pollution 
(Control and Civil 
Liability) Act 
 
Section 2(1) 111 




Sections 6 and 7 
 
119-20 
Act No. 2 of 1986 Marine Pollution 
(Prevention of 









Section 29(2)(a) and 
(4) 
126-131 
                                                 
150  Not discussed in this work because it was felt that it was not environmental legislation since it deals 
with domestic animals and animals in captivity – in other words, not natural resources. 
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Section 58(1) in so far 
as it relates to 
contraventions of 
sections 43(2), 45, and 
47, and section 58(2) 






Act No. 36 of 1998  
 
National Water Act Section 151(i) and (j) 171-2 
 
Schedule 3: Part (b): Provincial Legislation 
 
No. and year of law Short title Relevant provisions 
 
 
Ordinance No. 8 of 
1969 Section  
 
Orange Free State 
Conservation Ordinance 
Section 40(1)(a) 
insofar as it relates to 
contraventions of 
sections 2(3), 14(2), 
15(a),16(a) and 33 
n/a 
Ordinance No. 9 of 
1969 
Orange Free State 
Townships Ord. 
 
Section 40(1)(a)(ii) n/a 




Section 55 insofar as it 
relates to section 37(1), 
to section 49 in respect 
of specially protected 
game and to section 51 
in respect of specially 
protected game, section 
109 insofar as it relates 
to section 101, to 
section 102 and to 
section 104, section 
154 insofar as it relates 
to section 152; section 
185 insofar as it relates 
to section 183, and 
section 208 insofar as it 
relates to section 194 
and to section 200 
214-239 
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Ordinance No. 19 of 
1974  
 
Cape Nature and 
Environmental 
Conservation Ord. 
Section 86(1) insofar as 
it relates to 
contraventions of 
sections 26, 41(1)(b)(ii) 
and (c)-(e),52(a), 57(a), 
58(b) and 62(1) 
 
239 





Sections 16A, 42, 84, 
96 and 98 
243 
Ordinance No. 15 of 
1985  
 
Cape Land Use 
Planning Ord. 
Section 46(1) insofar as 
it relates to sections 
23(1) and 39(2) 
n/a 






Sections 42, 93 and 115 n/a 





Section 48 251 




Section 67 insofar as it 
relates to sections 
59(1), 59(2), 60(1) and 
62(1); section 86 
insofar as it relates to 
sections 76, 77 and 82; 
and section 110 insofar 





Section 34(1) allows a criminal court to enquire into the amount of any loss suffered by a 
victim as a result of the commission of the offence in question, without the necessity of a 
separate civil trial, and to give judgment in the amount proved in favour of the victim.   
This is not a novel provision – it has been used, for example, in the National Water Act (s 
152) and previous Acts (the Water Act 54 of 1956 in s 171). This provision is a useful 
time-saving tool that recognizes the civil consequences of environmental criminal acts.  
At the time of writing, there was no record of the section’s having been used in any 
prosecution. 
 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions  







Subsection (3) allows the Court to award damages or compensation or require payment of 
a fine in the amount of the advantage gained by the offender as a result of his or her 
contravention.  Again, this is not a novel provision.  It has been used, for example, in the 
Sea Fishery Act.151  
 
Subsection (4) 
Section 34(4) allows the Court to award costs incurred in the mounting and execution of 
the prosecution.  Although this is not a practice that has been used in South Africa before, 
it has been common practice in other countries like the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand.152  It is submitted that this is a good provision as it encourages an offender who 
knows that he or she has committed the offence to plead guilty rather than waste the 
Court’s time in attempting to avoid conviction on a technicality.  If an offender knows 
that there is a chance that he or she will have to pay for expert evidence and the time of 
the prosecutor, there will be a good incentive for such offender to expedite proceedings 
and avoid unnecessary costs.  This will also encourage offenders to co-operate with 
enforcement personnel before any prosecution is brought. 
The question may be raised whether it is not an infringement of a person’s right to a 




This subsection provides for vicarious liability.  It is discussed in detail in Chapter 10. 
 
Subsection (6) 
This section envisages a situation where it would be an offence for an employer to 
commit an act which he or she entrusts to an employee, manager or agent.  If the latter 
fails to act (or refrain from acting, as the case may be) then the latter will be liable to be 
                                                 
151  Act 12 of 1988 s 47(2)(a). 
152 See Chapter 13 (infra), §2. 
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convicted and sentenced as if he or she was the employer.  In evaluating this section, the 
first question to ask is whether it is necessary.  Are there any acts or omissions that would 
impose criminal liability on the employer but not (absent this subsection) on the 
employee, manager or agent who in fact carried out the act (or failed to do it, as the case 
may be)?   Nothing obviously springs to mind from the list of Schedule 3 offences.  A 
second observation is that the subsection speaks of ‘an act which it had been [the 
manager, employee or agent’s] task to do or to refrain from doing on behalf of the 
employer’.  This does not require a specific instruction on the part of the employer to act 
in a particular way.  If an employee does something contrary to his or her conditions of 
employment, but that had never been explicitly explained to him or her, that would 
conceivably fall within the purview of this subsection.  Given the Constitutional Court’s 
rejection of servants’ liability in terms of s 332(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act in S v 
Coetzee,153 it is unlikely that this section would pass the constitutional test.  In any event, 
it would seem to be a pointless provision. 
 
Subsection (7) 
This subsection is also a vicarious liability provision and is discussed in Chapter 10. 
 
Subsection (8) 
This subsection, it is submitted, is not clear at all.  The subsection reads ‘any such 
manager, agent, employee or director may be so convicted and sentenced in addition to 
the employer or firm’.  The previous subsection refers only to directors, so the reference 
in subsection (8) to ‘manager, agent, employee’ lacks a reference point.  Notwithstanding 
the lack of clarity, the objective of the subsection seems to be a sound one – that 
corporate officers ought to be liable for offences in addition to the corporation.  This 
issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 11. 
 
                                                 
153  1997 (1) SACR 379 (CC). 
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Overall, the vicarious liability and other provisions in section 34(5)-(8) inclusive are 
possibly problematic and ought to be reconsidered.  This issue will be discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 10. 
 
7.3 Further comment 
 
Section 28 of NEMA places significant responsibilities on persons who are carrying out 
activities harmful to the environment to take steps to keep such harm to a minimum and 
even to remediate harm already caused.   The Act provides for a competent authority to 
issue a directive requiring the person in question to carry out specified steps in order to 
meet these objectives.  Failure to comply with such directive may result in the competent 
authority taking steps itself to ameliorate the problem and then to recover the costs of 
doing so from the defaulting party or other persons specified in the Act.  The Act does 
not, however, provide that failure to comply with the directive is an offence.  This, it is 
submitted, is a serious omission as the criminal sanction should be available in such 
circumstances as a reinforcement for the primary instrument of civil liability. 
 
8 National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 
 
This Act is the successor to, and repeals, the National Monuments Act 28 of 1969.  It is 
concerned with the management of heritage resources in the Republic.  A ‘heritage 
resource’ is any place or object of cultural significance.  ‘Cultural significance’ means 
aesthetic, architectural, historical, scientific, social, spiritual, linguistic or technological 
value or significance.154  The focus of the National Heritage Resources Act is 
consequently somewhat wide, but there is environmental significance to the Act, 
particularly its regulation of protected areas.  For the purposes of the current analysis, 
offences which relate to matters that are not directly connected with environmental 
conservation will not be discussed.  This would exclude, for example, offences relating to 
archaeological issues and conservation of movable objects, but will include offences 
                                                 
154  Section 1. 
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relating to conservation of buildings, even though there is some debate as to whether the 
latter topic is really environmental law.155 
 
8.1 Destroying etc heritage site 
 
No person may destroy, damage, deface, excavate, alter, remove from its original 
position, subdivide or change the planning status of any heritage site without a permit 
issued by the heritage resources authority responsible for the protection of such site.156  A 
‘heritage site’ is a place declared to be a national heritage site by the South African 
Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) or a place declared to be a provincial heritage site 
by a provincial heritage resources authority.157  The penalty is a fine or imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding five years or both.158 
 
8.2 Damage etc to any part of a protected area 
 
No person may damage, disfigure, alter, subdivide or in any other way develop any part 
of a protected area unless, at least 60 days prior to the initiation of such changes, he or 
she has consulted the heritage resources authority which designated such area in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by that authority.159  Protected areas may be 
designated either by SAHRA or a provincial agency.160  The penalty is a fine or 
imprisonment for not more than two years or both.161 
                                                 
155  See Michael Kidd Environmental Law: A South African Guide (1997) at 5-7. 
156  Section 27(18). 
157  Section 1. 
158  Section 51(1)(a) read with item 1 of the Schedule. 
159  Section 28(3). 
160 (1) SAHRA may, with the consent of the owner of an area, by notice in the Gazette designate as a 
protected area— 
(a) such area of land surrounding a national heritage site as is reasonably necessary to ensure the protection 
and reasonable enjoyment of such site, or to protect the view of and from such site; or 
(b) such area of land surrounding any wreck as is reasonably necessary to ensure its protection; or 
(c) such area of land covered by a mine dump. 
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8.3 Damage etc to provisionally protected place or object 
 
No person may damage, deface, excavate, alter, remove from its original position, 
subdivide or change the planning status of a provisionally protected place or object 
without a permit issued by a heritage resources authority or local authority responsible for 
the provisional protection.162  The Act allows the relevant authority to provisionally 
protect for a maximum period of two years any protected area; heritage resource, the 
conservation of which it considers to be threatened and which threat it believes can be 
alleviated by negotiation and consultation; or heritage resource, the protection of which 
the relevant authority wishes to investigate in terms of this Act.163  The penalty for this 
offence is as for the offence discussed in §8.1. 
 
8.4 Alteration of structure older than 60 years 
 
No person may alter or demolish any structure or part of a structure which is older than 
60 years without a permit issued by the relevant provincial heritage resources 
authority.164  A ‘structure’ is any building, works, device or other facility made by people 
and which is fixed to land, and includes any fixtures, fittings and equipment associated 
therewith.165  ‘Alter’ means any action affecting the structure, appearance or physical 
properties of a place or object, whether by way of structural or other works, by painting, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2) A provincial heritage resources authority may, with the consent of the owner of an area, by notice in the 
Provincial Gazette designate as a protected area— 
(a) such area of land surrounding a provincial heritage site as is reasonably necessary to ensure the 
protection and reasonable enjoyment of such site, or to protect the view of and from such site; or 
(b) such area of land surrounding any archaeological or palaeontological site or meteorite as is reasonably 
necessary to ensure its protection. 
161  Section 51(1)(c) read with item 3 of the Schedule. 
162  Section 29(10). 
163  Section 29(1). 
164  Section 34(1). 
165  Section 1. 
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plastering or other decoration or any other means.166  ‘Demolish’ is not defined.  The 
penalty is the same as for the offence discussed in §8.2. 
 
8.5 Compensatory order 
 
Section 51(8) provides: 
When any person has been convicted of any contravention of this Act which has resulted in damage 
to or alteration of a protected heritage resource the court may— 
(a) order such person to put right the result of the act of which he or she was found guilty, in the 
manner so specified and within such period as may be so specified, and upon failure of such 
person to comply with the terms of such order, order such person to pay to the heritage resources 
authority responsible for the protection of such resource a sum equivalent to the cost of making 
good; or 
(b) when it is of the opinion that such person is not in a position to make good damage done to a 
heritage resource by virtue of the offender not being the owner or occupier of a heritage resource 
or for any other reason, or when it is advised by the heritage resources authority responsible for 
the protection of such resource that it is unrealistic or undesirable to require that the results of the 
act be made good, order such person to pay to the heritage resources authority a sum equivalent 
to the cost of making good. 
Failure to comply with such an order is an offence, the penalty for which is a fine or 
imprisonment for not more than six months or both.167  This order is similar to provisions 
found in other legislation and comes into effect only on conviction of an offender. 
 
8.6 Miscellaneous provisions 
 
In terms of s 51(3), the Minister or the MEC, as the case may be, may make regulations 
in terms of which the magistrate of the district concerned may levy admission of guilt 
fines up to a maximum amount of R10 000 for infringement of the terms of this Act for 
which such heritage resources authority is responsible; and serve a notice upon a person 
who is contravening a specified provision of this Act or has not complied with the terms 
                                                 
166  Ibid. 
167  Section 51(1)(e) read with item 5 in the Schedule. 
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of a permit issued by such authority, imposing a daily fine of R50 for the duration of the 
contravention, subject to a maximum period of 365 days. 
Another provision, which is relatively common in environmental legislation, is to the 
effect that a magistrate’s court shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, be 
competent to impose any penalty under this Act.168 
Also, in addition to other penalties, if the owner of a place has been convicted of an 
offence in terms of the Act involving the destruction of, or damage to, the place, the 
Minister on the advice of SAHRA or the MEC on the advice of a provincial heritage 
resources authority, may serve on the owner an order that no development of such place 
may be undertaken, except making good the damage and maintaining the cultural value 
of the place, for a period not exceeding 10 years specified in the order.169 
Section 51(13) provides that, in any case involving vandalism, and whenever else a 
court deems it appropriate, community service involving conservation of heritage 
resources may be substituted for, or instituted in addition to, a fine or imprisonment. 
Finally, the Act also provides for forfeiture orders: Where a court convicts a person of 
an offence in terms of this Act, it may order the forfeiture to the relevant heritage 
authority, of a vehicle, craft, equipment or any other thing used or otherwise involved in 
the committing of the offence.170  Since the forfeiture order is limited to the 
instrumentalities of the offence, it is not likely to be constitutionally problematic. 
 
8.7 Alternatives to criminal sanctions 
 
There is a plethora of criminal offences provided for in the Act, only a handful of which 
have been considered here.  In addition to the criminal enforcement, however, the Act 
provides for alternatives.  First, section 43 provides for the Minister to make regulations 
                                                 
168  Section 51(7). 
169  Section 51(9).  The affected individual is given a chance to make submissions on whether the order 
should be made and its duration (s 51(10)).  Such an order attaches to the land and is binding on any person 
who becomes an owner of the place while the order remains in force (s 51(11)).  Such an order may be 
reconsidered (s 51(12)).   
170  Section 51(14). 
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providing for financial incentives for the conservation of heritage resources.  MECs and 
local authorities may also do so.  In addition, section 45(1) provides 
When the heritage resources authority responsible for the protection of a heritage site considers that 
such site— 
(a) has been allowed to fall into disrepair for the purpose of— 
(i) effecting or enabling its destruction or demolition; 
(ii) enabling the development of the designated land; or 
(iii) enabling the development of any land adjoining the designated land; or 
(b) is neglected to such an extent that it will lose its potential for conservation, 
the heritage resources authority may serve on the owner an order to repair or maintain such site, to 
the satisfaction of the heritage resources authority, within a reasonable period of time as specified in 
the order: Provided that the heritage resources authority must specify only such work as, in its 
opinion, is necessary to prevent any further deterioration in the condition of the place. 
Default by the owner allows the authority to take the necessary steps and to recover costs 




There is nothing remarkable about the criminal provisions in the National Heritage 
Resources Act.  What is noteworthy is that there are, at least on paper, alternative 
compliance mechanisms to the criminal sanction in the form of incentives and reparation 
or maintenance orders.  Penalties provided for differ according to the seriousness of the 
offence, and a system similar to that in the National Forests Act is used.  Some of the 
maximum penalties are quite stringent, making use of the criminal provisions worthwhile. 
 
9 Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999 
 
This is the third in a series of Acts regulating nuclear energy since 1982.  It establishes 
the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (SANEC) Ltd and its powers and 
functions; provides for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty; and regulates nuclear activities and the possession and 
acquisition of nuclear material.  Most of the offences under the Act are administrative or 
                                                 
171  Section 45(2). 
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relate to obstruction of officials.  Those that have direct environmental significance are as 
follows: 
 
9.1 Failing to discharge duty under s 33 
 
A person is guilty of an offence upon failing to discharge any duty or obligation imposed 
on the person by or in terms of section 33(3).172  Section 33 is concerned with the 
responsibilities of the  Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs towards implementing the 
Safeguards Agreement.  To this end the Minister is given several powers, including the 
power to issue instructions on matters like the keeping of records and the physical 
protection of nuclear material.  Subsection (3) places responsibilities on ‘any person in 
possession of, using, handling or processing nuclear material’ to carry out certain 
specified duties, including the implementation and maintenance of the prescribed 
physical protective measures in respect of nuclear material; and the immediate 
notification of the Minister in the event of loss of nuclear material.  The penalty for 
failure to discharge any of the duties imposed by s 33(3) (the remainder of which are 
largely administrative in nature) is a fine or imprisonment for not longer than five 
years.173 
‘Nuclear material’ is defined as source material and special nuclear material.  The 
Minister may declare any substance containing uranium or thorium with concentration 
and mass limits higher than those specified in the notice, to be source material.174  He or 
she may also declare any of the substances specified in s 2(c)175 with concentration and 
                                                 
172  Section 56(1)(a). 
173  Section 56(2)(a). 
174  Section 2(b). 
175  The substances specified in the subsection are - 
(i) plutonium-239; 
(ii) uranium-233; 
(iii) uranium enriched in its 235 or 233 isotope; 
(iv) transuranium elements; or 
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mass levels higher than those specified in the notice, to be special nuclear material for the 
purposes of this Act.176   
 
9.2 Performing restricted act without authorisation 
 
A person is guilty of an offence upon performing or carrying out any restricted act or 
activity without an authorisation required in terms of section 34 or 35 (as the case may 
be), or in contravention of the relevant authorisation or any condition imposed in respect 
thereof under section 34 or 35 (as the case may be).177  A ‘restricted act’ is any of the acts 
or activities mentioned in paragraphs (c) to (u) of section 34(1); and section 35(1).  These 
are as follows: 
 The acquisition, use or disposal of178 any source material;179 
 The import of any source material into the Republic; 
 The processing,180 enriching181 or reprocessing182 of any source material; 
 The acquisition of any special nuclear material; 
 The import of any special nuclear material into the Republic; 
                                                                                                                                                 
(v) any composition of any of the materials referred to in subparagraphs (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv), or any 
composition of those materials and any other substance or substances. 
176  Section 2(c). 
177  Section 56(1)(d). 
178 ‘Disposed of’ used in the context of safeguards means sell, exchange, donate, distribute, lend or in any 
other manner transfer and ‘disposal of’ has a corresponding meaning.  All the definitions given in the 
footnotes dealing with ss 34 and 35 are from s 1. 
179  All of the activities in this list are listed in s 34(1) unless otherwise indicated. 
180  ‘Process’, when used as a verb in relation to source material, special nuclear material and restricted 
material, means to extract or recover such a material or to concentrate, refine or convert it in any manner 
without enriching it, and ‘processing’ has a corresponding meaning; 
181 ‘Enrich’ means to increase the ratio of an isotopic constituent of an element to the remaining isotopic 
constituents of that element relative to the naturally occurring ratio, and ‘enrichment’ has a corresponding  
meaning. 
182 ‘’Reprocess’ means to extract or separate, from source material or special nuclear material that has been 
subjected to radiation, the constituents that have undergone transmutations as a result of the radiation, or 
the constituents that have not undergone those transmutations and are re-usable. 
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 The use or disposal of any special nuclear material; 
 The processing, enriching or reprocessing of any special nuclear material; 
 The acquisition of any restricted material;183 
 The import of any restricted material into the Republic; 
 The use or disposal of any restricted material; 
 The production of nuclear energy; 
 The manufacture of or otherwise to produce or acquire, or dispose of, uranium 
hexafluoride (UF 6 ); 
 The import of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) into the Republic; 
 The manufacture, or acquisition, or disposal of, nuclear fuel;184 
 The importation of nuclear fuel into the Republic; 
 The manufacture of or otherwise to produce, import, acquire use or dispose of 
nuclear-related equipment and material;185 
 The disposal of, storage or reprocessing of any radioactive waste186 or irradiated 
fuel (when the latter is external to the spent fuel pool); 
 The transport of any of the abovementioned materials; 
 The disposal of any technology related to any of the abovementioned materials or 
equipment. 
                                                 
183  ‘Restricted material’ means beryllium and zirconium and any other substance declared under section 
2(a) to be restricted material. 
184 ‘Nuclear fuel’ means any material capable of undergoing a nuclear fission or nuclear fusion process on 
its own or in combination with some other material and which is produced in a nuclear fuel assembly or 
other configuration. 
185  ‘Nuclear-related equipment and material’ means equipment and material declared under section 2(f) to 
be nuclear-related equipment and material.  The Minister may declare any equipment and material specially 
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of nuclear material, to be nuclear-related 
equipment and material (s 2(f). 
186  ‘Radioactive waste’ means any radioactive material destined to be disposed of as waste material;  
‘‘radioactive material’’ means any substance consisting of, or containing, any radioactive nuclide, whether 
natural or artificial. 
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Section 35(1) provides that no person may export any source material, special nuclear 
material or restricted material or any nuclear-related equipment and material from the 
Republic except with the written authorisation of the Minister. 
The prohibition amounts essentially to a number of interrelated offences, all of which 
are regarded as serious when one takes into account that the penalty for contravention of 
this section is a fine of maximum term of imprisonment of ten years.187  
 
9.3 Possession of restricted matter 
 
A person is guilty of an offence upon being in possession of restricted matter in 
contravention of section 34(1)(a) or (b).188  ‘Restricted matter’ means (in terms of s 1) 
any or all of the following, namely— 
(a) source material; 
(b) special nuclear material; 
(c) restricted material; 
(d) uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ); 
(e) nuclear fuel; and 
(f) nuclear-related equipment and material. 
Section 34(1)(a) provides that, except with the written authorisation of the Minister, no 
person, institution, organisation or body may be in possession of any source material, 
except where— 
(i) the possession has resulted from prospecting, reclamation or mining operations 
lawfully undertaken by the person, institution, organisation or body; or 
(ii) the possession is on behalf of anyone who had acquired possession of the source 
material in the manner mentioned in subparagraph (i); or 
(iii) the person, institution, organisation or body has lawfully acquired the source material 
in any other manner. 
                                                 
187  Section 56(2)(c). 
188  Section 56(1)(e). 
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Section 34(1)(b) prohibits any person from being in possession of any restricted matter 
except source material, save with Ministerial authorisation.   The penalty for this offence 




There are no additional enforcement provisions other than the offences and penalties 
provided for in section 56.  The Act is not concerned primarily with regulating behaviour 
– it is more of an empowering Act as far as the SANEC is concerned.  Where there are 
prohibitions, however, the nature of the serious damage or harm that can be caused by 
nuclear or radioactive material dictates the imposition of heavy potential penalties for 
contravention of the Act and perhaps explains why the only enforcement mechanism 
provided for is the criminal sanction. 
 
10 National Nuclear Energy Regulator Act 47 of 1999 
 
As its name suggests the Act provides for a National Nuclear Regulator which is 
designed to regulate nuclear activities.  The Act also provides for safety standards and 
regulatory practices for protection of persons, property and the environment from nuclear 
damage.  The offences of an environmental nature under this Act are: 
 
10.1 Activities of unlicensed nuclear installation 
 
No person may site, construct, operate, decontaminate or decommission a nuclear 
installation, except under the authority of a nuclear installation licence.190  A ‘nuclear 
installation’ is defined as – 
(a) a facility, installation, plant or structure designed or adapted for or which may involve the 
carrying out of any process, other than the mining and processing of ore, within the nuclear fuel 
cycle involving radioactive material, including, but not limited to— 
                                                 
189  Section 56(2)(b). 
190  Section 20(1). 
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(i) a uranium or thorium refinement or conversion facility; 
(ii) a uranium enrichment facility; 
(iii) a nuclear fuel fabrication facility; 
(iv) a nuclear reactor, including a nuclear fission reactor or any other facility intended to create 
nuclear fusion; 
(v) a spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility; 
(vi) a spent nuclear fuel storage facility; 
(vii) an enriched uranium processing and storage facility; and 
(viii) a facility specifically designed to handle, treat, condition, temporarily store or permanently 
dispose of any radioactive material which is intended to be disposed of as waste material; or 
(b) any facility, installation, plant or structure declared to be a nuclear installation in terms of section 
2(3).191 
The required licence may be granted in terms of s 21.  Contravention of this prohibition is 
an offence,192 punishable by a fine or imprisonment for no longer than ten years.193  Since 
this activity is hardly likely to be something that a person could do overnight, it may have 
been useful for the Act to contain an alternative to the criminal sanction like a directive 
procedure allowing the Minister or other specified authority to order cessation of the 
activities on pain of a criminal prosecution. 
 
10.2 Operation of vessel using nuclear power 
 
No vessel which is propelled by nuclear power or which has on board any radioactive 
material capable of causing nuclear damage may anchor or sojourn in the territorial 
waters of the Republic; or enter any port of the Republic, except under the authority of a 
nuclear vessel licence.194  Such licence is also provided for in s 21.  ‘Vessel’ is not 
defined in the Act, but ‘radioactive material’ means any substance consisting of, or 
containing, any radioactive nuclide, whether natural or artificial, including, but not 
limited to, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel;195 and ‘nuclear damage’ means any 
                                                 
191  Section 1. 
192  Section 52(1)(a). 
193 Section 52(3)(a). 
194  Section 20(2). 
195  Section 1. 
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injury to or the death or any sickness or disease of a person; or other damage, including 
any damage to or any loss of use of property or damage to the environment, which arises 
out of, or results from, or is attributable to, the ionizing radiation associated with a 
nuclear installation, nuclear vessel or action.196  Contravention of the prohibition is an 
offence,197 and the penalty is the same as for the offence discussed above. 
 
10.3 Failure to comply with conditions of authorisation 
 
Both a nuclear installation licence and nuclear vessel licence required by s 20 may have 
conditions attached if they are granted.198  Failure to comply with a condition is an 
offence.199  The penalty is the same as for the above two offences. 
 
10.4 Unspecified offences 
 
The Act also provides that any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any 
provision of this Act or any condition, notice, order, instruction, directive, prohibition, 
authorisation, permission, exemption, certificate or document determined, given, issued, 
promulgated or granted in terms of this Act is, if any such contravention or failure is not 
declared an offence in terms of s 52(1), is guilty of an offence.200  The penalty is the same 
as for the other offences discussed here. 
It appears that the only possible offence under this subsection with environmental 
relevance would be failure to comply with prescribed duties regarding nuclear accidents 
or incidents in terms of s 37.  Essentially, s 37 requires the holder of the relevant nuclear 
authorization to report to the Regulator if there is a nuclear accident or nuclear incident in 
connection with a nuclear installation, nuclear vessel or nuclear action.  ‘Action’ means 
the use, possession, production, storage, enrichment, processing, reprocessing, conveying 
                                                 
196  Ibid. 
197  Section 52(1)(b). 
198  See s 23.  Section 24 deals with special conditions for nuclear vessel licences. 
199  Section 52(1)(a) and (b). 
200  Section 52(2). 
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or disposal of, or causing to be conveyed, radioactive material; any action, the 
performance of which may result in persons accumulating a radiation dose resulting from 
exposure to ionizing radiation; or any other action involving radioactive material.201  A 
‘nuclear accident’ is any occurrence or succession of occurrences having the same origin 
which results in the release of radioactive material, or a radiation dose, which exceeds the 
safety standards contemplated in section 36; and is capable of causing nuclear damage.202  
A ‘nuclear incident’ is any unintended event at a nuclear installation which causes off-site 
public exposure of the order of at least one tenth of the prescribed limits; or the spread of 
radioactive contamination on a site or exposure of a worker above the prescribed limits or 
a significant failure in safety provisions, other than a nuclear accident.203  Section 37 does 
not specify that failure to comply with these duties is an offence.  Read with s 52(2), 
however, it is likely that a person failing to comply with the duty would be liable for 
criminal prosecution. 
 
10.5 Alternative enforcement mechanisms 
 
The Act provides in s 30 for strict (civil) liability of the holder of a nuclear installation 
licence for nuclear damage204 caused by or resulting from the nuclear installation in 
question arising during that person’s period of responsibility.  The importance of this 
provision is that it provides advance warning to a person wishing to become involved in 
an activity that holds significant potential danger for the environment and for people, that 
he or she will not avoid liability for damage on the basis of absence of fault.  If this 
requires extraordinary safety measures on the part of the licence holder, then so be it.  
There was a similar provision in this Act’s precursor and it is a welcome provision.  What 
is interesting, though, is that it is unique among enactments regulating hazardous 
activities and it (or similar provisions) may well be useful in other regulated areas 
(hazardous substances, for example).   
                                                 
201  Section 1. 
202  Ibid. 
203  Section 1. 
204  Defined above, §10.2. 
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The only noteworthy aspect of the criminal provisions in this Act is the fact that the 
maximum penalty is significant.  This is hardly surprising given the nature of the 
regulated activity, however.  As indicated in the previous paragraph, the imposition of 
strict civil liability for any damage arising from activities regulated by the Act is an 
interesting and worthwhile provision. 
 
11 World Heritage Convention Act 49 of 1999 
 
This Act deals with the incorporation of the World Heritage Convention into South 
African law and issues like the establishment of World Heritage Sites in South Africa.  
The Act is primarily of an empowering nature and applies more to organs of state than 




One would expect that the legislation enacted post-1994 would be less inclined to use 
devices that might be in conflict with the Constitution.  Also, given modern trends in 
enforcement of regulatory offences, one would be excused for expecting that increased 
reliance would be placed on non-criminal modes of enforcement.  While one might be 
largely correct on the first score, there are some vicarious liability provisions in various 
Acts that might give cause for constitutional concern.  This issue will be canvassed fully 
in Chapter 10. 
As far as alternatives to the criminal sanction are concerned, less use is made of these 
than one might expect.  Although several Acts contain provisions for officials to make 
use of powers enabling directives to be given to offenders to remedy the situation or take 
other necessary steps, the criminal sanction still appears to be the primary mode of 
enforcement.  There are currently no provisions in South African environmental law at 
the national level that empower officials to levy administrative penalties, for example.  
The potential for use of alternative measures is discussed in Chapter 8. 
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A final observation concerns penalties.  Criticism has often been levelled at South 
African environmental law to the effect that the penalties provided for are so low as to 
make the use of criminal sanctions a pointless exercise.205  Certainly this is the case in 
respect of several pre-1994 environmental statutes.  If one considers the penalties 
provided for offences in Acts considered in this Chapter, however, the penalties provided 
for are, in most if not all cases, relatively serious.  In most cases heavy maximum terms 
of imprisonment are imposed.  Another recent trend has been for legislation not to specify 
the amount of the fine, leaving that to the discretion of the Court.  Such discretion will 
probably be influenced by the maximum term of imprisonment provided for, which is not 
subject to the effects of inflation.  In short, then, the criticism of inadequate penalties 
does not hold much water when it comes to more recent environmental legislation. 
On paper, then, other than a reluctance to provide for alternative enforcement 
measures, there is not much wrong with recent environmental legislation from the point 
of view of enforcement.  It would appear, though, that the paper potential of 
environmental law is not yet being given effect to in reality.  There may be several 
reasons for this, and these will be considered in more detail further on in this work.  
Enforcement is vital if environmental law is to be taken seriously and whatever can be 
done to facilitate and make more effective the enforcement of environmental law should 
be seriously considered. 
                                                 
205  RF Fuggle & MA Rabie Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) at 130; Cheryl Loots 
‘Making environmental law effective’ (1994) 1 SAJELP 17 at 18. 
Chapter 6  
 
An examination of environmental crimes and their 
enforcement in South Africa: 
Part Three – Provincial and Local Legislation 
 
Not all environmental legislation is found at national level and, in fact, many important 
environmental enactments are either provincial or local.  In terms of the Constitution,1 
various environmental matters are of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence: environment, nature conservation, pollution control and soil conservation, 
for example.  Air pollution and noise pollution are examples of matters of local 
responsibility in terms of the Constitution.  Provincial legislatures have not been 
particularly busy since 1994 and there are not many new provincial environmental Acts 
to examine. 
However, nature conservation was a matter regulated at provincial level before the 
new Constitutional era and there are several provincial nature conservation ordinances 
that are still applicable today.  It is these ordinances which constitute the most important 
nature conservation legislation in South Africa and, for this reason, their enforcement 
provisions should be carefully evaluated. 
In this Chapter, not all enactments will be examined in the same detail as was the case 
with the national legislation in the previous two chapters.  Since the four2 nature 
conservation ordinances are relatively similar in substance, detailed examination will be 
made of only one of these, the Natal Nature Conservation Ordinance,3 and, where there 
are significant provisions in the other ordinances that are different from the Natal 
provisions, these will also be examined. 
                                                 
1  Schedules 4 and 5. 
2  One for each of the four previous provinces: Transvaal, Natal, Cape and Orange Free State. 
3  15 of 1974. 
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There are three post-1994 provincial environmental Acts4 dealing with substantive 
environmental law and these will all be examined in some detail as well.   
 
1 Pre-1994 Provincial Legislation 
 
1.1 The Natal Nature Conservation Ordinance 15 of 1974 
 
This Ordinance is comprehensive in its scope, regulating issues relating to hunting, and 
all types of wild fauna ranging through mammals, reptiles, birds, amphibians, 
invertebrates and fish (freshwater and marine), as well as indigenous plants.  Since 
important protected areas in the province of KwaZulu-Natal are not subject to the 
National Parks Act, the ordinance applies to these areas as well as to areas that are not 
protected, and where most of the infringements of the legislation probably take place. 
The ordinance sets out penalties in each of its chapters and does not always specify 
explicitly that activities are offences.  There are numerous prohibitions and offences in 
the ordinance, and for this reason not all of the offences will be discussed in any detail.  
Analysis will be reserved for noteworthy or controversial provisions.  As far as the latter 
are concerned, there are several presumptions in the ordinance that are very unlikely to 
pass constitutional muster.  The analysis will be carried out by examining the following 
categories of offences: 
 Offences in relation to parks; 
 Offences in relation to game; 
 Offences in relation to private reserves; 
 Offences in relation to mammals; 
 Offences in relation to professional hunting; 
 Offences in relation to amphibians, invertebrates and reptiles; 
                                                 
4  KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act 5 of 1998; Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 
1998; and the Western Cape Planning and Development Act 7 of 1999.  There have been several 
amendment Acts that have few substantive provisions relevant to this analysis and the KwaZulu-Natal 
Nature Conservation Management Act 9 of 1997, which deals with institutional arrangements and does not 
regulate public behaviour. 
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 Offences in relation to wild birds; 
 Offences in relation to freshwater fish; 
 Offences in relation to marine fish; 
 Offences in relation to indigenous plants. 
 
1.1.1 Offences in relation to parks 
 
Section 15 deals with the restriction of access into parks and the prohibition of certain 
acts within parks.5  A ‘park’ is defined with reference to a repealed section of the 
ordinance, but they are essentially protected areas initially managed by the Natal Parks 
Board and now managed by the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Services (hereafter 
referred to as the NCS).  As far as prohibitions are concerned, first, it is unlawful for any 
person other than an employee of the NCS to enter or reside in any park without 
authorisation.6  This is similar to the prohibition in the National Parks Act. 
Then s 15 lists a number of prohibitions, relating to bringing weapons or hunting 
implements into parks, and the hunting, capturing etc of fauna and gathering etc of flora 
within parks.  For example, s 15(1)(c) provides that it is not lawful for any person within 
a park to kill, injure, capture or disturb any animal or to take or destroy any egg, larva or 
nest thereof; provided that any dangerous animal, or noxious insect may be killed in 
defence of human life or to prevent the infliction of personal injury.  Penalties for these 
offences are provided for in s 23.  The heaviest penalties are provided for the offence of 
killing animals and this depends on the type of animal killed. 
The ordinance differentiates between different categories of ‘game’, which means any 
of the mammals or birds, alive or dead, mentioned in Schedule 1, 2, 3 or 4 and shall 
include any meat, fat or blood thereof, whether fresh, preserved, processed or 
manufactured in any manner, and also any tooth, tusk, bone, head, horn, shell, claw, hoof, 
hide, skin, hair, egg, feather, or other durable portion or any such mammal or bird, 
                                                 
5  Some of the offences also apply to ‘game reserves’ and ‘nature reserves’.  These terms are also both 
defined in terms of a deleted section. 
6  The penalty is a maximum fine of R100 or imprisonment for one month: s 23(5). 
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whether preserved, processed, manufactured or not, but shall not include any trophy.7  
The four schedules represent the categories of ‘ordinary game’; ‘protected game’; 
‘specially protected game’ and ‘open game’ respectively.  Examples of ordinary game are 
the impala and Egyptian goose.  Protected game includes zebra, hippopotamus and 
Whitebacked Duck.  Specially protected game is a relatively short list containing the 
elephant, both species of rhinoceros, the big cats and some others.  Finally, open game 
consists of only two animals, the springbok and the blesbok. 
Any person who wilfully or negligently kills, injures or captures any specially 
protected game within a park or game reserve or nature reserve is guilty of an offence and 
liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand rand or imprisonment for not more than two 
years or both.8  If the contravention relates to either species of rhinoceros or elephant, the 
maximum penalty is R100 000 fine or ten years imprisonment or both.9  This is a very 
heavy penalty indeed but it reflects the seriousness with which poaching of these animals 
is viewed, given these animals’ vulnerable10 status in the wild. 
The same activity with respect to ordinary or protected game is also an offence and the 
penalty is a maximum of five thousand rand fine or imprisonment for one year or both.11 
This is still a relatively serious penalty and certainly not what could be described as 
insignificant.  Other offences relating to parks, other than wilfully or negligently causing 
a veld fire, which carries the same penalty as killing protected game, carry a maximum 
fine of five hundred rand or six months’ imprisonment.12 
 
1.1.2 Offences in relation to game 
 
The offences in relation to game are essentially hunting offences.  This ordinance has a 
very complex system of hunting permits and licences which are utilised in conjunction 
                                                 
7  Section 1. 
8  Section 23(1). 
9  Ibid. 
10  This term is used here in its ordinary sense and not to reflect the IUCN Red Book categorisation. 
11  Section 23(2). 
12  Section 23(4). 
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with open and closed hunting seasons.  No person may hunt during a closed season save 
in specified circumstances,13 and no person may hunt ordinary or protected game without 
the necessary permit.14  The hunting, capture and keeping in captivity of specially 
protected game is prohibited unless in terms of a specially-granted permit.15  No person 
may capture or keep in capticity ordinary or protected game without a permit.16 
This Chapter also prohibits the following: 
 Trespassing on land during hunting;17 
 Use of unlicensed persons to hunt;18 
 Hunting or capturing game in or from public roads;19 
 Conveyance of firearms on roads traversing area in which game is present;20 
 Possession of snares;21 
 Hunting contrary to prohibited methods or at prohibited times;22 
 Sale and purchase of game;23 and 
 Exportation of game.24 
This Chapter contains a presumption to the effect that whenever any person is or has 
been in possession of or deals or has dealt in or handles or has handled any game and 
there exists at any time a reasonable suspicion that such game was hunted or acquired 
                                                 
13  Section 31(2). 
14  Section 33(1)(a).  Open game may be hunted with the prior permission of the landowner: s 33(1)(b). 
15  Section 37. 
16  Section 38. 
17  Section 42. 
18  Section 44. 
19  Section 45. 
20  Section 46. 
21  Section 47.  A ‘snare’ is a noose of string or of wire or of any other material which can be used for 
capturing any animal (s 1). 
22  Section 48.  Hunting with artificial light or with a crossbow or between half-an-hour of sunset on any 
day and half-an-hour before sunrise the following day are some of the prohibitions listed here.  
23  Section 50. 
24  Section 51.  ‘Export’ is not defined. 
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unlawfully he shall be guilty of an offence unless he proves the contrary.25  If that is not 
enough, whenever any game is upon any vehicle or at any camping place, every person 
who is in any way associated with such vehicle or who is at or in any way associated with 
such camping place shall be deemed to be in possession of such game for the purposes of 
s 39(1).26 
This presumption, which casts a reverse onus on the accused to explain his or her 
possession, dealing or handling of the game, certainly infringes the presumption of 
innocence in the Constitution and its operation could lead to a person’s conviction despite 
the presence of reasonable doubt.  It is doubtful that this presumption would meet the 
requirements of the limitations clause, primarily because there are other ways of 
addressing the issue.  It would appear that the presumption assists enforcement officials 
in cases (probably the vast majority) where there is no direct evidence of the actual 
killing of the animal.  Possession is presumed to be hunting.  If the legislation made it an 
offence for any person to possess game, without a licence or reasonable explanation for 
that possession, this would address the problem without having to resort to a reverse onus 
provision. 
There are three further presumptions.  First, any person who is in possession of any 
game shall be deemed to have hunted or captured such game in contravention of the 
Chapter, unless it is proved that he was in lawful possession of the same.27  Second, if 
any person is found removing game from any trap or snare it shall be presumed until the 
contrary is proved that he hunted or captured such game in contravention of the 
prohibition on using snares.28  Finally, any person who is found conveying game between 
half-an-hour after sunset on any day and half-an-hour before sunrise on the following day 
shall be deemed to have contravened the prohibition on night hunting unless in any 
prosecution the contrary is proved.29 
                                                 
25  Section 39(1).  None of the verbs in this provision are defined in the Act. 
26  Section 39(2). 
27  Section 57(1). 
28  Section 57(2). 
29  Section 57(3). 
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All three of these presumptions cast a reverse onus on the accused and could lead to 
the conviction of innocent persons.  It is unlikely that any of these will be regarded as 
acceptable by the Courts.  The first presumption overlaps with the one discussed 
immediately above.  As indicated above, if possession of game was made an offence, the 
presumption would be unnecessary.  As for the second presumption, surely the evidence 
of a person removing an animal from a snare would in itself be very strong evidence for 
the accused to counter in a prosecution for using a snare?  If not, the offence could be 
redrafted to include within the definition of using a snare the removal of a captured dead 
animal therefrom.  By specifying that the animal must be dead, the offence would 
exclude from its ambit good Samaritans who remove living animals from snares.  The 
hunters would be unlikely to remove living animals from snares and would probably kill 
them first.  The third presumption is unnecessarily broad.  It would technically extend to 
anybody travelling at night with some game biltong in his or her car.  It is difficult to 
think of an alternative manner of addressing this issue, but perhaps unlicensed hunters 
could be prosecuted by means of the suggested unlawful possession provision, whereas 
licensed hunters might well just have to be caught in the act. 
Differing penalties are provided for in this Chapter, depending on the offence.  Any 
offences in the Chapter in relation to specially protected game carry a maximum fine of 
ten thousand rand or two years imprisonment or both, unless in respect of elephant or 
either species of rhinoceros, where the penalty is a maximum of R100 000 or ten years 
imprisonment or both.30  Other specified offences carry a maximum fine of five thousand 
rand or one year’s imprisonment or both.31  Any offence not specified will be punished 
by a maximum fine of five hundred rand or imprisonment for six months or both.32 
In addition to these penalties, the ordinance provides for the imposition of double the 
fine or double the imprisonment provided for, or imprisonment without the option of a 
fine, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction.33  It is also provided that a person 
convicted of hunting or capturing game without the necessary licence, shall be ordered by 
                                                 
30  Section 55(1)(a). 
31  Section 55(1)(b). 
32  Section 55(1)(c). 
33  Section 55(2). 
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the Court to pay the licence fees and charges in addition to whatever other penalty is 
imposed.34  Given the value of many species, it would be a good idea to provide for 
payment of compensation to the owner of game in the event of contravention of this 
Chapter, also in addition to whatever other penalties may be imposed. 
 
1.1.3 Offences in relation to private reserves 
 
It is an offence for any person, within a private nature serve or private wild-life (sic) 
reserve to: 
 Gather any indigenous plant or hunt any wild bird without a permit;35 
 Hunt any ordinary pr protected game without a permit;36 
 Hunt any specially protected game;37 
 Trespass.38 
 
1.1.4 Offences in relation to mammals; 
 
The offences provided for in this Chapter are as follows: 
 Possession and disposal of endangered mammals: Section 79 provides that no 
person shall at any time purchase, acquire by any means, possess, sell, exchange 
                                                 
34  Section 55(3). 
35  Section 60.  The maximum penalty is a five hundred rand fine or six months imprisonment or both (s 
76(1)). 
36  Section 61. The maximum penalty is a five thousand rand fine or one year’s imprisonment or both (s 
76(2)). 
37  Section 62.  Exemption can be given by means of authorisation of the Premier.  The maximum penalty 
is a ten thousand rand fine or two years imprisonment or both; except in the case of an offence in respect of 
elephant or either species of rhinoceros, where the maximum penalties are R100 000 fine or ten years 
imprisonment or both (s 76(1A)). 
38  Section 76(3), which provides for a maximum penalty of one hundred rand fine or one month’s 
imprisonment. 
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or otherwise dispose of, or keep in captivity any endangered mammal.39  
Endangered mammals are listed on Schedule 6 and the list consists primarily of 
exotic (that is, not from South Africa) species. 
 Keeping mammals in captivity without a permit: Section 80 provides for the 
necessity of a permit for the keeping of animals, whether exotic or indigenous, in 
captivity.40   
 Sale, purchase or exchange of mammals: No person shall sell, purchase or 
exchange in any manner whatsoever any indigenous mammal or exotic mammal, 
save in accordance with a permit.41 
 Operation of zoo without authorisation: No person shall establish, conduct or 
maintain any zoo without the prior approval of the Premier, or contrary to any 
conditions imposed by the Premier in granting such approval and without being in 
possession of a valid certificate of registration and a licence.42 
 Cruelty to mammals: No person shall keep any indigenous mammal or exotic 
mammal secured by means of a rope, cord, chain or anything serving a similar 
purpose.43 
The ordinance provides for a doubling of the maximum penalty in cases of subsequent 
convictions.44  It also provides that any licence or permit or other authority granted to any 
person found guilty of an offence under this Chapter, or the regulations made thereunder 
                                                 
39  The maximum penalty for contravention of this prohibition is a fine of five hundred rand or six months’ 
imprisonment or both (s 90(1)(a)). 
40  The maximum penalty for contravention of this prohibition is a fine of two hundred and fifty hundred 
rand or three months’ imprisonment or both (s 90(1)(b)). 
41  Section 81.  The penalty is as indicated in the previous footnote. 
42  Section 82.  The maximum penalty for contravention of this prohibition is a fine of five hundred rand or 
six months’ imprisonment or both (s 90(1)(a)). 
43  Section 86.  This is not explicitly referred to in the ‘Offences’ section, which means that the maximum 
penalty for contravention of this prohibition is a fine of one hundred rand or one month’s imprisonment or 
both (s 90(1)(c)). 
44  Section 90(2). 
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shall be cancelled by the court.45  There is nothing remarkable about these offences, save 
that the penalty provided for cruelty to mammals is rather lenient. 
 
1.1.5 Offences in relation to professional hunting; 
 
Chapter VI of the ordinance deals with professional hunters and hunting-outfitters.  The 
offences provided for in this Chapter are essentially administrative in nature and will not 
be discussed here. 
 
1.1.6 Offences in relation to amphibians, invertebrates and reptiles; 
 
Chapter VII concerns amphibians, invertebrates and reptiles, and in this respect the 
ordinance provides for the following offences: 
 Killing or capturing a protected indigenous amphibian, invertebrate or reptile: No 
person shall kill or capture any protected indigenous amphibian, invertebrate or 
reptile, save in accordance with a permit.46  A ‘protected indigenous amphibian, 
invertebrate or reptile’ is defined as ‘any species of amphibian, invertebrate or 
reptile included in Schedule 7, whether alive or dead, indigenous to the Republic 
or South West Africa or any territory which formed part of the Republic and in 
terms of an Act of Parliament became an independent state’.47  Schedule 7 
contains all indigenous tortoises, two monitors, the Nile crocodile and two snakes.  
The penalty for this offence is the rather inadequate maximum fine of five 
hundred rand or, in default, six months imprisonment or both.48  
                                                 
45  Section 91. 
46  Section 101(1).  There is an exemption for the killing or capture, without the requisite permit, of any 
protected indigenous reptile in defence of human life or property; provided that any officer or honorary 
officer may require that any protected indigenous reptile so killed or captured be surrendered to the Board 
for disposal in such manner as the Board may deem fit (s 101(2)). 
47  Section 1. 
48  Section 109(1)(a). 
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 Keeping in captivity a protected indigenous amphibian, invertebrate or reptile: 
Section 102(1) prohibits this without a permit.  The penalty for this offence is a 
maximum fine of two hundred and fifty rand or, in default, three months 
imprisonment or both.49 
 Exporting an indigenous amphibian, invertebrate or reptile: Section 104(1)(a) 
provides that no person shall export from the Province any indigenous amphibian, 
invertebrate or reptile, except in accordance with a permit.  The penalty is the 
same as for killing a protected indigenous animal. 
 Importing an amphibian, invertebrate or reptile: No person shall import into the 
Province any indigenous amphibian, invertebrate or reptile unless he is in 
possession of a valid licence or permit;50 nor any exotic amphibian, invertebrate 
or reptile.51  The penalty for importing an indigenous protected species is as for 
keeping a protected indigenous species in captivity.  If the imported species is not 
protected, the penalty is a maximum fine of one hundred rand or, in default, one 
month’s imprisonment or both.52  The penalty for importing an exotic species is 
the same.53 
As was the case in other chapters in the ordinance, the penalty is doubled for 
subsequent convictions, or the Court may impose imprisonment without the option of 
fine.54  Moreover, a permit or licence held by an offender under this chapter is subject to 
cancellation.55  There is a further provision that enables the relevant official to seize and 
confiscate any indigenous species subject to this Chapter, if there is contravention of any 
                                                 
49  Section 109(1)(b). 
50  Section 104(3). 
51  Section 104A. 
52  Section 109(1)(c). 
53  Ibid.  The offence is not explicitly specified but this subsection contains the penalty for any offence not 
specified. 
54  Section 109(2). 
55  Section 109A. 
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of the provisions of the Chapter.56  This does not prejudice the right to prosecute the 
individual in question. 
Finally, this Chapter contains certain presumptions which, as was the case with those 
used in the game Chapter, are unlikely to survive constitutional challenge (for the same 
reasons as expounded in the discussion of those presumptions).  They are a presumption 
of  killing or capture of a protected indigenous species in contravention of the Chapter if 
the person in question is found in possession of the species in question;57 and a 
presumption of  killing or capture of a protected indigenous species in contravention of 
the Chapter if the person in question is found removing the species from a trap or snare.58 
 
1.1.7 Offences in relation to wild birds; 
 
Chapter VIII is the applicable Chapter and it provides for the following offences: 
 Killing or capture of wild birds: No person shall at any time kill or capture any 
wild bird without a permit,59 nor shall any person remove the nest or eggs of any 
wild bird, except in accordance with a permit, and no person shall at any time 
destroy, injure or disturb the nest or eggs of any wild bird save in so far as that 
may be necessary in exercise of any authority conferred upon him by any such 
permit aforesaid.60  A ‘wild bird’ is any non-domestic bird of a species which 
inhabits either permanently or temporarily any part of the Republic, but does not 
include any such bird which is classified as game by virtue of its inclusion in 
Schedule 1, 2, 3, or 4 and shall include any skin or egg of any such bird which has 
not been completely processed.61  The penalty for this offence is a fine not 
exceeding one thousand rand or, in default of payment, imprisonment for any 
                                                 
56  Section 110. 
57  Section 110A(1). 
58  Section 110A(2). 
59  Section 114(1). 
60  Section 114(2). 
61  Section 1.   
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term not exceeding twelve months or both.62 Sale and purchase of wild birds: 
Section 115(1) prohibits any person from selling any wild bird or disposing of the 
possession of any wild bird to any other person in any manner whatsoever; 
purchasing any wild bird or acquisition of the possession of any wild bird from 
any other person in any manner whatsoever, save in accordance with a permit.63   
The penalty is the same as for the previous offence. 
 Unlawful keeping of wild bird in captivity: No person shall keep any wild bird in 
captivity except in an aviary of a capacity of at least 8,50 m³ which has been 
registered in his or her name and in respect of which there is in operation a 
certificate of registration and an aviary licence granted to him or her.64  The 
penalty is the same as for the offences discussed above. 
 Importation of foreign birds: foreign birds may not be imported without a 
permit.65  A ‘foreign bird’ is any non-domestic bird which is not indigenous to the 
Republic and shall include any egg or skin of any such bird which has not been 
completely processed.66  The penalty for this offence is not individually specified, 
which means that it is a fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty rand or, in 
default of payment, imprisonment for note more than three months or both.67 
 Release from captivity of foreign birds: no person may release wild birds from 
captivity without a permit.68  The penalty is the same as for importing a foreign 
bird.  This is potentially an act that could have very serious environmental 
consequences and the penalty provided is consequently completely inadequate. 
                                                 
62  Section 130(1)(a). 
63  The provisions of subsection (1) shall also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the nest or eggs, or both, of any 
wild bird. 
64  Section 118(1). 
65  Section 123.   
66  Section 1. 
67  Section 130(1)(c). 
68  Section 124. 
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 Exportation of wild birds: wild birds may not be exported from the province 
without a permit.69  The penalty for this offence is a fine not exceeding one 
thousand rand or, in default of payment, imprisonment for any term not exceeding 
twelve months or both.70 
 Killing or capturing wild birds by means of prohibited methods:  Section 127 
prohibits any person from killing or capturing any wild bird by means of poison, 
drugs or birdlime; or with the aid of artificial light of any kind; or between half-
an-hour after sunset on any one day and half-an-hour before sunrise on the 
following day, without a permit.  The penalty is as for the offence of importing 
foreign birds. 
 Prohibition of killing or capture of wild birds in public roads:  No person shall 
kill or capture any wild bird in any public road or in the road reserve of any public 
road, nor shall any person in any such road or reserve aforesaid kill or discharge 
any weapon at any wild bird which is off such road or reserve.71  The penalty is as 
for the previous offence. 
Chapter VIII contains the same provision relating to repeat offenders as in previous 
Chapters.  It also contains presumptions of the sort contained in the game Chapter, which, 
for the reasons outlined in discussion of those presumptions, are most likely 
unconstitutional.  There is a presumption that someone in possession of a wild bird killed 
or captured such bird in contravention of the Chapter;72 a presumption relating to removal 
of a wild bird from a trap; and a presumption to the effect that a person conveying a wild 
bird during the period between half-an-hour after sunset on any day and half-an-hour 
before sunrise on the following day, will be presumed to have killed or captured it during 
those hours (which is prohibited). 
 
                                                 
69  Section 125. 
70  Section 130(1)(a). 
71  Section 129. 
72  Section 132(1). 
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1.1.8 Offences in relation to freshwater fish; 
 
These offences, provided for in Chapter IX, are as follows: 
 Operation of angling competitions: No person shall promote, organise, conduct or 
take part in any angling competition in any waters of the Province, without the 
necessary authorisation.73  ‘Waters’ in respect of freshwater fish, are defined as 
any river, stream, estuary or creek which is not subject or liable to tidal influence, 
or that portion of any river, stream, estuary or creek which, being subject or liable 
to tidal influence, lies upstream or inland of a point of demarcation fixed in terms 
of regulations made in that behalf, and any freshwater lake, pan, pond, furrow or 
other collection of water, whether natural or artificial, in which fish may be found, 
including the foreshores or banks of any such waters.74  The penalty for carrying 
on an unauthorised angling competition is a fine not exceeding five hundred rand 
or in default of payment, imprisonment for not more than six months or both.75 
 Unauthorised catching of fish: The ordinance envisages the catching of fish 
subject to a licence.  In addition, it provides for open and closed seasons for the 
catching of fish and also provides for the prohibition, for a stated time or 
indefinitely, of the catching of all fish or certain species of fish.  It is thus an 
offence for any person to: 
o Catch a fish for which an open season was proclaimed without a licence; 
o Catch a fish for which an open season was proclaimed during the closed 
season; 
o Catches or wilfully disturbs any fish for which a prohibition was issued; 
o Catches any fish without a licence where a licence is required.76 
In addition, no person shall at any time wilfully injure or disturb the spawn of fish 
or any spawning bed, bank or shallow whereon or wherein such spawn is 
deposited.77  The penalty is as for the previous offence. 
                                                 
73  Section 142. 
74  Section 1. 
75  Section 154(1)(b). 
76  Section 143(2). 
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 Use of prohibited net: Section 150 prescribes a certain type of net that may be 
used for the catching of bait.  Use of any net other than the prescribed type is an 
offence.78  The penalty is a fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty rand or, in 
default of payment, imprisonment for a maximum of three months or both.79  
 Contravention of licence conditions: it is an offence to fail to comply with the 
applicable licence/permit conditions issued under this Chapter.80  The penalty is 
the same as for the previous offence. 
 Export or import of live fish: Export of import of live fish without a permit is an 
offence.81  The penalty is as for the previous offence. 
 Sale of trout: No person may sell trout without the necessary authorisation.82  The 
penalty is the same as for the previous offence. 
 Placing of trap in waters: Any person who places any unauthorised trap or 
obstruction in any waters for the purpose of capturing fish or preventing the free 
passage of fish in such waters is guilty of an offence.83  The penalty is a fine not 
exceeding five hundred rand or in default of payment, imprisonment for not more 
than six months or both.84 
 Catching fish in unauthorised manner: There is a prohibition of the catching, 
injuring or destroying of fish in any waters by means of any unauthorised trap, 
firearm, explosive, poisonous or stupefying substance, electrical device, gaff, 
spear or any unauthorised implement of fishing.85  The penalty is as for the 
previous offence. 
                                                                                                                                                 
77  Section 143(3). 
78  Section 150(2). 
79  Section 154(1)(c). 
80  Section 151(1)(a). 
81  Section 151(1)(b). 
82  Section 151(1)(c). 
83  Section 151(1)(d). 
84  Section 154(1)(b). 
85  Section 151(1)(e). 
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 Breaking down banks in order to catch fish: No person may without the necessary 
consent cut through, break down, destroy or damage any wall, bank, dam or 
barrier of any pond, reservoir, lake, stream or other waters with intent to drain 
water therefrom for the purpose of capturing fish or causing the loss or destruction 
of fish.86  The penalty is the same as for the previous offence. 
 Pollution of waters: No person shall deposit or discharge or allow to enter or 
percolate into any waters, any substance, matter or thing, whether solid, liquid or 
gaseous, which is injurious or is liable to become injurious to fish or fish food.87 
The penalty for this offence is a fine not exceeding one thousand rand or, in 
default of payment, imprisonment for any term not exceeding twelve months or 
both.88 
Once again, there is the subsequent conviction provision,89 and several questionable 
presumptions.90  The presumptions all cast a reverse onus on the accused and none of 
them appear to be essential to the effective operation of the Chapter.   
                                                 
86  Section 151(1)(f). 
87  Section 152.  Excluded from the ambit of the prohibition is any discharge permitted by s 21 of the 
Water Act of 1956, which has been repealed. 
88  Section 154(1)(a). 
89  Section 154(2). 
90  Section 156 provides- 
(1) Any person who in a close season is in possession of any species of fish to which such close season 
applies, shall be deemed to have caught such fish in contravention of section 143 (2) (b) unless the 
contrary is proved. 
(2) Any person who at any time is in possession of any species of fish the capture of which is prohibited by 
proclamation of the Administrator, shall be deemed to have caught the same in contravention of section 
143 (2) (c) unless the contrary is proved. 
(3) Any person who is in possession of any species of fish for the capture of which a licence in terms of 
this Chapter is required, shall be deemed to have caught such fish without a licence, unless the contrary 
is proved. 
(4) Any person who is in possession of any unauthorised trap, firearm, explosive, poisonous or stupefying 
substance, electrical device, gaff, spear, or unauthorised implement of fishing upon or adjacent to any 
waters, in circumstances indicating his intention to capture fish by means thereof, shall be deemed to 
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1.1.9 Offences in relation to marine fish; 
 
Chapter X deals with coastal fishing and is concerned with marine resources. In terms of 
the Constitution, although nature conservation is an area of concurrent national and 
provincial competence, ‘marine resources’ is explicitly excluded from this, meaning that 
it is of national competence only.  Conservation of marine resources is addressed on a 
national level by the Marine Living Resources Act.91  Although Chapter X of the Natal 
ordinance has not been repealed, it is no longer being implemented by the authorities in 
KwaZulu-Natal.  The conservation officers in this province who are responsible for 
marine resources are implementing the Marine Living Resources Act.  For this reason, 
this Chapter in the ordinance will not be discussed. 
 
1.1.10 Offences in relation to indigenous plants. 
 
Indigenous plants are the subject of Chapter XI of the ordinance.  ‘Indigenous plant’ is 
defined as any plant or part thereof, including cycad and any cycad hybrid, indigenous to 
the Republic, but does not include any plant which is a noxious weed by virtue of any 
law.92  The offences in the Chapter apply only to protected and specially protected 
indigenous plants.  A ‘protected indigenous plant’ means any indigenous plant mentioned 
in Schedule 11, which is any indigenous plant not listed on Schedule 10 (unprotected 
indigenous plants) or Schedule 12 (specially protected indigenous plants).  ‘Specially 
protected indigenous plants’ include several species and whole families, including 
cycads, lilies, tree ferns, and orchids.  The offences provided in this Chapter are listed 
below: 
                                                                                                                                                 
have employed the same in contravention of section 151 (1) (e), unless it is proved that the same was 
being employed or was intended to be employed for a lawful purpose. 
91  Discussed above at 147-163. 
92  Section 1. 
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 Purchase of specially protected indigenous plants:  No person shall purchase any 
specially protected indigenous plant except from a person lawfully entitled to sell 
it under the provisions of this Chapter.93 
 Sale of specially protected indigenous plants: A specially protected indigenous 
plant may be sold only in terms of a licence.94 
 Donation of specially protected indigenous plant without a permit: No person 
shall donate or exchange any specially protected indigenous plant without a 
permit.95  
 Exportation of indigenous plants: No person shall export from the Province any 
indigenous plant save under the authority of and in accordance with a permit 
issued to him in terms of this Chapter.96 
 Importation of specially protected indigenous plants: Such importation into the 
province requires a permit.97 
 Gathering of specially protected indigenous plants: no person shall gather any 
specially protected indigenous plant save under the authority of and in accordance 
with a permit, and such gathering shall only take place on land, by the owner of 
such land, or by any person with the prior written permission of such owner.98 
 Prohibition of gathering on public roads: No person who is not in possession of a 
permit, shall gather any indigenous plant on any public road or in the road reserve 
of any public road without the prior permission of the Administrator.99 
 Possession of specially protected indigenous plants: Section 203 provides that any 
person who is in possession of any specially protected indigenous plant and is 
unable to give a satisfactory account of such possession shall be guilty of an 
offence; provided that a specially protected indigenous plant growing in a wild 
                                                 
93  Section 194. 
94  Section 196. 
95  Section 197. 
96  Section 198. 
97  Section 199. 
98  Section 200. 
99  Section 202. 
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state on private land shall not be deemed for the purposes of this section to be in 
the possession of the owner or occupier of such land. 
 Trespass on land: Whenever any person is found trespassing on land for the 
purpose of gathering any indigenous plant he or she shall be guilty of an 
offence.100 
The penalties are all the same for the offences under this Chapter: a fine or 
imprisonment for a maximum period of ten (10) years or to both such fine and 
imprisonment.101 Although the fine is unspecified (a practice which differs from the rest 
of the ordinance), the prison term indicates that this is a heavy penalty.  This is 
presumably to serve as a deterrent to the lucrative business of taking cycads out of the 
wild, which is a serious environmental problem. 
As is the practice in other Chapters in the ordinance, there are several presumptions 
designed to assist with enforcement.  The first is likely to be found unconstitutional for 
the reasons set out in discussion of a similar provision in the Chapter dealing with game: 
s 210(1) provides that any person who at any time is in possession of any specially 
protected indigenous plant for the gathering of which a permit or licence is required in 
terms of this Chapter shall, failing a satisfactory account of such possession, be deemed 
to have gathered the same in contravention of the Chapter.  In any event, this presumption 
is redundant given that the possession of a specially protected indigenous plant is in itself 
an offence in terms of s 203.  Section 210(2) provides that, whenever in any proceedings 
under this Chapter the question arises as to whether or not any indigenous plant is 
specially protected, it shall be deemed to be such unless the contrary is proved. This 
presumption also seems to be unnecessary, since this information would surely have to be 
determined by the authorities before deciding to prosecute in the first place. 
                                                 
100  Section 205. 
101  Section 208. 
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1.1.11 Miscellaneous provisions 
 
Chapter XII deals with various general matters, including powers of officers (including 
powers of search and seizure).  Section 215B provides for the mandatory forfeiture of 
certain items wherever a person is convicted of an offence under the ordinance:   
 any animal or part of an animal in respect of which there has been contravention 
of the prohibition on removing any animal from a park;102 
 any game or trophy, or any indigenous amphibian, invertebrate or reptile, or any 
wild bird or foreign bird, including any such bird found in any unregistered or 
unlicensed aviary or in excess of the number of such birds authorised to be kept in 
any such aviary, or any fish, or any indigenous plant in respect of which the 
offence was committed; 
 any weapon, explosive trap, snare, poison, receptacle, instrument, implement of 
fishing, animal or any other article or object used by such person in, for the 
purpose of, or in connection with the commission of the offence; 
Moreover, the court is given a discretion in the case of a second or subsequent 
conviction of an offence under the same chapter of this Ordinance, to declare forfeited to 
the Natal Provincial Administration any vehicle, vessel, boat, craft, float or aircraft and 
any right, title and interest of such person in or to such vehicle, vessel, boat, craft, float or 
aircraft used in, for the purpose of, or in connection with the commission of the 
offence.103  These forfeiture provisions are unlikely to be problematic since they target 
either the subject matter of the offence, or the objects used in the commission of the 
offence. 
The final noteworthy provision is one which requires the payment to the Board of all 
fines or estreated bail moneys paid or recovered in respect of any contravention of this 
ordinance or the regulations.104  This is a useful provision in that it serves to provide 
                                                 
102  Section 15(1)(f). 
103 Section 215B(1)(b). 
104  Section 216. 
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funds for the implementation of the legislation in question, instead of such funds being 




The Natal Nature Conservation Ordinance makes liberal use of the criminal sanction as 
an enforcement device.  In many cases, it operates as a subsidiary sanction, in cases of 
failure to act with the necessary permit or licence.  Although in certain cases penalties 
provided for are heavy, many of the offences carry small maximum penalties which 
would make use of the criminal court process of questionable value.  For these offences, 
alternatives to the criminal sanction (administrative penalties, for example) would be 
ideal.  Another noteworthy aspect is the fact that the ordinance is riddled with 
presumptions that have little chance of avoiding negative constitutional scrutiny.  
Although enforcement officials would probably argue strongly that they are necessary in 
order to enforce the legislation, in most cases they could quite feasibly be replaced by 
something that has much the same effect without infringing the right to a fair trial, as 
argued above. 
Given that the ordinance is more than twenty-five years old, it is not surprising that it 
is caught in the traditional ‘command and control’ paradigm, but the fact that much of the 
focus of the ordinance is on relatively minor infractions makes it the ideal vehicle for the 
application of alternative enforcement measures. 
 
1.2 Orange Free State Nature Conservation Ordinance 8 of 1969 
 
The Free State Ordinance is a shorter and less complex document than the Natal 
legislation.  It regulates wild animals (including hunting); fish; indigenous plants and 
nature reserves.  Instead of containing offences provisions in each Chapter like the Natal 
ordinance, there is one section dealing with all offences under the General Chapter, 
Chapter VI. 
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The offences which carry the heaviest penalties are: 
 Hunting protected game: No person shall hunt protected game, except under 
authority of a permit.105  Protected game is not defined in the body of the Act, but 
Schedule 1 contains a list of protected game, which includes, inter alia, elephant, 
both species of rhinoceros, and some reptiles and birds. 
 Prohibition of hunting with or laying of poison: No person shall hunt with poison 
or lay poison or cause poison to be laid at any place where it is likely to be picked 
up by a wild animal, except under authority of a permit.106  ‘Poison’ includes any 
poison, preparation or chemical substance used to catch, immobilize, sterilize or 
to harm physically a wild animal.107 
 Activities in respect of Schedule 3 animal: Except under authority of a permit, no 
person shall possess, convey, buy, sell, grant, exchange, process or manufacture 
any product from any part of the body of a wild or exotic animal of a species 
specified in Schedule 3.108  Schedule 3 contains two entries: all elephants and all 
rhinoceroses. 
 Export of animals: No person shall export from the Province an animal of an 
endangered or scarce species.109  ‘Endangered species’, in relation to an animal or 
plant, is a species specified in Appendix 1 to the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington, 1973) and 
includes any reasonably identifiable part or derivative of such species; while a 
‘scarce species’, in relation to an animal or plant, is a species specified in 
Appendix 11 to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
                                                 
105  Section 2(3). 
106  Section 7. 
107  Section 1. 
108  Section 14(2). 
109  Section 15(a). 
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Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington, 1973) and includes, in the case of an animal, 
any reasonably identifiable part or derivative of such species.110 
 Importation of animals: No person shall import into the Province an animal of an 
endangered or scarce species.111   
 Prohibited acts in respect of certain plants: No person shall sell, donate, import 
into or export from the Province any protected plant or a plant of an endangered 
or scarce species, except under authority of a permit.112  Schedule 6 contains a 
long list of protected plants, including cycads and yellowwoods. 
The penalty for the offences listed above is a maximum fine of R100 000 or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years or both.113 
The penalty for other offences in terms of the Act, including the offence of being in 
possession of a wild animal, fish or plant, or derivative or part thereof, in respect of 
which there is a reasonable suspicion that it has not been hunted, caught, picked or 
obtained in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance and being unable to give a 
satisfactory account of such possession; is a fine not exceeding R20 000 or imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding 5 years or both.114 
 
1.2.2 Miscellaneous provisions 
 
The ordinance does contain a provision providing for compensation, but only in respect 
of poisoned animals (damages are payable to the owner of the animal).115  There is also a 
section dealing with forfeitures, ranging from forfeiture of any animal involved in the 
offence to instruments (weapons and fishing tackle, for example) to vehicles used in 
connection with the commission of such offence or for the conveyance of anything in 
                                                 
110  Section 1. 
111  Section 16. 
112  Section 33. 
113  Section 40(1)(i). 
114  Section 40(1)(ii). 
115  Section 40(2)(a). 
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respect of which such offence was committed.116  This provision is very similar to that 
found in the Natal ordinance.  Payment to an informant is provided for.117  Finally, the 
ordinance contains several presumptions: 
In any prosecution in terms of this Ordinance it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved - 
(a) in the case where it is alleged that a person is not the holder of a permit, licence, exemption or 
document issued in terms of this Ordinance, that such person is not the holder of such permit, 
licence, exemption or document; 
(b) in the case where it is alleged that an animal, fish or plant is of a specified species or sex, that 
such animal, fish or plant is of that species or sex; 
(c) in the case where an animal, fish or plant is found on a vehicle, vessel, float or aircraft or at a 
camping place, that every person, who at the time such animal, fish or plant was so found, was 
upon such vehicle, vessel, float or aircraft or at such camping place or was in any way associated 
therewith, was in possession of such animal, fish or plant; 
(d) that any person caught in the act while removing an animal or fish from a snare, trap, gin, net, 
bird-lime, fish-trap, set line, pitfall, holding pen, trap-cage or any other like means or 
contrivance, was busy hunting or catching such animal or fish; 
(e) in the case where an animal, fish or plant is found in any shop or other place of sale, that the 
person in whose possession it is found or who has control over such shop or place, has attempted 
to sell such animal, fish or plant; 
(f) in the case of a contravention of section 7 (1), that the owner of the land on which poison or an 
animal which died of poison was found laid or caused such poison to be laid on such land.118 
Presumptions (b) and (d) are similar to presumptions contained in the Natal ordinance 
and are likely to be problematic for reasons outlined in the discussion of the Natal 
presumptions.  As far as the other presumptions are concerned, let us examine them in 
turn.  Presumption (a), although it may be of questionable evidential value, would 
probably not be struck down because it is easy for the accused to discharge the reverse 
onus – if he or she has the relevant authorisation, production of such authorisation would 
rebut the presumption. 
Presumption (c) is similar in effect to the presumption in the Drugs and Drug 
Trafficking Act119 that was declared unconstitutional in S v Mello.120  This presumption 
                                                 
116  Section 41. 
117  Section 41A. 
118  Section 42. 
119  Section 20 of Act 140 of 1992. 
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extends too far – it would not be difficult to conceive of instances where a person who 
had nothing to do with the offence could be presumed to be involved without being able 
to satisfy the reverse onus.  It is likely that this presumption, if challenged, would suffer 
the same fate as the one in Mello. 
The presumption in (e) could be avoided by changing the nature of the offence to 
which it relates.  Instead of making it an offence only to sell the prohibited item, the 
offence could include being in possession of the item in a shop or place of sale.  This 
would obviate the need for the presumption. 
The last presumption concerns the laying of poison.   This presumption is, of all the 
presumptions in the ordinance, probably the one most necessary for the administration of 
justice.  It is difficult to conceive how the state could prosecute this offence in certain 
instances without such a presumption.  On the other hand, the presumption is very broad 
– if a poisoned animal after being poisoned elsewhere moves onto a person’s land and 
dies on that land, the presumption will require the landowner to prove that he did not lay 
the poison, which might be very difficult and lead to the possibility of an innocent 
person’s conviction for this offence.  It is not immediately apparent, however, how to get 
around the practical difficulties in prosecuting this offence.  Perhaps the severance of the 





This is another enactment firmly embedded in the command and control paradigm.  Like 
the Natal ordinance, it makes liberal use of subsidiary sanctions, penalising activities 
carried out without a permit or contrary to the permit conditions.  It does not provide for 
alternative enforcement measures other than the criminal sanction.  A further 
shortcoming is the inclusion of several presumptions that are unlikely to pass 
constitutional scrutiny.  On the other hand, however, for an old ordinance, the penalties 
                                                                                                                                                 
120  1998 (3) SA 712 (CC). 
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provided for are reasonable -  this is one piece of legislation that cannot be criticised for 
having unreasonably low penalties.  
 
1.3 Cape Nature and Environmental Conservation Ordinance 19 of 1974 
 
This ordinance covers roughly the same subject matter as the ordinances discussed above.  
Like the Free State ordinance, it deals with offences and penalties in the General Chapter, 
rather than in each individual chapter, with one exception.  The offences are of the same 
sort found in the previous two ordinances.  Noteworthy aspects of the ordinance are as 
follows: 
 
1.3.1 Fines in respect of commercial value of animal that is subject of offence 
 
A provision not found in either of the previous ordinances discussed, is provision for a 
fine to be paid that does not exceed three times the commercial value of the animal or 
carcase in respect of which the offence was committed.  This is provided for in a special 
Chapter dealing with rhinoceroses,121 and in the general offences section.122  This is a 
significant penalty, since the commercial value of wild animals can be considerable.  
Someone who commits an offence in respect of a rhinoceros, for example, is liable to a 
maximum fine of one hundred thousand rand or ten years imprisonment or both and, in 
addition, a fine not exceeding three times the value of the rhinoceros, which could be 
worth approximately five hundred thousand rand.  It is possible, then, that the offender 
could be facing a fine of more than R1.5 million. 
It is submitted that an improvement to this provision would have been to provide that 
an amount equal to the commercial value of the animal in question be payable to the 
owner (which would be an organ of state in the case of an offence in a protected area). 
 
                                                 
121  Section 47A(2). 
122  Section 86(1)(a)-(d). 
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There are several presumptions in the ordinance that cast a reverse onus on the accused.  
Some are similar to those found in the other ordinances.  There is, first, a presumption 
that an animal or firearm found in a vehicle or other stated means of conveyance shall, 
unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be in the possession of the person in charge 
of that vehicle or other means of conveyance at the relevant time.123  This is similar to the 
presumption that the Constitutional Court struck down in S v Mello.124  It would seem 
that the presumption in unnecessary in any event, because proof of the fact that the 
animal or firearm was found in the vehicle would constitute proof of possession if the 
accused did not explain otherwise.  The problem with the presumption is that it reverses 
the onus – if the presumption did not operate, the accused would have to raise reasonable 
doubt, but the absence of the presumption would not cast any extra burden on the 
prosecution. 
Then there are two presumptions relating to possession of flora and wild animals.   A 
person in possession of flora is presumed to have picked it or bought it in contravention 
of the ordinance125 and a person in possession of a wild animal is presumed to have kept 
the animal in captivity in contravention of the ordinance.126  Both these presumptions 
could be avoided by merely making the possession of flora and wild animals unlawful 
without a permit or reasonable explanation on the part of the accused.  There is, in fact, 
an offence of being in possession of wild animal without being able to give a satisfactory 
account of that possession.127 
 The fourth presumption is one much like those found in the previous two ordinances 
presuming that a person removing an animal from a snare, trap etc laid the snare and 
captured the animal.128  For the reasons set out above, this presumption is problematic but 
                                                 
123  Section 84(1)(a). 
124  (Supra n120). 
125  Section 84(1)(b). 
126  Section 84(1)(b). 
127  Section 85(k). 
128  Section 84(1)(d). 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions: 241 
Chapter 6 Analysis of SA provisions          
 
 
it could be addressed by redrafting the relevant offence.129  Similarly, a presumption that 
somebody trespassing while in control of a dog was hunting wild animals by use of that 
dog,130 could be removed and an offence created of trespassing with a dog.  This would 
have the same effect without the constitutional problems of reversing the onus. 
The final presumption is drafted in a relatively complex manner.  It reads- 
(2) Whenever- 
(a) a vehicle, vessel, boat, craft, float, aircraft or other means of conveyance is being or has been 
used for the purpose of or in connection with the commission of an offence under this ordinance; 
(b) any wild animal, the carcase of such animal or fish in respect of which an offence is being or has 
been committed under this ordinance is found or has been in or on a vehicle, vessel, boat, craft, 
float, aircraft or other means of conveyance, or  
(c) a weapon, line, poison, net or any other object which could be used for the hunting of wild 
animals or the catching of fish and which is being or was used or forms or formed an element in 
the commission of an offence under this ordinance, is found or has been in or on a vehicle, 
vessel, boat, craft, float, aircraft or other means of conveyance,  
the owner of such vehicle, vessel, boat, craft, float, aircraft or other means of conveyance as well as 
the person in charge thereof at the time of the commission of the offence or at the time when the 
wild animal, carcase, fish or any object contemplated by paragraph (c) is found or was in or on such 
vehicle, vessel, boat, craft, float, aircraft or other means of conveyance shall be presumed to have 
committed the offence concerned and be liable to be convicted and sentenced in respect thereof 
unless it is proved that he did not commit such offence and was unable to prevent the commission 
thereof.131 
This is a very broad presumption and certainly raises the constitutionally unacceptable 
spectre of conviction of the innocent.  For the reasons set out in S v Mello,132 this 
presumption would almost certainly be struck down if challenged in a Court.  It is not 
immediately clear what the purpose of this presumption is and therefore it is difficult to 
suggest and alternative way of dealing with the problem. 
 
                                                 
129  See above, 219. 
130  Section 84(1)(e). 
131  Section 84(2). 
132  (Supra n120). 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions: 242 





The ordinance provides for three levels of penalties.  The most serious, for offences 
relating to protected species and similar offences, is a maximum fine of one hundred 
thousand rand or ten years imprisonment or both.133   The intermediate penalty, for 
offences like hunting a protected wild animal other than an elephant is a maximum fine of 
ten thousand rand or two years imprisonment or both.134  The penalty for offences not 
specified individually is a fine of not more than five thousand rand or one year’s 
imprisonment or both.135  These penalties conform to the penalties provided for in the 
previous ordinances discussed. 
There are also provisions relating to discretionary cancellation by the Court of 





There is nothing in the Cape ordinance significantly different from what was found in the 
Free State and Natal ordinances, other than the fine equal to three times the commercial 
value of an animal or plant in respect of which an offence was committed.  The 
observations made about those ordinances relating to the reliance on command and 
control and the problems with presumptions are of equal applicability to the Cape 
ordinance. 
 
1.4 Transvaal Nature Conservation Ordinance 12 of 1983 
 
The Transvaal ordinance shares several common features with the three ordinances 
already considered.  It deals with the same subject matter, by and large, and a large 
                                                 
133  Section 86(1)(a). 
134  Section 86(1)(c). 
135  Section 86(1)(d). 
136  Section 87. 
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portion of the ordinance is concerned with issues relating to hunting.  The ordinance 
contains a plethora of offences, of much the same sort as those found in the other 
ordinances.  What is particularly noteworthy about the Transvaal ordinance is the large 
number of presumptions that have reference to criminal proceedings.  The ordinance 
contains no fewer than fifteen reverse-onus presumptions and several presumptions 
imposing an evidential burden on the accused.  Several of these are similar to 
presumptions found in the other ordinances, but there are some that relate to particular 
matters that are not regulated by the other ordinances.  For instance, there is a prohibition 
of making an opening in a fence from which a game animal cannot readily escape.137  
There is a corresponding presumption that deems a hole or opening in the fence to have 
been made by the owner or occupier of land and that it is designed as contemplated in the 
prohibition.138 
One of the presumptions in the ordinance was successfully challenged in the case of S 
v Mumbe.139  At first glance this may appear to have inflicted a severe blow to the 
authorities’ ability to enforce the law, but, as has been argued in respect of some of the 
other presumptions already considered in this Chapter, redrafting of the law to change the 
essence of the offence in question would enable the authorities to prove the offence 
relatively easily without falling foul of the bill of rights. 
The presumption in question is relevant to s 98(1) of the ordinance which prohibits 
any person from importing into or exporting from the province an endangered species or 
a rare species unless he or she is the holder of a permit which authorises him or her to do 
so (save in certain specified circumstances which are not relevant to the case at hand).  
The ‘endangered species’ and ‘rare species’ referred to in the section are those species of 
fauna and flora which are so designated in Appendices I and II of  the Convention of 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington DC 
1973) (‘CITES’). 
                                                 
137  Section 26. 
138  Section 110(1)(h). 
139  1997 (1) SA 854 (W). 
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South Africa, as a party to CITES, is required to take appropriate measures to enforce 
the provisions of the Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof.  
These shall include measures to penalise trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or 
both.140  Section 98 of the ordinance is clearly designed to fulfil South Africa’s 
obligations in this regard as far as the province of Transvaal is concerned. 
In evidence before the court in Mumbe, the commanding officer of the Endangered 
Species Protection Unit (a unit of the South African Police Services) testified, in respect 
of smuggling and illegal trade in ivory and rhinoceros horn (both falling within the 
definitions of endangered and rare species mentioned above) that ‘control at border posts 
leaves much to be desired and that the Republic would by virtue of its superior 
communication and transport facilities continue to feature prominently as an exporter of 
illegal goods from other parts of Africa for as long as this can take place with little or no 
risk of detection’.141 
Seemingly to overcome the problem of poor border controls, the ordinance contains a 
presumption to the effect that, where at criminal proceedings in terms of this ordinance, it 
is proved that any person was in possession or in control of an endangered species or rare 
species, such person will be deemed to have imported such species into the province, 
until the contrary is proved.142 
In S v Mumbe, the appellant had been convicted of contravention of section 98(1) of 
the ordinance solely on the basis of the presumption contained in section 110(1)(m).  On 
appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of this presumption. 
Respondent contended that the presumption cast on the accused only an evidential 
burden to adduce evidence which raised a reasonable doubt as to whether he was guilty of 
importation.  The court (Streicher J, with whom Southwood J concurred) held, however, 
that ‘there can be no doubt that the section is a reverse onus provision which imposes a 
burden of proof on the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was not 
                                                 
140  Article VIII.1(a). 
141  At 858E. 
142  Section 110(1)(m). 
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guilty of importation’143 and that the provision, therefore, conflicted with the presumption 
of innocence.   
The question which now remained to be established was whether the limitation of the 
right effected by section 110(1)(m) was a reasonable, necessary and justifiable limitation 
in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.144 (section 33 of the 
interim Constitution). Having established that the presumption of innocence was ‘crucial’ 
and ‘essential in a society  committed to fairness and social justice’,145 the Court also held 
that: 
It is of considerable importance to an open and democratic society that the environment be protected 
for the benefit of present and future generations.  The [interim] Constitution ... recognises the right 
of everyone to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations 
through legislative and other measures that promote conservation’ .146 
As far as the extent of the limitation was concerned, the Court held that the effect of 
the presumption is that a person could be convicted of contravening s 98(1) of the 
ordinance in circumstances where reasonable doubt as to guilt was present.  Moreover, 
although ‘the presumption is no doubt efficacious in the sense that it facilitates 
convictions’,147 the Court decided that ‘an evidential burden as opposed to a deeming 
provision until the contrary is proved is less damaging to the right in question and should 
be reasonably efficacious in securing a conviction of a guilty accused’.148 
The court consequently decided that the presumption did not satisfy the requirements 
of the limitations clause.  Whilst recognising the importance of enforcing the legislation 
in question, and acknowledging the difficulty of proving contravention of the ordinance, 
the Court was of the view that there was an alternative manner of dealing with the 
difficulty which would be ‘less damaging’ to the presumption of innocence.  The Court’s 
words in this regard are instructive: 
                                                 
143  At 856I. 
144  Section 33 of the interim Constitution. 
145 At  857J-858C, quoting from R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200 at 212-3. 
146  At 858J-859A 
147  At 859G. 
148  At 860A. 
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[The] difficulty [of proving the offence] can be dealt with adequately in a way which is less 
damaging to the constitutionally entrenched rights, for example by imposing an evidential burden on 
an accused by providing that possession would constitute prima facie evidence of importation.  Such 
a provision would be of assistance to the prosecution whilst at the same time being less invasive of s 
25(3) rights ... That is not to say that such a provision would be constitutional but only that such a 
provision has a better chance of passing the constitutionality test’.149 
An evidential burden would have the effect of requiring the accused to adduce 
evidence raising reasonable doubt as to whether the offence was committed, which is less 
onerous than having to disprove a presumed fact.  Yet, as the Court indicates, there is still 
doubt that an evidential burden would pass constitutional muster.  If it did not, would this 
mean that the authorities would have to prove the actual import of the rare or endangered 
species, a task which apparently is extremely difficult?  If so, South Africa’s efforts at 
meeting its responsibilities under CITES would suffer an important setback. 
Fortunately, it is possible to redraft the ordinance so as to create a different offence 
which would be much easier to prove and which would not infringe the accused’s 
constitutional rights.  Rather than focussing on the illegality of the import and therefore 
having to presume the importation of the items in order to establish the offence, it is 
suggested that the ordinance make it an offence for any person to be in possession of an 
endangered or rare species without a permit.  Such a permit could be issued to legal 
importers as well as existing possessors of such species.  This provision would satisfy 
CITES, since the relevant article in the Convention requires ‘measures to penalise trade 
in, or possession of, such specimens’.  It would also be easy to prove that someone was 
not in possession of the necessary permit. 
This is, thus far, the only presumption in environmental legislation to have been 
subjected to judicial scrutiny and the Court’s approach does not send an encouraging 
message for the other presumptions contained in this and the other nature conservation 
ordinances.  It is possible, however, as has been argued here, to make up for the loss of 
the presumption by considering more closely exactly what it is that the state is attempting 
to prohibit.  Imaginative ‘offence-creation’ would in nearly all cases obviate the need for 
reverse onus presumptions, or even evidential burdens. 
                                                 
149 At 860E-F, emphasis added. 
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The remaining presumptions in the ordinance will not be considered in any detail, 
since the general themes of the Transvaal ordinance have been identified. 
 
1.5 Natal and Free State pollution ordinances 
 
Both the Free State and Natal have short ordinances dealing with environmental 
pollution:  the Free State Prohibition of the Dumping of Rubbish Ordinance 8 of 1976 
and the Natal Prevention of Environmental Pollution Ordinance 21 of 1981. 
The Free State ordinance prohibits the throwing, dumping or leaving of any rubbish 
without authority on land (other than private land) in a defined area or in or on water on 
such land; or in or on any public water, except in a container or at a place specially 
adapted and set apart for such purpose; or on private land in a defined area or in or on 
water on such land in such manner that it is visible from a public road or place, unless 
such act is performed in connection with farming activities or for the purpose of the 
immediate burying or destruction of such rubbish.150  Also, when there is an 
accumulation of rubbish, or rubbish lies scattered, on land in a defined area in sight of a 
public road or place an authorized officer may, by written notice directed to the owner or 
occupier of such land, order such owner or occupier to clean up or remove such rubbish 
within a period of not less than seven days specified in such notice and if such owner or 
occupier refuses or fails to give effect to such order within such period the authorized 
officer may clean up or remove such rubbish at the expense of such owner or occupier.151 
Any person who contravenes a provision of section 2 (1); or refuses or fails to comply 
with an order in terms of section 2 (2); is guilty of an offence and liable upon conviction 
in the case of an offence involving the throwing, dumping or leaving of rubbish , to a fine 
not exceeding four hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve 
months or to both such fine and imprisonment; and in all other cases, to a fine not 
exceeding two hundred rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or 
to both such fine and imprisonment.  These penalties are somewhat low. 
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There is a presumption in the ordinance to the effect that when in a prosecution in 
terms of the ordinance it is alleged that rubbish has been thrown or dumped out of or 
from a vehicle it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such rubbish was so 
thrown or dumped by the owner or driver of such vehicle.  This presumption may well be 
acceptable on the grounds set out in the case of S v Meaker.152 
The Natal ordinance contains much the same prohibition as the Free State ordinance, 
without the provision relating to an officer’s order to clean up rubbish.  The penalty 
provided for littering or pollution in the Natal ordinance is a fine not exceeding R 1 000 
or in default of payment, imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or both 
such fine and imprisonment or such imprisonment without the option of a fine.153 
The Natal ordinance is purely within the command and control paradigm whilst the 
Free State ordinance does have a directive procedure in certain circumstances.  Neither 
departs much from the usual enforcement methods of provincial legislation of the time. 
 
1.6 Overall Evaluation 
 
The purpose of this exercise is to examine general trends in the provincial environmental 
legislation, and the analysis of the four provincial ordinances reveals more generaql 
similarities than differences.  Although there are obviously differences in individual 
provisions and different emphases in parts, all four ordinances are based on a command 
and control approach, prohibiting numerous different acts and providing penalties for 
these that range in seriousness from fines of R100 000 or ten years imprisonment (in the 
case of all four ordinances, primarily for offences relating to endangered species like 
elephant and rhinoceroses) to fines of one hundred rand.  All four make use of reverse 
onus provisions in order to facilitate proof of offences and all four have provisions 
relating to forfeiture of items used in the commission of the offence and the subject 
matter of the offence.  What is noteworthy, however, about the ordinances as far as what 
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they do not contain is concerned, is alternative enforcement measures are conspicuous by 
their absence. 
 
2 Post-1994 Provincial legislation 
 
The three Acts that will be considered are the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development 
Act 5 of 1998; Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998; and the Western Cape 
Planning and Development Act 7 of 1999.  The two enactments dealing with planning 
and development will be discussed first, followed by the Mpumalanga statute. 
 
2.1 KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act 5 of 1998 
 
This Act is intended to regulate spatial planning and development in the province and, to 
this end, it deals with matters such as town planning, zoning, subdivision of land, 
development of buildings and land and the institutional arrangements for administering 
these matters.  The primary enforcement procedure provided for by the Act is a notice 
process whereby any person failing to comply with the Act is required to take steps to 
remedy the situation.  One of the consequences of failure to do so is possible criminal 
prosecution, so criminal sanctions are used here only as a back-up to the notice 
procedure.  Let us examine the provisions in more detail. 
Section 47 provides – 
(1) If any person – 
(a) develops or subdivides land; 
(b) sells land in the process of subdivision; 
(c) erects a building or other structure; 
(d) uses land, a building; or other structure; 
(e) causes any land, building or other structure to be developed, erected or used in any manner 
other than in terms of an approval under this Act or any other applicable law, the responsible 
authority concerned shall serve a prohibition notice on the person concerned. 
(2) The prohibition notice referred to in subsection (1) shall - 
(a) set out the unauthorised activity concerned; and 
(b) invite the person concerned to make representations to the responsible authority why it 
should not issue an order contemplated in subsection (3). 
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(3) If after considering the representations made to it, if any, the responsible authority concludes that 
the activity referred to in subsection (1) is unauthorised, it shall serve a prohibition order - 
(a) declaring that the unauthorised activity is prohibited; 
(b) ordering the person concerned to cease such prohibited activity by a date specified in the 
notice; 
(c) where necessary, ordering the person concerned to demolish any unauthorised building or 
other structure by a specified date; and 
(d) where applicable, notifying the person concerned of any financial penalty which will be 
payable for not complying with the terms of the notice. 
(4) Should the person concerned fail to comply with any of the requirements of the order, the 
responsible authority may - 
(a) use any other remedy it has in terms of this Act or any other law; or 
(b) apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for an order restraining the person concerned from 
continuing the prohibited activity, or both. 
(5) Where it has come to the attention of the Minister that the responsible authority referred to in 
subsection (1) has failed to serve the required prohibition notice or order, the Minister may after 
hearing the responsible authority, act in accordance with the provisions of subsections (2) and 
(3). 
(6) Where the Minister has issued a notice or order in terms of subsection (5) the Minister may 
exercise the powers in subsection (4) to enforce compliance therewith. 
(7) Nothing in this section shall preclude any person in receipt of a prohibition notice or order under 
this section from making an application in terms of this Act or any other applicable law for 
approval of the activity concerned. 
The prohibition notice essentially provides the alleged offender with a hearing, after 
which, if the responsible authority154 concludes that the activity is unauthorised, the 
prohibition order is served.    This requires the offender to take steps to remedy the 
situation, failing which the authority may seek further remedies.  There is also provision 
for the Minister to act in the case of default by the responsible authority. 
  Section 47(3)(d) provides for the imposition of a penalty by the responsible 
authority (an extra-curial penalty, in effect) that is provided for by regulations made 
                                                 
154 ‘Responsible authority’ means the relevant body or person required – 
(i) under section 23 to prepare or administer a development plan; 
(ii) under section 34(2) to consider a development application; or 
(iii) under section 39 to consider a subdivisional application (s 1). 
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under the Act.155  Regulation 63(2) provides that, in determining any penalty in terms of 
this section of the Act, the responsible authority may determine a different penalty for 
different or recurring contraventions, provided however that the penalty must be 
reasonable in all the circumstances, taking into account the anticipated enforcement costs 
of the responsible authority; the prevalence of the contravention and desirability of a 
deterrent element in the penalty; and the need for a punitive element appropriate to the 
contravention concerned. 
As far as the criminal aspect is concerned, section 48 provides that any person who 
fails to comply with any requirement contained in an order contemplated in sections 
47(3), (5) or (6) shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding one hundred thousand rand, or to a period of imprisonment not exceeding five 
years, or both.  Regulation 62 provides that, if in any prosecution under section 48 of the 
Act, it is proved that the accused was either (a) the registered owner of the land, or the 
lessee or occupier of that portion of any land, building or structure on or in which the 
contravention was taking place; or (b) the owner of any business or other enterprise 
which was prohibited; the accused is required to prove that he or she did not cause or 
knowingly permit the offence to take place.  It is not immediately clear what the purpose 
of this provision is. 
The Planning and Development Act regulates an area that has probably not historically 
been one regulated by command and control mechanisms, so the muted role of the 
criminal sanction in this Act is not surprising.  On paper, the mix of enforcement 
mechanisms provided for in the Act falls squarely behind the overall objective of 
sustainable development.  As a primary tool, attempt is made to remedy the situation.  
The criminal sanction operates a subsidiary sanction, being invoked only upon failure of 
the primary administrative enforcement tool.  Whether the enforcement tools provided for 
are being effectively used in practice, however, is not readily apparent. 
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2.2 Western Cape Planning and Development Act 7 of 1999 
 
The Western Cape Act regulates essentially the same subject matter as the KwaZulu-
Natal Act discussed above, and its enforcement procedure, although somewhat more 
complex, is similar in effect. 
Section 60(2)(a) prohibits any person from contravening or failing to comply with the 
provisions incorporated in a zoning scheme in terms of this Act; or conditions, including 
title conditions, imposed in terms of the Act or under any law listed in Schedule III,156 or 
the provisions of the Act, or of any law listed in Schedule III which apply in terms of the 
Act or any by-law made under the Act.  It also prohibits the utilisation of any land for a 
purpose or in a manner other than that indicated on a zoning map or approved building 
plan, or where a zoning has not yet been indicated on a map, according to the lawful 
utilisation of the land.157  Any contravention of these prohibitions may then be addressed 
by means of a directive procedure.  If land or a building or any part thereof was 
developed or utilised or any other action was taken in contravention of s 60(2), the 
municipality shall serve a directive on the owner to rectify that contravention before a 
date specified therein, being not more than 2 months after the date of the directive.158  If 
the owner fails to comply with the directive, the municipality shall take all further steps 
required to rectify the contravention.159  Such steps may include the imposition of a 
contravention levy on the offender.160 
Section 63 provides for a judicial order which may be applied for by the Provincial 
Minister where provincial or regional interests so require, or by a municipality when the 
development or utilisation of land is in contravention of or does not comply with a 
provision of the Act or an approval or authorisation granted in terms thereof; or where the 
environment concerned has been damaged as a result of an act or omission which 
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constitutes an offence in terms of this Act.  The Act empowers a judge or magistrate to 
make an order in the circumstances described above - 
(a) prohibiting any person from commencing or proceeding with the development or 
utilisation of land; 
(b) authorising the Provincial Minister or municipality, as the case may be, to demolish 
any structure or any portion thereof; provided that the relevant decision to do so has 
been made by the authority in question; 
(c) ordering a person to restore the environment on the basis and conditions deemed fit by 
the judicial officer; 
(d) authorising the Provincial Minister or municipality, as the case may be, to execute the 
repairs as contemplated in paragraph (c) if the person mentioned therein fails to 
execute the repairs on the basis and conditions set out in the order, and 
(e) awarding compensation to the Provincial Minister or municipality, as the case may be, 
for the repairs in the circumstances as contemplated in paragraph (d).161 
There is substantial similarity with the approach taken by the KwaZulu-Natal Act as 
far as the objective and the impact on the offender is concerned, but the big difference is 
that the KZN Act makes use of an administrative procedure whereby the orders are made, 
whereas the Western Cape makes use of a judicial procedure.  This is more cumbersome 
and expensive than an administrative procedure, although the order may well be regarded 
as carrying more weight.  It is not clear from the Act whether the judicial order would be 
used only after the municipality has issued a directive in terms of s 62. 
  Offences, imposition of fines and penalties are provided by section 64.  There is an 
offence relating to obstruction of officials, but the important offence for present purposes 
is to the effect that any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of 
this Act or any order, directive, prohibition, condition, requirement or notice made, 
issued, imposed, stipulated or given in terms thereof, shall be guilty of an offence and 
liable on conviction to an appropriate fine not exceeding R500 000 or to imprisonment 
                                                 
161  Section 63(2).  and thereafter the provisions of section 300(2), (3), (4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), shall apply mutatis mutandis.  This section deals with the power of the Court to 
award compensation where an offence causes damage to or loss to property. 
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for a period not exceeding 5 years or to both such fine and such imprisonment.162  
Moreover, a person convicted of an offence under this Act who, after conviction, 
continues with the conduct in respect of which he or she was so convicted shall be guilty 
of a continuing offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding R10 000 in 
respect of each day on which he or she so continues or has continued with it.163 
Much the same general comment can be made about the Western Cape Planning and 
Development Act as was made about the KZN Act.  It is probably somewhat more 
difficult to enforce than the KZN Act is due to the requirement of applying for a judicial 
order rather than simply dealing with the matter administratively. 
 
2.3 Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998 
 
Before the enactment of this legislation, nature conservation in Mpumalanga (formerly 
part of the Transvaal province) was regulated by means of the Transvaal Nature 
Conservation Ordinance discussed above.  The Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act is 
based substantially on the ordinance, the main differences being removal of matters 
relevant to the Transvaal (for instance, exclusion of Chapter 2 of the ordinance, dealing 
with the institutional structures for nature conservation in the former Transvaal).  The 
Chapters dealing with wild animals, professional hunting, problem animals, fisheries, 
indigenous plants, endangered species, and cave formations are much the same as those 
in the ordinance.  The offences in respect of these matters are essentially the same as 
well. 
An examination of the Chapter dealing with general matters, including enforcement, 
reveals that the Mpumalanga Act does not specify the amount of fines, but follows the 
trend apparent in many more recent enactments164 of leaving this to the Court’s 
discretion.  Despite the obvious Constitutional problems with reverse onus provisions, the 
Mpumalanga Act makes use of 12 of the 15 presumptions contained in the Transvaal 
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ordinance.  Interestingly, the presumption struck down in S v Mumbe165does not appear in 
the Act.  There is, however, a provision to the effect that no person shall possess an 
elephant tusk or a rhinoceros horn unless he or she is the holder of a permit which 
authorizes him or her to do so.166  Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with 
this provision shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years or to both a fine and such 
imprisonment.167 
In general, then, the comments made about the Transvaal ordinance can be made with 
equal relevance to the Mpumalanga Act.  The Act contains no enforcement provisions 
different from the ordinance that add anything to the current analysis. 
 
2.4 Evaluation of post-1994 provincial legislation 
 
While the Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act is caught in the old ‘command and 
control’ paradigm, the two Planning and Development Acts make use of administrative 
procedures as a first means of attack on infringements of the legislation.  The criminal 
sanction is reserved as a back-up in the case of default by the offender of the instructions 
contained in the administrative order or directive concerned.  This procedure, it is 
submitted, is potentially far more effective than exclusive reliance on criminal sanctions. 
 
3 Local legislation 
 
Two local enactments will be considered as fairly typical examples of local by-laws 
dealing with environmental issues.  First, the Pietermaritzburg-Msunduzi Transitional 
Local Council industrial effluent by-laws, and then the noise regulations made in terms of 
the Environment Conservation Act that are implemented at local authority level. 
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3.1 Pietermaritzburg-Msunduzi Transitional Local Council industrial effluent by-laws 
 
These by-laws provide for the discharge of industrial effluent into the municipal sewer 
system provided that the person discharging the effluent has the necessary authorisation 
and that the effluent conforms to certain specified standards.  Section 21 of the by-laws 
provides that any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provisions of the 
by-laws or with the conditions of any permit or notice issued under the by-laws is guilty 
of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred rand or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or both.  The penalty for a 
subsequent conviction is a fine not exceeding one thousand rand or one year’s 
imprisonment or both.  The section also provides that the Court may, in addition to the 
punishment specified, impose an amount equal to any costs and expenses found by the 
Court to have been incurred by the Council as a result of any breach of the by-laws.  In 
addition, the by-laws provide that any person who discharges any industrial effluent into 
the sewer in contravention of the by-laws which damages any component of the sewer or 
the industrial effluent treatment works or which entails additional treatment costs shall be 
liable, in addition to prosecution under the by-laws, for the costs of any necessary repairs 
to the sewer and industrial effluent treatment works and the additional treatment costs 
thereby incurred. 
The most noteworthy aspect of the by-laws is the ludicrously low penalty provided for 
non-compliance.  In reality, most industrial polluters are more likely to contravene these 
by-laws than other water pollution legislation and the lack of deterrent value in this small 
fine is worrying.  Frequently, local legislation is practically the most immediately 
applicable of the environmental legislation that people are required to comply with, and 
for this reason it is important that the penalties make enforcement of the by-laws 
worthwhile. 
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3.2 Noise control regulations 
 
Regulations dealing with noise control were made under s 25 of the Environment 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989 in January 1992.168  At the time, regulations made under the 
Act that affected local authorities, would become applicable within the areas of those 
local authorities only with the consent of those authorities.  The noise control regulations 
were designed for implementation at local authority level and over some time just over 30 
local authorities decided to implement these regulations.  Subsequently, the provision in 
the Environment Conservation Act requiring concurrence with local authorities was 
repealed and draft noise control regulations for the entire country were published, but 
these have yet to be finalised. 
The regulations are comprehensive, dealing with issues relating to town planning and 
targeting through prohibitions various noisy activities.  Reg 3 contains a general 
prohibition on activities like carrying out certain specified developments without taking 
noise control measures; use of power tools in prohibited times; driving a vehicle which 
emits noise greater than that allowed by specified standards; and so on.  There is also a 
prohibition of a disturbing noise, produced or caused by any person, machine, device or 
apparatus or any combination thereof.169  A ‘disturbing noise’ is a noise level which 
exceeds the ambient sound level at the same measuring point by 7 dBA or more.  This is 
a standard which can be objectively assessed by means of an integrating impulse sound 
level meter. 
In addition to the objectively-determined disturbing noise prohibition, there is a 
prohibition of a noise nuisance.  The prohibition in regulation 5 specifies a number of 
activities that are prohibited if they case a noise nuisance, which is defined as any sound 
which disturbs or impairs or may disturb or impair the convenience or peace of any 
person.  Some of the prohibited activities are the playing of instruments or devices 
reproducing or amplifying sound; allowing an animal to cause a noise nuisance; 
discharge of firearms or explosives; allowing sirens and alarms to emit sound, except in 
                                                 
168  GN R154 GG 13717 of 10 January 1992. 
169  Reg 4. 
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an emergency; operation of machinery; and the driving of a vehicle in such a maneer that 
it causes a noise nuisance. 
The local authority is given various powers of enforcement, including an abatement 
notice procedure,170 and the power to impound animals171 and vehicles.172  There is also a 
criminal prosecution provision – a person who contravenes the regulations is guilty of an 
offence and liable to a fine of not more than R20 000 of two years imprisonment or both, 
and in the event of a continuing contravention, to a fine not exceeding R250, or 
imprisonment for not more than twenty days, for each day on which the contravention 
continues. 
One of the biggest noise problems is noise caused by motor vehicles and it is 
interesting how the authorities have tended to deal with this problem.  The noise pollution 
regulations prohibit the driving of a car on a public road if it makes a noise exceeding 
specified sound levels.173    The maximum noise levels set down in this legislation are the 
same as those set down in the Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989, which prohibits operation on 
a public road of a vehicle causing noise which is in excess of the prescribed noise 
level.174 The Act provides that a motor vehicle which causes excessive noise is regarded 
as unroadworthy and allows officials to suspend such vehicle from use pending removal 
of the fault causing the excessive noise.175 As a matter of course, officials who come 
across an offending vehicle, prefer to suspend the vehicle’s certificate of roadworthiness 
(COR) rather than prosecute.  Suspension of the COR, which is a decision that can be 
made by a traffic official without any judicial inquiry, is an effective measure to use since 
the noise pollution problem will have to be remedied before the vehicle can be used 
again.  In the case of heavy vehicles, which are the main offenders, owners will be 
reluctant to allow these vehicles to remain off the road for too long because this will lead 
                                                 
170  Reg 2(c). 
171  Reg 2(g). 
172  Reg 2(h). 
173  Reg 3(j). 
174  Section 103(1), read with reg 344(e) GN 910 GG 12441 26 April 1990 as amended by reg 25 GN 1954 
GG 12701 17 August 1990. 
175  Section 73(1). 
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to loss of revenue.  On the other hand, use of the criminal penalties in the Environment 
Conservation Act would require court proceedings at which attendance of traffic officials 
would be necessary to prove contravention of the maximum noise levels.  The costs of 
the absence of the official from normal duties, when weighed against the extreme 
unlikelihood of the court’s imposing anything like the maximum penalty, make the COR 
suspension option much more attractive. 
This observation aside, the noise control regulations do allow for enforcement 
measures other than the criminal sanction and the penalty provided for does make the 
criminal sanction’s use worthwhile, even if only in theory.  
 
4 Overall evaluation 
 
The two recent provincial enactments in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal dealing 
with planning and development both contain alternatives to the criminal sanction that 
appear workable and likely to be effective if used.  Otherwise, provincial environmental 
legislation is mostly firmly rooted in the command and control paradigm.  Alternatives to 
the criminal sanction are few and far between and many provincial enactments make use 
of constitutionally questionable reverse-onus presumptions in order to facilitate criminal 
prosecution.  While this may be explained on the basis that much provincial legislation is 
from a time when questions of alternative modes of enforcement were not regarded as 
pertinently as they are today, the recent Mpumalanga nature conservation legislation 
reveals a distinctive lack of imagination as to enforcement and remains firmly rooted in 




Strengths and weaknesses of using criminal sanctions 
to enforce environmental law 
 
1 Introduction: Inadequate enforcement of environmental law 
 
As was pointed out in the introduction, there is a widely held perception that 
environmental law in South Africa is inadequately enforced.  Bearing in mind the 
analysis in the previous three Chapters of South African environmental legislation and 
the enforcement mechanisms provided in that legislation, the notion of inadequate 
enforcement could be translated as meaning infrequent successful criminal prosecution of 
environmental offenders.  In other words, if the principal enforcement mechanisms 
provided for in South African legislation are criminal sanctions (which the preceding 
analysis has established), then the infrequency of criminal prosecutions means that the 
law is not being enforced.  This is a tempting conclusion to draw but, although it is not 
entirely misguided, is somewhat misleading. 
The reason for this is that the role of criminal sanctions in regulatory enforcement is 
not only the obvious one of use in criminal prosecutions.  Their existence is also vital in 
reinforcing other modes of enforcement.  It is instructive in discussing this idea to take 
into account the difference between compliance and deterrence systems of social control.  
According to Reiss,1 
‘Compliance and deterrence forms of law enforcement have different objectives.  The principal 
objective of a compliance law enforcement system is to secure conformity with law by means 
insuring compliance or taking action to prevent potential law violations without the necessity to 
detect, process, and penalize violators.  The principal objective of deterrent law enforcement 
systems is to secure conformity with law by detecting violations of law, determining who is 
responsible for their violation, and penalizing violators to deter violations in the future, either by 
those who are punished or by those who might do so were violators not punished’. 
                                                 
1  Albert J Reiss Jr ‘Selecting strategies of social control over organizational life’ in Keith Hawkins & 
John M Thomas (eds) Enforcing Regulation (1984) 23 at 23-4 (emphasis in original). 
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If the only mode of law enforcement were the deterrence model, then absence of 
successful prosecutions would be evidence of the failure of enforcement.  But if the 
compliance model is followed, authorities use methods like negotiation to motivate 
compliance with the law.  In following the compliance approach, the threat of criminal 
sanctions being imposed if people do not comply with the law, is very often a crucial 
bargaining tool on the part of the authorities.  Criminal law, then, is playing a vital role in 
the enforcement of law where officials are following the compliance approach, but its 
role is not an immediately obvious one. 
A large number of successful prosecutions, then, is not necessarily an indicator of 
successful law enforcement.  In fact, if the predominant mode of enforcement is the 
compliance model, criminal prosecutions are often seen as the failure of the system – the 
carrot has not worked, which means that the stick must be used.2  Are there, then, other 
indicators that suggest South African environmental law is not effectively enforced? 
If there are laws that prohibit pollution, for example, and there is evidence of pollution 
all around, this would be a good indicator of inadequate enforcement of the law.  This is a 
better indicator than the infrequency of criminal prosecutions, for reasons outlined above.  
It is probably this indicator, more than the absence of criminal prosecutions, that leads 
people to claim that our environmental law is not being enforced adequately. 
If this is the case, and there is certainly widespread evidence of non-compliance with 
environmental law, it is necessary to consider why the law is not being enforced.  The 
reasons may be – 
 inadequate resources for monitoring and inspection; 
 administrative paralysis – in other words, officials know what is happening, 
but are not sure of what to do next or afraid of taking the next step; 
 reluctance to use the enforcement mechanisms provided for (in many cases, 
only the criminal sanction); and/or 
                                                 
2  Reiss op cit at 25; Keith Hawkins Environment and Enforcement (1984) at 179; Jeremy Rowan-
Robinson, Paul Watchman & Christine Barker Crime and Regulation (1990) at 186; David Farrier ‘In 
search of real criminal law’ in Tim Bonyhady Environmental Protection and Legal Change (1992) 79 at 
89. 
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 ‘capture’ by the regulated community.  ‘Capture’ describes the process 
whereby government agencies responsible for corporate regulation shift from 
enforcing law in the public interest to serving the interests of the regulated 
community, most often corporate bodies.3  There are several possible reasons 
for this, only one of which, and the crudest form, is corruption. 
There are clearly resource constraints at many levels of government that are 
responsible for enforcement of environmental laws and this will have a negative impact 
on the enforcement of the law.  It is beyond the scope of this work to suggest how to 
combat this problem (and it would not help much to suggest that government allocate 
more resources to environmental matters, in any event), but increased vigilance by the 
general public would be of immense value. 
Administrative paralysis is another problem that is unfortunately prevalent in 
government today.  This may simply be due to what Rowan-Robinson calls the 
pusillanimity of the enforcement agency.4  Often, however, the problem is that 
government departments (at all levels) are assigned administrative responsibilities in 
respect of environmental legislation without being given any guidance as to how to 
implement, administer or enforce the law.  For example, the powers of various organs of 
state in terms of section 28 of the National Environmental Management Act5 have great 
enforcement potential, but the section is a complex one that many government 
departments are unsure of how to use.  This may be relatively easy to remedy by 
supplying government departments with step-by-step guidelines on how to use legislative 
powers and how to avoid pitfalls with their use.  This should be the responsibility of the 
government department where the legislation originated – in the case of NEMA, for 
example, with the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. 
Another reason for administrative paralysis seems to be related to division of 
administrative responsibility.  This would arise in circumstances where more than one 
                                                 
3  Michael Briody & Tim Prenzler ‘The enforcement of environmental protection laws in Queensland: A 
case of regulatory capture?’ (1998) 15 EPLJ 54 at 55; Hawkins op cit at 3. 
4  Rowan-Robinson op cit at 8. 
5  Discussed above at 188 ff. 
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government agency is involved in the administration of a particular law and each one 
thinks that the other is responsible for problems that arise. 
Tied in with the notion of administrative paralysis is the reluctance to use available 
enforcement measures.  The preceding analysis has shown that the available enforcement 
measures are overwhelmingly criminal sanctions.  In many cases, where there is non-
compliance with environmental legislation, the only options available to an official would 
be negotiation (not officially sanctioned by the legislation) or criminal prosecution.  Even 
if negotiation was unsuccessful, the official may still be reluctant to resort to criminal 
sanctions.  What would be the reasons for this? 
Reluctance to use the available criminal prosecution can be explained by considering 
the strengths and weaknesses of criminal law.  Once this examination has been 
completed, consideration will be given as to how to improve the situation. 
 
2 Strengths of criminal law 
 





In Chapter 2, the conclusion reached was that criminal law could be identified by its 
stigmatising quality and the fact that it could be used to impose sentences of 
imprisonment on offenders.  It was also argued that the goal of punishment for 
environmental offences, other than in serious cases, is deterrence.  Since deterrence of 
less serious cases (that is, those for which imprisonment would be excessive punishment) 
can be achieved through non-criminal means, the strength of the criminal law is that it 
alone can be used for more serious offences where imprisonment may be warranted.  
These would be cases where the stigmatising quality of criminal law, discussed in 
Chapter 2, would be most appropriate. 
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A second strength of criminal law, particularly in South Africa, is that those responsible 
for enforcing the law are familiar with it.  Since criminal sanctions are the ‘default’ mode 
of enforcement for most environmental legislation, as shown by the analysis in Chapters 
4-6, they are the means that people are used to.  This, however, is not to say that criminal 
sanctions are frequently used.  Neither should it be taken to indicate that familiarity with 
criminal sanctions connotes expertise in their use, as will be suggested below. 
 
3 Weaknesses of criminal law 
 
It is possible to identify two broad categories of weakness.  First, there are those that are 
characteristically found in all systems of criminal law or, at least, those systems which 
are based on the same accusatorial-type procedural approach as South Africa’s.  These 
can be called inherent weaknesses.  The second category comprises those that are found 
particularly in South Africa’s criminal law system (or environmental criminal law 
system).  These are by no means unique to South Africa, and may indeed be shared by 
many other developing nations, but are not invariably found in all criminal systems.  
These could also conceivably be removed or otherwise ameliorated (at least in theory) by 
means of extra resources, change in political will, amendment of legislation or a 
combination of these.  In reality, however, improvement may be unlikely.  These will be 
called contingent weaknesses, as they are contingent on matters that are not invariably 
part of a criminal law system. 
 
3.1 Inherent Weaknesses 
 
3.1.1 Burden of time and cost 
 
Criminal prosecutions involve significant costs to the state and there is a considerable 
time delay between the commission of the offence and the conclusion of the trial. The 
delay may be even lengthier in respect of environmental crimes because of the necessity 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions: 265 
Chapter 7 Strengths and weaknesses of criminal law  
 
   
  
of carrying out scientific analyses etc.  By way of illustration, although there are aspects 
of this case that make it somewhat unusual, in Feedmill Develoments (Pty) Ltd and 
another v Attorney-General, KwaZulu-Natal,6 samples for analysis were taken during 
July 1993 and charges first put to the accused in March 1997, a delay of nearly four 
years.   Because of the need to use expert evidence in certain types of pollution trials, 
costs are higher than in trials dealing with the more frequently encountered common-law 
crimes. Witnesses and other people involved in prosecutions are frequently 
inconvenienced by numerous delays and postponements.  Authorities are justifiably 
reluctant to institute costly criminal prosecutions when the likely consequence in most 
cases is a small fine.  Part of the problem is that sentences provided for are small, but the 
problem would not be necessarily resolved by stiffening penalties.  In many cases, even if 
the maximum fine provided for were severe, the facts would not justify a large fine, 
making a costly criminal trial unattractive.  This argument would obviously be one that 
the law and economics theorists would put forward, but it is not confined to a particular 
theory of law.  Inefficient use of resources is bad in any language. 
The practical impact of this feature of the criminal law is well illustrated by 
Veljanovski,7 who observes that- 
‘since prosecution is from eight to ten times more time-consuming to the [Health and Safety] 
inspectorate than the average factory visit, it would be rational to concentrate resources on 
information production rather than prosecution, especially when the former is more likely to 
increase compliance’. 
Another problem with the time-consuming nature of the criminal process is one which 
relates to the next shortcoming discussed immediately below – the delay in resolution of 
a matter may well delay the remediation of the harm for which liability is being 
determined in the court proceedings.8 
 
                                                 
6  [1998] 4 All SA 34. 
7  C Veljanovski ‘Regulatory enforcement: An economic study of the British Factory Inspectorate’ (1983) 
5 Law and Policy Quarterly 75. 
8  Nicola Pain ‘Criminal law and environment protection – Overview of issues and themes’ in Neil 
Gunningham, Jennifer Norberry & Sandra McKillop (eds) Environmental Crime (1995) 19 at 21. 
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3.1.2 Reactive nature of criminal law 
 
The second weakness of criminal law is that it is designed to react to offences that have 
already been committed, which might often be too late to prevent damage to the 
environment.  Bearing in mind that the purpose of environmental law is protection of the 
environment, the criminal law in such circumstances does not achieve this objective, 
other than by deterring people from committing similar harmful actions in the future.  
There are other instruments, however, which achieve the ends of protection by adopting a 
more preventive approach.  An abatement notice procedure (or an interdict) would serve 
in many instances to halt the damaging activity before the harm becomes too severe.   
 
3.1.3 Problems of proof 
 
Third is the universal problem of the more stringent standard of proof to be satisfied in 
criminal cases.  Proof of commission of an offence beyond reasonable doubt, it need 
hardly be said, is considerably more difficult than the balance of probabilities required in 
civil actions.  In general, there are three principal evidential problems facing the 
prosecution – identification of the offender; the requirement to obtain sufficient evidence 
to provide proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the difficulty of establishing mens rea in 
cases where the offence is not a strict liability offence.9 
 
3.1.4 Procedural safeguards 
 
Tied in with problems of proof are the additional obstacles to prosecution presented by 
the constitutional rights to a fair trial.10  The courts, in considering these constitutional 
rights, have consistently insisted on their importance, thereby suggesting that any 
                                                 
9  Rowan-Robinson op cit at 256.  These authors identify four problem areas but one, the need for 
corroboration, is not an essential requirement of the South African law of evidence, although corroboration 
is of importance. 
10 Section 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.  See discussion in 
Chapter 3. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions: 267 
Chapter 7 Strengths and weaknesses of criminal law  
 
   
  
limitation of these rights would have to be justified very strongly indeed.11  South African 
environmental legislation is awash with reverse-onus provisions, presuming certain 
elements of environmental offences unless the accused can prove otherwise.12  Whereas 
some of these clearly are unnecessary, others were designed to deal with the extreme 
difficulty of proving elements of certain offences.13  Although very few of these 
provisions in environmental legislation have yet been challenged in the courts, most 
reverse onus provisions have not passed constitutional muster.14  None have passed the 
scrutiny of the Constitutional Court.  As others are likely to follow in the same way, the 
prosecutor’s task will undoubtedly become more difficult. 
In general, the presence of ‘due process’ safeguards makes criminal prosecution a 
cumbersome and time-consuming business.  As Kagan reflects, ‘Formal enforcement … 
is slow, labour-intensive and subject to numerous procedural steps designed to protect the 
innocent, each step allowing the defendant further opportunities for delay and 
obfuscation’.15 
 
3.1.5 Preparation of cases for prosecution 
 
The preparation of cases for prosecution may be a significant drain on the resources of an 
enforcement agency and may constitute a powerful disincentive to embark on a criminal 
prosecution, particularly where the possible penalty is light and, in addition, where any 
                                                 
11 See, for example, O’Regan J in S v Bhulwana, S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) at para 24: ‘[the 
presumption of innocence] is a pillar of our system of criminal justice’. 
12  See Chapter 4. 
13 See, for example, the presumption contained in s 2(3) of the Prevention and Combating of Pollution of 
the Sea by Oil Act 6 of 1981.  The history of this provision can be traced through S v Peppas 1977 (2) SA 
643 (A) particularly at 653A et seq and (1981) 91 House of Assembly Debates column 573 (Wednesday 4 
February 1981). This section has now been repealed, but it still serves as a useful illustration. 
14 See discussion in Chapter 3. For a presumption in environmental legislation which was struck down, see 
S v Mumbe 1997 (1) SA 854 (W). 
15  RA Kagan ‘On regulatory inspectorates and police’ in Hawkins & Thomas op cit at 41. 
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fine imposed does not go into the coffers of the agency in question but rather into the 
general fiscus.16 
 
3.1.6 Officials’ attendance in Court 
 
Enforcement officials would frequently be required to appear in Court as key prosecution 
witnesses.  The time spent in Court is necessarily time sacrificed for carrying out other 
enforcement activities.  Not only is this problematic but appearance in Court may also be 
regarded as an unpleasant experience by some officials.17 
 
3.1.7 The ‘moral’ aspect of criminal law 
 
The idea of punishment under criminal law is frequently seen as involving a moral 
judgment being made over the offender.  People who are morally blameworthy are seen 
as morally deserving of punishment.  In the case of environmental offences, however, 
several offences are purely regulatory and hence morally neutral – illegal but not 
criminal, in other words.  A possible moral dilemma is hence faced by enforcement 
officials who may well be reluctant to use the criminal law to punish offenders for 
morally neutral conduct.18  Tied in with this consideration is the fact that the criminal law 
is seen as a device to be used on ‘criminals’, people seen as disreputable, whereas 
environmental offenders often do not conform to that stereotype – polluters may well be 
otherwise morally-upstanding contributors to the community’s economy.  
 
                                                 
16  Rowan-Robinson op cit at 258-9, citing various studies that have made this observation. 
17  Rowan-Robinson op cit at 262-3. 
18  SA Kadish ‘Some observations on the use of criminal sanctions in enforcing economic regulation’ 
(1963) 30 University of Chicago LR 423 at 444-9. 
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3.2 Contingent Weaknesses 
 
3.2.1 Inadequate policing 
 
Inadequate policing is a further problem faced by South Africa and many other countries 
with strained government resources. The situation is hardly likely to improve. The 
administration of a number of South African environmental statutes has been assigned to 
provinces who are spending most of their budgets on matters which are seen as more 
pressing, namely education, health and welfare.  Unfortunately, this defect would 
probably undermine the efficacy of alternative methods of state control as well, so it is 
not a problem unique to criminal law. 
 
3.2.2 Lack of public awareness 
 
Lack of public awareness of threats to the environment and, in addition, as to what is 
prohibited, also impairs the efficacy of the criminal law.  People who are aware that 
conduct is wrong and prohibited by law may well assist officials by bringing offences to 
their notice.  In addition, public awareness - let us call it an environmental ethos – would 
serve to underpin the status of the environmental criminal law and would be likely to 
contribute to the attitude of judicial officers in hearing environmental cases. Currently, 
the lack of development of this environmental ethos would mean that most of the 
population would be relatively unconcerned with less serious contraventions of 
environmental legislation.  A fact that exacerbates the lack of environmental ethos is the 
incidence of serious common law criminal activity that is prevalent in South Africa 
today.  This serves to numb people to the significance of even serious environmental 
offences.  People who are concerned about the rate of murder, rape, robbery and similar 
offences will understandably be less attuned to the seriousness of environmental offences. 
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3.2.3 Difficulties of investigation 
 
Difficulties of investigation present further challenges for criminal law.  Many officials 
not only require specialist scientific and technical expertise but must also be au fait with 
the rules of evidence and criminal procedure.  The need for proper training is important 
but this is also undermined by lack of resources. 
 
3.2.4 Lack of expertise of court officials 
 
A further problem relates to lack of expertise of court officials.  Many prosecutors in 
South Africa are inexperienced, young lawyers who are often ‘thrown in the deep end’.  
Those who do not drown have to learn very quickly and develop expertise in prosecuting 
mainly common-law crimes and everyday statutory offences like traffic matters.  Because 
environmental prosecutions are few and far between, however, there is little expertise in 
prosecuting these offences, which often require proof of difficult scientific facts. 
Moreover, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, even where such cases are 
competently prosecuted, magistrates can sometimes be intimidated by the intricacies of 
the scientific evidence into requiring proof beyond any doubt rather than reasonable 
doubt. 
 
3.2.5 Inadequate penalties 
 
There are two aspects to this.  First, is the penalty provided for by legislation.  Second, 
the penalty actually imposed by the Court.  Much of the criticism of criminal enforcement 
of environmental law in South Africa is levelled at the inadequate penalties provided for 
by legislation.19  For example, the maximum penalty for a first-time offence under the 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 35 of 1965 is a R500 fine or imprisonment for a 
                                                 
19 RF Fuggle & MA Rabie Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) at 130; Cheryl Loots 
‘Making Environmental Law Effective’ (1994) 1 SAJELP 17 at 18. 
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period of six months.  This has somewhat politely been described as ‘rather mild’,20 but it 
makes the prosecution of such offences an exercise in futility, which is why air pollution 
authorities have used other means to deal with offenders.21  The analysis in the preceding 
chapters indicates, however, that although there are some glaring examples of ludicrously 
low penalties, most penalties provided for on paper seem to be commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offence in question.  What is important, then, where there are adequate 
penalties provided for, is that the Courts use the full range of the penalties at their 
disposal – imposing heavy penalties where the circumstances of the case warrant this.  
Studies elsewhere have shown that judicial officials often impose inadequate penalties.22  
Although there are no equivalent studies for South Africa, it would seem that South 




The strengths of the criminal sanction identified above suggest that it be used ideally in 
serious cases – the main strength of the criminal sanction is that offenders may be subject 
to serious penalties including imprisonment.  On the other hand, there are several 
drawbacks in using the criminal sanction which make the criminal process a relatively 
unattractive route to follow.  Under what circumstances, then, is criminal prosecution 
used and when ought it to be used? 
Keith Hawkins, in a study of the regulation of water pollution control in England,23 
found that officials tended to use a compliance approach rather than the deterrence 
approach described above.  In other words, officials negotiated with polluters in an 
attempt to secure their compliance with the law as the ‘default’ approach.  It was only 
when this approach failed that the criminal sanction was utilised.24  More specifically, 
                                                 
20 Fuggle and Rabie op cit at 441. 
21  See 73 (supra). 
22  Rowan-Robinson op cit at 264-5. 
23  Environment and Enforcement (1984). 
24  See also Rowan-Robinson op cit at 8 and 201. 
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‘… there are two types of case where efficiency decrees prosecution to be the most appropriate 
response.  First, where persistent, noticeable failure to comply is concerned, belief in individual and 
general deterrence demands public sanctioning….Secondly, where a pollution incident which causes 
substantial and noticeable damage, hazards water supplies, or involves the agency in heavy 
expenditure takes place, the response will again be to prosecute’.25 
In the first type of case, the moral blameworthiness of the offender is plain from his or 
her actions in persistently failing to comply with the law, most likely in circumstances 
where the offender has been subject to persuasion from the relevant officials to comply.  
In the second instance, there is not necessarily any blame or, more specifically, mens rea, 
but the water pollution offences in effect at the time Hawkins was writing were strict 
liability offences.  Prosecuting the morally blameless in such circumstances is justified on 
the basis that ‘the gravity of the harm is the key factor in this kind of case, outweighing 
any complaints that morally blameless behaviour is being stigmatised as criminal by the 
enforcement of a strict liability statute’.26 
The use of the criminal sanction as a last resort or long-stop, as it is sometimes 
referred to,27 has been observed in Australia28 and Canada29 as well.  This approach can 
only be understood in the context of the relationship between the officials and the 
regulated community.  Since this is often an ongoing relationship, where field officials 
periodically inspect the premises and operations of the regulated, use of the criminal 
sanction at the first sight of an offence, however minor, will sour the future relationship.  
What must also be borne in mind is that the regulated persons in such circumstances are 
most often productive members of society whose offences consist of carrying on an 
activity which is not illegal per se, but only illegal where a certain standard is exceeded.  
In many cases, as well, the reason for the infringement is not wilful disregard for the law 
but, at worst, negligence. 
It would seem that the situation is similar in South Africa, where officials would prefer 
to use the compliance approach (negotiation) in the first instance before resorting to 
                                                 
25  Hawkins op cit at 201. 
26  Hawkins op cit at 202. 
27  Farrier op cit at 86, 88-92. 
28  Ibid. 
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criminal sanctions.  This is a tendency that this author has observed in numerous 
discussions with enforcement officials in South Africa, but is also revealed from this 
analysis by Fuggle and Rabie:30 
‘… statistics on criminal prosecutons reveal only the ultimate phase of control where all other 
strategies have failed and the sanction is engaged as a last resort.  Such statistics tend to conceal the 
considerable persuasive force of the negotiation process which precedes – and in many cases 
obviates – criminal proceedings.  For instance, during the past five years 91 criminal cases involving 
soil erosion were served in the courts.  Of this number, 25 were withdrawn because of the accused’s 
compliance, while 11 are still pending.  In 38 of the remaining 55 cases, the outcome was 
successful.  However, these statistics do not reveal that informal negotiation led to compliance by 52 
per cent of the approximately 1 400 land-users who are annually identified as transgressors of soil 
conservation control measures.  Moreover, 47 per cent of land-users comply with such measures 
after having been formally served with a direction in terms of the Conservation of Agricultural 
Resources Act.  It is only in respect of 1 per cent of land-users that court proceedings are eventually 
initiated.  It is important, nevertheless, to remember that the success of the above negotiation process 
is due, in large measure, to the threat of criminal proceedings which underpins the process’. 
While use of criminal sanctions as a last resort would probably be the approach in 
circumstances where there is likely to be an ongoing relationship between officials and 
the regulated persons, not all environmental laws would present this type of scenario.  
This would frequently be the situation in pollution control and land-use planning 
regulation, but the situation would be different in many nature conservation offences. 
Nature conservation offences are very often more akin to ‘traditional’ crimes, in that 
their commission is not usually the unintended side-effect of otherwise socially-useful 
behaviour.  People do not usually shoot elephants by accident.  Although many nature 
conservation offences (and here one thinks particularly of unlawful killing of animals or, 
to be pejorative, poaching) may be attributable to poverty, ignorance31 or traditional 
culture, many are carried out for personal profit in wilful disregard of the law.  In these 
circumstances, a compliance approach would not be ideal, particularly since the damage 
to the environment (in the form of a dead animal) has already been done. 
                                                                                                                                                 
29  Kernaghan Webb Pollution Control in Canada: The Regulatory Approach in the 1980s (1988) at 18. 
30  Fuggle & Rabie op cit at 130. 
31  See, for example, S v Ntimbane 1990 (2) SACR 302 (N). 
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Having said that, it is not necessary, however, to resort to criminal sanctions in every 
instance of infringement of nature conservation laws.  In practice, however, current South 
African nature conservation law may make this unavoidable.  A nature conservation 
official is unlikely to enter into negotiations with an offender due to the unlikelihood of 
there being an ongoing relationship between the parties, of the type that there often is 
between polluters and pollution officials.  The only alternative available to the nature 
conservation official is, however, the criminal sanction.  While this would certainly be 
the appropriate response to premeditated poaching on a commercial scale, for example, 
many nature conservation offences (picking indigenous plants, for example) are not in 
themselves very serious and warranting the type of heavy penalties for which criminal 
prosecutions are suitable.  There is a need for alternative means of enforcement in these 
circumstances. 
Returning to the pollution example and the Hawkins study, he favours (or, at least, 
does not reject) the use of strict liability in cases of serious environmental harm.  This 
position must be understood in the context of Hawkins’s failure to take into account 
modes of enforcement other than criminal prosecution.  It is possible to address serious 
pollution events, where the polluter does not have mens rea, by using alternatives to the 
criminal sanction and it will be argued in Chapter 9 that the use of strict liability in 
environmental offences is both undesirable and unnecessary. 
Where does the discussion in the preceding paragraphs lead us in respect of 
determining the appropriate role to be played by criminal sanctions.  It is apparent that, as 
a matter of fact, criminal prosecution is often used as a last resort in the case of 
environmental offences.  But ought this to be the case? 
It is possible to refine this approach somewhat.  In suggesting an appropriate 
approach, it should be borne in mind that criminal prosecution is most appropriate in 
cases demanding heavy penalties.  On the other hand, where an offence is likely to attract 
a small penalty, efficiency, both financial and otherwise, militates against the use of 
criminal sanctions, especially if there are alternative modes of enforcement available.  
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This suggests that the criminal sanction should be reserved for the most serious 
environmental offences.  This is by no means a novel view.  Herbert Packer32 states that 
‘The criminal sanction is the law’s ultimate threat.  Being punished for a crime is different from 
being regulated in the public interest, or being forced to compensate another who has been injured 
by one’s conduct, or being treated for a disease.  The sanction is at once uniquely coercive and, in 
the broadest sense, uniquely expensive.  It should be reserved for what really matters’. 
Richard Lazarus suggests that ‘criminal sanctions should be reserved for the most 
culpable subset of offenses and not used solely for their ability to deter’.33  
If this view is accepted, and it is submitted that this is a compelling view, the next 
question that must be answered is: what are the most serious or egregious environmental 
offences?  In the United States, according to Smith,34  
‘…criminal prosecutions are the pinnacle of a finely-tuned environmental enforcement system that 
has strong administrative and civil enforcement mechanisms with both injunctive and civil penalty 
powers.  This allows criminal prosecution to be reserved for circumstances where there is moral 
culpability in terms of criminally negligent, reckless or deliberate conduct’.35 
Following this broad approach, it is submitted that criminal sanctions should be reserved, 
first, for cases where there is intentional wrongdoing.  These would include so-called 
‘midnight dumping’ offences, deliberate killing of animals or gathering of plants and 
failure to comply with notices, directives or similar instructions by officials.  Secondly, 
prosecution should be used in cases where there is persistent wrongdoing, which is 
indicative at least of dolus eventualis.  For example, a polluter who repeatedly fails to 
comply with emission standards where past infractions have been pointed out to him or 
her would fall into this category.  The third type would be an offender who has caused 
                                                 
32  Herbert L Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) at 250. 
33  Richard J Lazarus ‘Assimilating environmental protection into legal rules and the problem with 
environmental crime’ (1994) 27 Loyola LA LR 867 at 883.  See also Zada Lipman ‘Old wine in new bottles: 
Difficulties in the application of general principles of criminal law to environmental law’ in Gunningham et 
al op cit 31 at 42; C Reasons ‘Crimes against the environment: Some theoretical and practical concerns’ 
(1991) 34 Crim LQ 86 at 104, who suggests that, ‘there is a role to be played by the use of criminal 
sanctions, but only for the most serious harms and persistent offenders’. 
34  Susan L Smith ‘An iron fist in the velvet glove: Redefining the role of criminal prosecution in creating 
an effective environmental enforcement system’ (1995) 19 Criminal LJ 12 at 13. 
35  See also Pain op cit at 28. 
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serious harm to people or to the environment – for example, cases of the Exxon Valdez, 
Bhopal, Seveso, Merriespruit and recent Treasure type – but only where there is mens rea 
on the part of the offender, at least in the form of negligence. 
The decision as to the circumstances in which criminal sanctions ought to be used 
would probably have to be subject to enforcement officials’ discretion – it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for legislation to stipulate that criminal sanctions could be 
imposed only in the situations outlined above.  In order to allow the officials to exercise 
this discretion in the manner suggested, however, it is necessary that there be alternative 




Alternatives to the Criminal Sanction 
 
Chapter 6 has established that the weaknesses of criminal sanctions are such that it would 
be undesirable to use them as the primary, default tool of enforcement.  If this is the case, 
it is necessary to consider what alternatives there are to the criminal sanction.  The 
consideration of alternatives to criminal sanctions works at two levels: first, at the level of 
the overall regulatory regime that is used and, second, the individual methods that can be 
used instead of criminal prosecution. 
Criminal sanctions are at the forefront of the so-called ‘command and control’ 
regulatory approach.  This approach envisages the state’s laying down of regulatory 
commands, compliance with which is enforced by punishing non-compliers by means, 
primarily, of criminal sanctions.  This approach, and alternatives to it will be considered 
in more detail below. 
As far as alternatives to the criminal sanction are concerned at an instrumental level, 
there are several that will be considered in this Chapter: both those of the administrative 
variety and civil variety.  In the former category are abatement notices, withdrawal of 
permits and administrative penalties.  Civil measures include injunctive processes 
(interdicts) and civil liability tools including civil penalties and delictual mechanisms. 
 
1 Alternatives to Command and Control 
 
The command and control approach to enforcement is becoming increasingly unpopular.  
Instead, regulatory approaches in many countries are moving towards increased use of 
economic incentive-driven approaches or co-regulatory approaches, involving negotiated 
agreements between regulator (typically the state) and the regulated community as to 
performance and indicators.  Detailed consideration of regulatory approaches is an 
immense study in its own right and is, consequently, beyond the scope of this work.  It 
will be useful, however, to consider in general terms the reasons why command and 
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control approaches are being rejected and what the benefits of the alternative approaches 
are.  Despite the widespread trend away from command and control, however, it will be 
argued here that there is nevertheless still an important role for the use of criminal 
sanctions.  Instead of being the main weapon under the command and control approach, 
criminal sanctions are part of a mix of instruments used in alternative approaches and 
often operate either as a last resort or ‘long-stop’,1 or are reserved for serious offences, or 
both. 
Before examining the alternative approaches, however, let us consider why command 
and control approaches have been set aside in favour of alternative regimes, and what the 
alternative approaches are. 
 
1.1 The drawbacks of command and control 
 
Excessive responsibility on government. 
In countries like South Africa, where state resources are strained and often directed at 
sectors other than the environment, the central role to be played by the state under the 
command and control approach may be too much to ask.  This can be seen in South 
Africa, where many of the commands are present on paper, but the control is frequently 
absent.  The responsibility is not confined to enforcement aspects like monitoring and 
investigation.  One of the biggest burdens on the state is to set the standards that have to 
be complied with, especially where these standards are not uniform but rather industry- or 
source-specific (and the problem with uniform standards is that they can be excessively 
rigid – see below).2 
 
Cost 
This relates to the previous point.  In order adequately to monitor and enforce 
compliance, the financial burden on the state is considerable. 
 
                                                 
1  See above, 272. 
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Command and control typically requires the regulated parties to comply with either 
explicitly set standards (maximum emission levels, for example) or best available 
technology.  If the regulated entity meets those requirements, then there is no incentive to 
reduce emissions further by, for example, development or installation of new technology.  
The command and control approach, therefore, constitutes a licence to pollute, provided 
such pollution remains within a predetermined maximum level.3  Command and control 
often also relies on uniform standards that fail to take into account different situations and 
the assimilative capacities of different local or regional environments. 
 
Focus on ‘end of pipe’ 
Also related to the previous point, the command and control approach usually focuses on 
‘end of pipe’ solutions, mandating emission levels rather than providing for alternative 
cleaner technology approaches.  In short, command and control does not take into 
account a holistic approach.4 
 
1.2 The advantages of alternative regulatory approaches 
 
Cost benefits 
According to Breger et al, the cost savings in a price-based system ‘can run anywhere 
from 20 to 30 percent to as much as 50 percent or more. Given that the amount that 
society is actually willing to spend for environmental protection is limited, that means we 
can get more environmental protection for the same amount of money by using economic 
                                                                                                                                                 
2  See Jonathon Hanks ‘Achieving industrial sustainable development in South Africa: What role for “self-
regulatory” and “co-regulatory” instruments?’ (1998) 5 SAJELP 298 at 311. 
3  See Marshall J Breger, Richard B Stewart, E Donald Elliott & David Hawkins ‘Providing economic 
incentives in environmental regulation’ (1991) 8 Yale Jnl on Regulation 463 at 468; Hanks op cit at 311. 
4  See Breger et al ibid; Hanks op cit at 312. 
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Greater incentives for innovation 
As pointed out above, command and control impedes (or, at least, fails to provide 
incentive for) innovation.  In an approach based on market mechanisms or co-regulation, 
the manner in which regulated entities can operate is not limited by regulation.  Where 
the target is cost reduction (based on reduction of emissions), whatever method will best 
achieve that target will be utilised and this will often be an innovative approach that does 
not take into account only end-of-pipe solutions.  This is a dynamic process – polluters 
will constantly be striving for further cost reduction through less pollution. 
 
Less responsibility on government 
Although the role of government is not removed altogether, the government’s role is 
reduced to a monitor, not also an administrative body that has to set a host of individual 
emission levels.  
 
1.3 What are the alternatives? 
 
The alternatives to command and control are: 
 Market-based or economic instruments; 
 Co-regulatory instruments; 
 Information-based instruments; and 
 Self-regulatory instruments.6 
 
                                                 
5  Ibid.  See also RW Hahn & GL Hester ‘Marketable permits: Lessons for theory and practice’ (1989) 16 
Ecology LQ 361; BA Ackerman & RB Stewart ‘Reforming environmental law: The democratic case for 
market incentives’ (1988) 13 Columbia Jnl of Environmental Law 171 at 175-77. 
6  Hanks op cit at 309-10. 
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Market-based instruments or economic incentives 
Much has been written on market-based instruments7 and it is beyond the scope of this 
work to consider in detail their intricacies and the extent to which they should be 
implemented.  The purpose of using these instruments is in order to cure market failure 
caused by the externalities which occur when environmental costs are incurred without 
payment.  For example, a person who discharges emissions into a river imposes a ‘cost’ 
onto the environment.  If he or she does not pay for the privilege of polluting the river, 
then an externality occurs because the cost is incurred without corresponding payment.  
To express it somewhat differently, economic or market-based instruments are designed 
to encourage environmentally-beneficial behaviour by altering (which in some cases 
means setting a price that has not existed before) the price of environmental resources in 
order that they reflect more accurately the environmental costs of production and/or 
consumption.8  By imposing a charge on the water polluter, the externality will be 
removed and, moreover, the polluter will be provided with the incentive to reduce 
pollution thus further reducing his or her costs.  Market-based instruments thus encourage 
persons to go beyond compliance.  Examples of market-based instruments are taxes and 
charges, tradable permits, environmental bonds, subsidies and deposit-refund systems.9 
 
                                                 
7  See, for example, (and this is a very small sample) Klaus Bosselmann & Benjamin J Richardson (eds) 
Environmental Justice and Market Mechanisms: Key Challenges for Environmental Law and Policy 
(1999); J Bernstein Alternative Approaches to Pollution Control and Waste Management (1994); Richard B 
Stewart ‘Economics, environment and the limits of legal control’ (1985) 9 Harvard Environmental LR 1;  
and the authorities cited in n9 (infra). 
8  See Hanks op cit at 309. 
9  Ruth A Eblen & William R Eblen The Encyclopedia of the Environment (1994) at 177-8; RB Stauth & 
PH Baskind ‘Resource economics’ in Fuggle & Rabie op cit 26 at 40-47.  Cf Robert W Hahn and Robert N 
Stavins ‘Incentive-based environmental regulation: A new era from an old idea?’ (1991) 18 Ecology LQ 1, 
who suggest that ‘most incentive-based approaches fall within one (or more) of five major categories: 
pollution charges, marketable permits, deposit-refund systems, market barrier reductions, and government 
subsidy elimination’ (at 7). 
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A co-regulatory approach involves an interactive relationship, typically an agreement or 
covenant, between the regulator and the regulated.  In this situation, the overall policy 
objectives are set by the regulator whilst the details are subject to negotiated agreement 
between the two parties.  This type of approach is particularly suitable for industry.  
South African legislation currently provides for negotiated agreements, or, as they are 




According to Hanks, these instruments ‘include measures taken to enhance awareness on 
environmental issues, such as technical assistance programmes, advertising, eco-




As the name suggests, this entails business imposing its own regulatory structure without 
any direct compulsion from the relevant regulator in that community.  There may well be 
pressure on the business to carry out self-regulation in the form of acceptance in the 
market place or competitive advantage.  Examples of self-regulation approaches are the 
ISO 14000 environmental management system standards12 and the chemical industry’s 
Responsible Care programme.  Self-regulation by itself would probably not work due to 
the problem of free-riding, but as a parallel system to other regulatory approaches, it is an 
important force. 
 
                                                 
10  NEMA, Act 107 of 1998 section 35.  See also a Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism 
Discussion Document Environmental Management Co-operation Agreements: A Guide for their Design 
and Use (June 2000). 
11  Hanks op cit at 309-10. 
12  See Neil Gunningham ‘From adversarialism to partnership?: ISO 14000 and regulation’ unpublished 
paper, ISO 14000 Conference, Australian National University (1996). 
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1.4 The role of criminal sanctions under alternative regulatory approaches 
 
It is not the task of this work to make recommendations as to the best regulatory approach 
to choose, but a combination of the approaches above would constitute an improvement 
on the dominant command and control culture that is the current approach.  What is 
important for present purposes is to consider the role that is played by criminal law in the 
equation.  Even if the emphasis is switched predominantly to a co-regulatory approach, 
the threat of criminal sanctions is still important as a means to persuade vacillating 
participants to stay within the parameters that have been agreed upon, and to deal with 
serious breaches of the agreements.  Criminal law also deals with the free riders – those 
who do not wish to play the game.  This role for criminal law corresponds with the 
suggestion made at the end of the previous Chapter.  In short, then, moving away from 
command and control envisages a changed role for criminal law but does not dispense 
with it and, indeed, it still remains an important tool in the overall regulatory toolbox. 
This is well illustrated by John Braithwaite in his regulatory enforcement pyramid.13  
The pyramid is designed to respond to the dilemma faced by regulators as to whether to 
treat firms (the model focuses on the corporate community as the regulated community) 
as being committed to self-regulation or having to be coerced with the ‘big stick’ into 
compliance.  The problem with treating firms as being interested in voluntary action is 
that this approach fails to deter effectively those firms that have no interest in responding 
to voluntary initiatives.  On the other hand, threatening all firms with the threat of strict 
enforcement of laws in order to achieve compliance serves to alienate and impose 
unnecessary costs on firms that are willing to comply voluntarily, with the result that a 
culture of resistance to regulation is created.14 
The regulatory enforcement pyramid appears on the following page.  The idea behind 
the pyramid is that regulators will start at the bottom of the pyramid, assuming virtue 
(voluntary self-compliance) on the part of the regulated community, but that provision is 
                                                 
13  I Ayres and J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation (1992) at 35-41. 
14  Neil Gunningham ‘Beyond compliance: Management of environmental risk’ in Ben Boer, Robert 
Fowler & Neil Gunningham (eds) Environmental Outlook (1994) 254 at 273.  See also E Bardach & R 
Kagan Going by the Book (1982). 
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made for dealing with the situation that arises where this assumption is disappointed.  
Under threes circumstances, the regulator may move up the pyramid to increasingly 




















But, according to Braithwaite, this might not be necessary due to the ‘paradox of the 
pyramid’, which is that- 
‘the signalled capacity to escalate regulatory response to the most drastic of measures channels most 
of the regulatory action to the cooperative base of the pyramid.  The bigger the sticks at the disposal 
of the regulator, the more it is able to achieve results by speaking softly.  When the consequence of 
                                                 
15  John Braithwaite ‘Responsive business regulatory institutions’ in C Cody & C Sampsford (eds) 
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firms being non-virtuous is escalation ultimately to corporate capital punishment, firms are given 
reason to cultivate virtue’.16 
It must be borne in mind that the discussion about regulatory approaches above 
focuses predominantly on environmental law that targets industry, which would mainly 
be of the pollution-control type.  It is likely that the nature conservation regulatory regime 
will remain situated towards the command and control side of the regulatory continuum, 
due to the nature of the regulated community and the types of offences.  It is not 
necessary, however, for the control to be carried out solely by means of criminal 
sanctions.  There are several alternative enforcement measures available that will be 
considered in the second part of this Chapter.  These instruments will not only be useful 
in the nature conservation sphere, but also have an important role to play in pollution 
control, land use planning and other environmental areas, irrespective of the overall 
regulatory approach which is chosen. 
 
2 Alternatives to the criminal sanction 
 
As indicated above, the alternatives broadly fall into two categories – administrative 
measures and civil measures. 
 
2.1 Administrative measures 
 
There are several obvious benefits to using administrative enforcement measures instead 
of criminal sanctions:17  
 Administrative measures are easier to use because it is not necessary to have the 
matter decided in Court.  In addition, it is not necessary to worry about the 
standard of proof and constitutional safeguards inherent in a criminal trial.18   
                                                 
16  Ibid. 
17  See Laura J Kerrigan (ed) ‘Project: The decriminalization of administrative penalties’ (1993) 45 
Administrative Law Review 367; also European Committee on Crime Problems The Contribution of 
Criminal Law to the Protection of the Environment (1978) at 17ff.. 
18  See John Swaigen Regulatory Offences in Canada: Liability and Defences (1992) at 217. 
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 Less costly.  This follows from the previous point. 
 More efficient.  Again, this follows from the previous points – efficiency means 
the ability to achieve the same results as achieved by the criminal process more 
quickly or at a lower cost.  Many administrative measures can simply be carried 
out by officials in the field and, if successfully used, can have an immediate 
positive impact. 
 Less likely opposition from offenders.  The fact that the stigma attached to 
criminal prosecution is absent from the realm of administrative measures would 
be likely to result in offenders opposing findings of wrongdoing less vigorously.19  
Another factor influencing this, and probably more so than the absence of stigma, 




The power to issue notices or directives mostly requiring abatement or remediation are 
frequently encountered legislative devices in environmental law in many countries.21  
This power is provided for in several South African environmental statutes as follows: 
 
Legislation Section Type Functionary 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention 
Act  
19(1) Smoke abatement Local authority 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention 
Act  
29(1) Dust abatement Chief officer 




                                                 
19  Swaigen op cit at 217. 
20  Swaigen op cit at 221. 
21  For example, s 31A of the Environment Protection Act in Victoria, Australia, provides for pollution 
abatement notices that can be issued by the Environment Protection Authority. 
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Minerals Act 41(1) Limitation of 























National Forest Act 4(8) Remedy of breach Forest officer 
National Environmental 
Management Act 





Free State Prohibition of the 
Dumping of Rubbish Ordinance 
2(2) Remediation Authorised officer 
KZN Planning and Development 
Act 




W Cape Planning and 
Development Act 
62 Rectification of 
breach 
Local authority 
Noise control regulations in terms 
of Environment Conservation Act 
Reg 
2(c) 
Abatement Local authority 
 
The notice/directive procedure is a useful enforcement measure in that it is not difficult to 
use and it is effective in that it is usually (but not always, the NEMA s 28 notice 
procedure being an important exception) visited by criminal sanctions in the event of 
default.  Another incentive in the case of several of the notice procedures provided for in 
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South African legislation, is the provision for the authority in question to take the 
necessary steps if the person in question defaults.  The latter is required then to pay the 
costs of the authority’s measures. 
In making provision for notice/directive measures, the legislator should ensure that the 
officials intended to use them know how to do so.  It is apparent in the case of the NEMA 
s 28 powers, for example, that several ‘competent authorities’, those authorities 
empowered to issue directives under s 28, are not sure how to use the section effectively.  
This could be remedied by the production of use guidelines by the relevant government 
department.  One of the important considerations, for example, is whether the 
requirement of natural justice requires the person upon whom the directive or notice is 
served to have the opportunity to state his or her case before the directive takes effect. 
In Evans and others v Llandudno/Hout Bay Transitional Metropolitan Substructure 
and another,22 the legality of a direction issued under section 31A of the Environment 
Conservation Act23 was under scrutiny.  The applicants were building a jeep track on land 
owned by them in Hout Bay and the municipality issued a direction ordering them to 
cease the activity.  The principal issue raised in the case was whether the applicants (the 
recipients of the direction) were entitled to the rights of natural justice. 
The court decided that the direction was unlawful and held that a person who will be 
directly affected by the direction must be given adequate notice of what the direction 
proposes in order to enable them to make representations on their own behalf; to appear 
at any hearing or enquiry that is held; and to prepare their cases effectively in order to 
answer the case they have to meet. 
From the perspective of administrative law, the decision appears to be correct.  Section 
31A is a powerful tool for use against environmentally destructive activities, and in order 
to make sure it is effective, officials who use the section need to ensure that they give 
notice of intention to issue the direction and give the persons to whom the notice is 
directed an opportunity to state their case.  The decision in Evans suggests that natural 
justice would require the affected party to be given the right to be heard before a notice or 
                                                 
22  2001 (2) SA 342 (C). 
23  Act 73 of 989. 
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directive is issued to him or her, whether under s 31A of the Environment Conservation 
Act or other environmental legislation. 
Another crucial consideration is that diligent record-keeping must be carried out in 
order to ensure that, once a person has been served a notice or directive, the necessary 
follow-up takes place.  This may also involve subsequent imposition of criminal 
sanctions in cases where a person has been issued and fails to heed an abatement notice 
or notice to rectify a breach of legislation. 
 
2.1.2 Withdrawal of authorisation 
 
Some environmental statutes in South Africa provide for the withdrawal of any permit, 
licence or other authorisation by a Court upon conviction for an offence involving an 
activity for which the authorisation was given.24  This, however, is not an administrative 
measure since it rides on the back of a criminal conviction. 
A very effective enforcement measure, although a somewhat extreme one, is the 
power of the relevant authority to withdraw authorisations in the case of failure to comply 
with the conditions of that authorisation.  It is a serious measure since in many cases it 
will serve to put a stop to the activity in question (or, at least, serve to remove the 
lawfulness of the activity in question). 
An example is the suspension of a vehicle’s certificate of roadworthiness by the road 
traffic authorities in the case of the vehicle emitting excessive noise.25  Other examples 
are found in the Environment Conservation Act26 and the Marine Living Resources Act.27 
It is obviously less cumbersome for the authorisation to be withdrawn by the authority 
which issued it, rather than having to rely on a Court order.  The provision in the Marine 
Living Resources Act28 is a good one, since it allows the holder of the authorisation to 
make representations why the authorisation should not be revoked in circumstances 
                                                 
24  For example, s 109A of the KZN Nature Conservation Ordinance. 
25  See above, 258. 
26  Section 21. 
27  Section 28. 
28  Ibid. 
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where the authority desires to do so.  The authority may withdraw the authorisation if it is 
not satisfied with the case made out by the holder. 
In the event of a person continuing with an activity requiring authorisation after the 
authorisation has been withdrawn, the authority may have to resort to an interdict29 and/or 
criminal prosecution. 
 
2.1.3 Administrative penalties 
 
Administrative monetary penalties are penalties that are imposed by government officials 
rather than by courts.  In Canada, they are distinguished from ‘tickets’ (roughly 
equivalent to admission of guilt fines in South Africa), by the fact that administrative 
penalties provide more flexibility in the range of penalty that can be imposed; and due to 
differences in the burden of proof and available defences.30  According to Rolfe, the 
‘clear’ advantages of these penalties over tickets and criminal prosecution are that they 
provide for more effective deterrence, especially for minor offences, and that they ensure 
consistency as to the penalties imposed on violators while at the same time being more 
flexible than ticketing systems.  ‘Minor’ advantages are that they can be applied by 
officials with specialised understanding of industry, and often appeals are to tribunals 
with specialised understanding, and that they involve lower costs per sanction than 
offences dealt with by alternative procedures.31 
Rolfe’s ‘clear’ advantages are, it is submitted, not that clear, although the advantages 
that he regards as less important are sufficiently compelling to suggest that administrative 
penalties have a role to play in South African enforcement measures. 
Effective deterrence, Rolfe argues, is determined by five factors: the chances of 
getting caught, the chances of an enforcement response, the speed of the enforcement 
                                                 
29  See, for example, two cases both concerning the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act: Minister of 
Health & Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd and another 1996 (3) SA 155 (N) and Minister of Health v Drums 
and Pails Reconditioning CC t/a Village Drums and Pails 1997 (3) SA 867 (N). 
30  Chris Rolfe ‘Administrative monetary penalties: A tool for ensuring compliance’ on West Coast 
Environmental Law Association website: http://www.vcn.bc.ca/wcel/wcelpub/1997/11685.html  
31  Ibid. 
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response, the chances of a penalty being imposed, and the severity of the penalty.    Even 
in Rolfe’s analysis, he concludes that only in respect of the chances of an enforcement 
response do administrative penalties have an advantage.  He cites empirical research to 
indicate that administrative penalties are imposed more frequently than penalties are 
imposed using alternative processes and this, he argues, is due to their ease of use. 
Their ease of use ties in with their lower cost, and the ease of use is determined in part 
by the less stringent standard of proof and exclusion of defences (in Canada, in any 
event).  What is important is that, in the event of an appeal against an administrative 
penalty, the responsibility for providing evidence will rest on the alleged violator. 
Administrative penalties also play an important role in German law.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the majority of regulatory offences (and many environmental 
offences fall in this category) are classified as Ordnungswidrigkeiten, which are not 
prosecuted in the criminal courts but by administrative agencies.32  They are 
distinguished from ‘real’ criminal offences which, in the environmental sphere, are 
reserved for acts that have led to ‘actual damaging effects’33 on the environment.  One of 
the reasons why Ordnungswidrigkeiten are important in German law is that corporate 
bodies cannot be subject to criminal prosecution, whereas they can be sanctioned in terms 
of the Ordnungswidrigkeiten.34   
What would the benefits of administrative penalties be in the South African context?  
First, it would seem that their use is certainly more efficient (easier and less costly) than 
imposition of criminal sanctions by means of prosecution in court.   Although it has been 
suggested that this is an unproved assumption,35 the only reason for this not being the 
case would be if administrative penalties were usually taken on appeal or review.  The 
statistics that Rolfe supplies suggest that this is not the case and, in fact, less than one 
                                                 
32  Günther Heine ‘Environment protection and criminal law’ in Owen Lomas Frontiers of Environmental 
Law (1991) 75 at 83. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Heine op cit at 90. 
35  See Swaigen op cit at 219. 
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percent of administrative penalties imposed by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency are taken on appeal.36 
Their use in South Africa will only be justified, however, if it can be shown that they 
have an advantage over the admission of guilt fine procedure, which is provided for in s 
57 of the Criminal Procedure Act.37  An admission of guilt fine is a summons to appear in 
court that specifies a fine payable before a specified date.  If the offender pays the fine, 
then the necessity to appear for trial falls away.  Should the accused avail himself or 
herself of the right to trial, then it is a ‘regular’ criminal trial – the state bears the onus of 
proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the safeguards guaranteeing a fair trial 
apply. 
In the case of an administrative penalty, on the other hand, the initial act by the 
enforcement official would be much the same – detection of an infringement, and service 
of a document on the offender which specifies payment of a particular penalty.  It is 
widely agreed, and would probably be required in terms of the Constitutional right to 
administrative justice in South African law,38 that if an agency has the power to impose 
penalties, then some form of independent appeal or review of the agency’s finding of 
liability and its assessment of penalty should be provided for.39 
If the person receiving the administrative penalty decided to appeal, then the impact in 
terms of time and cost on the authority in question would probably be much the same as 
in the case of a person who received an admission of guilt fine insisting on going to trial.  
The crucial difference, however, is that the appellant (in the case of the administrative 
penalty) bears the onus of convincing the appellate forum (probably an administrative 
tribunal) that his or her case should prevail, which is considerably different from the state 
agency in question having to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. 
This is the essential difference between the two measures.  The fact that the case is 
kept out of court (unless there is an administrative review) in the case of administrative 
penalties is, it is submitted, a strong reason for their implementation, but only in the case 
                                                 
36  Rolfe op cit. 
37  Act 51 of 1977.  See also s 56. 
38  Section 33 of the Constitution. 
39  Swaigen op cit at 217. 
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of offences that do not carry a large penalty and certainly only in the case of monetary 
penalties (fines). 
This leads on to the question of whether the use of administrative monetary penalties 
would in any way fall foul of the Constitution.  It will be suggested that administrative 
penalties are used in cases where the infringement is relatively minor and the penalty 
corresponds to this.  Under such circumstances, it is doubtful that the Court would regard 
administrative penalties as problematic.  From the point of view of the right to a fair trial, 
this right applies only to an accused person, which the person who receives an 
administrative penalty is not.  It may be claimed that the difference is merely semantic 
and that the recipient of an administrative penalty is, in effect, an accused person, but if 
this argument is accepted by a court, and it is found that the imposition of administrative 
penalties does infringe a person’s fair trial rights, it is submitted that the limitation on 
these rights will be justifiable.  The reason for this is the important rationale 
(effectiveness of the administration of justice) behind the use of administrative penalties, 
coupled with the relatively minor impact that it will have on ‘victims’.  It is arguable that 
the alternative to administrative penalties, the ‘regular’ criminal process, is more invasive 
of a person’s rights, even with the fair trial safeguards. 
Another argument in favour of the state, and this is also relevant to the question of 
administrative justice, is that administrative penalties should not be provided for without 
the possibility of the recipient being able to appeal.  The opportunity to review the 
imposition of the penalties is provided by the common law in any event. 
There is at least one example of a recent South African Act that has provided for 
administrative penalties.  In the Firearms Control Act,40 section 122 provides - 
(1) If a person is alleged to have committed an offence contemplated in section 120 for which that 
person may be sentenced to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years in terms of 
section 121, the Registrar may cause to be delivered by hand to that person (hereinafter referred to 
as the infringer) an infringement notice which must contain the particulars contemplated in 
subsection (2). 
(2) A notice referred to in subsection (1) must— 
(a) specify the name and address of the infringer; 
                                                 
40  Act 60 of 2000. 
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(b) specify the particulars of the alleged offence; 
(c) specify the amount of the administrative fine payable, which— 
(i) if the period contemplated in subsection (1) does not exceed two years, may, in respect of a first 
infringement, not exceed R5 000 and, in respect of a second or subsequent infringement, not exceed 
R10 000; 
(ii) if the period contemplated in subsection (1) does not exceed three years, may, in respect of a first 
infringement, not exceed R15 000 and, in respect of a second or subsequent infringement, not 
exceed R30 000; 
 (iii) if the period contemplated in subsection (1) does not exceed four years, may, in respect of a 
first infringement, not exceed R20 000 and, in respect of a second or subsequent infringement, not 
exceed R40 000; or  
(iv) if the period contemplated in subsection (1) does not exceed five years, may, in respect of a first 
infringement, not exceed R50 000 and, in respect of a second or subsequent infringement, not 
exceed R100 000; 
(d) inform the infringer that, not later than 30 days after the date of service of the infringement 
notice, the infringer may— 
(i) pay the administrative fine; 
(ii) make arrangements with the Registrar to pay the administrative fine in instalments; or 
(iii) elect to be tried in court on a charge of having committed the alleged offence; and 
(e) state that a failure to comply with the requirements of the notice within the time permitted, will 
result in the administrative fine becoming recoverable as contemplated in subsection (4). 
(3) If an infringer elects to be tried in court on a charge of having committed the alleged 
contravention or failure, the Registrar must hand the matter over to the prosecuting authority and 
inform the infringer accordingly. 
(4) If an infringer fails to comply with the requirements of a notice, the Registrar may file with the 
clerk or registrar of any competent court a statement certified by him or her as correct, setting forth 
the amount of the administrative fine payable by the infringer, and such statement thereupon has all 
the effects of a civil judgment lawfully given in that court in favour of the Registrar for a liquid debt 
in the amount specified in the statement. 
(5) The Registrar may not impose an administrative fine contemplated in this section if the person 
concerned has been charged with a criminal offence in respect of the same set of facts. 
(6) No prosecution may be instituted against a person if the person concerned has paid an 
administrative fine in terms of this section in respect of the same set of facts. 
(7) An administrative fine imposed in terms of this section does not constitute a previous conviction 
as contemplated in Chapter 27 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977). 
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The Registrar referred to in this section is the National Commissioner of the South 
African Police Services.  The Act empowers the Registrar to delegate any of his or her 
powers to ‘any official in the service of the State’.41  It is unlikely, for reasons of 
convenience, that the Commissioner himself or herself will be responsible for issuing 
infringement notices but that, in all likelihood, this power will be delegated to members 
of the South African Police Services.  Significant features of the section are that there is 
no provision for appeal against the decision of the official in question to issue the 
infringement notice and that the penalties provided for can be quite severe – up to R100 
000 fine in some cases. 
There is also provision for the payment of administrative fines in the Mine Health and 
Safety Act.42  The procedure provided for here is quite complex and the official 
empowered to impose fines is the Principal Inspector of Mines.  The maximum fine 
provided for is R200 000. 
One final issue of relevance as far as administrative penalties is concerned is the way 
in which they can be used.  Discretionary administrative penalties are those where the 
decision to impose the penalty and the quantum of the fine are within the discretion of the 
official in question.  This is probably the more common way in which they are used.  
They can also be used automatically, however.  An example of this is provided by Title 
IV of the USA’s Clean Air Act, in terms of which utilities are required to install tamper-
proof continuous emissions monitoring systems.  If the monitors indicate that the 
maximum sulphur dioxide level has been exceeded, there is an automatic penalty of $2 
000 payable for every ton or part thereof by which the limit has been exceeded.  This type 
of penalty is important in order to sure the effective use of economic instruments like 
emission charges and tradeable permits.  The system will break down if polluters who 
break the rules are not penalised.   
 
                                                 
41  Section 141. 
42  Act 29 of 1996.  See s 55-55H. 
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2.2 Civil measures 
 
2.2.1 Injunctive processes (interdicts) 
 
An interdict is potentially a very useful enforcement tool because it can be used to put a 
stop to harmful activity and often at an early stage, allowing proactive intervention.  An 
interdict can be sought by anybody, given the wide locus standi provisions in NEMA.43  
For present purposes, however, what is of interest is the state’s power to apply for an 
interdict. 
In Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd and Another,44  the Minister 
was seeking an interdict requiring the respondent to cease operating an incinerator in the 
absence of the necessary authorisation under the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act.45  
One of the arguments raised by the respondent was that the Minister was not authorised 
by the Act to apply for an interdict – the fact that the Act provided for criminal sanctions 
served to exclude alternative remedies.  The Court rejected this argument and the 
reasoning adopted by the Court would probably be persuasive in similar cases in the 
future.  There is also now the provision in s 32 of NEMA which would apply not only to 
members of the public but with equal weight to government officials and agencies. 
Nevertheless, it could do no harm, and would reduce the opportunity for challenge to 
the official’s right to use an interdict procedure, to make explicit the power to use this 
procedure in legislation.  This is what has been done in the National Water Act.46  Section 
155 provides that a High Court may, on application by the Minister or the water 
management institution concerned, grant an interdict or any other appropriate order 
against any person who has contravened any provision of this Act, including an order to 
discontinue any activity constituting the contravention and to remedy the adverse effects 
of the contravention. 
                                                 
43  Section 32. 
44  1996 (3) SA 155 (N). 
45  Act 45 of 1965. 
46  Act 36 of 1998. 
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It must be borne in mind, however, that an interdict still requires the involvement of a 
Court and hence is a relatively costly and time-consuming process (although it is quicker 
to have a matter resolved through an interdict than by using criminal sanctions).  
Administrative notice procedures, although lacking the gravitas of a High Court order, 
may be equally if not more effective in putting a stop to harmful activities and the 
interdict should not be used as a matter of course but only in cases where alternatives 
such as a notice procedure are likely to be ineffective or otherwise problematic. 
 
2.2.2 Civil penalties 
 
A civil penalty can be defined as punitive sanctions that are imposed by courts otherwise 
than through the normal criminal process.47  Civil penalties are an important facet of the 
enforcement mechanisms used in environmental law in the United States.  According to 
Mann, 
‘Punitive civil sanctions are replacing a significant part of the criminal law in critical areas of law 
enforcement, particularly in white-collar and drug prosecutions, because they carry tremendous 
punitive power.  Furthermore, since they are not constrained by criminal procedure, imposing them 
is cheaper and more efficient than imposing criminal sanctions’.48 
They have also been used in other countries but are not found (with few if any 
exceptions) in South African law. 
In the US Clean Water Act, any person who violates certain specified sections of the 
Act shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $25 000 per day for each violation.  In 
determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness of the 
violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any 
history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable 
requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters 
                                                 
47  Definition adapted from the ‘broad’ definition given by Michael Gillooly & Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce 
‘Civil penalties in Australian legislation’ (1994) 13 University of Tasmania LR 269 at 269.  Their definition 
excluded the requirement of judicial implementation. 
48  Kenneth Mann ‘Punitive civil sanctions: The middleground between criminal and civil law’ (1992) 101 
Yale LJ 1795 at 1798. 
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as justice may require.49  A single operational upset which leads to simultaneous 
violations of more than one pollutant parameter is regarded as a single violation.  There is 
a similar provision in the Clean Air Act.50  Note that the penalty provided for is 
significant, but in other instances of the use of civil sanctions, the penalties can be even 
stiffer and do not bear relation to any damages suffered.51 
By way of further illustration, civil penalties are used in a variety of Australian 
statutes regulating ‘white collar’ enterprise: the Industrial Relations Act,52 Trade 
Practices Act,53 state consumer credit legislation,54 and the Corporations Law.55  Penalties 
do not include imprisonment, but the financial penalties can be severe: under the Trade 
Practices Act, offenders can be fined a maximum of $500 000,56 whilst bodies corporate 
may be fined up to $10 million.57 
What is the rationale behind civil penalties?  It would appear that they essentially boil 
down to two considerations.  The first is that they are less severe (in some ways) than 
criminal penalties in that they do not impact upon personal liberty, they do not attract the 
stigma that a criminal conviction does, and the person upon whom a civil penalty is 
imposed does not acquire a criminal record.  This makes them suitable for use in cases 
where a person may have infringed the law (probably regulatory in nature) without 
criminal mens rea, but where the regulator regards penalisation as important for the 
purposes of deterrence.  
The second reason for their use is a practical one – they are easier to impose than 
criminal sanctions are because of the less stringent standard of proof in civil litigation – it 
                                                 
49  § 1319(b) of USC Title 33. 
50  § 7413(b) of USC Title 42. 
51  See Mann op cit at 1797-8. 
52  1988 (Cth) s 178(1). 
53  1974 (Cth) s 76. 
54  See Gilloolly et al op cit at 280ff. 
55  As amended by the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992, Part 9.4B. 
56  Section 76(1B). 
57  Section 76(1A). 
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is easier to satisfy the balance of probabilities than proof beyond reasonable doubt and 
hence it is easier to establish the defendant’s liability.58 
Although this is an important consideration, it must be borne in mind that civil 
penalties share the same shortcoming of criminal law in that both require the time-
consuming, onerous and costly requirement of a Court decision.   
Moreover, civil penalties may be criticised as being, in effect, substantially similar to 
criminal penalties (certainly criminal fines) which means that the absence of the criminal 
procedural safeguards that an accused has in a criminal trial are problematic.59  This is 
exacerbated by the fact that the civil penalties provided for in US law, for example, can 
be severe and in some cases even heavier than criminal sanctions provided for the same 
offence.60 
From a practical perspective, the Australian Institute of Criminology has investigated 
the use of civil penalties under the Australian Corporations Law and discovered that the 
penalties are noticeably underutilised.61  The reasons suggested for this are as follows:62 
 The availability of apparently more viable alternative remedies, such as 
injunctions. 
 The delays and other drawbacks associated with use of the court system, including 
difficulties in interpretation by the courts. 
 A tendency amongst enforcement personnel to prefer criminal sanctions to civil 
sanctions. 
 The requirement to liaise with the Director of Public Prosecutions impacts 
negatively on the use of civil penalties. 
                                                 
58  See Gillooly et al op cit at 270.  As the authors point out at 293, the use of civil penalties enables the 
Legislature ‘to promote compliance with its legislation without the need to criminalise the conduct in 
question.  The individual penalised is not subjected to imprisonment or the stigma of criminal conviction 
and the civil rules of procedure and standard of proof are sufficiently flexible to ensure that innocent 
persons are not caught in the civil penalties net’.  See also Mann op cit at 1853 ff. 
59  See Gillooly et al op cit at 270-1. 
60  See Mann op cit at 1798. 
61  George Gilligan, Helen Bird & Ian Ramsay ‘The efficacy of civil penalty sanctions under the Australian 
Corporations Law’ (November 1999) 136 Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice. 
62  Gilligan et al op cit at 5-6. 
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 Action that may attract civil penalties in terms of the Corporations Law 
(Commonwealth legislation) may also infringe State law that is easier to use, 
meaning that enforcement personnel prefer to use the State law’s criminal 
prosecution provisions. 
 Civil penalties are of limited utility in certain situations – for example, where the 
offender is bankrupt. 
 Under-utilisation of civil penalties has undercut the deterrent function of the 
measure, leading to negative perceptions amongst enforcement personnel of their 
worth which in turn leads to further under-utilisation. 
What does this analysis suggest about the possibility of using civil penalties in South 
Africa?  First, although there are benefits in using civil penalties, as pointed out above, 
there is the drawback of still having to use the Court and misgivings about procedural 
safeguards for the defendant, which we will return to in a moment.  Another relevant 
consideration is that research has shown in Australia, where civil penalties are not as 
established in the legal landscape as in the USA, that they have not been well utilised.  
Since they would be a novelty in South Africa, this may well turn out to be the case here 
as well. 
Probably the biggest problem with civil penalties, though, would be the probability 
that our Courts would regard their punitive nature as being their main characteristic and 
therefore regarding them as effectively criminal sanctions dressed up as civil measures.  
It is unlikely that South African courts would allow the imposition of severe civil 
penalties without the same (or similar) constitutional safeguards required for accused 
persons in criminal trials.  Although this might not be the case if the penalties imposed 
were less severe, then the use of civil penalties would be unnecessary since 
administrative sanctions could be used for this purpose. 
The United States Supreme Court judgment in United States v Halper63 is, it is 
submitted, an indication of how the South African courts could approach the question of 
civil penalties, at least in broad terms.  In Halper, the defendant was the manager of 
medical laboratory who had made false claims for reimbursement on sixty-five separate 
                                                 
63  490 US 435 (1989). 
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occasions, resulting in an unjustified government payout of $585.  He was prosecuted 
criminally and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of $5 000.  In addition, 
after the criminal conviction, the government sued him for a civil penalty of 
approximately $130 000. 
The issue before the Court was whether the imposition of the civil penalty in addition 
to the criminal penalty violated the Double Jeopardy clause in the US Constitution.  The 
Court held that the disparity between the amount of the civil penalty and the damages 
suffered by the government was so great that the civil penalty constituted a second 
punishment and therefore contravened the Double Jeopardy clause.  According to the 
Court, ‘[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but 
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
punishment, as we have come to understand the term’.64 
It is likely that South African Courts, coming from the tradition where punishment is 
from the realm of criminal law and the purpose of civil law is compensation, would take a 
similar view to the United States Supreme Court.   For this reason, it is submitted, it 
would be unlikely for civil penalties, especially if they provided for severe penalties, to 
gain a foothold in South African law. 
 
2.2.3 Delictual measures 
 
It is important that an environmental law system allows victims of harm caused by 
environmentally-harmful activities to be able to claim compensation.  The availability of 
compensation measures is not necessarily an alternative to criminal sanctions and in 
many cases may be used in addition to criminal sanctions.  There are, however, some 
instances where compensation measures may be used as an alternative to criminal 
sanctions and, maybe, in conjunction with other non-criminal enforcement measures.  
This will be discussed further below. 
It may be argued that the availability of delictual remedies already serves to provide 
for compensation for victims of environmental harm, but the use of the Aquilian action 
                                                 
64  Halper (supra) at 448. 
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may be less than ideal in certain circumstances.  In 1994, Loots argued for the express 
inclusion in environmental legislation of the right to civil action.65  Although the main 
focus of her article was on locus standi, the position in respect of which has now been 
ameliorated by the Constitution and s 32 of NEMA, there is another important 
consideration that she highlighted.  This is the rule in Madrassa Anjuman Islamia v 
Johannesburg Muncipality66to the effect that where a specific remedy such as a criminal 
sanction or administrative measure is  provided for in legislation, then the legislature is 
presumed to have intended to exclude all other remedies, except an interdict.67  This 
would serve to exclude delictual actions for damages, as was illustrated in the case of 
Hall and Another v Edward Snell & Co Ltd.68  In this case, the Court refused to allow a 
claim for damages as a result of food poisoning caused by contaminated cooking oil.  The 
reason was that the relevant legislation made it a criminal offence to sell contaminated 
foodstuffs and that the legislature could not have intended to subject the offender to both 
criminal sanctions and civil damages.  As Loots says, ‘the possibility that environmental 
offenders could escape claims for damages brought by those who suffer harm as a result 
of their activities is totally unacceptable’.69  The solution is to provide expressly in 
legislation that persons may claim damages for harm or injury suffered as a result of 
breach of the legislation in question. 
In certain circumstances, however, even this may not be enough.  Due to the difficulty 
of proving fault on the part of the defendant in many environmental cases, it may be 
useful to provide in legislation for strict delictual liability in cases of breaches of the 
legislation causing harm.  There is case authority to the effect that a person claiming 
damages for a breach of a statutory duty (such breach constituting a criminal offence) 
does not have to allege negligence.  In Lascon Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wadeville 
Investment Co (Pty) Ltd,70 the Witwatersrand Local Division held, in effect, that a breach 
                                                 
65  Cheryl Loots ‘Making environmental law effective’ (1994) 1 SAJJELP 17 at 33. 
66  1917 AD 718. 
67  See Minister of Health v Woodcarb (supra). 
68  1940 NPD 314. 
69  Loots op cit at 34. 
70  1997 (4) SA 578 (W). 
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of a statutory duty allowed a strict liability remedy separate from the Aquilian action.  
This decision, it is submitted, is wrong: the breach of the statutory duty determines 
whether there has been wrongfulness in a particular case (or, in other words, whether the 
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff), it does not have any impact on the normal 
Aquilian requirement of fault.  (Interestingly, the Court in Lascon completely ignored the 
Madrassa Anjuman Islamia rule). 
If Lascon is correct, then it is not necessary for legislation to provide for no-fault 
liability since an offender will be strictly liable for the breach of a statutory duty.  Since, 
however, Lascon would not be likely to withstand more careful legal scrutiny, it would be 
beneficial in certain cases to provide for strict civil liability for breach of environmental 
statutes.  This may provide for a defence of due diligence71 in which case, in effect, the 
burden of disproving negligence shifts to the offender. 
The question of the constitutionality of this may be raised, but it was held by the 
Constitutional Court that shifting the onus onto the defendant to disprove negligence is 
not unconstitutional.  In Prinsloo v van der Linde,72 in issue was the constitutionality of s 
84 of the Forest Act,73 which provided ‘when in any action by virtue of the provisions of 
this Act or the common law the question of negligence in respect of a veld, forest or 
mountain fire which occurred on land outside a fire control area arises, negligence is 
presumed until the contrary is proved’.  The Court was concerned with whether this 
presumption conflicted with the Constitutional right to be proved innocent or with the 
right to equality. 
The first argument was to the effect that, since the section referred to ‘any action’, it 
extended also to criminal prosecutions under the Act and, if the reverse onus provisions 
was unconstitutional in the criminal context, then it would be unconstitutional in the civil 
context as well.  The Constitutional Court rejected this argument on the basis that s 35(2) 
of the interim Constitution required the Court to give to a provision a reasonable 
restricted interpretation that was constitutional.  Moreover, s 98(5) also provided that ‘in 
                                                 
71  Discussed in more detail in the next Chapter. 
72  1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC). 
73  Act 122 of 1984. 
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the event of the Constitutional Court finding that any law or any provision thereof is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, it shall declare such law or provision invalid to the 
extent of its inconsistency’.  This was a further barrier to the argument. 
The second argument related to equality.  It was contended that the differentiation 
between defendants in veld fire cases and other delictual matters had no rational basis.  
The Court held that there as a rational connection between the purpose of the impugned 
section and the means chosen to do so.  Moreover, the differentiation between owners 
and occupiers within fire control areas and those without was not unfair discrimination as 
envisaged by the Constitution.  In sum, the Court held that s 84 of the Forest Act was not 
inconsistent with the Constitution. 
There is a good example of a strict civil liability provision in South African 
environmental law in the National Nuclear Energy Regulator Act.74  The Act provides in 
section 30 for strict civil liability of the holder of a nuclear installation licence for nuclear 
damage75 caused by or resulting from the nuclear installation in question arising during 
that person’s period of responsibility.  It would be desirable for environmental legislation 
dealing with hazardous activities to include this type of provision.  People engaging in 
such activities would be on their guard that harm caused by such activities would result in 
liability, irrespective of fault or lack thereof on the part of the defendant. 
In certain circumstances, delictual liability could play a role as an alternative to 
criminal sanctions.  For example, in the case of industrial effluent discharged into 
municipal sewers, the penalty provided for contravention of the emission limits is usually 
rather low, yet the damage caused to the sewerage works may be substantial.  Even where 
there is no damage as such, the cost of cleaning up may be significant.  In such 
circumstances, particularly where there would be difficulty in proving mens rea on the 
part of the polluter, the relevant legislation could provide for strict liability for the costs 
of clean up or repair of the sewerage works.  Since this amount could be quite substantial, 
this would provide an incentive for the polluter to take steps to ensure non-repetition, and 
                                                 
74  Act 47 of 1999. 
75  Defined above, §10.2. 
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the task of claiming damages for the operator of the sewerage works would be facilitated 
by not having to prove fault. 
One further issue relating to liability for damages should be mentioned and that is that 
legislation frequently provides for the power of the Court to order payment of damages 
assessed by the Court upon conviction of the accused.76  This is a power that is a 
supplement to the criminal sanction rather than an alternative but it is an important 
provision in that it obviates the need for the victim to launch separate civil litigation in 
order to claim damages.  A similar provision is one which allows the Court to order a 
convicted accused to remediate the harm, rather than awarding damages.77  This would be 




The discussion above indicates that there are several alternatives to the criminal sanction 
that could be effectively utilised in enforcement of environmental law.  Several are 
already relatively common in South African law but some could be reinforced through 
explicit provision in legislation (injunctive powers and delictual liability, for example).  
Civil penalties, on the other hand, although common in other jurisdictions, would be 
unlikely to find favour in South Africa. 
In considering alternatives to the criminal sanction as the primary mode of 
enforcement of environmental law, the focus in this Chapter has been on the enforcement 
of environmental law by organs of state.  This, however, is likely to be only part of the 
enforcement picture in South Africa in the future and it can be expected that citizens 
(individually or as part of non-governmental environmental activist organisations) will be 
increasingly taking up the cudgels on behalf of the environment.  The legal environment 
for them to do so, with liberal standing rules provided by the National Environmental 
Management Act and the Constitution, makes this a likely scenario. 
                                                 
76  For example: s 7 of the Game Theft Act 105 of 1991; s 153 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998; s 
34(1) of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
77  For example: s 12A(3) of the Sea-Shore Act 21 of 1935; s 29(7) of the Environment Conservation Act 
73 of 1989. 
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Although the National Environmental Management Act does provide for private 
prosecutions, it is doubtful that this will be utilised much by the public, who would be 
more likely to use interdicts or actions for damages.  Whatever instruments are used by 
members of the public, it is likely that their efforts will constitute a significant part of 
environmental law enforcement efforts in years to come. 
This, it is submitted, is something to be encouraged.  The liberal standing provisions 
mentioned above are invaluable in this regard and, in effect, provide for a blanket ‘citizen 
suit’ clause.   This can be reinforced by the disclosure of information which will 
empower members of the public to exercise their rights more effectively.78  South Africa 
does have provision for access to information in the form of the Promotion of Access to 




The message of this and the previous Chapter, in short, is that criminal sanctions, 
suffering as they do from several shortcomings, should be reserved for the more 
egregious contraventions of environmental law.  Other infringements can be addressed by 
a combination of the measures discussed in this Chapter.  A mix of alternatives (statutory, 
delict, civil, criminal, amongst others) should be used according to the nature and 
magnitude of the harm.   
This brings us to the point where a suggestion has been made as to the circumstances 
in which to employ the criminal law.  The remainder of this thesis examines the way in 
which the criminal law may be implemented so as to make it as effective as possible 
when it is called upon, as explained in Chapter One.   
                                                 
78  But cf. Cass Sunstein, who argues that provision for increased disclosure of information often has the 
paradoxical effect of making people less informed: ‘Paradoxes of the regulatory state’ (1990) 57 Univ of 
Chicago LR. 407 at 424-5. 
79  Act 2 of 2000. 
80  Act 107 of 1998. 
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A factory manager pours a certain substance into the municipal sewers and is then 
prosecuted for contravening environmental regulations prohibiting the introduction of the 
substance into the sewerage system.  It may well be that the manager responds to the 
charge by claiming ignorance of the terms of the prohibition.  Should he or she be able to 
avoid liability on these grounds? 
Environmental law can be a very technical field and environmental legislation often 
contains reams of technical requirements, including prohibitions.  It has been estimated 
that in the United States, for example, the body of federal environmental legislation 
amounts to about 11 000 A4 pages.  Is it reasonable to expect people to know all of this 
law?  On the other hand, if people can avoid responsibility for their actions by claiming 
ignorance of the law, will this not undermine the law and be detrimental to the 
environmental interests supposed to be protected by the legislation? 
These are some of the issues that arise within the context of debating the benefits and 
shortcomings of strict criminal liability, a device frequently used to impose liability on 
accused persons even if they are mistaken as to the law.  This device is used relatively 
widely in environmental criminal law,1 the focus of this Chapter. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to consider the necessity of using strict liability in 
environmental criminal law, given that it offends against one’s basic sense of justice in 
that somebody could be convicted without knowing what he or she was doing was wrong.  
Obviously, the dictates of justice have to be balanced against the environmental interests 
                                                 
1  Keith Hawkins Environment and Enforcement (1984) at 13-14. 
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that will be undermined by the possible difficulty in bringing environmental offenders to 
book without strict liability. 
It will be argued that, even if there was once a certain legal logic to the imposition of 
strict liability in public welfare offences, this logic has been distorted over time so that 
now strict liability tends to be imposed somewhat randomly.  Consequently, the use of 
strict liability in the realm of environmental criminal law needs to be regulated more 
explicitly or excluded altogether. 
 
2 What is strict liability? 
  
Strict liability is usually taken to mean that mens rea is not a necessary element for 
liability for contravention of the offence.2  The effect of the doctrine of strict liability is 
that the accused is denied a defence based on ignorance or mistake of fact or law.3  This 
is the only departure from the general principles of liability, since it is still incumbent on 
the prosecution to prove the performance of a voluntary unlawful act carried out with the 
necessary capacity, and the accused may raise any of the defences relating to these 
elements.4  In this respect, strict liability must be distinguished from absolute liability, 
which entails liability merely upon proof of the prohibited act. 
This is the way in which strict liability has been ‘defined’ in South Africa.  There are 
various types of strict liability that will emerge in the comparative analysis below. We 
will return to the appropriate meaning of strict liability after this analysis.  Strict liability 
has historically been used most frequently in so-called ‘regulatory’ or ‘public welfare’ 
offences. 
It was in 1933 that Francis Sayre coined the term ‘public welfare offence’.  This was 
‘a specialized type of regulatory offense involving a social injury so direct and 
widespread and a penalty so light that in exceptional cases courts could safely override 
the interests of innocent individual defendants and punish without proof of any guilty 
                                                 
2  JRL Milton and MG Cowling South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol III: Statutory Offences 
(1988) at Liability 26. 
3  Ibid. 
4  Ibid. 
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intent’.5  Typically, the public welfare offence involved threats to public interests like 
health and safety in commercial, industrial and social undertakings.6  Pollution offences, 
which are today responsible for most instances of what may be called ‘environmental 
crime’, are the archetypical public welfare offence. 
 
3 The rationale for the use of strict liability 
 
Essentially, the criminal law is seen to have developed in order to punish people who 
committed the ‘traditional’ common-law type crimes, and the general requirements for 
criminal liability, including mens rea, developed in this context.  Once it became evident 
that it was necessary to regulate areas of life that had not traditionally been regulated 
(certainly not by statute, at any rate) such as public health and labour, the criminal law 
was invoked in order to deal with those who failed to comply with the statutes.  But it 
became evident that there were problems with the use of traditional criminal law 
principles.  The requirement of proof of fault, for instance, was, in many cases, almost 
impossible to satisfy and reliance on fault was seen to have the potential for inundating 
the courts with offences that were seen as rather trivial.  The time spent in dealing with 
proof of fault would not be economically warranted in the circumstances,7 leading to the 
effective nullification of the legislation.8  As Burchell and Milton state, 
‘In essence [the justification for strict liability] is, first, that strict liability contributes to the efficient 
administration of regulatory legislation and, secondly, that strict liability encourages and stimulates 
compliance with the provisions of the legislation’.9 
The basic justification for strict liability offences is therefore one of expedience - a 
utilitarian approach.  Reliance on proof of mens rea would serve to hinder the 
achievement of the objectives of the legislation in question.  There are, however, other 
                                                 
5  Francis B Sayre ‘Public Welfare Offences’ (1933) 33 Columbia LR 55 at 68. 
6  Burchell and Milton at 372. 
7  See Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers & Stanley Yeo Australian Criminal Justice 2 ed (1999) at 20. 
8  See H Gross A Theory of Criminal Justice (1979) 349 and R v City of Sault Ste Marie (1978) 85 DLR 
(3d) 161 at 171. 
9  Burchell and Milton at 372.  See also the judgment of Botha JA in Amalgamated Beverage Industries 
Natal (Pty) Ltd v Durban City Council 1994 (3) SA 170 (A) at 180. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions       310 




vital diagnostic features of the strict liability (or public welfare) offence that are more in 
the nature of an apology for the use of strict liability than a justification for its use.  These 
are that public welfare offences have traditionally been seen as, in their nature, not true 
crimes; and that they carry relatively light or nominal sentences, more in the nature of 
penalties than punishment.  The distinction between offences requiring proof of mens rea 
and those which do not is explained by Sayre as follows.  He says that there are two 
‘cardinal principles’ which determine the distinction: 
1.  The character of the offence.  ‘Crimes created primarily for the purpose of singling out 
individual wrongdoers for punishment or correction are the ones commonly requiring 
mens rea; police offenses of a merely regulatory nature are frequently enforceable 
irrespective of any guilty intent’.10  
2.  The possible penalty: ‘Crimes punishable with prison sentences … require proof of a 
guilty intent’.11 
It will become apparent from the following examination of how strict liability has 
been used in various countries that these ‘characteristics’ of regulatory offences based on 
strict liability have been watered down to such an extent, certainly in some cases, that 
they no longer signify strict liability offences at all.  The comparative analysis will begin 
with South Africa, and, where possible, particular reference will be made to 
environmental offences. 
 
4 Strict Liability in South Africa 
 
Sayre identified the origin of the doctrine of strict liability for public welfare offences in 
England in the mid nineteenth century, the doctrine emerging in the United States shortly 
thereafter but seemingly independently of what was happening in England.12  Early South 
African decisions tended to follow the English lead, 13 which was not surprising given 
                                                 
10  Sayre op cit at 72. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Sayre op cit at 62. 
13  See R v Wallendorf 1920 AD 383; R v von Wielligh 1931 CPD 247; R v Langa 1936 CPD 158; R v H 
1944 AD 121; Burchell and Milton op cit at 374. 
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that much legislation in South Africa was based significantly on English statutes. The 
doctrine was accepted in such a way that it threatened to run away with itself, but there 
was a backlash from the judiciary from the 1950s onwards, leading to increasing hostility 
towards the principle.  In the oft-cited judgment of Holmes JA in S v Qumbella,14 the 
stricter judicial position was clearly expressed: 
‘[T]he basic principle is that actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.  Current judicial thinking is 
recognizing more fully the scope and operation of this fundamental rule of our law … Of course the 
lawmaker has it within its power to override this fundamental principle of fairness, and to make 
absolute the duty of compliance with its behests, thus rendering innocent violations punishable.  But 
such an inroad into individual freedom should be made to appear very plainly, so that he who runs 
may read’.15 
At first glance, this approach seems to fly in the face of the utilitarian considerations 
underlying imposition of strict liability in statutory offences, but it has been pointed out 
that this judgment must be seen in the light of the evolution in South African case law of 
certain devices which served to strike a balance between the general principle of fault as a 
necessary element for criminal liability on the one hand, and the utilitarian arguments in 
favour of strict liability on the other.  These devices were, first, the placing of the onus of 
disproving fault on a balance of probabilities onto the accused, and, second, recognition 
of negligence as sufficient fault for a contravention of legislation.16 
The reverse onus notion was raised in South Africa first in the case of R v 
Wallendorf,17and later explicitly approved in R v H,18 thereby becoming part of South 
African law.  In an obiter statement, the court in S v Qumbella19 cast doubt on this 
position, indicating that the requirement of the state having to discharge the onus of proof 
in criminal cases is ‘part of our basic criminal law’.  This decision, however, was 
followed by a period of uncertainty, where courts took one of three views: that favoured 
by R v H; that requiring the state to prove mens rea in the form of intention beyond 
                                                 
14  1966 (4) SA 356 (A). 
15  At 364. 
16  Burchell and Milton op cit at 375; Cowling and Milton at Liability 29. 
17  1920 AD 383 at 401-2. 
18  1944 AD 121 at 127. 
19  1966 (4) SA 356 (A) at 366. 
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reasonable doubt; and a third approach imposing on the accused an evidential burden 
requiring him or her to produce evidence in rebuttal of a prima facie case made out by the 
prosecution, with the onus of proof remaining on the latter.20 
Most commentators suggest that the position was resolved by the Appellate Division 
in S v De Blom,21 despite the court’s not expressly overruling the earlier position.22  The 
decision in De Blom appears to accord with the third position outlined above.  It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that this is the position only in cases where the 
situation as to the onus of proof is not clear from the wording of the statute.  It is open to 
the legislature to reverse the onus by doing so explicitly.  Having said this, though, the 
legal position of reverse-onus provisions, whether explicit or otherwise, is now subject to 
the provisions of the Constitution,23 and there have been several cases in which the 
constitutionality of such provisions has been considered. 
Other than in the case of S v Meaker,24 the Courts have consistently found that reverse 
onus decisions are unconstitutional, although in S v Manamela25the Constitutional Court 
does make reference to the types of offences for which reverse onus provisions may be 
acceptable.26  This has been discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  A reading of the judicial 
tealeaves in this regard suggests that reverse onus provisions, although always infringing 
the right to be presumed innocent, might be regarded as acceptable in cases where the 
accused is not subject to heavy penalty (imprisonment, for example) and where the 
interests of administration of justice would make it necessary (as opposed to merely 
desirable) that the accused prove facts that are within his or her knowledge and that 
would be difficult if not impossible for the state to have to prove. 
Given the existing state of the law in South Africa, it is possible to make some 
suggestions as to how the issue can be dealt with in environmental legislation.  Before 
                                                 
20  See EM Burchell & JRL Milton ‘Criminal law’ (1977) Annual Survey of South African Law 417. 
21  1977 (3) SA 513 (A). 
22  See Cowling and Milton op cit at Liability 38. 
23  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
24  1998 (8) BCLR 1038 (W). 
25  2000 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
26  At para [29]. 
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doing so, however, let us examine the way that the law has developed as far as strict 
criminal liability is concerned in other jurisdictions.  The trends can then all be compared 
in order to suggest a way ahead for the effective prosecution of environmental crime in 
South Africa. 
 
5 Strict Liability in the United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, strict liability offences are almost always creatures of statute, but 
(as is the case in other countries) the legislature rarely uses express words to the effect.  It 
is left to the courts to make the decision, which they do on the basis of the wording used.  
Even if there is no word or phrase importing a mental element, the court will not 
inevitably find that mens rea is not required.  There is a presumption of mens rea which 
must be rebutted by the prosecution, and the principles relating to this were set out by the 
Privy Council in Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong:27 
(1) there is a presumption of law that mens rea is required before a person can be held guilty of a 
criminal offence; (2) the presumption is particularly strong where the offence is “truly criminal” in 
character; (3) the presumption applies to statutory offences, and can be displaced only if this is 
clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute; (4) the only situation in which the 
presumption can be displaced is where the statute is concerned with an issue of social concern; 
public safety is such an issue; (5) even where a statute is concerned with such an issue, the 
presumption of mens rea stands unless it can be shown that the creation of strict liability will be 
effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the 
commission of the prohibited act. 
The presumption is often displaced in cases where, in effect, there is no need to prove 
mens rea in respect of one or more elements (usually one important element) of the 
offence.28 
There is a host of cases dealing with strict liability in the United Kingdom, which are 
not necessarily all that consistent in their application of the doctrine.29  According to 
                                                 
27  [1984] 2 All ER 503 (PC) at 508f-g. 
28  JC Smith Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 7 ed (1999) at 168.  In one case, the 
Court held not only that there was no need to prove mens rea but that the prosecution must not prove it: R v 
Sandhu [1997] Crim LR 288. 
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Smith & Hogan, the presumption of mens rea may be displaced by either (i) the words of 
the statute or (ii) its subject-matter.  As far as the words are concerned, verbs importing a 
mental element (such as ‘permit’) suggest that mens rea is necessary.30  Similarly, the 
adverb ‘knowingly’ does the same, although the word ‘wilfully’ seems to be treated 
somewhat haphazardly.31  In addition, use of words importing mens rea in some sections 
but not in others does not automatically indicate that the latter sections are strict liability 
provisions.32 
The subject matter of the legislation is also regarded as important.  There are a number 
of considerations at play in this regard.  First, the courts consider whether the offence is a 
‘real crime’ or a ‘quasi crime’.33  The latter is an offence which, in the public eye, carries 
little or no stigma and does not involve ‘the disgrace of criminality’.34  Strict liability may 
be imposed for such offences since the ordinary person would not feel that conviction 
without proof of moral guilt was unjust. 
Secondly, the court may be more ready to impose strict liability in the case where the 
provision in question relates to a specific trade, profession or activity rather than to the 
general public.  This is the classic regulatory offence.  The third factor is possibility of 
amendment, which has been stated by Devlin J as entailing the following: 
‘a safe general principle to follow … that where the punishment of an individual will not promote 
the observance of the law either by that individual or by others whose conduct he may reasonably be 
expected to influence, then, in the absence of clear and express words, such punishment is not 
intended’.35 
                                                                                                                                                 
29  R v Prince [1874-80] All ER Rep 881; R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168; Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 
QB 918 at 921; Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 All ER 356 (HL); Sweet v Parsley 
[1970] AC 132, [1969] 1 All ER 347 (HL); Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Storkwain Ltd 
[1986] 2 All ER 635 (HL); B v DPP [1998] 4 All ER 265. 
30  JC Smith & Brian Hogan Criminal Law 7 ed (1992) at 104. 
31  Smih & Hogan op cit at 105-6. 
32  Smith & Hogan op cit at 106. 
33  Smith & Hogan op cit at 107. 
34  Warner v Metropolitan Police Comr [1969] 2 AC 256 at 272. 
35  Reynolds v Austin & Sons Ltd [1951] 2 KB 135. 
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  Finally, if the social danger which will follow from the contravention is significant, 
the courts will be more inclined to impose strict liability.36  Pollution offences are an 
example, apposite for purposes of this Chapter, which the courts have tended to regard as 
strict liability offences. 
Two important cases involving pollution offences and strict liability are Alphacell Ltd 
v Woodward37 and Atkinson v Sir Alfred McAlpine & Son Ltd.38  In the former, the House 
of Lords held that the defendant company was guilty of causing polluted matter to enter a 
river in contravention of s 2(1) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951.  Settling 
tanks with an overflow channel into the river had been built, with pumps designed to 
ensure that overflow did not take place.  The pumps, however, became obstructed with 
vegetation, and overflow of polluted water occurred.  The defendant was not shown to 
have known of the pollution nor to have been negligent, but the court nevertheless 
convicted.  According to Lord Salmon, 
‘If  … it were held to be the law that no conviction could be obtained under the 1951 Act unless the 
prosecution could discharge the often impossible onus of proving that pollution was caused 
intentionally or negligently, a great deal of pollution would go unpunished and undeterred to the 
relief of many riparian factory owners.  As a result, many rivers which are now filthy would become 
filthier still and many rivers which are now clean would lose their cleanliness’.39 
In McAlpine, Asbestos Regulations of 1969 required persons to give written notice of 
intention to undertake work involving crocidolite.  The defendant company undertook 
such work, without knowing nor having reason to know that the work involved 
crocidolite.  The court held that the words ‘knows or ought to know’, if read into the 
regulation, would not address the mischief sought to be combated by the regulations, that 
it was not open to the defendant to raise impossibility as a defence. 
One of Sayre’s characteristics of the strict liability public welfare offence was a light 
penalty, but, as Smith & Hogan point out, if the penalty is light this suggests that 
Parliament thought the social danger to be slight, which seemingly contradicts the 
                                                 
36  Smith & Hogan (1992) op cit at 108. 
37  [1972] AC 824, [1972] 2 All ER 475. 
38  [1974] Crim LR 668. 
39  [1972] AC 824 at 848. 
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previous consideration, that strict liability is often imposed in cases involving social 
danger.40  The courts in the United Kingdom, however, have departed from Sayre’s 
principle and in several cases have imposed strict liability in cases involving relatively 
serious terms of imprisonment as prescribed sentences.41 
Often statutes provide for defences along the lines of allowing the defendant to prove 
absence of mens rea (meaning intention) and that he or she took all reasonable 
precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence.  
According to Smith & Hogan,42 
‘Such provisions are a distinct advance on unmitigated strict liability; but they are still a deviation 
from the fundamental principle that the prosecution must prove the whole of their case; and an 
extensive use of offences of strict liability, even where so qualified, is to be deplored’. 
 
6 Strict Liability in Canada 
 
The leading case in Canada is R v City of Sault Ste. Marie.43 Before this decision, the 
courts in Canada had (not all that consistently) chosen between either liability 
irrespective of fault (which has been called absolute liability in Canada) or the traditional 
position requiring proof of fault.44  In 1976, the Canadian Law Reform Commission had 
recommended:45 
(i)  every offence outside the Criminal Code be recognized as admitting of a defence of 
due diligence; 
(ii)  in the case of such offence for which intent or recklessness is not specifically 
required the onus of proof should lie on the defendant to establish such defence; 
(iii)  the defendant would have to prove this on the preponderance or balance of 
probabilities. 
                                                 
40  Smith & Hogan op cit at 114. 
41  See, for example, Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1, [1984] 2 All ER 503 
(PC). 
42  Smith & Hogan op cit at 122. 
43  85 DLR (3d) 161. 
44  Don Stuart Canadian Criminal Law 3 ed (1995) at 149-156. 
45  Canadian Law Reform Commission Our Criminal Law (March, 1976) at 32. 
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The recommendation endorsed a working paper46 in which it was stated that negligence 
should be the minimum standard of liability in regulatory offences, and that such offences 
were:47 
‘… to promote higher standards of care in business, trade and industry, higher standards of honesty 
in commerce and advertising, higher standards of respect for the … environment and [therefore] the 
… offence is basically and typically an offence of negligence’. 
The working paper expressed the view that, in regulatory law, to make the defendant 
disprove negligence – in other words, to prove due diligence – would be both justifiable 
and desirable. 
In Sault Ste. Marie, the accused city had contracted with a company to dispose of its 
waste (garbage).  The company had, in doing so, caused pollution to a river in the course 
of the disposal operations.  The company was found guilty of contravening s 32(1) of the 
Ontario Water Resources Act of 1970.  The main issue in the case was whether the city 
itself was liable, and this issue reached the Supreme Court of Canada.  The court, in 
considering a middle position between absolute liability and requiring proof of mens rea, 
aimed at finding a position which fulfils the  
‘goals of public welfare offences while still not punishing the entirely blameless.  There is an 
increasing and impressive stream of authority which holds that where an offence does not require 
full mens rea, it is nevertheless a good defence for the defendant to prove that he was not 
negligent’.48 (at 172). 
Dickson J considers that there is nothing improper – given the difficulty faced by the state 
in proving wrongful intention – in placing the burden of proving on a balance of 
probabilities due diligence on the accused.  This would be preferable to absolute liability, 
and the means of proving reasonable care (due diligence) would be within the grasp of 
the accused.49  The court thus concludes that there are three categories of offences:50 
                                                 
46  Working Paper No. 2 – Criminal Law - Meaning of Guilt -  Strict Liability (1974).  
47  Canadian Law Reform Commission at 32. 
48  At 172. 
49  At 181. 
50  At 181-2. 
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1. Offences in which mens rea, consisting of some positive state of mind such as intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness, must be proved by the prosecution, either as an inference from the nature of the 
act committed, or by additional evidence. 
2. Offences in which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the existence of mens rea; the 
doing of the prohibited act prima facie imports the offence, leaving it open to the accused to 
avoid liability by proving that he took all reasonable care.  This involves consideration of what a 
reasonable man would have done in the circumstances.  The defence will be available if the 
accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would render the act or 
omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular event.  These 
offences may properly be called offences of strict liability. 
3. Offences of absolute liability where it is not open to the accused to exculpate himself by showing 
that he was free of fault. 
The Court then set out the criteria as to which choice of categories is to be made as 
follows.  The first category would contain offences which are ‘criminal in the true 
sense’.51  ‘Public welfare offences’ would fall into the second category, unless they were 
drafted to contain words such as ‘wilfully’, ‘with intent’, ‘knowingly’ or ‘intentionally’, 
in which case they would be in the first category.  Absolute liability offences would be 
those where the Legislature ‘had made it clear that guilt would follow proof merely of the 
proscribed Act’.52 
The court accordingly held that the offence in Sault Ste. Marie was one of strict 
liability (category 2), since there were no express words indicating that it was an absolute 
liability offence and the words ‘cause’ and ‘permit’ in the statute did not indicate that the 
offence was a first category offence.  The city would thus be allowed to raise the defence 
of due diligence.53  This defence entails that the defendant shows that he or she did 
everything reasonably within his or her power to prevent the offence, or that he or she 
                                                 
51  At 182. 
52  Ibid.  The Court does not state that this must be expressly provided, but states that ‘The overall 
regulatory pattern adopted by the Legislature, the subject matter of the legislation, the importance of the 
penalty, and the precision of the language used will be primary considerations in determining whether the 
offence falls into the third category’. 
53  The defence was raised but failed and the city was convicted. 
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reasonably believed in a mistaken set of fcats that, if true, would render the act or 
omission innocent.54 
In assessing the decision in Sault Ste. Marie, the issue of classification warrants 
further consideration. The judgment makes reference to ‘public welfare’ offences falling 
into category two, yet does not define such offences.  Stuart asks ‘why is fouling a river – 
pollution being one of the greatest social ills of our times – not truly criminal’?55   He 
continues to say:56 
‘The distinction between real and regulatory offences, a modern version of the malum in se and 
mala prohibita distinction, has never been satisfactorily made.  Unless the courts or the legislature 
undertake this difficult task of substantive classification, remarks … that criminal law principles can 
be relaxed in the area of regulatory offences should be viewed with suspicion, particularly as the 
penalties attached to many regulatory offences are severe, in some cases including the threat of 
imprisonment’. 
Given the uncertainty in making this distinction, with the result that certain offences 
considered to be public welfare offences involve potential substantial penalties, Stuart 
expresses discomfort at Sault Ste. Marie’s apparent finding that the accused bears the 
onus of proving (as opposed to raising prima facie evidence of) due diligence.57  Dealing 
with the argument that the reverse onus is necessary in public welfare offences due to the 
alleged difficulty or impossibility of the prosecution in obtaining evidence, Stuart 
suggests:58 
‘This concern seems hugely exaggerated and shows a surprising lack of faith in triers of fact.  Mens 
rea is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, but the accused’s testimony is only 
one source of evidence.  In practice the Crown has little difficulty in proving mens rea by asking the 
trier of fact to draw reasonable inferences from the circumstances.  The accused bears the 
evidentiary burden’. 
Sault Ste. Marie was decided before the enactment in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.  Two important post-Charter decisions are relevant to the position 
adopted in Sault Ste. Marie.  First, in Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act 
                                                 
54  Diane Saxe Environmental Offences (1990) at 145. 
55  Stuart op cit at 160.  See also Eric Colvin Principles of Criminal Law 2 ed (1991) at 175. 
56  Stuart op cit at 160-1. 
57  Stuart op cit at 162-165. 
58  Stuart op cit at 166. 
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(BC),59 the Court held that any penal law which imposes absolute liability violates section 
7 of the Canadian Charter and would be of no force or effect where there is a potential 
deprivation of the liberty interest, in other words, where the accused could be 
imprisoned.60  The effect of this is to make a due diligence defence a minimum 
constitutional standard.  The issue of whether an absolute liability offence for which 
imprisonment can be imposed in default of payment of a fine has not been definitively 
decided yet, but Stuart suggests that if the Supreme Court were to hold this, absolute 
liability would be ‘virtually banned’.61 
The second ‘Charter case’ was R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc.62 The two most 
important aspects of this decision concerned qualification (or ‘watering down’) of the due 
diligence defence and the constitutionality of placing a reverse onus on the accused in 
regulatory offences.  First, the Court decided that the due diligence defence could not be 
watered down by requiring anything more onerous than demonstrating reasonable care.63  
Secondly, by a 5-4 majority, the Court decided that there was nothing unconstitutional 
in the case of regulatory offences placing a persuasive burden of proving the due 
diligence defence on the accused.64  Essentially, the majority judgments rested on 
arguments of law enforcement efficacy and the distinction, not convincingly drawn, 
between regulatory and real offences.  Despite the perceived shortcomings of the majority 
decision,65 it constitutes the current law on the position, and the alternative of an 
‘evidentiary presumption of evidence’ is not the default position but may be opted for by 
a court.66 
                                                 
59  (1985) 48 CR (3d) 289 (SCC). 
60  See Alan W Mewett ‘Editorial’ (1992) 34 Criminal LQ 257 at 258. 
61  Stuart op cit at 176. 
62  (1991) 8 CR (4th) 145 (SCC). 
63  Per Cory J (L’Heureux-Dubé J concurring) at 187, per Iacobucci J (Gonthier and Stevenson JJ 
concurring) at 189, per Lamer CJC (Sopinka and  La Forest JJ concurring) at 212, per McLachlin J at 223.  
64  Per Cory J (L’Heureux-Dubé J concurring) at 184, Iacobucci J (Gonthier and Stevenson JJ concurring) 
at 192, Lamer CJC (Sopinka J concurring) dissenting at 219, La Forest dissenting at 223, McLachlin J 
dissenting at 223-4. 
65  See Stuart op cit at 177-181. 
66  Stuart op cit at 181. 
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As far as the defence of due diligence is concerned, several trends can be observed in 
the way that the Canadian courts have dealt with the defence in the context of 
environmental offences.  According to Lowe,67 in general, ‘any delay in investigating the 
cause of an environmental problem and any consequential delay in preparing a plan of 
rehabilitation will ordinarily be fatal to the defence’.68  Moreover, if the defendant has 
knowledge of a potential environmental problem but fails to act to minimise the risk, this 
would have a similar effect.69  It has been held that due diligence does not mean 
superhuman effort, but requires a ‘high standard of awareness and decisive, prompt and 
continuing action’.70 
There is authority for the view that adherence to guidelines might be seen as satisfying 
the due diligence defence.71  Along similar lines, due diligence can be based on the 
standard of care in the relevant industry.  The test, known as the ‘industry standards test’, 
is derived from the case of R v Gonder.72 The test involves two steps in order to 
determine the issue of reasonable care: 
‘First, the standard of care common to the business activity in question has to be determined.  Is 
there a standard of practice or care commonly acknowledged as a reasonable level of care and did 
the defendant act in accordance with that standard?  Secondly, are there any special circumstances 
which require a different level of care than the level suggested by the standard practice?’73 
In summary, then, the Canadian position is that, in regulatory offences (which are not 
clearly demarcated), strict liability is permissible.  Strict liability entails the accused’s 
                                                 
67  Peter Lowe ‘A comparative analysis of Australian and Canadian approaches to the defence of due 
diligence’  1997 EPLJ 102 at 108. 
68  See R v Laidlaw Waste Systems Ltd (1993) 11 CELR (NS) 232 at 245-7 and R v Toronto Electric 
Commissioners (1991) 6 CELR (NS) 301 at 323-4. 
69  See R v Rivtow Straits Ltd (1993) 12 CELR (NS) 153 and R v Fibreco Pulp Inc (1993) 10 CELR (NS) 1 
at 20-21. 
70  R v Courtaulds Fibres Canada (1992) 9 CELR (NS) 304 at 313. 
71  R v Canada (Environment Canada) and Northwest Territories (Commissioner) (1993) 12 CELR (NS) 
37 at 51. 
72  62 CCC (2d) 326 (1981). 
73  Lowe op cit at 110. 
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having to prove, on a balance of probabilities, the existence of due diligence or 
reasonable care once the prosecution has proved the actus reus. 
 
7 Strict Liability in the United States of America 
 
As indicated above, offences which Sayre labeled ‘public welfare’ offences emerged in 
the United States shortly after they were recognized in England.  Such offences, however, 
are the exception rather than the rule.  The Supreme Court has indicated that there is 
generally a presumption of mens rea,74 but in certain cases this presumption is not present 
and strict liability may be applicable.  In Morissette v United States,75 the Court stated 
that in ‘public welfare offences’ the accused ‘if he does not will the violation, usually is 
in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no 
more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his 
responsibilities’.76 The Court indicated that the criteria for delineating between crimes 
which require proof of mens rea and those which do not ‘is neither settled nor static’,77 
and held that mere omission from the provision under scrutiny of words indicating mens 
rea ‘will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced’.78 
In United States v Dotterweich,79 referring to ‘public welfare’ offences, the Court said:  
‘such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct – awareness of 
some wrongdoing.  In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a 
person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger’.80  
                                                 
74  United States v Balint 258 US 250 (1922) at 251.  See also Morissette v United States 342 US 246 
(1952), where Jackson J stated at 250 that, ‘The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when 
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems 
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to 
choose between good and evil’. 
75  342 US 246 (1952). 
76  At 256. 
77  At 260. 
78  At 263. 
79  320 US 277 (1943). 
80  At 280-81. 
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Later, in Staples v United States,81 it was indicated that the Supreme Court has 
‘essentially … relied on the nature of the statute and the particular character of items regulated to 
determine whether congressional silence concerning the mental element of the offense should be 
interpreted as dispensing with conventional mens rea requirements.’82 
The court raised the suggestion that 
‘punishing a violation as a felony is simply incompatible with the theory of the public welfare 
offense.  In this view, absent a clear statement from Congress, that mens rea is not required, we 
should not apply the public welfare offense rationale to interpret any statute defining a felony 
offense as dispensing with mens rea.’83 
In United States v Park84 the clear statement from Congress was apparently present.  
The legislation in question was the same as that under scrutiny in Dotterweich,85 and the 
Court reaffirmed that knowledge or intent were not required to be proved in prosecutions 
under the Act.86  Both these cases hold corporate officers strictly liable for crimes 
committed by their corporations,87 and, in particular, require individuals who  
‘execute the corporate mission … [to] seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and 
primarily, a duty to implement measures that will ensure that violations will not occur’. 88   
There is some uncertainty as to whether the Park decision applies strict liability or 
negligence, but, in practice, the application of the doctrine amounts to strict liability due 
to the inferences the court tends to draw in the circumstances.89 
The decision in Park has been interpreted as providing for a defence which arises 
where the defendant was ‘powerless’ to prevent or correct the violation.90 This has been 
                                                 
81  511 US 600 (1993). 
82  At 607. 
83  At 618. 
84  421 US 658 (1975). 
85  The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 1938. 
86  At 670. 
87  See Steven Zipperman ‘The Park Doctrine – Application of strict criminal liability to corporate 
individuals for violation of environmental crimes’ (1991) 10 UCLA J Environmental Law and Policy 123 at 
127-134. 
88  Zipperman op cit at 134. 
89  Ibid. 
90  421 US 658 at 673. 
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interpreted to require the corporate officer to prove either: (i) that he or she exercised 
extraordinary care through ‘vigilance’ or ‘foresight’, or (ii) that prevention of the offence 
would have been ‘objectively impossible’.91  Given the existence of this defence, 
subsequent cases92 have rejected the notion of strict liability and interpreted Park as 
imposing a negligence standard of ‘extraordinary care’ upon corporate officers.93  The 
effect of the defence has been held to cast an evidential burden upon the defendant to 
raise evidence as to his exercise of extraordinary care.  This then requires the prosecution 
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that ‘the defendant, by the use of extraordinary care, 
was not without the power or capacity to correct or prevent the violations of the Act’.94 
Shortly before Park, the Supreme Court had extended the ‘public welfare’ doctrine 
imposing strict liability to statutes involving felony penalties, as opposed to 
misdemeanours.95  At almost the same time, the Court also used the public welfare 
approach to interpret a statute making criminal ‘knowing’ conduct in United States v 
International Minerals & Chemicals Corp.96 The Court, in dealing with an alleged 
contravention of a provision in the Federal Explosives Act requiring display on shipping 
papers of the classification of corrosive liquids being transported across state lines, held 
that ‘knowingly’ applied only to the act, not to knowledge of the law: 
‘[where] dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, 
the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them, or 
dealing with them, must be presumed to be aware of the regulation’.97 
The Court also held that there was a rebuttable presumption of knowledge (which 
amounts to allowing the defence of mistake of fact), so that someone who thought in 
                                                 
91  Zipperman op cit at 136, quoting as examples United States v Y Hata & Co Ltd 535 F.2d 508 at 511 (9th 
Cir) cert denied 429 US 828 (1976) and United States v Starr 535 F.2d 512 at 515-6 (9th Cir 1976). 
92  See cases cited in previous note. 
93  Zipperman op cit at 137. 
94  United States v New England Grocers Supply Co 488 F. Supp 230 at 236 (D. Mass 1980). 
95  United States v Freed 401 US 601 (1971).  See Katherine H Setness ‘Statutory interpretation of Clean 
Water Act section 1319(C)(2)(A)’s knowledge requirement: Reconciling the needs of environmental and 
criminal law’ (1996) 23 Ecology Law Quarterly 447 at 461. 
96  402 US 558 (1971). 
97  At 564. 
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good faith that he or she was handling something which was not regulated when, in fact, 
it was, would escape liability.98   
As far as strict liability in environmental offences is concerned, federal environmental 
crimes do not provide for strict liability99 but in each case requires proof of ‘a particular 
state of mind’.100 Nevertheless, this has not prevented the courts, somewhat 
controversially admittedly, from imposing what amounts to strict liability in cases where 
the statute contains words clearly requiring a form of mens rea.  In United States v 
Weitzenhoff,101 the defendants were convicted for violating the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
which provides that any person who ‘knowingly violates’ certain sections of the Act ‘or 
any permit condition or limitation implementing any such sections’ is guilty of a 
felony.102  The defendants were both sentenced to significant terms of imprisonment.103  
The defendants were managers of a sewage treatment plant in Hawaii and they had 
instructed employees to pump, under cover of darkness, ‘waste activated sludge’ directly 
into the ocean.  This effluent did not comply with the standards with which the plant had 
to comply.  They had instructed the employees who did the pumping not to say anything 
about the discharges, because if they all stuck together and did not reveal anything, ‘they 
[couldn’t] do anything to us’.104 
The Court of Appeals confirmed their convictions by holding that the word 
‘knowingly’ in the relevant section of the CWA merely required that the defendants knew 
that they were discharging pollutants, not that they knew that the discharges violated the 
relevant permit.105  This decision was followed in United States v Hopkins.106  
                                                 
98  At 563-4.  See Setness op cit at 462. 
99  Although environmental crimes in state legislation often do impose strict liability – see, for example, 
George Jugovic Jr ‘Legislating in the public interest: Strict liability for criminal activity under the 
Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act’ (1992) 22 Environmental Law 1375. 
100  Zipperman op cit at 159. 
101  1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir 1993) amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir 
1994) cert. Denied 115 S Ct 939 (1995). 
102  § 1319(c)(2)(A). 
103  Weitzenhoff was sentenced to 21 months and his co-defendant Mariani to 33 months. 
104  Weitzenhoff at 1282. 
105  Weitzenhoff at 1283. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions       326 




Carmichael argues convincingly, it is submitted, that these decisions are wrong and that 
‘knowingly’ refers both to the action being performed and to the fact that such action is in 
violation of the law.107  Wettach, on the other hand and less compellingly, agrees with the 
decision.108  According to Wettach,109 the CWA is 
‘not a strict liability statute. Strict liability statutes make certain actions or omissions criminal 
regardless of whether the actor intended the results that occurred. No mens rea is required. In 
contrast, the CWA provisions do set forth a general intent mens rea. Congress requires proof of 
some mental state as a prerequisite to conviction under the CWA. The CWA demands that the 
violator engaged in “knowing” conduct to be convicted. The existence of this mens rea requisite 
prevents classification of the CWA as a strict liability law’. 
She distinguishes110 ‘general intent’ crimes from ‘specific intent’ crimes on the basis that: 
‘“Specific intent” designates a special mental element which is required above and beyond any 
mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime”.  
Her interpretation of the Weitzenhoff decision suggests that, following this decision, the 
defendant will be convicted without proof of mens rea but will be able to raise the 
defence of mistake of fact, but not mistake of law.  Wettach seeks to justify this position 
by suggesting that, had the court extended the word ‘knowingly’ to the law, the 
defendants would have escaped liability.111  This conclusion, however, is doing the triers 
of fact in this case great discredit: if ever there was a case, on the facts, where there 
would have been justification in drawing an inference that there was not ignorance of the 
law, Weitzenhoff was it. 
Setness,112 in the light of this decision, suggests the path the law ought to follow in 
order to ensure the efficacy of the legislation on the one hand and fair warning of the 
defendant on the other.  She suggests that ignorance of the law should be disallowed as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
106  53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir 1995). 
107  Kepten D Carmichael ‘Strict criminal lliability for environmental violations: A need for judicial 
restraint’ (1996) 71 Indiana LJ 729. 
108  Christine L Wettach ‘Mens rea and the “heightened criminal liability” imposed on violators of the Clean 
Water Act’ (1996) 15 Stanford Environmental LJ 377. 
109  Wettach op cit at  397. 
110 Ibid, quoting Blacks Law Dictionary 6th ed (1990) at 1399. 
111  Wettach op cit at 377-8. 
112  Setness op cit at 490-1. 
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defence but that the government should be required to prove that the defendant, ‘in his 
position, would have been aware that discharge of the “pollutant” was subject to strict 
regulation or had the potential to be harmful to others or to the environment’.113  This 
would not require the prosecution’s having to prove that the defendant knew the precise 
details of the law that he was alleged to contravene.  In addition, the defendant should be 
allowed to raise the defence of mistake of fact.  This would accord with the International 
Minerals decision.  While Setness advocates the defendant bearing the burden of proving 
this, it is submitted that an evidential burden to this effect could have substantially the 
same effect. 
In addition, she suggests that the jury should be instructed as to ‘conscious avoidance’ 
or ‘wilful blindness’, as follows: 
‘[A] wilful blindness instruction is proper if a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, the facts 
suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be 
misunderstood as mandating an inference of knowledge’.114 
A new twist to the saga was recently added in the case of United States v Ahmad,115 
where the defendant was charged with various offences following his emptying of an 
underground gasoline tank which had been contaminated with water.  The contents of the 
tank had been pumped out and disposed of in a stormwater drain and a sewer.  Ahmad, 
the owner of the service station, claimed that he thought the substance being pumped out 
was water.  The court in Ahmad concluded that violations of the Clean Water Act do not 
fall within the public welfare defence ambit116 and that the requirement of ‘knowledge’ 
applies to each element of the offence.117  There is some uncertainty as to whether Ahmad 
directly requires knowledge of the ‘law’,118 since the specific ground on which the appeal 
was allowed is that the court was concerned that the jury instructions in the court a quo 
suggested that the jury be satisfied only that the defendant had discharged ‘something’ in 
                                                 
113  Ibid. 
114  United States v Littlefield 840 F.2d 143 (1st Cir) at 147, cert denied 488 US 860 (1988). 
115  101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir 1996). 
116  At 391. 
117  At 393. 
118  Andrew J Turner ‘Mens rea in environmental crime prosecutions: Ignorantia juris and the white collar 
criminal’ (1998) 23 Columbia J of Environmental Law 217 at 229. 
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order to be convicted.  The decision in Ahmad clearly, therefore, allows a mistake of fact 
defence. 
Not long afterwards, United States v Sinskey,119 followed Weitzenhoff and Hopkins in 
excluding the defence of mistake of law in a Clean Water Act violation, distinguishing 
Ahmad on the basis that the latter dealt with mistake of fact.  This position was confirmed 
in United States v Wilson,120 where the court specified the degree of factual knowledge 
required for conviction: 
‘the court held that the government must prove a defendant’s knowledge of the “operative” facts 
meeting each essential element of the substantive offense, “but need not prove that the defendant 
know his conduct to be illegal”’.121 
Further explaining this, the court stated that the ‘government need not prove that the 
defendants understood the legal consequences of those acts or were ever aware of the 
existence of the law granting them significance’.122 
In summary, therefore, four different courts of appeal have come out clearly in 
rejection of the mistake of law defence for Clean Water Act violations involving a 
‘knowing’ requirement, while one (Ahmad) is somewhat less than clear on this but seems 
to have decided on the basis of mistake of fact. 
 
8 Strict Liability in Australia 
 
In Australia, the High Court of Australia in the 1941 case Proudman v Dayman123 held 
that ‘[a]s a general rule an honest and reasonable belief in a state of facts which, if they 
existed, would make the defendant’s act innocent affords an excuse for doing what would 
                                                 
119  119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir 1997). 
120  1997 WL 785530 at 1 (4th Cir 1997). 
121  Turner op cit at 234, quoting Wilson (supra) at 11. 
122  Wilson at 264. 
123  (1941) 67 CLR 536. 
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otherwise be an offence’.124  The Court also, apparently, held that there is an evidential 
burden of establishing this defence on the defendant.125 
Several years later, in R v Kennedy,126 the Supreme Court of Victoria was concerned 
with a statutory provision imposing strict liability for removing a girl under the age of 18 
years out of the possession and against the will of the person having lawful charge of her 
with intent that she should be carnally known.  The court decided that the offence will be 
committed whether or not the accused knew that taking the girl was or might be against 
the custodian’s will, ‘and even if the accused reasonably believed that the taking was not 
against the will of the custodian’.127  In other words, the court was excluding the 
possibility of the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact. 
This decision has most probably128 been overruled by the case of He Kaw Teh v R.129 
The court was unanimous that proof of honest and reasonable mistake of fact did not have 
to be satisfied by the accused on a balance of probabilities, but that he or she bears only 
an evidential burden.  The majority of the court, Wilson J dissenting, held that statutes 
providing for serious offences should not be read as dispensing with the requirement of 
mens rea, in accordance with the traditional common law approach.  Gibbs CJ held that 
                                                 
124  At 540. 
125  The wording used by the court is somewhat ambiguous: ‘The burden of establishing honest and 
reasonable mistake of fact is in the first place upon the defendant and he must make it appear that he had 
reasonable grounds for believing in the existence of a state of facts, which, if true, would take his act 
outside the operation of the enactment and that on those grounds he did so believe.  The burden possibly 
may not finally rest upon him of satisfying the tribunal in case of doubt’.   See L Waller & CR Williams 
Brett, Waller & Williams Criminal Law: Text and Cases 6 ed (1989) at 702-3.  See also He Kaw Teh v R 
(1985) 157 CLR 523 at 535, where Gibbs CJ describes the statement as ‘somewhat equivocal’. 
126  [1981] VR 565. 
127  At 560. 
128  Waller & Williams op cit state that the authority of Kennedy ‘has been severely affected’ by the 
decision in He Kaw Teh (at 678) and also that the status of Kennedy, in the light of He Kaw Teh, ‘must now 
be regarded as uncertain’ (at 699).  
129  (1985) 60 ALR 449. 
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the ‘gravity of the offence suggests that guilty knowledge was intended to be an element 
of it’.130 
In the environmental law sphere, in New South Wales, the Protection of the 
Environment Operations Act of 1997 contains a three-tier system of offences.131  This is 
essentially the same system that was provided for by the Act’s forerunner, the 
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989.  Tier One offences132 are those which 
require fault in the form of intention or negligence, and for which the defendant can raise 
a defence of showing that the commission of the offence was due to causes over which 
the person had no control, and that the person took reasonable precautions and exercised 
due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.133  In the New South Wales 
context, then, the defence of due diligence applies to offences requiring mens rea, not to 
strict liability offences.134 
Tier two offences are offences for which strict liability is applied, giving the defendant 
the opportunity of raising the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact.135  By 
way of contrast, in Allen v United Carpet Mills (Pty) Ltd,136 the Victorian Supreme Court 
held that s 39(1) of the Environment Protection Act of 1970, prohibiting pollution of 
water, imposed absolute liability and therefore the defence of honest and reasonable 
mistake of fact was not available.  In New South Wales, however, the strict liability 
standard applies.137 
                                                 
130  At 537. 
131  Section 114. 
132  Sections 115-119. 
133  Section 118. 
134  See Peter Lowe ‘A comparative analysis of Australian and Canadian approaches to the defence of due 
diligence’ (1997) Environmental and Planning LJ 102. 
135  Tier three offences are also strict liability offences but these are imposed by way of ‘penalty notices’ 
rather than by means of prosecution in court. 
136  [1989] VR 323. 
137  SPCC v Tiger Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 72 LGRA 337 at 342.  See also Zada Lipman & Lachlan Roots 
‘Protecting the environment through criminal sanctions: The Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 
1989 (NSW)’ (1995) 12 Environment and Planning LJ 16 at 22-3.  Although both the case and the article 
deal with the 1989 Act, the principle applies equally to the 1997 Act. 
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9 Strict Liability in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand’s approach to strict liability follows that set out in the Canadian case of 
Sault Ste. Marie.138  The New Zealand Court of Appeal followed this approach first in 
Civil Aviation Department v MacKenzie139 and then in Millar v Minister of Transport.140  
Following Millar, the strict liability position in New Zealand would appear to be that 
there are two very similar approaches.  The first may be called the Strawbridge approach, 
after the decision in R v Strawbridge.141  This entails an assumption of mens rea in the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, but allows the accused to raise the defence of 
honest belief in facts that would make the act lawful plus some evidence or basis for 
thinking that it was on reasonable grounds.142  If such evidence is raised, then the onus 
falls on the prosecution to disprove honest belief on reasonable grounds.  This, therefore, 
amounts to an evidentiary burden. 
The second approach is similar except that  it admits of the defence of ‘total absence 
of fault’,143 proof of which rests on the accused on a balance of probabilities.  The onus of 
proof is more burdensome (as far as the accused is concerned) than in the Strawbridge 
approach. 
The New Zealand courts have also recognised the possibility of absolute liability 
offences, where proof beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict the accused and 
even absence of fault is no defence.144  The court in Millar expressed its doubts about the 
usefulness of absolute liability, but did not abolish it.145 
                                                 
138  AP Simester & Warren J Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (1998) at 125. 
139  [1983] NZLR 78. 
140  [1986] 1 NZLR 660. 
141  [1970] NZLR 909 (CA). 
142  Millar at 665 (judgment of Cooke P, Richardson J concurring). 
143  At 668. 
144  Simester & Brookbanks op cit at 130.  See Millar at 666. 
145  At 668, Cooke P stated, ‘there is a good deal less room for … absolute liability, once it is accepted that 
[strict liability] is an available alternative under which onus is on the defendant or proving total absence of 
fault’. 
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Strict liability cases, according to the Court of Appeal, would arise in those cases 
where the provision creating the offence is ‘directed at conduct having a tendency to 
endanger the public or sections of the public’.146  The court expressly gives as an example 
the discharging of waste into natural water. 
New Zealand environmental legislation contains several strict liability offences.  
Firstly, in the Conservation Act of 1987, which provides for the conservation of New 
Zealand's natural and historic resources and the establishment of a Department of 
Conservation, strict liability for offences is imposed, but a defendant may be relieved of 
liability upon proof, on a balance of probabilities, that there was no intention to commit 
the offence and reasonable steps were taken to avoid its commission.147  This accords 
with the approach set out in Millar. 
Then, in terms of the Resource Management Act of 1991, there is a penal regime 
providing for a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding $ 
200,000, with an additional maximum daily fine of $ 10,000 possible for continuing 
offenses.148 Section 338(1) provides that every person commits an offence against the 
Resource Management Act who contravenes, or permits a contravention of, the 
provisions imposing duties and restrictions in relation to land, subdivision, the coastal 
marine area, the beds of certain rivers and lakes, water, and discharges of contaminants. 
Under section 339(1), unauthorized development, contrary to a district plan or a resource 
consent, as described in section 338(1), will trigger the maximum penalties specified by 
the Act. Section 341 provides that section 338(1) offences (relating to the development of 
land contrary to a district plan or a resource consent) are strict liability offences. The Act 
provides that the defendant can escape liability by establishing, on a balance of 
probabilities, – 
(a) That – 
                                                 
146  At 669. 
147  John R Billington ‘Developments in criminal law and criminal justice: Recent New Zealand efforts to 
combat environmental crime’ (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 389 at 398. 
148  Resource Management Act (1991) s 339(1). 
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(i) The action or event to which the prosecution relates was necessary for the purposes of saving 
or protecting life or health, or preventing serious damage to property or avoiding an actual or 
likely adverse effect on the environment; and 
(ii) The conduct of the defendant was reasonable in the circumstances; and 
(iii) The effects of the action or event were adequately mitigated or remedied by the defendant 
after it occurred; or 
(b) That the action or event to which the prosecution relates was due to an event beyond the control 
of the defendant, including natural disaster, mechanical failure, or sabotage, and in each case 
either – 
(i) The action or event could not reasonably have been foreseen or been provided against by the 
defendant; and 
(ii) The effects of the action or event were adequately mitigated or remedied by the defendant 
after it occurred.149 
The explicit provision for these defences in the Act suggest that the specified defences 
replace the ‘no fault’ defence established in Millar, rendering those acts subject to s 341 
more in the nature of absolute liability offences, except for the defences provided for.150  
Offences other than those referred to in s 341 are, according to Grinlinton,151 ‘in the 
nature of traditional strict liability public regulatory offences’, thus attracting the 
‘absence of fault’ defence in Millar.  This is apparently true even of the offences for 
which imprisonment can be imposed under the Act.152 
In McKnight v NZ Biogas Industries Ltd,153 the Court of Appeal held that section 341 
did not require proof of mens rea.  Also of interest, on remission of the case back to the 
District Court,154 was the latter Court’s decision in respect of the defence in section 
341(2)(b).  Not only did the Court affirm that all three elements must be satisfied for the 
defence to be successful, the unsuccessful application of the defence to the facts of the 
                                                 
149  Section 341(2). 
150  See David Grinlinton ‘Liability for environmental harm in New Zealand’ (1997) 5 Environmental 
Liability 106 at 110. 
151  Ibid. 
152  Ibid. 
153  (1994) 2 NZLR 664. 
154  Auckland Regional Authority v NZ Biogas Industries Ltd unreported District Court CRN 2048024848-
49, 6 July 1994. 
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case illustrates the limited circumstances in which the defences will be available.  
According to Phillipson – 
‘These decisions are important because they operate to exclude the availability of any common law 
notions of due diligence. … Given the fact that all three elements of the defence need to be satisfied 
it is clear that the mere exercise of what is traditionally understood as “due diligence” will not be 
sufficient to avoid prosecution’.155 
 
10  Assessment 
 
What can be seen from the above analysis is that, although there is broad similarity in the 
approaches of the countries considered, the detail differs, often significantly.  There are 
differences in how the courts decide that offences are strict liability offences (and, in this 
respect, the United States courts’ approach in deciding that statutes creating ‘knowing’ 
offences do not allow the defence of mistake of law is unique in the countries examined); 
in the defences available, and in how the burden of proof is situated.  Interestingly, South 
Africa probably has the strictest approach to strict liability offences, particularly in 
respect of the reversal of the onus. 
In order to consider the proper role of strict liability in environmental offences, let us 
consider some examples of environmental offences and how strict liability would 
improve the chances of conviction.  These examples are based on South Africa’s National 
Water Act.156  Note that the wording of the National Water Act, particularly in the 
general pollution prohibition in section 151(1), clearly requires mens rea and cannot be 
interpreted as allowing strict liability.  It is used in the examples simply to illustrate what 
the consequences could be if it did provide for strict liability.  
 
Example 1.  The facts are similar to those in the US case of Weitzenhoff.  The manager of 
a sewage works instructs certain employees to pump untreated waste directly into a river 
under cover of darkness, to disconnect and put away the pumps before morning, and not 
                                                 
155  Martin Phillipson ‘Enforcement of environmental law: New Zealand’s statutory model’ (1995) 12 
Environmental and Planning LJ 308 at 314. 
156  Act 36 of 1998. 
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to tell anybody about what they are doing.  This is the classic ‘midnight dumper’ 
scenario. 
According to the National Water Act, no person may (i) unlawfully and intentionally 
or negligently commit any act or omission which pollutes or is likely to pollute a water 
resource; and/or (ii) unlawfully and intentionally or negligently commit any act or 
omission which detrimentally affects or is likely to affect a water resource.157  Assuming 
that the facts can be proven, a court would have no difficulty in inferring intention from 
the facts.  Any suggestion that the accused was ignorant of the law would be regarded as 
highly unlikely due to the fact that the accused took steps to conceal what was being 
done.  It would not be necessary to rely on strict liability in such a situation. 
Moreover, given that the maximum penalty for such an offence can be severe158 (and 
ought to be severe in such a case), the South African courts would have difficulty in 
accepting strict liability in this case.  It would not fall within the type of cases the 
Constitutional Court considered might be suitable for strict liability in Manamela.159 
 
Example 2.  A factory openly disposes of a large amount of untreated effluent into a 
stormwater drain.  This drain feeds into a stream and aquatic life in the stream is harmed 
by the discharge.  The factory manager claims to be ignorant of the prohibited nature of 
the act.  This differs from the first example in that there is no attempt to conceal the act, 
which (concealment) would strongly suggest knowledge of the law. 
Once again, it is submitted, strict liability would be unnecessary in prosecuting this 
offence.  The Act provides for negligence as sufficient mens rea and, measured against 
the reasonable factory manager, the manager in this example would probably be found to 
be negligent.  Given the highly-regulated nature of factory operations, it would not be 
reasonable for the manager to assume that there was no regulation of effluent disposal.  
                                                 
157  Section 151(1)(i) and (j) of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
158  According to Section 151(2), any person who contravenes any provision of s 151(1) is guilty of an 
offence and liable, on the first conviction, to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, 
or to both a fine and such imprisonment and, in the case of a second or subsequent conviction, to a fine or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or to both a fine and such imprisonment. 
159  2000 (3) SA 1 (CC).  See discussion above at 54. 
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This also accords with the rule in De Blom relating to mistake of law.  It is only where 
ignorance of the law is reasonable that a person may avail himself or herself of that 
defence and, in the circumstances of this example, ignorance would not be reasonable. 
 
Example 3.   A factory discharges effluent that is treated on its premises into a municipal 
sewer, which it has the necessary authority to do.  The level of a certain substance in the 
effluent discharged on a particular occasion slightly exceeds the maximum level allowed 
in terms of the relevant municipal by-laws.  A variation of this example is that the 
effluent is discharged directly into a river and the level exceeds the permissible level 
provided for by the general authorisation under section 39 of the National Water Act.160  
In neither example is any immediate harm caused by the discharge. 
In such a case, it would be difficult for the prosecution to prove fault, particularly in 
the case where there is continuous emission and the factory does its own monitoring on a 
random sampling basis.  This would be the typical ‘public welfare’ offence and strict 
liability might well be argued as a necessary device for the prosecution to secure a 
conviction for contravention of the law.  But this begs the question – is it necessary to use 
the criminal law for this type of non-compliance?  It is difficult to disagree with the view 
expressed by Findlay et al, when talking about absolute liability offences, but equally 
apposite to strict liability offences, that such offences ‘are (or should be) confined to 
trivial harms [yet] the criminal law should not be used to control such minor 
mischiefs’.161 
The law does not completely prohibit emissions of waste water.  This may be done, 
into sewers or into a water resource, provided that certain standards are met.  The 
standards are absolute – there is no grey area.  Enforcement of the law under such 
circumstances could effectively be exercised by means of some type of abatement notice 
                                                 
160  GN R1191 GG 20526 8 October 1999: the general authorisation in question allows discharge of waste 
or water containing waste into a water resource (which includes a river) provided that the effluent meets the 
quality standards set out in the general authorisation.  Any person who contravenes any provision of this 
authorisation is guilty of an offence and is subject to the penalty set out in section 151(2) of the National 
Water Act. 
161  Mark Findlay, Stephen Odgers & Stanley Yeo Australian Criminal Justice 2 ed (1999) at 20. 
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procedure, whereby the offender is put on notice that there is non-compliance and that 
repetition (or repetition within a certain period of time) may well lead to criminal 
prosecution.  In the event of another non-complying discharge, the inference of 
negligence on the part of the discharger would be difficult to rebut and a criminal 
prosecution would be possible on this basis. 
Alternatively, given that criminal prosecution is unlikely to result in anything other 
than a relatively small fine, the same result could be achieved by means of imposition of 
some kind of administrative penalty, liability for which could be strict.162 
 
The point that these examples are supposed to illustrate is this.  In the case of serious 
pollution offences, the facts would usually be such that proof of intention or negligence 
would not prove especially difficult.  In any event, the possibility of imposition of severe 
penalties in such cases would almost certainly present constitutional impediments to the 
use of strict criminal liability.  As far as less serious cases are concerned, where proof of 
fault may be more difficult, it is argued that there is no need to use criminal sanctions for 
such breaches. Alternatives to the criminal law can be used and strict civil liability can be 
used as the basis for the use of some alternatives.163 
On this point, Genevra Richardson has indicated that enforcement officers tend to 
reject strict liability ‘in practice’,164 deciding to prosecute only those whom they regard as 
having fault.  Nevertheless, according to Richardson, they favour the retention of strict 
liability since ‘although the field staff may themselves be convinced that fault exists, they 
are happy to avoid having to establish it at trial’.165  This argument in itself, however, 
cannot justify the use of strict liability, particularly where there is the suggested option of 
using alternative enforcement methods in borderline cases. 
Finally, other than the considerations outlined above, there is another reason for the 
rejection of strict criminal liability.  It is well expressed by Lazarus thus: 
                                                 
162  See discussion above, Chapter 8. 
163  Prinsloo v van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC). 
164  Genevra Richardson ‘Strict liability for regulatory crime: The empirical research’ (1987) Criminal LR 
295 at 303. 
165  Ibid. 
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 ‘Environmental standards, unlike most traditional crimes, present questions of degree rather than 
kind.  Murder, burglary, assault and embezzlement are simply unlawful.  There is no threshold level 
below which such conduct is acceptable.  In contrast, pollution is not unlawful per se: in many 
circumstances, some pollution is acceptable.  It is only pollution that exceeds certain prescribed 
levels that is unlawful.  But, for that very reason, the mens rea element should arguably be a more, 
not less, critical element in the prosecution of an environmental offence’.166 
 
11 Negligence v Strict Liability 
 
One of the points argued in the preceding discussion is that negligence can be used as an 
alternative to strict liability (and is explicitly provided for as the requisite fault in several 
statutes, including the National Water Act, mentioned above).  At first glance, there does 
not seem to be much difference between requiring fault in the form of negligence and 
strict liability allowing the defence of due diligence.  In both cases, the crux of the matter 
will be whether the accused has taken reasonable steps to avoid the harm (or the 
commission of the offence).  Strict liability allowing due diligence and negligence are 
not, however, the same thing.  A significant difference is that the accused is required to 
prove due diligence under a strict liability provision,167 whereas the state bears the onus, 
in proving negligence, of proving that the accused did not take the steps that were 
reasonable in the circumstances.  Although this would sometimes be more difficult for 
the prosecution to discharge, it would be difficult to foresee the South African courts 
countenancing the reverse onus aspects of the due diligence defence in cases for which 
penalties could be severe.  It might be allowed in cases where the penalties are minor 
(and where the infringements are relatively minor), but in such cases strict liability could 
be used in a non-criminal law context, as has been argued above. 
 
                                                 
166  Richard Lazarus ‘Assimilating environmental protection into legal rules and the problem with 
environmental crime’ (1994) 27 Loyola LA LR 867 at 882.  
167  This is an issue of some controversy in Canada as to the extent of the onus borne by the defendant: see 
above at 320. 
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There is strong opposition from several quarters to the use of strict criminal liability.168  
In this Chapter, it has been argued that there is no need for the use of strict criminal 
liability in the prosecution of environmental offences.  In serious offences, it ought not to 
be too difficult for the prosecution to prove fault, particularly where negligence is 
sufficient, as it often is in South African environmental statutes.  In any event, the classic 
public welfare doctrine frowns upon the use of strict liability in cases where serious 
penalties may be applied.  On the other hand, in less serious contraventions of the law, it 
has been argued that there is no compelling reason to use the criminal law and more 
imaginative use should be made of other modes of enforcement.  There is no reason why 
there cannot be strict civil liability imposed by environmental statutes where fault would 
be difficult to prove. 
South African environmental legislation currently does not make much use of strict 
criminal liability.  At the same time, South African environmental legislation is currently 
very infrequently enforced by means of criminal sanctions, despite the fact that for most 
environmental statutes this is the primary mode of enforcement that is provided for.  
Many South African environmental statutes are currently being reformed, or new 
legislation is being designed to replace legislation that is regarded as being outdated.  The 
temptation may arise, given the current weak enforcement of environmental statutes, to 
introduce strict criminal liability.  The purpose of this Chapter is to recommend that this 
temptation be resisted.  
 
                                                 
168 Burchell & Milton op cit 371-6; CR Snyman Criminal Law 2 ed (1989) at 248;  Smith & Hogan (1992) 
op cit Chapter 6 esp at 122; Findlay, Rodgers & Yeo op cit at 20; Simester & Brookbanks op cit at 128-9; 
Graham Hughes ‘Concept of crime’ in Sanford H Kadish (ed) Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice Vol 1 
(1983) at 299-300; Alan Norrie Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law 
(1993) at 94-5; Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on the Basis of Liability for Provincial Offences 
(1990) at 57-8, quoted in Stuart op cit at 244; Viljoen Commission Report on the Penal System of the 
Republic of South Africa (1976) at para 5.1.2.82. 
Chapter 10 
 




Although vicarious liability has an important role to play in delict/tort, most 
commentators are unanimous in criticising the use of vicarious criminal liability, for 
essentially the same reasons as strict liability is criticised – that an individual may be held 
liable without fault.  Nevertheless, vicarious liability is often used in public welfare 
legislation (including environmental legislation) in order to ensure that the 
implementation of such legislation is not ‘hindered by masters or employers evading their 
duties and responsibilities by hiding behind the sins and omissions of their servants or 
employees’.1 
The position as regards vicarious liability for environmental offences in the various 
countries under examination in this Chapter is as follows. 
 
1 South Africa 
 
The general common law rule is that no person is liable for the crime of another unless he 
or she authorised or procured its commission or took part in it.2  Vicarious liability, 
however, may be imposed by statute. 
In environmental legislation, the analysis in Chapters 4-6 reveals that express 
vicarious liability is provided for in a number of statutes.3  The provisions are all 
relatively similar, so it will not be necessary to examine all in detail.  Two recent 
                                                 
1  JM Burchell & JRL Milton Principles of Criminal Law  2 ed (1997) at 380. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act 36 of 1947 s 22; Hazardous 
Substances Act 15 of 1973 s 16; Dumping at Sea Control Act 73 of 1980 s 2(3); Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 85 of 1993 s 37; Water Services Act 108 of 1997 s 82(3); National Water Act 36 of 1998 s 154; 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 s 34(5)-(6). 
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provisions, somewhat different from each other, will be considered as typical examples of 
statutory vicarious liability provisions. 
In the National Water Act, section 154(a) provides whenever an act or omission by an 
employee or agent constitutes an offence in terms of the Act, and takes place with the 
express or implied permission of the employer or principal, as the case may be, the 
employer or principal, as the case may be, is, in addition to the employee or agent, liable 
to conviction for that offence.  For this provision, it is incumbent on the prosecution to 
prove express or implied permission of the employer or principal, so the vicarious 
liability imposed under this statute does require some degree of fault on the part of the 
principal.  This does not seem to be an unreasonable invasion of the rights of the 
employer or principal.  Moreover, since the accused does not bear the onus of proving 
anything (in other words, there is no reverse onus provision), the provision does not raise 
the constitutionally unacceptable spectre of conviction despite reasonable doubt. 
The vicarious liability imposed by the National Environmental Management Act, 
however, is probably also safe from constitutional challenge.  Section 34(5) provides – 
Whenever any manager, agent or employee does or omits to do an act which it had been his or her 
task to do or to refrain from doing on behalf of the employer and which would be an offence under 
any provision listed in Schedule 3 for the employer to do or omit to do, and the act or omission of 
the manager, agent or employee occurred because the employer failed to take all reasonable steps to 
prevent the act or omission in question, then the employer shall be guilty of the said offence and, 
save that no penalty other than a fine may be imposed if a conviction is based on this sub-section, 
liable on conviction to the penalty specified in the relevant law, … and proof of such act or omission 
by a manager, agent or employee shall constitute prima facie evidence that the employer is guilty 
under this subsection. 
This provision, which relates to a number of environmental offences under various 
statutes,4 provides for vicarious liability of an employer if the latter failed to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent the act or omission in question.  The accused employer will 
be required to raise evidence that he or she did take steps to prevent the offence in order 
to rebut the provision’s evidential burden, following which it will be required of the state 
to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the steps taken were not all the reasonable steps 
                                                 
4  All those listed in Schedule 3 to the Act. 
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that could have been taken.  This means that the accused employer will not be convicted 
despite there being reasonable doubt, so the right to a fair trial will not be contravened.  
Since the provision provides only for punishment of the employer by means of fine, the 
question of infringement of the right to freedom does not arise. 
Despite the probable constitutional acceptability of these provisions, there are two 
issues that should be considered concerning the imposition of vicarious criminal liability.  
The first is whether it is necessary.  The second, related to the first, is whether the 
objectives of the provisions discussed above are adequately served by the way these 
provisions have been drafted.  These issues will be considered in the evaluation of 
vicarious liability carried out after consideration of the approaches adopted in other 
countries. 
 
2 United Kingdom 
 
Under common law, vicarious liability did not apply since the guiding principle was that 
a master could not be liable for the criminal acts of his or her servant. 5  There were two 
exceptions: public nuisance and criminal libel.  Vicarious liability may, however, be 
imposed expressly or impliedly by statute.  Vicarious liability will usually be implied 
where the duty in question is one which is carried out by a servant or other person having 
responsibility. 
In terms of the ‘delegation principle’, a person may be held vicariously liable where he 
or she has delegated the performance of statutory duties to that person.  This principle 
applies in cases requiring mens rea.  In Vane v Yiannopoullos,6 the court held, on the 
facts, that there was no delegation and the accused (a restaurant licensee) was acquitted 
because he had no knowledge of the offence.  In contrast, the decision in Allen v 
Whitehead7 was that the accused, the occupier of a café, was liable because he had 
delegated managerial responsibility for the café to a manager. 
                                                 
5  R v Huggins (1730) 2 Stra 883. 
6  [1965] AC 486 (HL). 
7  [1930] 1 KB 211. 
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It has been suggested, correctly it is submitted, that the difference between the two 
cases suggests that vicarious liability will depend on the ‘real and effective delegation of 
powers and the corresponding duties, such that the activity delegated is under the 




Australia shares the English common law position, so the discussion above is applicable 
also to Australia. 
In the environmental sphere, several decisions in New South Wales have supported the 
imposition of vicarious liability for environmental offences.  Although these cases deal 
with repealed legislation,9 it is submitted that the decisions will be relevant to the current 
legislation10 due to the similarity in the relevant provisions.  Despite an early decision11 
against vicarious liability for Tier Two offences,12 in Tiger Nominees Pty Ltd v SPCC,13 
the Court of Criminal Appeal decided that vicarious liability did apply to section 16 of 
the Clean Water Act (a Tier Two offence, the current equivalent of which is section 120 
of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997), provided that the employee 
was acting within the course of his or her employment.14 
A closely related issue which has also had judicial consideration in New South Wales 
is whether vicarious liability can be imposed for the acts of independent contractors and 
their employees.  In SPCC v Australian Iron & Steel Ltd,15 the Court decided that the 
defendant company was vicariously liable for the acts of the employees of an independent 
contractor as the defendant ‘exercised or purported to exercise detailed control over the 
                                                 
8  AP Simester & Warren J Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (1998) at 181. 
9  Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989. 
10  Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997. 
11  SPCC v Blue Mountains City Council (No 2) (1991) 73 LGRA 337. 
12  These are offences for which a strict liability standard applies: see discussion above at 330. 
13  (1992) 25 NSWLR 715. 
14  At 720. 
15  (1992) 74 LGRA 387. 
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manner of the doing of the work’ by the employees of the contractor.16  In a second case, 
although the defendant was acquitted, the Court in EPA v Snowy Mountains Engineering 
Corp Ltd17 held that the acts of independent contractors would make persons who 
contract with them vicariously criminally liable, provided that the element of ‘sufficient 
control’ could be established.  Despite these decisions, however, it has been suggested 
that, in most cases, it is unlikely that the test of sufficient control will be satisfied, since 
this will usually be excluded by the terms of the contract.18 
 
4 New Zealand 
 
The common law relating to vicarious liability is the English law.  Vicarious liability may 
be established either by the ‘delegation’ principle or the ‘scope of employment principle’.    
In the case of the former, the principles outlined above apply. 
In the case of the ‘scope of employment’ principle, this applies to strict and absolute 
liability offences.  Under this principle, the principal is liable for the conduct of a person 
who has been authorised to do the type of act involved in the offence.  The reason for 
liability is that the servant’s physical acts are regarded in law as the principal’s acts.  This 
principle applies only where the servant acts within the scope of his or her employment 
and the authority conferred. 
Vicarious liability in New Zealand environmental law is imposed by the same section 
which imposes corporate liability:19 s 340 provides that where an offence is committed by 
an agent or employee, the principal is prima facie liable as if it had ‘personally committed 
the offence’.   Liability may be avoided if the principal can show that he or she did not 
know or could not reasonably have been expected to know that the offence was to be or 
                                                 
16  At 394. 
17  (1994) 83 LGERA 51. 
18  Zada Lipman & Lachlan Roots ‘Protecting the environment through criminal sanctions: The 
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW)’ (1995) 12 Environmental and Planning LJ 16 at 
24. 
19  Section 340.  See Chapter 11 §1.4. 
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had been committed or that they took reasonable steps to prevent its commission.20  In 





In short, the position in Canada is that vicarious liability is found in some legislative 
provisions, but the courts ‘are becoming increasingly resistant to the doctrine even when 
it is resorted to by a legislature’.22  The reason for this is the fact that vicarious liability 
militates against the fundamental principles of criminal law requiring an individual act 
and individual fault. 
In R v Canadian Dredge & Dock Co Ltd,23 the Canadian Supreme Court expressly 
rejected a vicarious liability alternative to the ‘directing mind and will’ theory of 
corporate liability which was confirmed in the case.  The Court, per Estey J, stated – 
‘In the criminal law, a natural person is responsible only for those crimes in which he is the primary 
actor either actually or by express or implied authorization.  There is no vicarious liability in the 
pure sense in the case of the natural person.  That is to say that the doctrine of respondeat superior is 
unknown in the criminal law where the defendant is an individual’.24 
In another important decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected vicarious criminal 
liability in R v Stevanovich,25 indicating that ‘statutory intervention’ is required to 
attach vicarious criminal liability. 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of vicarious 
criminal liability, it is unlikely that it would survive.  In two state Courts of Appeal,26 
vicarious liability provisions have been struck down as contrary to the principle of 
                                                 
20  Section 340(2)(a) and (b). 
21  Section 340(2)(c). 
22  Don Stuart Canadian Criminal Law 3 ed (1995) at 575. 
23  (1985) 45 CR (3d) 289 (CC). 
24  At 311. 
25  (1983) 36 CR (3d) 174 (Ont CA). 
26  R v Burt (1987) 60 CR (3d) 372 (Sask CA); R v Pellerin (1989) 67 CR (3d) 305 (Ont CA). 
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fundamental justice in section 7 of the Charter.27  According to Stuart, although it is 
conceivable that some forms of statutory vicarious liability could be saved as a 
reasonable limitation of Charter rights, ‘most instances of statutory vicarious liability 
are potentially unjust and should be struck down’.28 
 
6 United States of America 
 
In the United States, vicarious criminal liability can be imposed by statute, but seemingly 
not in cases where imprisonment could be imposed.29  The Supreme Court has not 
expressly considered the issue of vicarious criminal liability, but in United States v 
Park,30 the Court upheld the conviction of the president of a corporation who had a 
‘responsible relation’ to the corporate conduct and who did not show that he was 
‘powerless’ to prevent the violation.  This, however, is not true vicarious liability and 




In considering the necessity of criminal vicarious liability provisions in environmental 
legislation, it must first be pointed out that the idea under consideration here is vicarious 
liability other than that which may be imposed on a corporation for the acts of its officers 
or agents.  That is discussed in the following Chapter.  The concept relevant to this 
analysis is the liability of an employer for the acts of his or her employee, manager or 
agent.  Related to this, and something which should also be considered here, is whether 
there should be vicarious criminal liability for the acts of independent contractors and 
their employees. 
                                                 
27  This provision reads: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not 
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice’. 
28  Stuart op cit at 574. 
29  Commonwealth v Koczwara 397 Pa 575, 155 A 2d 825 (1959). 
30  421 US 658 (1975). 
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As a starting point, it should be stressed that vicarious criminal liability is universally 
rejected from a common law position due to the perceived injustice of visiting an 
employee’s sins onto the employer where the latter has not done anything wrong.  In the 
legislation that imposes vicarious liability in several jurisdictions, the type of liability 
imposed is something less than vicarious liability that applies automatically if the 
employee is acting in the course and scope of employment, because it requires some sort 
of control or absence of due diligence on the part of the employer.  In determining the 
desirability of vicarious liability and how best to provide for it in environmental 
legislation if it is desirable, it is first necessary to consider what its objective is. 
As pointed out at the beginning of this Chapter, vicarious liability is aimed at ensuring 
that the implementation of legislation is not ‘hindered by masters or employers evading 
their duties and responsibilities by hiding behind the sins and omissions of their servants 
or employees’.31  This, it is submitted, is a legitimate aim.  But can it be secured by 
means other than vicarious liability? 
In answering this question, let us return to consideration of section 34(5) of the (South 
African) National Environmental Management Act.  It has been argued that this provision 
is probably free from constitutional doubt, but it is difficult to express that view with 
certainty and the possibility of constitutional challenge cannot be absolutely discounted.  
Another comment is that the way the provision has been worded, requiring the 
prosecution to show that ‘the act or omission of the manager, agent or employee occurred 
because the employer failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the act or omission in 
question’ may present difficulties of proof for the state, thereby undermining the 
objective of the provision, which is that outlined above. 
The overall impression created by section 34(5) is that it is somewhat ‘messy’, and it 
is suggested that the same objective could be achieved by using primary liability instead 
of vicarious liability.  The Ontario (Canada) Environmental Protection Act provides in 
section 194: 
(1) Every director or officer of a corporation that engages in an activity that may result in the 
discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment contrary to this Act or the regulations 
                                                 
31  JM Burchell & JRL Milton Principles of Criminal Law  2 ed (1997) at 380. 
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has a duty to take all reasonable care to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting such 
unlawful discharge. 
(2) Every person who has a duty under subsection (1) and who fails to carry out that duty is guilty of 
an offence. 
(3) A director or officer of a corporation is liable to conviction under this section whether or not the 
corporation has been prosecuted or convicted.32 
The idea behind this provision could be adapted to cater for the vicarious liability 
scenario in section 34(5), as follows: 
(1) Where an employer is bound by any provision listed in Schedule 3, he or she has a 
duty to take all reasonable care to prevent any manager, agent or employee from 
contravening such provision. 
(2) Every person who has a duty under subsection (1) and who fails to carry out that duty 
is guilty of an offence. 
(3) An employer is liable to conviction under this section whether or not his or her 
manager, agent or employee has been prosecuted or convicted for the contravention of 
the provision referred to in subsection (1). 
It is submitted that this has the same effect as section 34(5), without some of the possible 
drawbacks of that section.  First, since it imposes primary liability there is no question of 
constitutional invalidity.  In S v Coetzee,33 Langa J indicated that the ‘Legislature is, in 
my view, fully entitles to place a positive duty on directors and to make the omission to 
discharge the duty an offence’.34  There is no reason why the same would not apply for 
employers.  The second benefit of this approach is that the onus of proof rests firmly on 
the state throughout, so there is no problem with infringement of the right to a fair trial.  
Third, it is probably easier for the state to prove contravention of the suggested provision 
rather than the requirement of showing that ‘the act or omission of the manager, agent or 
employee occurred because the employer failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the 
act or omission in question’. 
                                                 
32  See also the Ontario Water Resources Act RSO 1990 s 116 which is similar. 
33  1997 (3) SA 527 (CC). 
34  At para [46]. 
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Another benefit of the provision is that the duty can cover the acts of independent 
contractors.  It is important for environmental legislation to take into account the 
potential involvement of independent contractors in environmental harm.  Burchell and 
Milton’s comments about employers hiding behind the sins of their employees35 are 
equally apposite to the situation involving principal and agent in the independent 
contractor scenario.  In New South Wales, Australia, vicarious liability has been imposed 
in cases where there has been sufficient control by a principal over the activities of the 
independent contractors.  The provision proposed does not necessitate showing such 
control, but merely that the principal should have taken reasonable care to ensure that the 
contractor does not infringe the law. 
In conclusion, while the objective of vicarious criminal liability in the context of 
environmental legislation is sound, these objectives can be adequately achieved by means 
of primary liability.  Since there are problems with vicarious liability, the alternative of 






                                                 
35  JM Burchell & JRL Milton Principles of Criminal Law  2 ed (1997) at 380. 
Chapter 11 
 
Corporate Liability for Environmental Offences 
 
Corporate entities1 are a major focus of environmental law and discussion about 
environmental liability for a number of reasons: 
‘(a) they are major sources of environmental degradation, although by no means the only sources; 
(b) they wield extensive economic and political power; 
(c) larger corporations commit a disproportionate number of violations of the law; 
(d) corporations handle the most dangerous types of pollutants – individuals rarely have the 
resources or the need to handle heavy metals, radioactive waste or chemical residues; 
(e) the environmental degradation which corporations cause is relatively concentrates and large in 
scale compared to the activities of individuals; as a result, corporate activity is more likely to 
overwhelm natural equilibria; 
(f) corporations have very extensive resources with which to reduce pollution, resources which they 
have accumulated in part by using up clean air, clean water and other public goods; and 
(g) the localization and scale of corporate pollution typically make it easier to control than the 
equivalent amount of pollution from individuals’.2 
Although some of these factors may differ in degree in different parts of the world, 
overall they show that any approach to enforcement of environmental law needs to 
encompass an approach to dealing with corporate offenders.  Corporate criminal liability 
entails two interrelated ideas: first, the liability of the corporation itself and, second, the 
liability of the individual persons (directors, managers or similar) who are responsible for 
the activities of the corporation.  These persons will be referred to in this Chapter as 
‘controlling officers’.3 
There is one further issue that will be dealt with in this Chapter. This is the question of 
the use of environmental audit data collected by the corporation itself in criminal 
                                                 
1  In this chapter, the term ‘corporations’ will be used to denote all types of corporate entities unless the 
context suggests otherwise.   
2  Diane Saxe Environmental Offences: Corporate Responsibility and Executive Liability (1990) at 21. 
3  This is the term used in the English draft Criminal Code Bill.  See JC Smith Smith & Hogan Criminal 
Law: Cases and Materials 7 ed (1999) at 2. 
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prosecutions of the company for environmental violations.  This raises important 
questions relating to the right against self-incrimination, and is an issue that has received 
significant judicial and academic attention in the environmental sphere in other countries. 
The question of effective sanctions for corporate offenders is also one that has 
received considerable attention.  This is not discussed in this Chapter, however, but is 
covered in Chapter 12. 
Each of these issues will now be dealt with in turn. 
 
1 Corporate Liability for Environmental Offences 
 
Historically, criminal law has been concerned with the unlawful conduct of individual 
humans, and, in general, this is reflected in the current general principles of criminal law. 
However, since corporations in the modern era are capable of causing (and do in fact 
cause) significant social harm (including harm to the environment, as discussed above) it 
has been seen to become necessary to impose criminal liability on corporate bodies for 
acts ‘carried out’ by those bodies.  This has not been an easy task, since the general 
principles of criminal law do not fit easily with the concept of corporate crime.  As Alan 
Norrie correctly suggests, consideration of how the criminal law ought to deal with 
corporate criminality 
‘immediately faces two inherent problems … The first is that the criminal law was in its form 
developed to deal with individuals, not forms of social organisation such as the corporation, so that 
its categories are unadapted to the particular ways in which corporations arrange their activities.  
The second, tied to the first, is that the criminal law ideologically was never thought to be an 
appropriate mechanism for dealing with “respectable” corporate criminals.  On both a political-
ideological and a formal juridical level, corporate criminality and the standard categories of the 
criminal law do not fit.  Yet, measured in the same scales, the wrongs that corporations do are every 
bit as deadly, and often more so, than those done by individuals, and there appears to be an increase 
in social awareness of this.  The law’s responses to corporate deviance are caught in this tension 
between a need to act and a historical and ideological tendency, instantiated through the legal 
categories themselves, not to’.4 
                                                 
4  Alan Norrie Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (1993) at 85. 
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Although Norrie’s observation applies particularly to corporate crime (ie crime 
committed by the corporation), it is apposite too to the concept of imposing liability on 
controlling officers, who do not comply with society’s criminal stereotype.  Such 
liability, the liability of the ‘white collar’ criminal, is discussed later.  What is of 
immediate concern is how the law responds to offences carried out by corporate 
organisations, which Reasons has defined as – 
‘illegal acts of omission or commission engaged in by corporate organisations themselves as social 
or legal entities, or by officials or employees of the corporation acting in accordance with the 
operative goals, or standard operating procedures and cultural norms of the organisation intended to 
benefit the corporation itself’.5 
The dilemmas with using criminal law principles designed for individual wrongdoers 
to hold corporations liable have led to different approaches being adopted to corporate 
criminal liability as indicated by the ensuing comparative analysis. 
 
1.1 South Africa 
 
Criminal liability of corporations and controlling officers in South Africa is governed by 
legislation rather than common law.  Section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act6 
provides as follows – 
‘for the purpose of imposing upon a corporate body criminal liability for any offence, whether under 
any law or at common law – 
(a) any act performed, with or without a particular intent, by or on instructions or with permission, 
express or implied, given by a director or servant of that corporate body; and 
(b) the omission, with or without a particular intent, of any act which ought to have been but was not 
performed by or on instructions given by a director or servant of that corporate body, 
in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as such director or servant, or in 
furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of that corporate body, shall be deemed to have 
been performed (and with the same intent, if any) by that corporate body, or, as the case may be, to 
have been an omission (and with the same intent, if any) on the part of that corporate body’. 
                                                 
5  C Reasons ‘Crimes against the environment: Some theoretical and practical concerns’ (1991) 34 
Criminal LQ 86 at 88. 
6  Act 51 of 1977. 
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This subsection imputes the fault of its directors or servants on the corporation, rather 
than making the company vicariously liable for the crimes of its directors or servants.7  
The principal distinction between the liability imposed by s 332(1) and vicarious liability 
is that this section imposes liability in cases where the director or servant acts beyond his 
or her powers or duties but while ‘furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of’ 
the corporation.  Vicarious liability applies only to cases where the servant is acting 
within the course and scope of his or her employment. 
A feature of this provision worthy of note, when compared with the position in other 
countries discussed below, is that the acts of individual persons attributed to the 
corporation are not only those of the ‘controlling officers’ of the corporation, but include 
the acts of servants as well.  While ‘servants’ is not defined in the Act, ‘director’ is 
defined in s 332 in relation to a corporate body as ‘any person who controls or governs 
that corporate body or who is a member of a body or group of persons which controls or 
governs that corporate body or, where there is no such body or group, who is a member 
of that corporate body’.8 
Finally, it remains to consider whether section 332(1) is constitutional.9  Clearly, if it 
related to individuals it would not be, since it imputes liability to the corporation without 
giving the latter any opportunity of raising a defence.  This would probably be an 
infringement of the right to freedom in the Constitution if applied to an individual.10   
But is the situation different as regards corporations?  According to the Constitution, a 
juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the 
nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.11  Whether the fact that a 
corporation cannot be imprisoned would be material to the question of infringement of 
the right to freedom in section 12 of the Bill of Right is not clear.  What is clear, 
however, is that section 332(1) permits conviction of the corporation without fault 
                                                 
7  See JM Burchell & JRL Milton Principles of Criminal law 2 ed (1997) at 386. 
8  Section 332(10). 
9  See MP Larkin & Julia Boltar ‘Company Law’ in (1997) Annual Survey of South African Law 403 at 
435. 
10  See S v Coetzee 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC) at 551, 567-574, 592-599. 
11  Section 8(4) of Act 108 of 1996. 
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(whatever that might be in the corporate context) since imputation of the agent’s act falls 
automatically upon the corporation.  There is, therefore, a real possibility that section 
332(1) might be regarded as infringing section 12 of the Constitution if challenged.  That 
would mean that it would have to rely on the limitations clause for its salvation.  In the 
light of the fact that corporate liability could be provided for by other means (see the 
proposal mooted below),12 it is quite possible that this section could fail the limitations 
test and consequently be declared invalid. 
 
1.2 United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, the position is similar to that in South Africa.  A corporation is 
liable on the basis of an act in the corporation’s business by those officers who control 
the affairs of the corporation (‘controlling officers’) and the intention with which the act 
was done.  The act and the intention are deemed to be the act and intention of the 
company itself.13  This is different from vicarious liability, where the corporation is not 
deemed to have committed the act but is held liable for the acts of its employee.  To look 
at the situation somewhat differently, the controlling officer is regarded as being the 
company for purposes of criminal liability.  This is known as the ‘identification’ or ‘alter 
ego’ theory.14 
Probably the most difficult matter to establish for purposes of corporate criminal 
liability is which officers’ acts can be deemed to be the acts of the corporation itself.   
The test is whether the person who did the relevant acts is the ‘directing mind and will of 
the company’.15  If so, then the corporation will be liable for his or her acts.  According to 
                                                 
12  §1.7 (infra). 
13  Smith op cit at 275. 
14  But, cf Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL) at 171, who claims that the 
phrase ‘alter ego’ is misleading in this context because the individual is not ‘alter’, but is identified with the 
company. 
15  Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 at 713 per Viscount Haldane 
LC. 
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Smith, if he or she ‘is not, there may be a question whether the company should 
nevertheless be held liable for them’.16 
 The reason for this is that, if corporate liability was reserved for situations where an 
act or decision was made by a member of the ‘higher management’ of the corporation or 
by a director identified as the ‘guiding will’ of the corporation, then the corporation could 
conceivably avoid liability when employees did something illegal after having been 
forbidden to do so by a member of the higher management.17  Consequently, what is 
needed is some sort of ‘test’ in order to determine when the corporation will be liable for 
acts carried out by persons who do not qualify as the ‘directing mind and will’ of the 
corporation. 
In the well-known and until recently leading case of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v 
Nattrass,18 the House of Lords decided that the manager of one particular store in a large 
chain of stores was not a person of sufficiently high stature within the corporate structure 
to be identified as the company for the purpose of criminal liability in the case in 
question.  It would appear as though many subsequent courts have applied Tesco 
relatively rigidly –as excluding managers from qualifying as the ‘directing mind and will’ 
of the corporation.19 
The Tesco ‘precedent’ has been refined in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia 
Ltd v Securities Commission,20 where the Privy Council held that, in casu, the acts of the 
chief investment officer and a senior portfolio manager of an investment company, 
unknown to the board of directors or managing director, were to be attributed to the 
company.  The Court was at pains to point out, however, that- 
‘… their Lordships would wish to guard themselves against being understood to mean that whenever 
a servant of a company has authority to do an act on its behalf, knowledge of that act will for all 
purposes be attributed to the company.  It is a question of construction in each case as to whether the 
                                                 
16  Smith op cit at 275. 
17  See In Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No 2) [1995] 1 AC 456 at 465. 
18  (Supra). 
19  Matthew Goode ‘Corporate criminal liability’ in Neil Gunningham, Jennifer Norberry & Sandra 
McKillop Environmental Crime (1995) 97 at 100. 
20  [1995] 3 WLR 413 (PC). 
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particular rule requires that the knowledge that an act has been done, or the state of mind with which 
it was done, should be attributed to the company’.21   
There is no ‘general rule’, then, but the issue will be resolved on the basis of the 
individual circumstances (including the construction of the relevant statute, if relevant) of 
each case.  There must still be some doubt, however, as to whether this decision has 




The Australian common law on the matter is the English common law.  Perceived 
shortcomings in the common law position, as discussed above when considering the 
English law, has led to a plethora of statutory provisions designed to overcome these 
shortcomings, but in an inconsistent manner.  In response to this, the Gibbs Committee22 
came to the conclusion that – 
‘the common law, largely because of the emergence of large corporations in modern times, does not 
make appropriate provision for the criminal liability of corporations.  Further, the change required in 
the law to accommodate this development is of such dimensions that legislative action, rather than 
reliance on evolution of the common law, is required’. 
Environmental legislation often provides for corporate liability.  Two examples will be 
examined by illustration.  In New South Wales, s 169 (4) of the Protection of the 
Environment Operations Act 1997 provides that, without limiting any other law or 
practice regarding the admissibility of evidence, evidence that an officer, employee or 
agent of a corporation (while acting in his or her capacity as such) had, at any particular 
time, a particular intention, is evidence that the corporation had that intention.  Note that 
this provision refers to any ‘employee’ of the corporation which means that the 
attribution to the corporation of a person’s mens rea is not confined to the ‘directing mind 
and will’ of the corporation. 
                                                 
21  At 423E-F  (per Lord Hoffmann). 
22  Review of Commonwealth General Law Interim Report: Principles of Criminal Responsibility and 
Other Matters (1990) at 305. 
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Similarly, the Victorian Environmental Protection Act of 1970 provides that, when in 
any proceedings under the Act it is necessary to establish the intention of a corporation, it 
is sufficient to show that a servant or agent of the corporation had that intention.23 
 
1.4 New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, as in Australia, the common law position is as in England.  The leading 
English case of Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission,24 
is a New Zealand case that was taken on appeal to the Privy Council.  The principles set 
out in Meridian, therefore, apply in the New Zealand common law. 
In the Resource Management Act, New Zealand’s primary environmental legislation, 
section 340 provides that where an offence is committed by an agent or employee, the 
corporation is prima facie liable as if it had ‘personally committed the offence’.   Liability 
may be avoided if the corporation is able to show that the director or persons involved in 
the management of the corporation did not know or could not reasonably have been 
expected to know that the offence was to be or had been committed or that they took 
reasonable steps to prevent its commission.25  In addition, the defendant must have taken 
all reasonable steps to remedy the effects of the offence.26  It has been held that the 
corporation is liable for an employee’s offence even where such employee cannot be said 




The leading Canadian case on corporate liability is R v Canadian Dredge & Dock Co 
Ltd.28 This case is authority for the following main principles of corporate liability. First, 
                                                 
23  Section 66B(2). 
24  (Supra). 
25  Section 340(2)(a) and (b). 
26  Section 340(2)(c). 
27  Auckland Regional Council v Bitumix Ltd (1993) 1B ELRNZ 57. 
28  (1985) 19 DLR (4th) 314, 19 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC). 
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the mental state of servants and agents of the corporation will not be attributed to the 
corporation unless the individual in question ‘represents the de facto directing mind, will, 
center, brain area or ego’ of the corporation.29  In casu, the presidents, vice-presidents and 
general managers were held to be directing minds.  It has been held that employees at a 
lower level without a measure of discretion and control are not directing minds,30 
although various types of employees have been held to be directing minds: 
 director and superintendent;31 
 vice-president of sales;32 
 experienced company salesman;33 
 office supervisor and auditor;34 and 
 drilling foreman.35 
This approach is similar to the English approach in Tesco (or, at least, to what has been 
perceived to be the Tesco approach) but the line separating ‘directing minds’ from lower-
level employees has often been drawn lower down the corporate hierarchy.36  A 1993 
Supreme Court case,37 however, has moved the line back towards higher levels, albeit in 
a civil context.  The Court was concerned with whether a negligent tug captain, 
responsible for a collision, was the directing mind of the company.  The captain in 
question was the master of the flotilla of four tugs, a ‘trouble-shooter’ for the other tugs 
and was subject to little control by his superiors, but the Court found that he was not a 
directing mind.  According to Iacobucci J, delivering the Court’s judgment – 
                                                 
29  At 324. 
30  R v Kimco Steel Sales Ltd (1988) 43 CCC (3d) 104 (Ont Dist Ct).  See Saxe op cit at 101. 
31  R v JJ Beamish Construction Co Ltd (1966) 59 DLR (2d) 6. 
32  R v St Lawrence Corporation Ltd (1969) 5 DLR (3d) 263. 
33  R v PG Marketplace (1979) 51 CCC (2d) 185 (BCCA). 
34  R v Spot Supermarket Inc (1979) 50 CCC (2d) 239 (Que CA). 
35  R v Panarctic Oils Ltd [1983] NWTR 47. 
36  Goode op cit at 100. 
37  The “Rhone”v The “Peter AB Widener”[1993] 1 SCR 497. 
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‘The key factor which distinguishes directing minds from normal employees is the capacity to 
exercise decision making authority on matters of corporate policy, rather than merely give effect to 
such policy on an operational basis whether at head office or across he sea’.38 
As far as mens rea is concerned, the important point here is the classification of 
offences made in the case of R v Sault Ste. Marie39.  If the offence is one for which mens 
rea is necessary (a so-called ‘true crime’), the corporation will be regarded as having 
mens rea if – 
(a) any of the corporation’s directing minds committed the offence deliberately or 
recklessly; and 
(b) that individual was acting 
(i) within the field of responsibility assigned to him or her, and 
(ii) by design or result, at least partly for the benefit of the corporation.40 
In strict liability offences, although mens rea is not an element of the offence, it is 
relevant to a possible defence since a corporation may avoid liability if it can be shown 
that a directing mind reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which would render 
the act or omission innocent, or had used all due diligence to prevent the offence.41  Most 
environmental offences in Canada are strict liability offences.42 
In the case of absolute liability offences, corporate liability arises without proof of 
mens rea,43 and is primary (as opposed to vicarious), arising as a result of the servant’s 
act being attributed to the corporation. 
 
                                                 
38  At 526. 
39  (1978) 85 DLR (3d) 161, discussed in the previous Chapter. 
40  Canadian Dredge & Dock Co Ltd (supra). 
41  See discussion in previous Chapter. 
42  Saxe op cit at 101. 
43  Canadian Dredge & Dock Co Ltd (supra) at 322. 
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1.6 United States of America 
 
Corporate liability in the USA common law is based on the imputation of agents’ conduct 
to a corporation, which is justified usually by the doctrine of respondeat superior.44  This 
doctrine has three requirements for corporate liability. 
First, a corporate agent must have committed an actus reus with mens rea, which can 
be imputed to the corporation regardless of the rank, status or position of the agent in the 
corporation.45  In addition to the respondeat superior doctrine, mens rea can be shown ‘on 
the basis of the “collective knowledge” of the employees as a group, even though no 
single employee possessed sufficient information to know that the crime was being 
committed’.46  In the Bank of New England case, the Court took into account the 
complexities of modern corporate operations in upholding the follwing jury construction 
concerning knowledge: 
‘You have to look at the bank as an institution.  As such, its knowledge is the sum of 
the knowledge of all the employees.  That is, the bank’s knowledge is the totaility of what 
all of the employees know within the scope of their employment’.47 
Second, the agent must have acted within the scope of his or her employment,48 which 
includes any act that ‘occurred while the offending employee was carrying out a job-
                                                 
44  New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v United States 212 US 481 at 494-5 (1909), 
‘Developments in the law – Corporate crime: Regulating corporate behaviour through criminal sanctions’ 
(1979) 92 Harvard LR 1227 at 1247 (hereafter referred to as ‘Developments’); VS Khanna ‘Corporate 
criminal liability: What purpose does it serve?’ (1996) 109 Harvard LR 1477 at 1489. 
45  United States v Basic Constr Co 711 F 2d 570 (4th Cir 1983) at 573; United States v Koppers Co 652 F 
2d 290 (2d Cir 1981) at 298; Developments at 1247-8. 
46  Developments at 1248; see United States v Farm & Home Savings Association 932 F 2d 1256 (8th Cir 
1991) at 1259; United States v Penagaricano-Soler 911 F 2d 833 (1st Cir 1990) at 843; United States v 
Bank of New England NA 821 F 2d 844 (1st Cir 1987) at 855.   
47  United States v Bank of New England NA (supra) at 855 
48  New York Cent. & Hudson River RR v United States (supra) at 491-5; United States v Route 2, Box 472 
60 F 3d 1523 (11th Cir 1995) at 1527; United States v Bank of New England NA 821 F 2d 844 (1st Cir 1987) 
at 856; United States v Automated Medical Labs Inc 770 F 2d 399 (4th Cir 1985) at 406. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions       361 




related activity’.49  In Domar Ocean Transport Ltd v Independent Ref Co,50 the Court 
stated that – 
‘Acts committed by a servant are considered within the scope of employment when they are so 
closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to 
it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the 
objectives of employment’. 
Corporations have been held to be liable even in cases where they have implemented 
policies expressly forbidding the behaviour.51 
The third requirement is that the agent must have intended to benefit the corporation.52  
This is satisfied even if the employee did not act with the exclusive purpose of benefiting 
the corporation,53 and the corporation does not have, in fact, to receive the benefits, since 
the mere intention to bestow a benefit suffices.54 
Certain states have adopted statutory provisions requiring criminal acts to be 
committed by agents high up in the managerial structure (as opposed to any agent) for 
such acts to be imputed to the corporation.55  Also imposing a stricter standard than the 
common law is the Model Penal Code,56 which provides that the commission of the 
offence be ‘authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the 
board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation 
within the scope of his office or employment’.57  Moreover, a corporation can raise the 
                                                 
49  Developments at 1250. 
50  783 F 2d 1185 (5th Cir 1986) at 1190. 
51  United States v Portac Inc 869 F 2d 1288 (9th Cir 1989) at 1293; United States v Automated Medical 
Labs Inc (supra) at 407; United States v Basic Constr Co (supra) at 573. 
52  United States v 7326 Hwy 45 North 965 F 2d 311 (7th Cir 1992) at 316; United States v Basic Constr Co 
(supra) at 573; Developments at 1250. 
53  United States v American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp 433 F 2d 174 at 204 (3d Cir 1970) cert 
denied 401 US 94 (1971); United States v Gold 743 F 2d 800 (11th Cir 1984) at 822-3; United States v 
Automated Medical Labs Inc (supra) at 407. 
54  United States v Automated Medical Labs Inc (supra) at 407; Developments at 1250. 
55  See examples cited in Cynthia E Carrasco & Michael K Dupee ‘Corporate criminal liability’ (1999) 36 
American Criminal LR 445 at 450.  
56  (1962). 
57  § 2.07(1)(c). 
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defence that supervisory agents58 with power over the area in which the offence took 
place acted with due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.59  It has been 
suggested that the existence of a corporate environmental compliance programme should 
serve as a defence to corporate liability under environmental statutes, which would serve 
to mitigate some of the harshness of the current approach, but this is merely a suggestion, 




The above analysis reveals that there is a broad similarity in the approach to corporate 
liability in the jurisdictions analysed.  In South Africa, the United Kingdom, Australia 
and New Zealand, the approaches are similar in that the identification theory of corporate 
liability applies – the act and mens rea of an agent is imputed to the corporation.  Where 
there are differences is in determining where to draw the line between those members of 
the corporation whose acts will be imputed to the corporation and those whose will not, 
and this certainly appears to be an issue which is somewhat vexing in all the jurisdictions 
studied. 
The approaches in Canada and the United States are somewhat more complex than 
those in the other countries considered.  As far as offences involving mens rea are 
concerned, both systems require three elements: (i) mens rea; (ii) that the agent was 
acting in the course and scope of his or her employment or field of responsibility and (iii) 
that he or she was acting for the benefit of the corporation. 
In assessing what the best approach should be for corporate liability for environmental 
offences, in the light of the above analysis, the first question that requires consideration is 
                                                 
58  Defined by the Code as ‘having duties of such responsibility that [their] conduct may be fairly assumed 
to represent the policy of the corporation’: § 2.07(4)(c). 
59  Model Penal Code § 2.07(5). 
60  Charles J Walsh & Alissa Pyrich ‘Corporate compliance programs as a defense to criminal liability: Can 
a corporation save its soul?’ (1995) 47 Rutgers LR 605. 
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whether there is a need for corporate liability at all.61  If not, then the matter need be 
taken no further and attention should be diverted to the issue of individual liability.  If, on 
the other hand, corporate liability is seen to be necessary, the second question is how best 
to make provision for it. 
First, then, do we need corporate criminal liability?  In Chapter 2, when considering 
the aims of environmental criminal law, it was suggested that, other than for those 
environmental offences which give rise to society’s moral condemnation or disapproval, 
and for which retribution may be regarded as a legitimate justification for invoking the 
criminal law, criminal sanctions are used in response to all other environmental offences 
as a deterrent.62  Most ‘regulatory’ type environmental offences would not attract societal 
condemnation or disapproval, and these offences would be justified only on the basis of 
deterrence.  It would only be a handful of serious offences for which retribution would be 
applicable. 
With this in mind, it is instructive to consider what various commentators have 
thought about the necessity for corporate criminal law.  First, there are some critics of 
corporate criminal liability who feel that the institution is unnecessary.63  This approach 
is founded on the premise that punishing corporations is done for purposes of deterrence 
and that this can be done equally well (if not better) by means of civil measures. 
Khanna asks what purpose is served by corporate criminal liability and answers 
‘almost none’.64  He suggests that ‘corporate criminal liability would only be socially 
desirable in the rarest of circumstances’.65  In other circumstances, because of the costs 
involved in using criminal law (the ‘higher sanctioning costs’ and the costs created by 
                                                 
61  See MP Larkin & Julia Boltar ‘Company Law’ in (1997) Annual Survey of South African Law 403 at 
435 (discussion of S v Coetzee 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC)). 
62  See above, at 18. 
63  VS Khanna ‘’ Corporate criminal liability: What purpose does it serve?’ (1996) 109 Harvard LR 1477;  
Daniel R Fischel & Alan O Sykes ‘Corporate crime’ (1996) 25 Jnl of. Legal Studies 319. 
64  Khanna op cit at 1534. 
65  Khanna op cit at 1533. 
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criminal procedural protection), civil liability alternatives should be used, which will 
have the same overall deterrent effect.66 
Fischel and Sykes posit that economic arguments for corporate liability can be 
adequately served by civil liability measures and that criminal liability, which in the 
United States can be (and often is) imposed on top of civil penalties, is ‘not merely 
redundant but often harmful’.67  The effect of corporate criminal liability is 
overdeterrence, which has socially harmful repercussions.  For example, 
‘… even in cases of clear injury, the doctrine of corporate criminal liability still serves no purpose.  
The Exxon Valdez oil spill, for example, caused substantial harm.  But nothing was gained by 
prosecuting Exxon criminally.  Civil penalties against Exxon levied through the tort system were 
sufficient to achieve optimal deterrence.  Nor was there any basis of the punitive damage award 
since there was no underdetection problem.  The probability that a large oil spill will be detected is 
one.  The imposition of additional criminal penalties, coupled with punitive damage awards, will 
overdeter and distort the incentives to engage in the socially optimal level of oil shipping in the 
future’.68 
The premise of the authors very much depends on the existence of an operational and 
adequate civil penalties regime, which is the case in the United States, but where, as in 
South Africa, alternatives to the criminal sanction are few and far between, their thesis 
has less resonance. 
Fisse,69 on the other hand, argues that deterrence is not the only goal of corporate 
liability and that retribution is also relevant – 
‘… retributive justice as fairness, through corporate criminal cost internalization, seems not only 
legitimate but also significant as a general justification for punishing corporations.  Indeed, 
retributive justice as fairness emerges as a basic foundation of corporate criminal law, free from the 
flaws that make retribution so dubious a platform in individual criminal law’.70 
                                                 
66  Ibid. 
67  Fischel & Sykes op cit at 322. 
68  Fischel & Sykes op cit at 342-3 (footnotes omitted). 
69  Brent Fisse ‘Reconstructing corporate criminal law: Deterrence, retribution, fault, and sanctions’ (1983) 
56 Southern California LR 1141. 
70  Fisse op cit at 1183.  ‘Justice as fairness’ posits the idea that one who benefits from a criminal act at 
society’s expense must make restitution for the social losses that he or she brought about: Fisse at 1218 
n371. 
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Hence, he argues, there is a need for both criminal and civil corporate liability. 
Friedman71 is in agreement concerning the retributive justification for criminal liability 
of corporations, but he takes the argument further.  Even in the corporate context, he 
argues, moral condemnation is a valid aim of the criminal law.72  Moreover, criminal law 
is also concerned with expressive retribution, by which he means that the moral 
condemnation attached to the criminal sanction has reference to the valuation of the 
goods or persons affected by the crime.  In the absence of criminal liability, civil liability 
will be seen simply as a cost of doing business and the proper valuation of the goods or 
persons concerned would not be attested to.  If the corporation were only subject to civil 
liability, the effect would be that the corporation would be, in effect, purchasing 
exemption from moral condemnation and this would dilute the overall impact of criminal 
law – 
‘The value of human health and safety, for example, would be regarded as less sacrosanct when 
denied by corporations as opposed to individuals.  Thus corporate exemption from criminal liability 
would tend to undermine the condemnatory effect of criminal liability on individuals in respect to 
similar conduct - and, ultimately, to diminish the moral authority of the criminal law as a guide to 
rational behavior’.73 
In similar vein, certainly from a practical perspective if not in theory, Smith, in 
pondering the purpose of corporate criminal liability, suggests that ‘the conviction of the 
company has an effect on the public mind that the conviction of individual officers does 
not’.74  Moreover, he proposes that victims of corporate wrongdoing may have a 
‘powerful urge’ that the corporation be punished, pointing out that ‘[t]he satisfaction of 
the demand for retribution by those injured by crime has long been recognised as a proper 
ground for the imposition of punishment.75 
                                                 
71  Lawrence Friedman ‘In defense of corporate criminal liability’ (2000) 23 Harvard Jnl of Law & Public 
Policy 833. 
72  Friedman op cit at 834. 
73  Friedman op cit at 858. 
74  Smith op cit at 283.  See also Nicholas Reville ‘Corporate manslaughter revisited’ (1993) 1 
International Jnl of Regulatory Law and Practice 245 at 252, who says, ‘Relatives may well be more 
concerned that corporate, rather than individual human, liability should be established’. 
75  Smith ibid. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions       366 




The notion of public moral condemnation of corporate wrongdoing seems to be an 
important consideration that is ignored by opponents of corporate criminal liability.  But, 
it is submitted, there are other reasons, particularly in the South African context, why 
corporate liability is necessary.  The reasons in question relate to the suitability of 
alternatives to corporate liability. 
The two alternatives would appear to be individual corporate officer liability and 
utilisation of civil (or administrative) instruments.  As far as the former is concerned, 
there is the real practical problem that a criminal system based on personal fault often has 
difficulties identifying and successfully prosecuting the individual persons responsible.  
Moreover, argues Heine, ‘dependence of the criminal system upon personal fault, means 
that the corporation escapes other indirect sanctions – such as damage to corporate image, 
which might have operated to influence future conduct’.76  The notion of influence on 
future corporate conduct is an important one, which may be undermined by focusing 
exclusively on individual officer liability.  Punishment of the corporation stimulates 
reform of the corporation’s practice and procedures, whereas punishment of the corporate 
officer has the effect of terminating liability once he or she has been dealt with due to the 
‘organisational divorce of responsibility for past offences from responsibility for future 
compliance’.77  Once the officer has been punished, in other words, there is no incentive 
for the corporation to reform its practice.78 
Then, as far as the alternative of civil penalties is concerned, opponents of corporate 
criminal liability like Khanna, Fischel and Sykes rely on the existence of a system of civil 
penalties that is capable of imposing heavy punitive sanctions as a viable alternative to 
criminal liability.  This may well be true in the United States, where the system of civil 
penalties is well-developed and the penalties themselves can be very severe.  In South 
Africa, on the other hand, there is currently no adequate alternative to criminal sanctions.  
                                                 
76  Günther Heine ‘Environment protection and criminal law’ in Owen Lomas (ed) Frontiers of 
Environmental Law (1991) 75 at 89. 
77  Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite ‘The allocation of responsibility for corporate crime: Individualism, 
collectivism and accountability’ (1988) 11 Sydney LR 468 at 497. 
78  See Nicola Pain ‘Criminal law and environment protection – Overview of issues and themes’ in Neil 
Gunningham, Jennifer Norberry & Sandra McKillop Environmental Crime (1995) 19 at 26. 
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It has been argued that alternative measures, such as administrative monetary penalties, 
ought to be used as an alternative to criminal sanctions, but such measures would not be 
suitable for the type of serious offence for which the public would want to see the 
imposition of criminal penalties.  It is extremely unlikely that a system of civil penalties 
involving the heavy sanctions prevalent in the United States would find favour here.  
What this means, then, is that in South Africa the only option for the imposition of 
penalties on corporations for serious offences is the criminal sanction. 
Having established the necessity of corporate criminal liability in the South African 
context, that leads to the question of how best to provide for it.  The problem faced by 
most approaches to corporate liability considered above is distinguishing between those 
officers or servants of the corporation whose actions should be imputed to the 
corporation, and those whose should not.  If the line is drawn too high, the approach will 
suffer from the fact that, in many corporations, higher-level officers are far removed from 
the ‘scene of the crime’, so to speak.  If, on the other hand, the line is drawn too low, the 
results may be unjust.  As Laufer reflects, ‘[o]ne is hard pressed to find something 
genuine about “corporate fault” where a rogue employee, under the scope of her 
authority, acts to benefit the corporation by violating express corporate policy, no less the 
criminal law’.79 
In the approach adopted by the South African Criminal Procedure Act, any servant’s 
offence may be attributed to the corporation, which means that the provision suffers from 
the problem observed by Laufer.  Also, from a theoretical perspective, section 332(1) 
does not adequately reflect the principle of corporate blameworthiness.  A further 
problem, which could be fatal to section 332(1), is that there is a possibility that the 
section might fall foul of the Constitution. 
A compelling approach to the issue of corporate criminal liability, free of the problems 
observed above, is proposed by Fisse,80 with reference to the Australian Ozone Protection 
                                                 
79  William Laufer ‘Corporate bodies and guilty minds’ (1994) 43 Emory LJ  648 at 663-4. 
80  Brent Fisse ‘Corporate criminal responsibility’ (1991) 15 Criminal LJ 166 at 173-4. 
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Act.81  Fisse proposes the adoption of section 65(2) of the Ozone Protection Act, which 
provides – 
Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a body corporate by a director, servant or agent of the body 
corporate within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority shall be taken, for the purposes 
of a prosecution for an offence against this Act, to have been engaged in also by the body corporate 
unless the body corporate establishes that the body corporate took reasonable precautions and 
exercised due diligence to avoid the conduct. 
He goes further to suggest that a better approach is to refine this section by adopting the 
‘following two-condition test of corporate criminal responsibility’: 
‘(1) the external elements of the offence have been committed by a person for whose conduct the 
corporate defendant is vicariously responsible; and 
(2) the corporation has been at fault in one or other of the following ways: 
(a) by having a policy that expressly or impliedly authorises or permits the commission of the 
offence or an offence of the same type; 
(b) by failing to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due precautions to prevent the 
commission of the offence or an offence of the same type; 
(c) by having a policy of failing to comply with a reactive duty to take preventive measures in 
response to having committed the external elements of the offence; or 
(d) by failing to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due diligence to comply with a 
reactive duty to take preventive measures in response to having committed the external 
elements of the offence’.82 
Following Fisse’s advice gives us a provision that could look like this: 
Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a corporation by a director, servant or agent of the corporation 
within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority shall be deemed, for the purposes of a 
prosecution for an offence against this Act, to have been engaged in also by the corporation if the 
State can prove corporate mens rea in any of the following forms: 
(a) the corporation has a policy that expressly or impliedly authorises or permits the commission 
of the offence or an offence of the same type; 
(b) the corporation failed to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due precautions to prevent 
the commission of the offence or an offence of the same type; 
(c) the corporation has a policy of failing to comply with a reactive duty to take preventive 
measures in response to having committed the external elements of the offence; or 
                                                 
81  1989 (Cth). 
82  Fisse op cit at 173-4. 
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(d) the corporation failed to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due diligence to comply 
with a reactive duty to take preventive measures in response to having committed the external 
elements of the offence. 
The advantages of this approach are several: 
 It allows for corporate liability arising from the conduct of a director, agent or 
servant, obviating the need to draw a line between those officers whose 
conduct can render the corporation liable and those who cannot. 
 At the same time, it allows the corporation to avoid liability if it has preventive 
policies in place, and in fact complies with those policies.  This reduces the 
risk of a corporation being subjected to criminal liability by a rogue employee.  
This also reduces the risk of the provision falling foul of section 12 of the 
Constitution (the right to freedom). 
 From a theoretical perspective, it reflects the principle of corporate 
blameworthiness, in that corporate policy is the corporate equivalent of 
intention.83 
A further observation is that the Ozone Protection Act places the onus on the 
defendant to prove due diligence, whereas the suggested provision requires proof of all 
the necessary elements by the prosecution.  This is to ensure that the provision would not 
fall foul of the South African Constitution.  It may be felt that the onus on the state 
imposed by this provision is too onerous, yet, as is frequently the case with individual 
mens rea, the courts will be fully justified in inferring the necessary mens rea from the 
facts of the case in question.  It would be possible, however, to adjust the situation as 
regards onus slightly by imposing an evidential burden to raise evidence showing the 
absence of corporate mens rea (by showing the existence of the necessary policy, for 
example).  This would make it less onerous for the state to prove mens rea while still 
remaining within the bounds of the Constitution. 
Having thus dealt with corporate liability, attention now turns to the liability of 
controlling officers. 
 
                                                 
83  Fisse op cit at 173 n7. 
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2 Liability of controlling officers 
 
Controlling officers may be criminally liable in four different ways.84  First and most 
obvious, the officer may be liable as a principal to the offence, where the officer commits 
the unlawful act personally.  This may arise in circumstances where the officer has 
influence and control over an activity and fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the 
occurrence of the offence. Second, the officer may be liable as an accomplice if he or she 
is a party to the offence committed by the corporation or another person, for example, in 
the case of an officer assisting a subordinate to break the law.  Similarly, the third type of 
liability would arise from conspiracy to commit the offence.  For example, members of a 
board of directors who voted to carry out illegal activities would qualify. 
The fourth way in which officers could be liable, and the manner which concerns us 
most here, is by means of statutory provisions which impose liability on corporate 
officers.  The reason for these provisions, as Lipman says, is that – 
‘Corporate policy is determined by an organised collectivity of individuals.  Thus any effective 
response to environmental problems must target the decision dynamics within the corporation.  For 
this reason, in most jurisdictions, legislation imposing personal criminal liability on corporate 
officials has been introduced to complement sanctions against the corporations themselves’. 
The situation as regards corporate officer liability for environmental offences in various 
jurisdictions is as follows: 
 
2.1 South Africa 
 
As far as directors’ liability is concerned, the common law provides for a director to be 
liable for the crime committed by another director if he or she participated in the other 
director’s crime or on the basis of vicarious liability or agency.85  Section 332(5) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, however, provided for vicarious liability of a director or servant 
of a corporation for a crime by that corporation (which means, in effect, the crime of 
another director or servant), unless he or she could show that he or she did not take part in 
                                                 
84  Saxe op cit at 102-3. 
85  Burchell & Milton op cit at 387. 
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that crime and that he or she could not have prevented it.  This provision, however, was 
declared unconstitutional and consequently invalid in S v Coetzee.86  This means that the 
issue of director’s liability is now governed by the common law position outlined above. 
The most important provision in South African environmental legislation that provides 
for vicarious liability of controlling officers of corporations is s 34(7) of the National 
Environmental Management Act.  This provision is important since it applies to 
prosecution of any of the offences listed in Schedule 3 of the Act.87   It provides – 
Any person who is or was a director of a firm at the time of the commission by that firm of an 
offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 shall himself or herself be guilty of the said offence 
and liable on conviction to the penalty specified in the relevant law, … if the offence in question 
resulted from the failure of the director to take all reasonable steps that were necessary under the 
circumstances to prevent the commission of the offence: Provided that proof of the said offence by 
the firm shall constitute prima facie evidence that the director is guilty under this subsection. 
In a prosecution under this section, the state would need to show that the ‘firm’88 
committed the offence and the effect of the proviso would be to place an evidential 
burden on the accused director89 of raising evidence that the offence did not result from 
the failure of the director to take all reasonable steps that were necessary under the 
circumstances to prevent the commission of the offence.  If there were evidence of this, it 
would be upon the state to discharge the burden, beyond reasonable doubt, of proving 
that the offence did result from the director’s failure to take reasonable steps. 
This provision is similar to section 34(5) of the same Act, which was discussed in the 
previous Chapter.  For the same reasons set out there, it is suggested that this provision, 
although unlikely to run the risk of constitutional invalidity due to the use of the 
evidential burden rather than a reverse onus, is somewhat clumsy and may well present 
problems of proof for the prosecution in showing that the offence ‘resulted from’ the 
director’s failure to take the requisite steps. 
                                                 
86  1997 (3) SA 527 (CC).  See full discussion of this case in Chapter 3 (supra). 
87  See above at 192-4. 
88  A body incorporated by or in terms of any law as well as a partnership: s 37(9). 
89  A member of the board, executive committee, or other managing body of a corporate body and, in the 
case of a close corporation, a member of that close corporation or in the case of a partnership, a member of 
that partnership: s 37(9). 
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Whether it is possible to provide for a better alternative to section 34(7) is discussed 
below.90 
 
2.2 United Kingdom 
 
There is no common law position on the liability of controlling officers which means that, 
in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, it would be necessary to prove 
liability on the basis of general principles of criminal law relating to actus reus and mens 
rea.  There are, however, statutory provisions providing for controlling officer liability in 
cases where the corporation has committed an offence through the consent, connivance or 
neglect of the officer concerned.91 
Section 157 of the Environmental Protection Act of 1990, for example,92 provides – 
Where an offence under any provision of this Act committed by a body corporate is proved to have 
been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable to any neglect on the 
part of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate or a person 
who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of 
that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
In Huckerby v Elliott,93 the Court was concerned with the meaning of the terms 
‘consent’ and ‘connivance’.  The Court held that ‘consent’ arises ‘where a director 
consents to the commission of an offence by his company, [and] he is well aware of what 
is going on and agreed to it’.  ‘Connivance’ involves the following: - ‘(the director) 
connives at the offence committed by the company, he is equally aware of what is going 
                                                 
90  § 2.7 (infra). 
91  For example, Water Industry Act 1991 s 210; Control of Pollution Act 1974 s 87; Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 s 157; Water Resources Act 1991 s 217; Radioactive Substances Act 1993 s 36.  See 
JC Smith & Brian Hogan Criminal Law 7 ed (1992) at 185; Penny Jewkes ‘The personal liability of 
directors in the United Kingdom for environmental offences’ (1996) 4 Environmental Liability 87 at 88.  
See also Andrew Waite ‘Criminal and civil liability of company directors’ (1991) 3 Land Management and 
Environmental Law Report 74. 
92  The wording of s 217(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991 is almost identical. 
93  [1970] 1 All ER 189 at 194. 
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on but his agreement is tacit, not actively encouraging what happens but letting it 
continue and saying nothing about it’. 
It has been suggested that the terms ‘consent’ and ‘connivance’ do not significantly 
add to the common law, since a corporate officer who consents or connives at the 
commission of an offence would be liable as a secondary party (accomplice).94  The 
reference to ‘neglect’, however, imposes wider liability in making an officer liable for his 




Corporate officer liability is often provided by statute.  For example, section 169 of the 
Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (New South Wales) provides- 
(1) If a corporation contravenes, whether by act or omission, any provision of this Act or the 
regulations, each person who is a director of the corporation or who is concerned in the 
management of the corporation is taken to have contravened the same provision, unless the 
person satisfies the court that: 
(a)  the corporation contravened the provision without the knowledge actual, imputed or 
constructive of the person, or 
(b)  the person was not in a position to influence the conduct of the corporation in relation to its 
contravention of the provision, or 
(c)  the person, if in such a position, used all due diligence to prevent the contravention by the 
corporation. 
(2) A person may be proceeded against and convicted under a provision pursuant to this section 
whether or not the corporation has been proceeded against or been convicted under that 
provision. 
(3) Nothing in this section affects any liability imposed on a corporation for an offence committed 
by the corporation against this Act or the regulations. 
(4) Without limiting any other law or practice regarding the admissibility of evidence, evidence that 
an officer, employee or agent of a corporation (while acting in his or her capacity as such) had, at 
any particular time, a particular intention, is evidence that the corporation had that intention. 
                                                 
94  Smith & Hogan op cit at 185. 
95  Ibid. 
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This is a very similar provision to the provision in the Act’s precursor, the Environmental 
Offences and Penalties Act of 1989.96  There are some comments that can be made on the 
defences available under subsection (1).  First, as far as knowledge is concerned, it is 
likely that the courts will regard ‘wilful blindness’ as satisfying the requirements for 
actual knowledge.97  Then, in the only cases decided under s 10 of the Environmental 
Offences and Penalties Act 1989,98 SPCC v Kelly,99 the scope of the due diligence 
defence was considered.  Since the provision refers to ‘all’ due diligence, the Court held 
that the defendant must prove – 
‘not only due diligence, but all due diligence.  This requires that everything properly regarded as due 
diligence should be done’. 
The Court (Hemmings J) qualified this by stressing that this did not require a standard of 
perfection, but that emphasis should be given to both the words ‘all’ and ‘due’.  The 
learned judge then continued- 
‘Due diligence … depends on the circumstances of the case, but contemplates a mind concentrated 
on the likely risks.  The requirements are not satisfied by precautions merely as a general matter in 
the business of the corporation, unless also designed “to prevent the contravention”. 
 Whether a defendant took the precautions that ought to have been taken must always be a 
question of fact and, in my opinion, must be decided objectively according to the standard of a 
reasonable man in the circumstances.  It would be no answer for such person to say that he did his 
best given his particular abilities, resources and circumstances’.100 
The absence of a definition of due diligence in the legislation, and the paucity of judicial 
opinion on the concept, make it difficult to express any further opinion on the scope of 
the defence in Australia.  It has been pointed out that the defence is one which does not 
often succeed, as was the case in Kelly.101 
                                                 
96  Section 10. 
97  Zada Lipman & Lachlan Roots ‘Protecting the environment through criminal sanctions: The 
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW)’ (1995) 12 Environmental and Planning LJ 16 at 
27. 
98  There have been no cases dealing with s 169 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997. 
99  (1991) 5 ACSR 607. 
100  At 608-9. 
101  Peter Lowe ‘A comparative analysis of Australian and Canadian approaches to due diligence’ (1997) 14 
Environment and Planning LJ 102. 
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Overall, then, corporate officer liability is something to be found in statute, which also 
provides for the defences, which are not well developed in Australia at the moment.102 
 
2.4 New Zealand 
 
The Resource Management Act provides for liability of corporate officers in  s 340(3) – 
Where any body corporate is convicted of an offence against this Act, every director and every 
person concerned in the management of the body corporate shall be guilty of the like offence if it is 
proved – 
(a) That the act that constituted the offence took place with his or her authority, permission, or 
consent; and 
(b) That he or she knew or could reasonably be expected to have known that the offence was to 
be or was being committed and failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent or stop it. 
This provision relates to both directors and persons ‘concerned in the management’ of the 
corporation.  The New Zealand courts have not yet decided what the ambit of the term 
‘management’ is, but it has been suggested that this could be extended as far as including 
mortgagees and other secured financiers,103 to say nothing of the people more directly 
involved in the corporation’s management. 
At first glance, the provision appears to encompass only those individuals who have 
allowed the offence to take place, but it should be noted that there is judicial authority to 
the effect that the words such as ‘permit’ do not require full mens rea.104  Moreover, the 
requirement of knowledge on the part of the controlling officer can be satisfied by 
constructive knowledge – if he or she should have known in the circumstances, this 
requirement will be met.  Despite the relatively wide (or potentially wide) ambit of this 
provision, however, the proof of all the elements rests on the prosecution, hence 
                                                 
102  Cf. Sharon Christensen ‘Criminal liability of directors and the role of due diligence in their exculpation’ 
(1993) Company and Securities LJ 340. 
103  David Grinlinton ‘Liability for environmental harm in New Zealand’ (1997) 5 Environmental Liability 
106 at 111. 
104  Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1984] 2 All ER 503 (PC) at 511-2; 
McKnight v New Zealand Biogas Industries Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 664. 
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differentiating it from the provisions found in other jurisdictions which reverse the onus 




In Canada, there is considerable jurisprudence relating to corporate officer liability, not 
only under statutory provisions providing for such liability, but often in the case of 
officers being held liable as principals.  This is most often not as a result of the officer 
personally committing the act, but through being held to have ‘caused or permitted’ the 
offence or as a result of their ‘influence and control’. 
Several Canadian environmental statutes prohibit any person from discharging a 
contaminant or ‘causing or permitting’ such discharge.105  A corporate officer will be 
held to have caused or permitted an offence when he or she was in a position of influence 
and control in the sense that the officer had the power and authority to prevent the 
commission of the offence and failed to do so.106   In Sault Ste Marie, the Court held that 
‘cause or permit’ did not require actual knowledge but that the offence ‘would be 
committed by those who undertake the collection and disposal of garbage, who are in a 
position to exercise continued control of this activity and prevent the pollution from 
occurring, but fail to do so’.107  In the same case, the Court emphasised at several points 
in the judgment that the notion of control is the basis of liability for public welfare 
offences of the type under scrutiny in that case.108 
In addition to liability as a principal, and in keeping with the trend observed in other 
jurisdictions, there are also several statutory provisions providing for corporate office 
liability in environmental legislation.  For example, the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act provides – 
Where a corporation commits an offence under this Act, any officer, director or agent of the 
corporation who directed, authorized, assented to, acquiesced in or participated in the commission of 
                                                 
105  Saxe op cit gives several examples at 107 n52. 
106  R v Sault Ste Marie (1978) 85 DLR (3d) 161. 
107  At 184-5. 
108  At 178-9 in particular. 
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the offence is a party to and guilty of the offence, and is liable to the punishment provided for the 
offence, whether or not the corporation has been prosecuted or convicted.109 
Some of the features of this provision, which is fairly typical,110 that are worthy of 
comment are as follows.  First, liability extends beyond only officers and directors to 
agents as well.  Second, according to Saxe, the words ‘directed, authorized, assented to, 
acquiesced in or participated in’ have ‘usually been held to connote influence or control 
plus knowledge of the relevant facts’.111  Knowledge has been held to include ‘wilful 
blindness’, which is something more than the contention that the officer ought to have 
known the relevant facts.112  Finally, for present purposes, it is noteworthy that the 
provision does not reverse the onus of proof in any way – it is up to the prosecution to 
prove that the officer directed, authorized, assented to, acquiesced in or participated in the 
commission of the offence.  Interestingly, and maybe because the onus is on the 
prosecution to prove this, more directors and officers in Canada, according to Saxe, ‘have 
been convicted under the general provisions of environmental statutes than under those 
which mention them by name’.113 
A different basis for corporate officer liability is provided by the Ontario 
Environmental Protection Act, section 194 of which provides – 
(1) Every director or officer of a corporation that engages in an activity that may result in the 
discharge of a contaminant into the natural environment contrary to this Act or the regulations 
has a duty to take all reasonable care to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting such 
unlawful discharge. 
(2) Every person who has a duty under subsection (1) and who fails to carry out that duty is guilty of 
an offence. 
(3) A director or officer of a corporation is liable to conviction under this section whether or not the 
corporation has been prosecuted or convicted.114 
                                                 
109  Section 122. 
110  Saxe op cit at 131. 
111  Saxe op cit at 132. 
112  R v Wilansky (1983) 41 Nfld & PEIR 29 (Nfld Dist Ct). 
113  Saxe op cit at 131. 
114  See also the Ontario Water Resources Act RSO 1990 s 116 which is similar. 
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The effect of this section is that officers are open to liability on the basis of a direct duty, 
rather than on the basis of their office.  The mens rea required is akin to that in 
negligence, as the officer must show that he or she took ‘all reasonable care’ to prevent 
the offence.  What this amounts to is that the officer must show due diligence.  The 
reverse onus in Canada has been held to be constitutional.115 
 
2.6 United States of America 
 
The criminal liability of corporate officers in the United States is governed by the 
‘responsible corporate officer’ doctrine, which was established by the US Supreme Court 
cases of United States v Dotterweich116 and United States v Park.117  In Dotterweich, the 
legislation in question did not require mens rea, so knowledge on the part of the corporate 
officer was not necessary.  The majority of the Court, holding that the president of the 
company (Dotterweich) was himself criminally liable, was concerned to circumscribe the 
scope of the liability as far as the range of individuals held to be liable was concerned.  
To this end, it held that the ‘offense is committed by all who have such a responsible 
share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws’.118  The Court did 
not, however, specify the class of employees who would be liable, leaving this task, 
perhaps somewhat ambitiously, to ‘the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of 
trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries’.119 
The defendant in Park was the CEO of a large retail food operation.  He was held to 
be personally liable, despite his not being involved in the wrongful conduct, of breaching 
a statute that, as was the case in Dotterweich, did not require mens rea.  The Court held 
that it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove wrongful conduct on the part of the 
defendant, but that it could establish liability be showing that ‘the defendant had, by 
reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in 
                                                 
115  R v Wholesale Travel Group Inc (1991) 8 CR (4th) 145 (SCC). 
116  320 US 277 (1943). 
117  421 US 658 (1975). 
118  320 US 277 at 284. 
119  At 285. 
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the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to 
do so’.120 
The principle that can be derived from these cases is that any corporate officer bearing 
a responsible relationship to conduct proscribed by what can be called ‘health and welfare 
statutes’, who is not powerless to prevent others from committing the conduct in 
question, can be held personally liable for the crime provided by that statute.121  It is 
important to note, however, that this principle applies to offences which are strict liability 
offences.122 
The responsible corporate officer doctrine has been extended to cases requiring 
knowledge.  In United States v International Minerals & Chemical Corp,123 the Court 
held that the word ‘knowingly’ referred to knowledge of the facts, not of the regulation or 
to violation of the regulation.  According to the Court, when dangerous materials are 
involved, ‘the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in 
possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the 
regulation’.124  This means that knowledge of the violation may be imputed to the 
corporate officer through his or her knowledge of the facts. 
In the environmental context, two important environmental statutes, the Clean Water 
Act125 and the Clean Air Act126 expressly include the term ‘responsible corporate officer’ 
in the definition of persons who can be held liable.  These statutes differ from the 
legislation127 at issue in Dotterweich and Park since they require proof of criminal 
knowledge, which is the case with all federal environmental statutes in the United States. 
                                                 
120  421 US 658 (1975) at 673-4. 
121  Joseph G Block & Nancy A Voisin ‘The responsible corporate officer doctrine – Can you go to jail for 
what you don’t know?’ (1992) 22 Environmental Law 1347 at 1354-5. 
122  See discussion in Chapter 9 of strict liability in the USA, involving discussion of both these cases. 
123  402 US 558 (1971). 
124  At 565. 
125  33 USC § 1319(c)(6) (1988). 
126  42 USCA § 7413(c)(6) (1991). 
127  The Food and Drug Act. 
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This means that the responsible corporate office doctrine should not be imported into 
environmental jurisprudence without taking into account the knowledge requirement of 
the environmental statutes.  There has been some lack of consensus in the cases that have 
attempted to do so.  There have been several cases involving offences under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) which by and large dilute the knowledge 
requirement significantly.128  In United States v Johnson & Towers Inc,129 it was held that 
knowledge both of the regulation and of the violation is required.130  Although this 
appears to be more stringent than the position adopted in International Minerals, the 
Court held that knowledge might be inferred as to ‘those individuals who hold the 
requisite responsible positions with the corporate defendant’.131  It has thus been 
suggested that the burden imposed on the prosecution by the Johnson & Towers decision 
‘is not significantly greater’ than in terms of International Minerals.132 
Other Courts dealing with the RCRA have declined to follow Johnson & Towers and 
made the prosecution burden even lighter.  United States v Hayes International Corp133 
held that a conviction required knowledge that there was no permit for the activity in 
question and of the facts relating to the substance used.134  It was not open to the 
defendant to raise the defence of ignorance of the hazardous nature of the waste, or 
ignorance of the requirement of a permit.135  United States v Hoflin136 did not even go so 
far as requiring knowledge of the absence of a permit.  Defendants were held to have 
‘knowingly’ contravened RCRA even where they were unaware that violation of the Act 
was a crime or that regulations existed identifying wastes as hazardous in United States v 
                                                 
128  42 USC. 
129  741 F 2d 662 (3d Cir 1984) cert denied 469 US 1208 (1985). 
130  At 669. 
131  At 670. 
132  Lisa Ann Harig ‘Ignorance is not bliss: Responsible corporate officers convicted of environmental 
crimes and the federal sentencing guidelines’ (1992) 42 Duke LJ  145 at 153. 
133  786 F 2d 1499 (11th Cir 1986). 
134  At 1505. 
135  At 1503. 
136  880 F 2d 1033 (9th Cir 1989) cert denied 493 US 1083 (1990). 
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Dee.137  Dee and Hoflin were followed by United States v Baytank (Houston) Inc,138 
which held that ‘knowingly’ only means that the defendant must know factually what he 
or she is doing.139 
In United States v Brittain140the court stated, in what was apparently an obiter 
dictum,141 that the responsible corporate officer doctrine may be used as a substitute for 
proof of criminal knowledge.  In other words, criminal knowledge of the conduct may be 
imputed to the corporate officer solely by reason of his or her position.  In United States v 
White,142 on the other hand, held that the responsible corporate officer doctrine in casu 
did not render the officer liable purely on the basis of the office held, but that the 
intention required by the statute143 had to be proved.  The White position was supported 
in United States v MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co,144 also a case involving RCRA, 
where the Court held that responsible corporate officer doctrine is an inferential doctrine 
– ‘while corporate position may not act as a substitute means of proof, it may raise the 
inference of criminal knowledge’.145  This case, therefore, did not follow the other RCRA 
cases discussed above. 
The Brittain approach should be rejected since it ignores the statutory requirement of 
knowledge.  Not only is the burden of proof substantially lowered, but equally if not more 
troubling is the strong possibility that the defendant could be sentenced to 
imprisonment.146  In contrast, the inferential doctrine raised in MacDonald & Watson is 
both sensible and preferable – corporate rank may raise an inference that the corporate 
                                                 
137  912 F 2d 741 (4th Cir 1990) cert denied 111 S Ct 1307 (1991). 
138  934 F 2d 599 (5th Cir 1991). 
139  At 613. 
140  931 F 2d 1413 (10th Cir 1991). 
141  See Block & Voisin op cit at 1369. 
142  766 F Supp 873 (ED Wash 1991). 
143  The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide 
Act. 
144  933 F 2d 35 (1st Cir 1991). 
145  Block & Voisin op cit at 1372. 
146  Harig op cit at 156. 
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officer in question had the requisite knowledge of subordinates committing statutory 
violations, but it is not a substitute for actual knowledge. 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit delivered a somewhat inscrutable judgment 
concerning criminal liability under the Clean Water Act in United States v Iverson.147  
The Court decided that ‘responsible corporate officer’ in the context of the Act meant any 
corporate officer who is ‘answerable’ or ‘accountable’ for the unlawful discharge.148  
Liability therefore rested on the officer’s authority and ability to control his or her 
subordinate’s conduct.  That part of the decision is clear, but the clarity is muddied 
somewhat by the Court’s reference to the charge in the trial court that the defendant had 
actual knowledge of the discharges.149  If the knowledge aspect is ignored, then the 
decision in Iverson follows essentially the same tack as that in Brittain. 
The knowledge requirement may also be satisfied by use of the ‘wilful blindness’ 
doctrine, which arises when a corporate officer becomes suspicious of a criminal 
violation, but takes no further action to investigate or mitigate – in effect, closing his or 
her eyes to what is occurring.  In United States v Jewell,150 the Court stated that – 
‘The rule that wilful blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential, and is found throughout the 
criminal law… A court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the 
defendant actually knew.  He suspected the fact; he realised its probability; but he refrained from 
obtaining the final confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge.  This, 




The general thread running through the controlling officer jurisprudence examined above 
is that officers are not automatically vicariously liable for the offences of the corporation, 
but must be shown to have had some involvement in the offence, through the exercise of 
                                                 
147  162 F 3d 1015 (9th Cir 1998). 
148 At 1023. 
149  Michael Dore & Rosemary E Ramsay ‘Limiting the designated felon rule: The proper role of the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine in the criminal enforcement of New Jersey’s environmental laws’ 
(2000) 53 Rutgers LR 181 at 196. 
150  532 F 2d 697 (9th Cir 1976) at 700. 
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some sort of control or some sort of acquiescence or neglect.  Some maverick decisions 
in the United States have severely diluted the knowledge requirement of federal 
environmental statutes in imputing liability to controlling officers, but these have been 
argued to be unsupportable. 
In the South African context, two important considerations are that there be some form 
of mens rea on the part of the officer for liability to ensue, and the onus of proving any 
part of the offence (including absence of mens rea) should not be placed onto the 
accused.  The latter aspect was the cause of the demise of section 332(5) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, which provided for general controlling officer liability in South African 
law.  With the striking down of that provision, the focus shifts onto provision for 
controlling officer liability in individual sectoral statutes.   
The National Environmental Management Act does provide for liability of controlling 
officers in section 34(7) and it would seem that the provision does not run the risk of 
constitutional invalidity.  However, as pointed out above, it may be a difficult provision 
to use in practice and might present difficulties in proving that the offence ‘resulted from’ 
the director’s failure to take the requisite steps. 
Along similar lines to the alternative vicarious liability provision suggested in the 
previous Chapter, it is suggested that a better alternative to section 34(7) would be to 
provide for primary liability of the type provided for in section 194 of the Ontario 
Environmental Protection Act151 – a slightly adapted version of which could read: 
(1) Every director or officer of a corporation that engages in an activity that may result in the 
contravention of any law concerned with the protection of the environment has a duty to take all 
reasonable care to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting such contravention. 
(2) Every person who has a duty under subsection (1) and who fails to carry out that duty is guilty of 
an offence. 
(3) A director or officer of a corporation is liable to conviction under this section whether or not the 
corporation has been prosecuted or convicted.152 
The benefits of this approach are that, first, it imposes primary liability so there is no 
question of constitutional invalidity.  As indicated in the previous Chapter, in S v 
                                                 
151  Set out above at 177. 
152  See also the Ontario Water Resources Act RSO 1990 s 116 which is similar. 
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Coetzee,153 Langa J indicated that the ‘Legislature is, in my view, fully entitles to place a 
positive duty on directors and to make the omission to discharge the duty an offence’.154 
The second benefit of this approach is that the onus of proof rests firmly on the state 
throughout, so there is no problem with infringement of the right to a fair trial.  Third, it 
is probably easier for the state to prove contravention of the suggested provision rather 
than the requirement of showing that ‘the offence in question resulted from the failure of 
the director to take all reasonable steps that were necessary under the circumstances to 
prevent the commission of the offence’, as required by section 34(7). 
 
3 Environmental audits and self-incrimination  
 
A third issue relating to corporate liability that requires discussion is the question of 
environmental audits and self-incrimination.  Today, more and more corporations are 
introducing their own environmental management systems, often reaching ‘beyond 
compliance’ with legislation by aiming for higher standards than that required by the law.  
A good example of this is the ISO 14000 standards.  In following such systems, 
corporations usually collect data about their environmental performance, including 
information about emissions.  This gives rise to the issue under scrutiny here: should the 
state be able to rely upon this information as evidence of contravention of environmental 
legislation in prosecuting the corporation of controlling officers?  There is much that has 
been written on this topic155 and several important cases in foreign jurisdictions, although 
it has not yet been considered judicially or academically in South Africa. 
                                                 
153  1997 (3) SA 527 (CC). 
154  At para [46]. 
155  See (in alphabetical order), for example, Stan Berger ‘The Supreme Court addresses statutorily 
compelled information and self-incrimination:  Case Comment - R v. Fitzpatrick (1995) 18 CELR (NS) 
237’ 18 CELR (NS) 283; MA Bowden and T Quigley ‘Pinstripes or prison stripes?  The liability of 
corporations and directors for environmental offences’ (1995) 5 Journal of Environmental Law and 
Practice 209; Robert W Darnell ‘Environmental criminal enforcement and environmental auditing: Time 
for a compromise’ (1993) 31 American Criminal LR 123; John P Kaisersatt ‘Criminal enforcement as a 
disincentive to environmental compliance: Is a federal environmental audit privilege the right answer?’ 
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Given that there is both academic and judicial opinion on the issue in three of the 
jurisdictions studied in this work – Australia, Canada and the United States – let us 




The leading authority in Australia is the High Court decision in Environment Protection 
Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd.156 In order to appreciate the finding of the Court, 
it is useful to examine the journey of the case on the way to the High Court.  The facts 
were that an authorised officer of the Environment Protection Authority (EPA - at the 
time called the State Pollution Control Commission (SPCC)) requested Caltex to produce 
certain documents – books and records used by the corporation in its self-monitoring 
programme concerned with the emission of effluent from its refinery approximately 
sixteen months previously – in terms of section 29(2)(a) of the Clean Water Act.157  This 
request was made at the time criminal proceedings were pending against the corporation 
for pollution of waters under the same Act. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1996) 23 American Journal of Criminal Law 405; Zada Lipman & Lachlan Roots ‘Protecting the 
environment through criminal sanctions: The Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW)’ 
(1995) 12 Environmental and Planning LJ 16 at 28-9; ‘Eilis S Magner ‘Case note on Caltex case’ (1992) 
16 Crim LJ 120; Vincent J Marella ‘The Department of Justice prosecutive guidelines in environmental 
cases involving voluntary disclosure – a leap forward or a leap of faith?’ (1992) 29 American Criminal LR 
1179; Jan McDonald ‘Confidentiality of environmental audit documents’ in Gunningham et al op cit 203; 
Joshua Puls ‘Corporate privilege – Do directors really have a right to silence since Caltex and Abbco 
Iceworks?’ (1996) 13 Environmental & Planning LJ 364. 
156  (1993) 178 CLR 477. 
157  This section provides: ‘An authorised officer may, by notice in writing, require: 
(a) the occupier of any premises from which pollutants are being or are usually discharged into any waters 
to produce to that authorised officer any reports, books, plans, maps or documents relating to the 
discharge, from the premises of pollutants into the waters or relating to any manufacturing, industrial or 
trade process carried on on those premises’. 
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The issues which arose for decision at first instance in the Land and Environment 
Court158 were whether the privilege against self-incrimination extended to corporations 
and, if so, the effect of section 29(2)(a) on that privilege.  Stein J held that the privilege 
did not extend to corporations, rendering answer of the second question unnecessary. 
The matter was taken on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal,159 where the Court 
decided that corporations were entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination at 
common law.160  As far as the issue of section 29(2)(a)’s impact on the privilege was 
concerned, the Court decided that this provision abrogated the privilege against self-
incrimination insofar as it applied to corporations, provided that the section was used for 
a proper purpose.161  The use of section 29(2)(a) for the sole purpose of gathering 
evidence for use in pending criminal proceedings, it was held, was not a proper purpose, 
and the section had therefore been improperly used. 
This decision was criticised as unduly hampering the authorities, which rely 
significantly on industry self-monitoring.162  This was not the end of the matter, however, 
as the matter was taken further to the High Court.  In the High Court, a four-three 
majority decided that the privilege was not available to corporations, based on an analysis 
of the common law and the historical and current rationale for the privilege.163  This 
position is reflected in legislation as well – the New South Wales Evidence Act provides 
that corporations do not enjoy the privilege against self-incrimination.164 
                                                 
158 SPCC v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1991) 72 LGRA 212. 
159  SPCC v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 118. 
160  At 128. 
161  At 132. 
162  Lipman & Roots op cit at 29; Magner op cit at 121-2. 
163  Mason CJ, Toohey J, Brennan J & McHugh J upheld the appeal, whilst Deane J, Dawson J & Gaudron J 
dismissed it. 
164  Section 187 provides – 
(1) This section applies if, under a law of the State or in a proceeding, a body corporate is required to: 
   (a)  answer a question or give information, or 
   (b)  produce a document or any other thing, or 
   (c)  do any other act whatever. 
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In Caltex, one of the majority judges, Brennan J, distinguished between the privilege 
against self-incrimination and the privilege against self-exposure to penalty.  He held that 
the latter was available to corporations, which made the situation as regards that privilege 
somewhat unclear. 
This matter was subsequently resolved by the Federal Court in Trade Practices 
Commission v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd.165 The Court decided that the two privileges were 
both ‘reflections of the same fundamental principle’,166 and this linkage led to the 
conclusion that, if the privilege against self-incrimination were not available to 
corporations, nor should the privilege against self-exposure to a penalty. 
As far as the availability of the privilege to corporate officers is concerned, the High 
Court in Caltex did hold that the privilege in respect of natural persons was not affected 
by their decision in respect of corporations.167  McHugh J indicated that: ‘Members of a 
corporation may be adversely affected by the conviction of a corporation, but they are not 
convicted’.168  It would seem, therefore, that the distinction between the position as 
regards corporations and the privilege remaining available to individuals (including 
controlling officers) is clear, but Puls has pointed out that this is a somewhat unrealistic 
view.169  Since corporations and their officers may be prosecuted in the same trial for the 
same offences, he argues, anything that self-incriminates the corporation or makes it 
expose itself to a penalty ‘will almost certainly make it easier to convict or penalise the 
officers of that corporation’. 
The solution to this problem is either to accept that directors will sometimes be denied 
the privilege, in the interests of the administration of justice or, alternatively, to recognise 
that the privilege does apply to corporations in cases where individual persons may be 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2) The body corporate is not entitled to refuse or fail to comply with the requirement on the ground that 
answering the question, giving the information, producing the document or other thing or doing that 
other act, as the case may be, might tend to incriminate the body or make the body liable to a penalty. 
165  (1994) 52 FCR 96. 
166  At 129. 
167  Caltex (supra) at 505. 
168  At 549. 
169  Puls op cit at 367. 
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self-incriminated by the production of that evidence.  This corresponds with the Canadian 




Section 11(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that ‘no accused 
person be required to act as a witness’, which is effectively the privilege against self-
incrimination.  At first glance, it would seem that this cannot apply to corporations since 
a corporation cannot act as a witness.  This is confirmed by the Canadian courts, which 
have held that corporations do not possess the privilege against self-incrimination, either 
during investigation170 or at trial.171  This was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in British 
Columbia (Securities Commission) v Branch.172 
  However, the courts have also held that section 7 of the Charter, providing for the 
‘right to life, liberty and security of person and the right not to be deprived of that except 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice’, provides a privilege against 
self-incrimination.  This does not apply to corporations except in circumstances where the 
privilege is invoked in order to protect the section 7 rights of a human being.  This was 
the import of the decision (on this point) in R v Bata Industries Ltd (No 1).173  In other 
words, the privilege under section 7 applies in cases where denial thereof to a corporation 
would effectively deny it to individual corporate officers. 
The twin protection of sections 7 and 11 of the Charter would suggest that individuals 
enjoy a blanket privilege against self-incrimination, but this is not the case, as was held 
by the Supreme Court in R v Fitzpatrick.174  Although this decision does not (directly) 
concern corporations, it is of immense potential importance to corporate controlling 
officers, given its sphere of operation. 
                                                 
170  Thomson Newspapers Inc v Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Restrictive Trade Practices 
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The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions       389 




The issue in Fitzpatrick was whether records kept by the defendant as required by 
legislation (in this case section 61 of the Fisheries Act) was admissible in a trial of the 
defendant for contravention of that legislation.  At first instance, the trial judge ruled the 
records inadmissible because the use of documents produced under compulsion of statute 
which incriminated the person who produced them was a violation of section 7 of the 
Charter.175  The British Columbia Court of Appeal overruled this decision,176 holding by 
two-to-one majority that the records were admissible, on the basis essentially that 
invocation of the privilege would undermine the efficacy of enforcement of the statute. 
The Supreme Court decided that the privilege against self-incrimination did not 
prevent the Crown from relying on the documents, because – 
‘It is not contrary to fundamental justice for an individual to be convicted of a regulatory offence on 
the basis of a record or return that he or she is required to submit as one of the terms and conditions 
of his or her participation in the regulatory sphere’.177 
This is an important decision for corporate controlling officers in situations where they 
(or their corporations) are required to keep records by legislation, which is the case with 
much environmental legislation in Canada.  It is important in evaluating this decision that 
a distinction be drawn between information that is required by legislation and information 
that the defendant has voluntarily collected, which will probably be protected by the 
privilege against self-incrimination (when applied to an individual).  This issue is 
canvassed in more detail below. 
 
3.3 United States of America 
 
In Campbell Painting Corp v Reid, the Supreme Court said – ‘It has long been settled in 
federal jurisprudence that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is 
essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals”’.178  Moreover, Bellis v 
United States is authority for the principle that ‘an individual cannot rely upon the 
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privilege [against self-incrimination] to avoid producing the records of a collective entity 
which are in his possession in a representative capacity, even if these records might 
incriminate him’.179 
 More recently, in Braswell v United States,180 Braswell claimed personal privilege in 
a situation apparently governed by Bellis.  He had been subpoenaed to produce corporate 
documents that he claimed would incriminate him.  He relied for his position on two 
Supreme Court decisions181 that distinguished between the contents of business 
documents, which are not privileged, and the act of producing the documents (which may 
be privileged).  The basis of the distinction is that testimony is protected.  Production of 
documents is testimonial in nature so it is protected, whereas corporate documents are not 
regarded as testimony.  The Court, by bare majority, dismissed Braswell’s claim. 
Since a corporation does not have the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
corporation could not claim the privilege in respect of production of the documents.  As 
far as an individual is concerned, the majority of the Court distinguished between the 
production of documents, where the individual may not claim a personal privilege, and 
oral testimony, which does offer personal privilege.  The majority felt that allowance of 
the personal privilege in respect of production of documents would undermine the 
prosecution of white-collar crime, in respect of both corporations and controlling 
officers.182  The Court indicated that, despite enjoying no privilege in respect of 
production of corporate documents, the fact of the production by the individual (the 
testimonial aspect of compliance with the subpoena) could not be used against the 
individual.  The contents of the documents, however, and their production by the 
corporation could be used against the individual in question. 
The overall effect of the American jurisprudence is that the privilege against self-
incrimination is severely circumscribed in the United States.  With this in mind, there is 
some disquiet about the issue of voluntary environmental audits and the potential for use 
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of such information in prosecutions against corporations and their officers.183  As a result, 
several states have enacted statutes providing for degrees of evidentiary privilege for 
environmental audits and immunity for voluntary disclosure of environmental 
infringements.184  Although there are variations amongst the states, generally the 
privilege protects voluntary environmental audits from discovery and admissibility in 
legal actions.  Typically, conditions applied are as follows: first, the information must 
have originated from the voluntary audit.  Second, the audit must be kept confidential. 
The privilege will be lost in circumstances where the court determines that it is asserted 
for a fraudulent purpose, that the information is not covered by the privilege statute (for 
example, information required to be gathered and kept by statute, as opposed to that 
voluntarily collected) or where the party asserting the privilege is held not to have taken 
appropriate, reasonable and prompt actions to achieve compliance.  There are also often 
provisions relating to the non-applicability of the privilege in compelling circumstances. 
Many states also provide for immunity from administrative or legal action for parties 
who voluntarily disclose violations.  These laws, it need hardly be said, apply only in the 
states where they have been enacted but this means that evidentiary privilege and 
immunity do not apply at the federal level.  That said, however, there are Department of 
Justice guidelines and Environmental Protection Agency policy that address these 
issues.185 
Despite the fact that the adequacy of safeguards at the federal level may be regarded as 
less than watertight, the spectre of defendants being subjected to criminal liability by 
their own records seems to be more apparent than real: according to Darnell, by 1993 
there had not been one case in which a company had been prosecuted using voluntarily 
disclosed audit information, and only two in which such information had been used in a 
criminal enforcement context.186 
 
                                                 
183  See Darnell, Kaisersatt and Marella op cit. 
184  See Kaisersatt op cit at 415-8. 
185  See Darnell, Kaisersatt and Marella op cit. 
186  Darnell op cit at 133-4, 142. 
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Many South African firms are engaged in voluntary environmental management systems 
and carrying out voluntary environmental audits.  In addition, some legislation requires 
parties to carry out their own monitoring and record-keeping.  An example is regulation 
3.9 of the General Authorisations in terms of the National Water Act.187  This suggests 
the need for an approach to the question of self-incrimination in the context of audit 
information.  It must be borne in mind that any system adopted must be in compliance 
with the Constitution, which provides that a juristic person is entitled to the rights in the 
Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that 
juristic person.188  The privilege against self-incrimination as regards an individual has 
been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Ferreira v Levin NO.189 
With this in mind, what lessons does this comparative analysis offer for South Africa?  
First, although all the countries considered in the above analysis withhold the privilege 
from corporations, there is a strong possibility that South African courts would not, given 
section 8(4) of the Constitution.  Even if this were not the case, it seems reasonably 
certain that the privilege would be asserted in cases where there exists a possibility of an 
individual being incriminated by information demanded from the corporation, as was the 
case in the Canadian case of Bata. 
The Canadian Supreme Court, in Fitzpatrick, has held that the privilege against self-
incrimination is not absolute and that there are circumstances where it does not apply, 
even for individuals.  Would such a principle apply in South Africa?  It is submitted that, 
in the present context, it is not necessary to decide this, for reasons which will become 
apparent from the discussion below. 
In considering an appropriate approach for the South African context, it may be 
instructive first to consider whether the issue has been addressed, and how, in legislation 
                                                 
187  GN 1191 of 8 October 1999. 
188  Section 8(4) of Act 108 of 1996. 
189 Ferreira v Levin NO & others; Vryenhoek v Powell NO & others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC).  See discussion 
in Chapter 3 §4.4 (supra). 
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other than environmental.  In the Basic Conditions of Employment Act,190 there is a 
provision excluding self-incriminating evidence as follows: 
No answer by any person to a question by a person conducting an investigation in terms of section 
53 or by a labour inspector in terms of section 66 may be used against that person in any criminal 
proceedings except proceedings in respect of a charge of perjury or making a false statement.191 
Section 66 deals with powers to question and inspect and provides, inter alia, for 
questioning of persons as well as production of documents and records.  Section 53 
concerns investigations relating to sectoral determinations and also provides for both 
questioning and the production of records.  The wording of section 91 seems to cover 
only answers to questions put under the two sections specified and not records or 
documents furnished under those provisions, which suggests that the latter are not 
privileged.  This provision is not very helpful as a precedent since it has a very limited 
scope. 
What is required in the environmental sphere is an approach that does not discourage 
parties from conducting voluntary environmental audits but which does not hinder 
enforcement efforts, especially in respect of records required by legislation.  In making a 
proposal, suggestions already made for the role of criminal law in enforcement of 
environmental legislation must be borne in mind.  It has been recommended that criminal 
sanctions be reserved for serious contraventions of environmental law, where there is 
intention, repetition of offences, or serious harm.  For other violations, non-criminal 
measures, for instance administrative penalties, could be used. 
In the case of serious offences of the type described above, it is unlikely that the state 
would need to rely on records or data that had been kept by the accused.  In the case of 
repeat violations, the state could use records produced by the regulated party to place the 
authorities ‘on notice’ that repeat violations were taking place.  This would enable the 
state to carry out its own monitoring and gather its own data for prosecution purposes, 
which would obviate the need to rely on any potential self-incriminating evidence. 
A ‘use immunity’, that is, immunity on the use of records in criminal proceedings, 
could be provided for without hindering enforcement, for the reasons set out above.  The 
                                                 
190  Act 75 of 1997. 
191  Section 91. 
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documentation, however, could be used in administrative or civil proceedings without 
infringing the self-incrimination privilege.  For example, there should be no constitutional 
problem with the imposition of relatively low administrative monetary penalties for the 
contravention of emission standards revealed by records produced by the polluter. 
There does, however, need to be a qualification on this, which distinguishes between 
records and data voluntarily collected by the party and that which is compelled by 
statute.192  It is suggested that information from voluntary environmental audits and 
monitoring should be excluded from use in any enforcement action against the party, 
whether criminal or otherwise.  Information compelled by statute, however, should be 
excluded only from criminal proceedings.  This privilege should fall away, however, in 
cases where the audit or monitoring is carried out for a fraudulent purpose or where the 
audit or monitoring reveals an infringement that is not remediated by the party in 
question. 
It may be asked why information compelled by state should be privileged in criminal 
proceedings, given the approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick.  The 
reason is that the South African Constitutional Court, in decisions like Manamela,193 has 
placed the bar very high for successful use of the limitations clause.  Factors relating to 
the practicalities of law enforcement and administration of justice have consistently been 
sacrificed on the altar of protection of civil liberties.  While this is not to suggest that this 
approach is wrong or ill-advised, it does suggest that our courts will likely take a dim 
view of the utilisation of self-incriminating evidence in circumstances where such use is 
not necessary, especially considering the possibility of alternative means to achieve the 
same result.  It has been suggested here that use of self-incriminating evidence is most 
likely not necessary for the types of violations for which criminal law should be reserved. 
With these considerations in mind, how should the approach to environmental audits 
and self-incrimination in South Africa be structured?  In the United States, the seminal 
state environmental audit privilege provision is that of Oregon.  Some guidance could be 
obtained from the Oregon statute and amendments suggested for the South African 
                                                 
192  See McDonald op cit at 217. 
193  2000 (3) SA 1 (CC).  See discussion above in Chapter 3. 
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context.  The Oregon provision ‘Environmental audit privilege; exceptions; burden of 
proving privilege; waiver; disclosure after in camera review’,194 provides – 
(1) In order to encourage owners and operators of facilities and persons conducting other activities 
regulated under [specified environmental legislation], both to conduct voluntary internal 
environmental audits of their compliance programs and management systems and to assess and 
improve compliance with such statutes, an environmental audit privilege is recognized to protect 
the confidentiality of communications relating to such voluntary internal environmental audits.  
(2) An Environmental Audit Report shall be privileged and shall not be admissible as evidence in 
any legal action in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding, except as provided in 
subsections (3) and (4) of this section.  
(3)(a) The privilege described in subsection (2) of this section does not apply to the extent that it is 
waived expressly or by implication by the owner or operator of a facility or persons conducting 
an activity that prepared or caused to be prepared the Environmental Audit Report. The release 
of an Environmental Audit Report by the owner or operator of a facility to any party or to any 
public body for purposes of negotiating, arranging or facilitating the sale, lease or financing of a 
property or a facility, or a portion of a property or facility:  
(A) Is not a waiver of the privilege; and  
(B) Does not create a right for a public body to require the release of an Environmental Audit 
Report.  
(b) In a civil or administrative proceeding, a court of record, after in camera review consistent with 
the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, shall require disclosure of material for which the privilege 
described in subsection (2) of this section is asserted, if such court determines that:  
(A) The privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose;  
(B) The material is not subject to the privilege; or  
(C) Even if subject to the privilege, the material shows evidence of noncompliance with 
[specified environmental legislation], appropriate efforts to achieve compliance with which 
were not promptly initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence.  
(c) In a criminal proceeding, a court of record, after in camera review as described in subsection (4) 
of this section, shall require disclosure of material for which the privilege described in subsection 
(2) of this section is asserted, if the court determines that:  
(A) The privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose;  
(B) The material is not subject to the privilege;  
                                                 
194  Oregon Revised Statutes § 468.963.  Some of the subsections relating to procedure have been omitted. 
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(C) Even if subject to the privilege, the material shows evidence of noncompliance with 
[specified environmental legislation], appropriate efforts to achieve compliance with which 
were not promptly initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence; or  
(D) The material contains evidence relevant to commission of an offense under [specified 
provisions of the ORS] the district attorney or Attorney General has a compelling need for 
the information, the information is not otherwise available and the district attorney or 
Attorney General is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by any 
means without incurring unreasonable cost and delay.  
(d) A party asserting the environmental audit privilege described in subsection (2) of this section has 
the burden of proving the privilege, including, if there is evidence of noncompliance with 
[specified environmental legislation], proof that appropriate efforts to achieve compliance were 
promptly initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence. A party seeking disclosure under 
subsection (3)(b)(A) of this section has the burden of proving that the privilege is asserted for a 
fraudulent purpose. A district attorney or the Attorney General seeking disclosure under 
subsection (3)(c)(D) of this section has the burden of proving the conditions for disclosure set 
forth in subsection (3)(c)(D) of this section.  
(4)(a) A district attorney or the Attorney General, having probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed under [specified provisions of the ORS] based upon information obtained from a 
source independent of an Environmental Audit Report, may obtain an Environmental Audit 
Report for which a privilege is asserted under subsection (2) of this section pursuant to search 
warrant, criminal subpoena or discovery …. The district attorney or Attorney General shall 
immediately place the report under seal and shall not review or disclose its contents.  
… 
(5) The privilege described in subsection (2) of this section shall not extend to:  
(a) Documents, communications, data, reports or other information required to be collected, 
developed, maintained, reported or otherwise made available to a regulatory agency pursuant to 
[specified environmental legislation];  
(b) Information obtained by observation, sampling or monitoring by any regulatory agency; or  
(c) Information obtained from a source independent of the environmental audit.  
(6) As used in this section:  
(a) “Environmental audit” means a voluntary, internal and comprehensive evaluation of one or more 
facilities or an activity at one or more facilities regulated under [specified environmental 
legislation], or of management systems related to such facility or activity, that is designed to 
identify and prevent noncompliance and to improve compliance with such statutes. An 
environmental audit may be conducted by the owner or operator, by the owner’s or operator’s 
employees or by independent contractors.  
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(b) “Environmental Audit Report” means a set of documents, each labeled “Environmental Audit 
Report: Privileged Document” and prepared as a result of an environmental audit. An 
Environmental Audit Report may include field notes and records of observations, findings, 
opinions, suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memoranda, drawings, photographs, computer-
generated or electronically recorded information, maps, charts, graphs and surveys, provided 
such supporting information is collected or developed for the primary purpose and in the course 
of an environmental audit. An Environmental Audit Report, when completed, may have three 
components:  
(A) An audit report prepared by the auditor, which may include the scope of the audit, the 
information gained in the audit, conclusions and recommendations, together with exhibits 
and appendices;  
(B) Memoranda and documents analyzing portions or all of the audit report and potentially 
discussing implementation issues; and  
(C) An implementation plan that addresses correcting past noncompliance, improving current 
compliance and preventing future noncompliance.  
(7) Nothing in this section shall limit, waive or abrogate the scope or nature of any statutory or 
common law privilege, including the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege.  
The Oregon provision could be adapted as follows to give effect to the considerations 
relevant to South Africa outlined above, using the same definitions of ‘environmental 
audit’ and ‘environmental audit report’ used in the Oregon statute: 
Section A: Privilege of voluntary environmental audit reports  
(1) An Environmental Audit Report shall be privileged and shall not be admissible as evidence in 
any legal action in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding, except as provided in 
subsections (2) and (3) of this section.  
(2)(a) The privilege described in subsection (1) of this section does not apply to the extent that it is 
waived expressly or by implication by the owner or operator of a facility or persons conducting 
an activity that prepared or caused to be prepared the Environmental Audit Report: Provided that 
the release of an Environmental Audit Report by the owner or operator of a facility to any party 
or to any organ of state for purposes of negotiating, arranging or facilitating the sale, lease or 
financing of a property or a facility, or a portion of a property or facility: 
(i) is not a waiver of the privilege; and  
(ii) does not create a right for an organ of state to require the release of an Environmental Audit 
Report.  
(b) In a civil or administrative proceeding, disclosure of material for which the privilege described in 
subsection (2) of this section is asserted, shall be required if the competent authority or court, as 
the case may be, determines that:  
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(i) the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose;  
(ii) the material is material contemplated by subsection (3); or  
(iii) even if subject to the privilege, the material shows evidence of noncompliance with 
[specified environmental legislation], appropriate efforts to achieve compliance with which 
were not promptly initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence.  
(c) A party asserting the environmental audit privilege described in subsection (1) of this section has 
the burden of proving the privilege, including, if there is evidence of noncompliance with 
[specified environmental legislation], proof that appropriate efforts to achieve compliance were 
promptly initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence. A party seeking disclosure under 
subsection (2)(b)(i) of this section has the burden of proving that the privilege is asserted for a 
fraudulent purpose. 
(3) The privilege described in subsection (2) of this section shall not extend to:  
(a) Documents, communications, data, reports or other information required to be collected, 
developed, maintained, reported or otherwise made available to an organ of state pursuant to 
[specified environmental legislation];  
(b) Information obtained by observation, sampling or monitoring by any organ of state; or  
(c) Information obtained from a source independent of the environmental audit.  
(4) Nothing in this section shall limit, waive or abrogate the scope or nature of any statutory or 
common law privilege. 
Section B.  Privilege of environmental audits required by legislation. 
(1) Any documents, communications, data, reports or other information required to be collected, 
developed, maintained, reported or otherwise made available to an organ of state pursuant to 
[specified environmental legislation] shall be privileged and shall not be admissible as evidence 
in any criminal proceeding, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section. 
(2) In a criminal proceeding, a court shall require disclosure of material for which the privilege 
described in subsection (1) of this section is asserted, only if the court determines that: 
(a) the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose; or 
(b) even if subject to the privilege, the material shows evidence of noncompliance with 
[specified environmental legislation], appropriate efforts to achieve compliance with which 
were not promptly initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence.  
These provisions, it is submitted, will adequately cater for the privilege against self-
incrimination in the context of voluntary environmental audits and audits and monitoring 
carried out as required by legislation, without unduly hampering enforcement efforts. It is 
important to note that the provisions do not prohibit the state from demanding production 
of the material, which may be important for enforcement purposes, but only that such 
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material may not be used as evidence in the circumstances mentioned in the provisions. 
The fact that this issue has not yet been addressed in South African legislation, given the 
increasing use of voluntary environmental management systems, and the requirement of 




Nowadays, corporations are responsible (or, at least, potentially responsible) for much 
environmental harm and certainly most of the serious environmental harm.  Where there 
is corporate blameworthiness, corporations should not be able to avoid the imposition of 
criminal sanctions, despite the fact that they have ‘no soul to damn and no body to 
kick’.195  Unfortunately, lawyers have almost universally found that the field of corporate 
criminal liability, as well as liability of controlling officers, is somewhat of a legal 
minefield.  This general difficulty is exacerbated in the South African context by the need 
to take into account constitutional protections.  The suggestions made in this Chapter, it is 
submitted, ought to make chartering the path of environmental corporate criminal liability 
in South Africa a less challenging task. 
 
                                                 
195  John C Coffee Jr ‘“No soul to damn: No body to kick”: An unscandalized inquiry into the problem of 
corporate punishment’ (1981) 79 Michigan LR 386.  Coffee ascribes the phrase to Edward, First Baron 
Thurlow 1731-1806, who is quoted as saying, ‘Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, 
when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?’ 
Chapter 12 
 
Sentencing environmental crimes 
 
In 1989, a Sappi-owned paper mill in what is now Mpumalanga province at Ngodwana 
emitted a large quantity of toxic pollutant, which polluted the Elands and Crocodile 
rivers, important watercourses in the area, causing significant environmental damage and 
death of numerous fish.  In a criminal prosecution in the Nelspruit Magistrates’ Court,1 
there was a guilty plea, which was taken into account as a mitigating circumstance, as 
was the fact that the company immediately took remedial steps upon the occurrence of 
the spill, which was held not to be deliberate. The sentence was a fine of R6 000.  For a 
company the size of Sappi, the fine was, therefore, clearly just a cost of doing business 
for SAPPI, since it was a drop in the ocean compared with the scale of the company’s 
financial worth.2  Even the maximum fine of R50 000 under the Water Act (the 
prevailing legislation at the time) would hardly make a dent in the company’s profits. 
By comparison, in the United States of America, in the 1999 Guide Corporation case,3 
the corporation, an Indiana company, negligently released about 1.6 million gallons of 
contaminated wastewater to the sewer system in Anderson, Indiana, which went through 
the public treatment works and into the White River.  The wastewater contained 
excessive amounts of a treatment chemical that resulted in the formation of various toxic 
residues and byproducts.  This release caused the death of 127 tons of fish and other 
aquatic creatures in the White River.  The corporation pleaded guilty to criminal 
negligence charges.  The corporation was fined $1,956,000 and ordered to pay $275,000 
                                                 
1  Case Sh 158/190 (unreported). 
2  In 2000, Sappi’s net profit was R2 377 million.  Although the 1989 financial results were not available, 
even if the net profit of Sappi in 1989 was one-hundredth of the 2000 figure, a fine of R6 000 would still 
have been trivial. 
3  The case was decided by plea bargain, so there was no reported judgment.  Information on the case 
supplied by Tim Chapman, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Chicago, personal 
communication. 
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in restitution.  They also forfeited an additional $1,956,000 based upon a law that 
provides for forfeiture of gains/avoided costs in environmental crimes cases.4 
There are admittedly differences between the two cases mentioned above, but they 
share sufficient similarities for the disparity in sentences imposed to be startling.  Why is 
this the case?  Due in part to the different public and judicial mindset to environmental 
offences in the United States, environmental law in the United States provides for serious 
penalties for environmental offences. Is it the case in South Africa that penalties provided 
for are not adequate?   The perception in South Africa is that penalties are inadequate,5 
which, if true, would serve to undermine these goals.  The purpose of this Chapter is to 
assess, first, whether this perception is correct.  This will be followed by an evaluation of 
the existing sentencing measures that are currently available in South Africa.  Innovative 
modes of sentencing used or suggested in other jurisdictions will then be examined, 
which apply mainly in the context of corporate offenders.  Finally, suggestions will be 
made as to how to improve the options available in South Africa. 
 
1 The adequacy of penalties for environmental offences in South Africa 
 
This analysis is proceeding on the premise that environmental harms are serious harms 
and that deliberate contraventions of environmental law and those that cause significant 
harm ought to be punished with serious penalties.  This is in order to meet both the 
deterrent and retributive goals of environmental criminal law.  Are penalties for 
contravention of environmental legislation sufficient to meet these goals?  There is a 
paucity of information in South Africa of penalties that have been imposed by the Courts, 
but information that there is, supported by anecdotal evidence, suggests that penalties 
(fines) imposed have been on the low side.6  There are no reported cases dealing with 
                                                 
4  18 USC § 981(a)(1)(C) read with § 1956(c)(7). In addition, Guide paid $10 million in civil settlements: 
Reuters report reported by Environmental News Network 19 June 2001. 
5  RF Fuggle & MA Rabie Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) at 130, Cheryl Loots 
‘Making environmental law effective’ (1994) 1 SAJELP 17 at 18. 
6  Information has been received from the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry dealing with 
sentences imposed in certain cases involving water pollution.  These appear to be a selection, rather than a 
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sentences of imprisonment (other than as an alternative to a fine) for environmental 
offences.7  Attempts at obtaining information and statistics relating to convictions and 
sentences imposed in South Africa for environmental offences have proved largely 
fruitless,8 hence the rather vague comments made about actual sentencing practices in 
South Africa. 
The second aspect concerning sentencing of environmental crimes is the provision for 
penalties in legislation.  Are penalties provided for in environmental statutes inadequate?  
This is certainly the perception,9 but careful analysis does not really support this view. 
The analysis in Chapters 4-6 suggest that, other than in the case of a few glaring 
exceptions, penalties provided for are generally satisfactory, and, in several cases, rather 
severe (although, on the whole, less stringent than those in the United States, for 
example).  The example often given to illustrate the inadequacy of penalties is the 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act,10 which provides for a maximum penalty of a 
R500 fine for a first contravention of the Act,11 but this seems to be the exception rather 
than the rule.  The problem, where there is one, may be exacerbated by the fact that 
sometimes conduct may be an offence under several different pieces of legislation and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
comprehensive list.  No detailed statistics are kept.  Information received from the Gauteng Nature 
Conservation Department suggests that the vast majority of contraventions of the Nature Conservation 
Ordinance are addressed by means of admission of guilt fines of less than R1 000.  Attempts to obtain 
statistics or information from other government departments, both national and provincial, were 
unsuccessful, mainly because, it seems, these statistics are not kept.  All documents are on file with the 
author. 
7  A press report in August 1998 reported that a woman from Empangeni, KwaZulu-Natal, had been 
handed down ‘the stiffest sentence yet for illegal trade in rhino horn’.  The Regional Court sentenced 
Nomsa Mkhwanazi, who tried to sell a 1,2kg horn, to four years’ imprisonment or a R60 000 fine 
(Independent Newspapers, obtained from Independent Online website www.iol.co.za [original site of 
article no longer available]). 
8  See n 6 (supra). 
9  See n2 (supra). 
10  Act 45 of 1965. 
11  It does also provided for the alternative of imprisonment, to be fair.  The maximum jail term is six 
months: section 46. 
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one chosen to use in the prosecution provides a limited penalty.  For example, water 
pollution offences have sometimes been prosecuted under local by-laws, which often 
suffer from inadequate penalties, instead of national legislation which offers far more 
realistic penalty options. 
Most legislation, however, does provide for realistic penalties, particularly more recent 
(post 1994) statutes which do not specify a maximum fine.  Several statutes provide for 
terms of imprisonment of up to ten years,12 and the Marine Living Resources Act13 
provides for fines of up to five million rand. As regards the older statutes that do specify 
an amount, however, if this is inadequate, the situation may be addressed by means of the 
Adjustment of Fines Act.14  This Act provides for calculation of the maximum fine on the 
basis of a ratio between the maximum fine and the maximum period of imprisonment 
provided for by the Magistrates’ Courts Act.15  This applies both to instances where a 
maximum fine is not provided for,16 and in those cases where there is a prescribed 
maximum fine,17 which suggests that the Act can be used to ‘update’ inadequate 
provision for fines in legislation.  The Act can best be understood by means of an 
illustration, rather than by analysing its provisions.  Let us use the much-maligned 
maximum fine in the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act as an example.  Section 46 of 
that Act provides for a maximum fine of R500 or maximum imprisonment of six months.  
The maximum penal jurisdiction of a Magistrates’ Court in terms of section 92 of the 
Magistrates’ Court Act and regulations made thereunder is a R60 000 fine or three years 
imprisonment.18  The ratio between fine (in thousands of rand) and years imprisonment is 
                                                 
12  National Water Act 36 of 1998; Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999; National Nuclear Energy Regulator 
Act 47 of 1999. 
13  Act 8 of 1998. 
14  Act 101 of 1991. 
15  Act 32 of 1944. 
16  Section 1(a) of Act 101 of 1991. 
17  Section 1(b). 
18  Section 92(1) and GN 1411 in GG 19435 of 30 October 1998. This is the amount for the district court – 
the jurisdiction for the regional court is R300 000 or fifteen years.  The ratio between fine and years 
imprisonment is the same for both: 20-1. 
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20 to 1.  This ratio is then used to calculate the maximum amount of the fine for the 
legislation in question.  The Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act provides for six 
months imprisonment.  Multiplying this (half a year) by 20 gives a fine of R10 000, 
considerably higher than the current R500 (but probably still inadequate in the 
circumstances). 
In summary, then, the penalties provided for in most case are probably adequate in 
most cases, but as regards the imposition of penalties, the available evidence suggests that 
most offenders receive no more than a slap on the wrist.  This trend, however, may be 
changing.  In a recent nature conservation case in the Western Cape,19 two foreigners 
convicted of illegally collecting 113 angulate tortoises were each sentenced to R168 000 
fines.  This was made up of a R10 000 fine for collecting wildlife without a permit, R5 
000 for possessing wildlife without a permit, R3 000 for transporting wildlife without a 
permit, and R150 000 relating to the value of the tortoises.  Despite the important 
deterrent message this sentence sends, it was possible for the Court concerned to impose 
a higher sentence in relation to the value of the tortoises.  The legislation allows 
imposition of a fine equal to three times the value of the market value of the tortoises.20  
The tortoises, according to evidence in the case, could be sold for between US$300 and 
$800 per animal, depending on size and condition.  Taking the lower value, and exchange 
rate at the time (approximately 10 to 1), this means that the value of each animal is at 
least R3000, the total collection being worth R339 000.  Three times this amount is over 
one million rand, which could have been imposed under the relevant section. 
Even allowing for severe fines provisions, however, there are corporate accused for 
whom even fines in the region of one million rand may be considered a cost of doing 
business.  For this reason, it will be useful to consider alternative penalties, those already 
in existence in South Africa and then those sentencing practices that are not currently 
provided for by our law, for both individual and corporate offenders. 
 
                                                 
19  Unreported, media report in 13 December Natal Witness at 2. 
20  Section 86(1)(a)-(d) of the Cape Nature and Environmental Conservation Ordinance 19 of 1974. 
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2 Types of penalties provided for in South African law 
 
The ‘default’ penalties usually provided for in South African legislation are fines and 
imprisonment.  These penalties will not be discussed here but rather other penalties that 
are provided for by environmental legislation.  These alternative penalties are usually 
supplementary to the primary penalty of fine or imprisonment, as is indicated below. 
 
2.1 Fine for continuing offence 
 
A useful provision is one which provides for the imposition of a specified fine per day 
that the offence continues.  This would give the offender ample incentive to put a stop to 
the contravention as soon as possible.  This device is used in the Environment 
Conservation Act,21 the National Heritage Resources Act,22 and the Western Cape 
Planning and Development Act;23 and the noise regulations made under the Environment 
Conservation Act.24  This type of measure is frequently used in United States 
environmental legislation, often in the context of civil penalties.25 
  
2.2 Compensation Order 
 
Statutes often provide for a criminal court, having convicted the accused, to have the 
power to enquire into loss or harm suffered by the victim and to order compensation.26  
The advantage of this is that it obviates the need for a second civil trial aimed at 
compensation.  In the environmental context, probably the most important provision in 
                                                 
21  Section 29 of Act 73 of 1989. 
22  Section 51(3) of Act 25 of 1999. 
23  Section 64(2) of Act 7 of 1999 
24  GN R154 GG 13717 of 10 January 1992. 
25  See, for example, § 1319(b) of USC Title 33 (Clean Water Act) and § 7413(b) of USC Title 42 (Clean 
Air Act). 
26  See section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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this regard is section 34(1) and (2) of the National Environmental Management Act.27  
This applies in respect of any offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Act.28  The provisions 
read as follows: 
(1) Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 and it 
appears that such person has by that offence caused loss or damage to any organ of state or other 
person, including the cost incurred or likely to be incurred by an organ of state in rehabilitating 
the environment or preventing damage to the environment, the court may in the same 
proceedings at the written request of the Minister or other organ of state or other person 
concerned, and in the presence of the convicted person, inquire summarily and without pleadings 
into the amount of the loss or damage so caused. 
(2) Upon proof of such amount, the court may give judgement therefor in favour of the organ of 
state or other person concerned against the convicted person, and such judgement shall be of the 
same force and effect and be executable in the same manner as if it had been given in a civil 
action duly instituted before a competent court. 
Similar provisions are found in the National Water Act,29 the National Forests Act,30 
National Heritage Resources Act,31 and, although in a rather limited manner, in the 
Orange Free State Nature Conservation Ordinance.32 
Such provisions are important in that they are aimed (at least in part) at the 
remediation of environmental damage, which is in keeping with the general aims of 
environmental law. 
 
2.3 Reparation order 
 
Similar to the order for compensation discussed above, certainly as far as the aims are 
concerned, but using a slightly different method, is what can be called a reparation order.  
Instead of a court ordering the convicted person to pay monetary compensation, this order 
requires the individual to carry out the reparations himself or herself.   This device is used 
                                                 
27  Act 107 of 1998. 
28  Detailed above at 192-4. 
29  Section 152 of Act 36 of 1998. 
30  Section 59 of Act 84 of 1998. 
31  Section 51(8) of Act 25 of 1999. 
32  Section 40(2)(a) of Ordinance 8 of 1969. 
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in the Sea-Shore Act,33 and in the National Heritage Resources Act, in conjunction with 
an order for compensation provision in the case of default of the reparation order.34 A 
good way of providing for this type of device is to link it to the power of the authorities 
concerned to take the necessary steps in default of the offender and then to claim the 
costs.  Section 29 of the Environment Conservation Act provides that, in the event of a 
conviction in terms of the Act the court may order that any damage to the environment 
resulting from the offence be repaired by the person so convicted, to the satisfaction of 
the Minister concerned.35  Failure to comply with such an order entitles the authority in 
question to take the necessary steps itself and to recover the costs from the defaulting 
party.36 
The reparation order is a good measure for the same reasons given in favour of the 
compensation order above.  It could well be combined with a compensation order by the 
provision of a reparation order that has to be complied with within a specified time, 
failing which a compensation order will take effect.  Section 51(8) of the National 
Heritage Resources Act37 essentially does this and is a good model for this type of 
provision. 
 
2.4 Fine equivalent to value 
 
This device is currently used only in some nature conservation legislation.  The National 
Parks Act38 provides for the fine not exceeding three times the commercial value of the 
animal in respect of which the offence of unlawful hunting39 was committed.40  The Cape 
                                                 
33  Section 12A of Act 21 of 1935. 
34  Section 51(8) of Act 25 of 1999. 
35  Section 29(7). 
36  Section 29(8). 
37  Act 25 of 1999.  The provision is set out in full at 200 (supra). 
38  Act 57 of 1976. 
39  Section 21(1)(c). 
40  Section 24(1)(b)(aa). 
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Nature and Environmental Conservation Ordinance41 has a similar provision, as discussed 
above in the introduction to this Chapter. 
This measure is an important deterrent in cases involving crime motivated by profits, 
for example poaching of wildlife.  The provisions could be improved by providing for the 
compensation to the owner of the animal (if there is an owner) of the value of the animal, 
which amount could be extracted from the fine paid.  
 
2.5 Fine equivalent to advantage gained 
 
A similar provision is the imposition of a fine equivalent to the advantage gained by the 
offender in failing to comply with the law.  The National Environmental Management42 
Act provides:43 
Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 the court 
convicting such person may summarily enquire into and assess the monetary value of any advantage 
gained or likely to be gained by such person in consequence of that offence, and, in addition to any 
other punishment imposed in respect of that offence, the court may order the award of damages or 
compensation or a fine equal to the amount so assessed. 
In the United States, legislation provides for similar forfeiture of proceeds of an 
offence.  18 USC § 981(a)(1)(C) provides for forfeiture to the state of any property which 
constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to any offence constituting ‘specified 
unlawful activity’44 or a conspiracy to commit such offence.  The federal money 
laundering statute, 18 USC § 1956, makes it illegal to place the funds of illegal activity 
into legitimate bank accounts (and similar), if the funds are derived from certain types of 
criminal behaviour, which are called ‘specified unlawful activity’ (SUA).  The statute 
lists all of the SUA’s - among the crimes listed are felony violations of the Clean 
Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.  Thus, any profit realized 
from the crime, which might include profit realized by virtue of not properly disposing of 
                                                 
41  Section 86(1)(a)-(d) of Ordinance 19 of 1974. 
42  Act 107 of 1998. 
43  Section 34(3). 
44  As defined in 18 USC § 1956(c)(7). 
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the waste, can be considered ‘proceeds traceable to’ a felony violation of the Clean Water 
Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 
In addition to this measure, the United States Sentencing Guidelines for Organisations 
require what is called disgorgement as follows: ‘The court shall add to the [basic fine 
determined under the Guidelines] any gain to the organization from the offense that has 
not and will not be paid as restitution or by way of other remedial measures.45 
It is submitted that this kind of penalty is one which can legitimately be used against 
environmental offenders, particularly those who deliberately flout the law in order to 
pursue profits.  Examples of such offenders would be persons who infringe nature 
conservation and endangered species legislation to smuggle animals out of the country in 
order to sell for significant profits overseas,46 and those who illegally dispose of 




Several statutes provide for forfeiture of items upon conviction of an offence.  Such items 
include the ‘contraband’ objects (illegally hunted animals, or unlicensed dangerous 
substances, for example),47 the ‘instrumentalities’ of the offence,48 or objects directly 
                                                 
45  United States Sentencing Guidelines § 8C2.9. 
46  See tortoise example referred to the in the introduction. 
47  Section 18(2) of the Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act 36 of 
1947; s 21 of the Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973, s 215B of the Natal Nature Conservation 
Ordinance 15 of 1974, s 47A and 87(1)(c)(ii) of the Cape Nature and Environmental Conservation 
Ordinance 19 of 1974, s 41 of the Orange Free State Nature Conservation Ordinance 8 of 1969, s 112 of the 
Transvaal Nature Conservation Ordinance 12 of 1983, s 101 of the Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 
10 of 1998. 
48  Section 24(9) of the National Parks Act 57 of 1976; s 30(1) of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 
1989, s 68 of the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998, s 51(14) of the National Heritage Resources Act 
25 of 1999, s 215B of the Natal Nature Conservation Ordinance 15 of 1974, s 87(1)(c)(ii) of the Cape 
Nature and Environmental Conservation Ordinance 19 of 1974, s 41 of the Orange Free State Nature 
Conservation Ordinance 8 of 1969, s 112 of the Transvaal Nature Conservation Ordinance 12 of 1983, s 
101 of the Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998. 
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used in the commission of the offence (weapons used to hunt animals illegally, for 
example) and certain other items.  Some provisions are mandatory,49 compelling the court 
to declare the items forfeit, whereas others are permissive,50 giving the court a discretion 
to do so. 
There would seem to be good sense behind the forfeiture of contraband items and items 
used in the commission of the offence.  It has been suggested that the only real problem 
with forfeiture of instrumentalities is that the forfeiture must not constitute unfair and 
excessive punishment (in addition to the basic sentence).51  In such cases, according to 
van der Walt, ‘proportionality jurisprudence can be employed to indicate whether it is 
reasonable and justifiable to forfeit the property in question, given the court’s findings on 
the facts, the nature of the property forfeited, the guilt of the defendant and the sentence 
already imposed’.52  In addition, there must be a necessary connection between the use of 
the instrumentality in question and the commission of the offence.  If something is used 
only incidentally to the commission of the offence, then forfeiture of that item will not be 
countenanced.53 
Certain forfeiture provisions in South African law could be seen as overly punitive in 
nature and consequently may infringe the Constitution.  The Fertilizers, Farm Feeds, 
Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act54 provides for forfeiture, not only of 
substances in respect of which an offence has been committed, but also all substances of 
a similar nature.  This provision targets neither the ‘contraband’ nor the instrumentalities 
of the offence, and, consequently, could be contended to be a breach of the right to 
property in the Constitution.55 Since it does not have any apparent compelling purpose, it 
is unlikely to be regarded as a justifiable limitation.  Also, several statutes provide for the 
                                                 
49  For example, s 215B of the Natal Nature Conservation ordinance (supra). 
50  For example, s 68 of the Marine Living Resources Act (supra). 
51  André van der Walt ‘Civil forfeiture of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime and the Constitutional 
property clause’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 1 at 7. 
52  Ibid. 
53  S v Vermeulen 1995 (2) SACR 439 (T).  See discussion above, 85 ff. 
54  Act 36 of 1947. 
55  Section 25 of Act 108 of 1996. 
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forfeiture of vehicles or vessels used ‘in connection’ with an offence.56  Where this 
connection is not sufficiently direct, there may be problems with the forfeiture of such 
items, as was the case in S v Vermeulen.57 
 
2.7 Community Service 
 
In terms of the National Forests Act,58 any person guilty of a ‘fourth category’ offence 
referred to in sections 63 and 64 (for instance, dropping litter in a forest), may be 
sentenced on a first conviction for that offence to a fine or community service for a 
period of up to six months or to both a fine and such service.  A court which sentences 
any person to community service for an offence in terms of this Act must impose a form 
of community service which benefits the environment if it is possible for the offender to 
serve such a sentence in the circumstances.59  Similarly, in the National Heritage 
Resources Act, it is provided that, in any case involving vandalism, and whenever else a 
court deems it appropriate, community service involving conservation of heritage 
resources may be substituted for, or instituted in addition to, a fine or imprisonment.60 
Community service is a particularly useful sanction in the case of impecunious 
offenders.61  This sentencing option will be discussed in more detail in respect of its 
application to corporate offenders below. 
                                                 
56  Section 24(9)(b) of the National Parks Act 57 of 1976 (see discussion of section and relevant cases 
above at 99-101), s 30(1) of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989, s 68 of the Marine Living 
Resources Act 18 of 1998, s 215B of the Natal Nature Conservation Ordinance 15 of 1974, s 87(1)(c)(ii) of 
the Cape Nature and Environmental Conservation Ordinance 19 of 1974, s 41 of the Orange Free State 
Nature Conservation Ordinance 8 of 1969, s 112 of the Transvaal Nature Conservation Ordinance 12 of 
1983, s 101 of the Mpumalanga Nature Conservation Act 10 of 1998. 
57  (Supra). 
58  Act 84 of 1998. 
59  Section 58(7)(a). 
60  Section 51(13). 
61  Zada Lipman & Lachlan Roots ‘Protecting the environment through criminal sanctions: The 
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW)’ (1995) 12 Environmental and Planning LJ 16 at 
31. 
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2.8 Revocation of licence or permit 
 
If an offence involves contravention of the conditions of a permit or licence, it would 
seem reasonable for a court to be able to revoke such permit or licence as part of the 
sentence.  Curiously, however, only one environmental Act, the National Forests Act,62 
contains such a provision.63  This should be a standard provision in statutes which 
provide for licensed or permitted activities, but it should be phrased permissively rather 
than in a mandatory fashion, since in certain cases revocation of a licence may amount, in 
effect, to a complete prohibition on carrying out a person’s livelihood, so it is a sanction 
that should not be imposed lightly.  That said, however, it is a sanction that will be 
warranted in certain cases, even if it amounts to loss of livelihood or, in extreme cases, a 
‘corporate death penalty’. 
 
2.9 Prohibition of further development 
 
A sanction that has application only in limited spheres of activity is found in the National 
Heritage Resources Act,64 to the effect that, if the owner of a place has been convicted of 
an offence in terms of the Act involving the destruction of, or damage to, the place, the 
Minister on the advice of the relevant authorities, may serve on the owner an order that 
no development of such place may be undertaken, except making good the damage and 
maintaining the cultural value of the place, for a period not exceeding 10 years specified 
in the order.65  This is a provision that has good deterrent value in the case of people who 
take the risk of incurring whatever sentence may be imposed for damaging culturally 
important heritage sites and demolish them in order to carry out development.  Not only 
will such a person be liable to the usual penalty, but he or she may also be forbidden from 
                                                 
62  Act 84 of 1998. 
63  Section 58(8). 
64  Act 25 of 1999. 
65  Section 51(9). 
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carrying out the intended development for a period of time up to ten years, which 




The above analysis reveals that several sanctioning methods other than fines and 
imprisonment are available in environmental legislation.  Most of them (for example, 
compensation orders and forfeiture orders) are supplementary to the usual penalty of fine 
or imprisonment but others, such as community service, are alternatives.  In most cases, 
the justification for using such instruments is persuasive.  Several of these methods are 
used in other jurisdictions. 
There are, in addition to those methods discussed above, several other sanctioning 
methods that have been used or mooted in other countries, particularly those that target 
corporations, which are often seen as difficult to penalise.  Those methods that can be 
used generally will first be considered, followed by corporate penalties. 
 
3 Other sentencing measures 
 
It is probably not necessary for a court to have more sentencing instruments at its disposal 
than those that are already provided for by South African legislation.  The discussion 
below indicates that there are problems with use of ‘traditional’ sentencing methods as far 
as corporate offenders are concerned, but fining or incarcerating an individual are both 
methods that are able adequately to serve the goals of deterrence and retribution. It 
would, therefore, appear to be unnecessary to discuss alternative sentencing methods 
here, but there is one aspect worthy of discussion that is much discussed in the United 
States66 and now seemingly being mooted in South Africa, that relates to the manner in 
which existing penalties are imposed.  This is sentencing guidelines. 
                                                 
66  For example, Jane Barrett ‘Sentencing environmental crimes under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines – A sentencing lottery’ (1992) 22 Environmental Law 1421; Patrick J Devine ‘The Draft 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines for environmental crimes’ (1995) 20 Columbia Jnl of Environmental 
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3.1 Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The South African Law Commission has recently issued a publication entitled Report on 
a New Sentencing Framework,67 in which the Commission recommends not only the 
development of clearly articulated sentencing principles, but also the creation by an 
independent Sentencing Council of sentencing guidelines for particular categories or sub-
categories of offences.68  The Commission published in this document a Sentencing 
Framework Bill, which provides for sentencing guidelines as follows:69 
(1) A sentencing guideline specified sentencing options and their severity for a particular category or 
sub-category of offence. 
(2) The sentencing options that may be included in a guideline are – 
(a) imprisonment; 
(b)  a fine; and 
(c) a community penalty. 
(3) Sentencing guidelines are determined by applying the sentencing principles in section 3 by – 
(a) grading categories or sub-categories of offences according to their comparative seriousness 
and ranking them accordingly; and 
(b) prescribing sentencing options and their severity for categories or sub-categories of offences 
in terms of their ranking of seriousness, which are within the capacity of the correctional 
system to implement. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Law 249; Martin Harrell ‘Organizational environmental crime and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: 
Combining fines with restitution, remedial orders, community service, and probation to benefit the 
environment while punishing the guilty’ (1995) 6 Villanova Environmental LJ 243; Lisa Ann Harig 
‘Ignorance is not bliss: Responsible corporate officers convicted of environmental crimes and the federal 
sentencing guidelines’ (1992) 42 Duke LJ  145 at 156-160; Gary S Lincenberg ‘Sentencing environmental 
crimes’ (1992) 29 American Criminal LR 1235; Cynthia E Carrasco & Michael K Dupee ‘Corporate 
criminal liability’ (1999) 36 American Criminal LR 445 at 457-473; Charles P Bubany ‘Criminal 
enforcement of environmental statutes’ in Frank F Skillern Environmental Protection Deskbook 2 ed 
(1995) 754 at 773-7. 
67  South African Law Commission Report: Project 82: Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) 
(November 2000). 
68  South African Law Commission op cit at 28. 
69  Section 5 of the Bill at 106.  See also section 6. 
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(4) Sentencing guidelines apply nationally but, where the degree of harmfulness of a category or 
sub-category of offence varies significantly from one magisterial district t another, different 
sentencing guidelines may be prescribed for specified magisterial districts. 
(5) In determining the severity of a community penalty as a sentencing option sentencing guidelines 
must specify the number of months of correctional supervision or the number of hours of 
community service. 
(6) In determining the severity of a fine as a sentencing option sentencing guidelines must refer only 
to fine units, as the amount of a fine is calculated in terms of section 22. 
(7) A sentencing guideline may provide – 
(a) for an increase or decrease of up to 30 percent in the severity of a sentencing option; and 
(b) that a part of the whole of a sentence of imprisonment be suspended, if such suspension is 
permitted by this Act. 
As far as calculation of fines is concerned, the idea proposed by the Commission is that 
the Sentencing Council create ‘means categories’ each of which will have a specific fine 
unit of specified value.  Sentencing officials in deciding on sentences will then follow a 
two-part process.  First, they will determine the number of units applicable for that type 
of offence in terms of the principles relating to the seriousness of the offence.  The 
number of fine units will then be multiplied by the value of the units set for the relevant 
means category.  This is to ensure that accused persons are not sentenced to fines that 
they are unable to pay.70 
Given the recommendations of the Law Commission, which are somewhat of a 
departure from existing practice, it will be useful to consider the experiences of the 
United States in the use of sentencing guidelines, with particular reference to the 
environmental sphere. 
In 1984 Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act71 in response to inconsistencies 
in sentencing practice and perceptions of lenient parole practices.  The Act created the 
Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing guidelines for different offences.  The 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) apply to federal environmental law in the 
United States.  The Guidelines comprise a set of specific offence guidelines and a set of 
general adjustments.  There are seven guidelines for environmental offences, each dealing 
                                                 
70  South African Law Commission op cit at 66. 
71  18 USC §§ 3551 et seq and 28 USC §§ 991 et seq. 
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with a specific set of offences.  Each guideline contains a base offence level and so-called 
‘guided departures’ from the base level.  For example, the base level for a violation of the 
Clean Water Act by an individual defendant involving toxic or hazardous effluents, the 
base level is 8.72  (There are also Guidelines for corporate defendants that are discussed 
below).  This base level is adjusted either up or down depending on the characteristics of 
the offence.  For example, if the offence results in a substantial likelihood of death or 
serious bodily injury, the base level is increased by 9 levels.73 
Once the level has been ascertained, this is used to determine the sentence by using the 
Sentencing Table.74  For each level, there are six sets of sentencing ranges depending on 
the criminal history of the offender.  If the overall level is 10, then the range for a first 
offender is 6-12 months imprisonment, while, for the same level, an offender with 13 or 
more ‘criminal history points’ has a range of between 24-30 months.  The offender will 
also be given a fine, also determined using a table.75  A level of 10 will attract a fine of 
between $2 000 and $20 000. 
There may also be a so-called ‘unguided departure’ which gives the Court some 
discretion in adjusting the otherwise rather inflexible guidelines.  These are both upward 
and downward adjustments, but an example of a downward adjustment that would come 
into play in the environmental sphere on occasion relates to the provision of assistance by 
the offender to the authorities.76 
This is a complex system (one of the common criticisms of the Guidelines) and it may 
best be understood by using an example.  If a person contravenes the Clean Water Act by 
a one-off discharge of a hazardous substance without a permit, the base level would be 8 
(for ‘mishandling of hazardous or toxic substances’), to which there would be added an 
upward adjustment of 4 levels because he offence involved a discharge, and another 4 
levels for discharge without a permit.  The total offence level, then, is 16.  For a first 
offender, this would result in a sentence of imprisonment of between 21 and 27 months 
                                                 
72  USSG § 2Q1.2. 
73  USSG § 2Q1.2(b)(2). 
74  § 5A. 
75  USSG § 5E1.2. 
76  USSG § 5K1.1. 
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plus a fine of between $5 000 and $50 000.  This shows that, even for a relatively minor 
transgression of the Clean Water Act, the sentence can be severe, especially considering 
that probation is not possible at level 16 and only 15 percent of time served is allowed for 
early release for good behaviour. 
Even if many South Africans would be dissatisfied with the minor penalty imposed in 
the Sappi Ngodwana case mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, it is likely that 
the majority of the South African public would regard the penalties for environmental 
offences under the United States Guidelines as excessive.  This seems to be a view shared 
by some Americans, although Susan Smith77 has stated that the approach that treats 
environmental crimes as real crimes worthy of prison time is – 
‘thoroughly consistent with American public values.  The American public regards environmental 
protection as a fundamental value, considers hazardous waste to be one of the most significant 
environmental problems, and regards corporate pollution as immoral.  In surveys, corporate 
polluters are regarded as worse offenders than armed robbers.  Thus, the stringent federal approach 
to environmental criminal law reflects not just good public policy, but political necessity’. 
It is highly unlikely that the South African public would share the views of the 
American public in this regard, especially given the high prevalence of common law 
crime in the country.  However, many South Africans would like to see more stringent 
enforcement of South African law including harsher penalties than those that have been 
imposed in the past.  There may well be scope for imprisonment of environmental 
offenders, but probably only those that have deliberately or repeatedly contravened the 
law. 
In comparing the proposed South African sentencing guidelines and those of the 
United States, it appears that the South African approach will be less complex, although 
the wording of the proposed legislation is wide enough to encompass detailed grading of 
offences depending on a variety of factors like those taken into account by the American 
system.  Where it is unlikely, however, that guidance will be taken from the American 
model is in regard to the severity of the sentences.  The South African environmental 
                                                 
77  Susan L Smith ‘Doing time for environmental crimes: The United States approach to criminal 
enforcement of environmental laws’ (1995) 12 Environmental & Planning LJ 168 at 176 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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ethos has not developed yet to a stage where imprisonment for a relatively small 
environmental infraction will be tolerated. 
The South African sentencing proposals do not explicitly mention corporations and the 
problem of sentencing corporate offenders, although this is a topic that has been 
addressed by the United States Sentencing Commission and many authors.  Our attention 
now turns to this issue. 
 
4 Sentencing Corporations 
 
Sentencing corporations is an issue that has vexed commentators throughout the ages.  
The main reason for this is that corporations have ‘no body to kick and no soul to damn’.  
Put in more real terms, corporations cannot be imprisoned, which means that the only 
alternative penalty of the ‘traditional’ criminal sanctions is the fine.  Many critics have 
indicated that fining corporations is an inadequate penalty78 as the corporations are likely 
to absorb the fine simply as a cost of doing business.79  For example, the chairman of 
Exxon, after the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska, for which the company entered a plea 
agreement amounting to a $100 million criminal fine and accompanying civil settlement 
of $1.1 billion over ten years, is reported to have claimed that this amount ‘would not 
curtail any of [the company’s] plans’.80  On the other hand, if the fine is set high enough 
to circumvent this possibility, there are other problems, discussed below. 
The purpose of this analysis is to consider why it is that traditional forms of sentencing 
are problematic in respect of corporations and to evaluate innovative alternatives that 
have been mooted. 
 
                                                 
78  See John D Wilson ‘Re-thinking penalties for corporate environmental offenders: A view of the Law 
Reform Comission of Canada’s Sentencing in Environmental Cases’ (1985) 31 McGill LJ 313 at 318-21. 
79  Steven Zipperman ‘The Park doctrine – Application of strict criminal liability to corporate individuals 
for violation of environmental crimes’ (1991) 10 UCLA Jnl of Environmental Law & Policy 123 at 153; 
Rachel Mulheron ‘Criminal enforcement of environmental law: Limitations and “flat-earth thinking” 
sanctions’ (1996) Queensland Law Society Jnl 427 at 436. 
80  Mulheron ibid. 
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It can be argued that conviction alone does have a potential retributive and deterrent 
impact on corporate offenders.  The stigma imposed by criminal conviction cannot be 
written off a cost of doing business.  However, the stigma of criminal conviction will 
only be significant if there is publicisation of the conviction, which is often not the case.    
In practice, then, the deterrent and retributive impacts on the corporation imposed by 




The main problem with fines is that, first, imposition of fines does not necessarily 
stimulate the guilty corporation to exercise adequate internal control or to revise their 
defective procedures.  Secondly, they convey the impression that permission to commit a 
crime may be bought for a price.82  This conflicts with the goals of deterrence and 
retribution which are, in part, to express the view that offences are ‘socially unwanted 
and that money alone cannot adequately compensate’.83 
Fines can easily fall victim to what Coffee calls the ‘deterrence trap’,84 which arises 
when the size of the fine that is necessary to bring about effective deterrence is larger 
than an amount that the corporation can pay.  A small corporation will not be more 
threatened by a R5 million fine if it cannot pay one of R50 000.  At least where an 
individual is unable to pay a fine, he or she can be deterred by the threat of imprisonment.  
As Coffee points out, ‘our ability to deter the corporation may be confounded by our 
inability to set an adequate punishment cost which does not exceed the corporation’s 
                                                 
81  See Brent Fisse ‘Reconstructing corporate criminal law: Deterrence, retribution, fault and sanctions’ 
(1983) 56 Southern California LR 1141 at 1221  
82  Fisse op cit at 1217. 
83  Ibid. 
84  John C Coffee Jr ‘“No soul to damn: No body to kick”: An unscandalized inquiry into the problem of 
corporate punishment’ (1981) 79 Michigan LR 386 at 389-93. 
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resources’.85  This problem was identified by Fischel & Sykes in their analysis of the 
United States Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, implemented in 1991.86  What the 
authors called overdeterrence characteristic of the massive monetary amounts (fines 
coupled with restitution), however, does not apply to environmental offences, which are 
excluded from the ambit of these Guidelines.87  Although the Sentencing Commission’s 
Advisory Working Group released a draft set of organizational sentencing guidelines for 
environmental offences, which were met by much opposition,88 mainly due to their 
severity, these have not been taken further. 
Not only do fines suffer from the problem with deterrence in the context of corporate 
offenders, but there is also a ‘retribution trap’. A retributive fine based on the idea of 
justice as fairness89 may also be far larger than that which the offender can pay.  As 
Braithwaite says,90 
‘Given what we know about how disapproving the community feels toward corporate crime, there 
may be many situations where the deserved monetary or other punishment bankrupts the company.  
The community then cuts off its nose to spite its face’. 
In addition to the problems of the deterrence trap and retribution trap, fining corporations 
may also operate unjustly in that the cost of paying the fine falls largely on innocent 
shareholders, or they can be externalised by imposing the costs upon consumers or 
employees of the corporation. 
Further problems with fining corporations are what Coffee calls the externality 
problem and the nullification problem.  The externality problem, put simply, is that the 
imposition of a fine on a corporation imposes costs (externalities) on persons who are 
                                                 
85  Coffee op cit at 390. 
86  Daniel R Fischel & Alan O Sykes ‘Corporate crime’ (1996) 25 Journal of Legal Studies 319 at 343 ff. 
87  USSG § 8C2.1.  Environmental offences are excluded from the scope of the section on fines, but are 
subject to the requirements of restitution and probation. 
88  See Patrick J Devine ‘The Draft Organizational Sentencing Guidelines for Environmental Crimes’ 
(1995) 20 Columbia Jnl of Environmental Law 249. 
89  This idea requires that a person who benefits from a criminal act that incurs a cost on society must make 
restitution for the social losses he or she brought about: Fisse op cit at 1218 n371. 
90  John Braithwaite ‘Challenging just deserts: Punishing white-collar criminals’ (1982) 73 Jnl of Criminal 
Law & Criminology 723 at 757. 
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largely innocent (some completely innocent).  This can be referred to as overspill of the 
costs of deterrence.  Persons thus affected are stockholders (who can perhaps be regarded 
as not completely innocent since they have been benefiting from tainted proceeds), 
creditors (through a diminution of the value of their securities reflecting the increasing 
riskiness of the enterprise), employees (who may be affected, maybe even retrenched, as 
a result of cost-cutting in response to a severe fine) and consumers.91 
The externality problem gives rise to the nullification problem: that judges are 
reluctant to impose fines approaching the maximum they can because of their perceptions 
of the overspill of negative impact on innocent persons.  This leads to nullification of the 
legislation. 
 
4.3 Managerial intervention 
 
This penalty would entail a court order requiring internal discipline and organisation 
reform.  Internal discipline orders would place responsibility upon the corporation for 
investigating the offence and bringing the appropriate individuals within the corporate 
structure to book.  Organisational reform would involve the installation of preventive 
policies or procedures, or modification of existing ones, in order to prevent the repetition 
of offences.  Fisse recommends the imposition of managerial intervention by means of a 
‘punitive injunction’, as opposed to probation, due to view of probation as being a ‘soft 
option’ alternative to other penalties.  The view may well have been valid at the time that 
Fisse was writing, but probation has subsequently been ‘promoted’ to a sentence in its 
own right, and often a supplement to other penalties,92 so managerial intervention could 
be imposed as a condition of corporate probation. 
The main advantages of managerial intervention are that, in short, they are directed at 
managers rather than shareholders and other victims of the overspill of fines, and they 
encourage reform of policies and procedures within the organisation.93   
                                                 
91  See Coffee op cit at 401-2. 
92  See USSG § 8D. 
93  See Fisse 1237-8 for more detail. 
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4.4 Community Service 
 
This penalty has been discussed above, but its focus is currently on individual offenders 
rather than corporate offenders.  Corporate offenders could be required to carry out 
community service by means of undertaking socially useful work projects tailored to the 
offender’s skills and resources and reasonably related to the offence subject to the 
sentence.  Harrell calls such projects ‘beneficial environmental projects’.94 
Community service is normally viewed as involving service ‘in kind’ but it can be 
imposed in the form of requiring offenders to pay money for charitable purposes.95  In 
certain cases, courts have imposed as a condition of probation either the membership of 
environmental groups or payment of monetary contributions to such groups,96 but this 
would appear to be a practice of somewhat dubious efficacy. 
The United States Sentencing Guidelines for organisations provides for the imposition 
of community service for corporations, ‘where such community service is reasonably 
designed to repair the harm caused by the damage’.97  In the commentary to this section 
of the Guidelines, which is intended to provide guidance as to how to apply the section, it 
is stated that – 
‘where the convicted organization possesses knowledge, facilities, or skills that uniquely qualify it 
to repair damage caused by the offense, community service directed at repairing damage may 
provide an efficient means of remedying harm caused.  
In the past, some forms of community service imposed on organizations have not been related to 
the purposes of sentencing. Requiring a defendant to endow a chair at a university or to contribute to 
a local charity would not be consistent with this section unless such community service provided a 
                                                 
94  Martin Harrell ‘Organizational environmental crime and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: 
Combining fines with restitution, remedial orders, community service, and probation to benefit the 
environment while punishing the guilty’ (1995) 6 Villanova Environmental LJ 243. 
95  United States v Allied Chemical Corp 420 F Supp 122 (ED Va 1976) and United States v Olin 
Corporation Criminal No. 78-30 slip op (D Conn 1 June 1978). 
96  See Jaimy M Levine ‘”Join the Sierra Club!”: Imposition of ideology as a condition of probation’ 
(1994) 142 Univ of Pennsylvania LR 1841 especially at 1842 n7. 
97  USSG § 8B1.3. 
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means for preventive or corrective action directly related to the offense and therefore served one of 
the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’.  
This would suggest that those cases that view community service as involving payment of 
an amount of money to a worthy cause are in most cases unlikely to satisfy the goals of 
community service. 
The advantages of community service are, first, that it serves the goals of deterrence 
and retribution in three ways that fines do not.  First, it relates to nonmonetary values as 
well as monetary values in that it has the capacity to inflict loss of power and autonomy 
on the corporation.98  Second, community service need not be ‘subverted by the micro-
goals of organizational subunits’, provided that community service requires the 
participation of the whole organisation.  Third, whereas fines give the impression that 
criminality can be purchased, community service has the ability to express the social 
undesirability of crime.  These three factors apply equally to adverse publicity and 
redress facilitation discussed below.  Further benefits of community service are that it 
does not fall into the deterrence and retribution traps, and it is unlikely to have negative 
impacts on shareholders, employees and consumers.  As Fisse explains – 
‘Community service projects could create new employment opportunities for persons unemployed 
or otherwise at risk of being laid off and, although the financial costs may be passed on to 
consumers, there would also be a positive externality – the service rendered to the community’.99 
In the well-known Canadian case of R v Bata Industries Ltd,100 a Bata Industries plant 
in Ontario, Canada, produced hazardous liquid industrial waste which was allowed to 
seep into the ground and contaminate groundwater.  The company was prosecuted and 
convicted under provincial environmental legislation and fined $60 000.  In addition, the 
Court imposed a probation order, the conditions of which required the payment of a 
further $60 000 to the establishment of a local toxic waste disposal programme.101  Given 
the views of the United States Sentencing Commission set out above, it is unlikely that 
this aspect of the Bata decision would accord with the goals of community service in the 
                                                 
98  Fisse op cit at 1239. 
99  Fisse op cit at 242. 
100  (1992) 7 CELR (NS) 293 (Ont Prov Div). 
101  This amount was halved on appeal: Bata (1993) 14 OR (3d) 354 (Gen Div). 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions       424 
Chapter 12   Sentencing environmental crimes 
 
 
United States.  Had the corporation been required to use it skills and resources to 
establish the programme itself, however, that would presumably have been acceptable.   
Further aspects of the sentencing in the Bata case are discussed below. 
 
4.5 Adverse publicity 
 
Nowadays, it is recognised that corporate prestige is a significant corporate asset that is 
closely related to its financial success.  A requirement, either instead of or in addition to, 
other penalties, that the corporate offender publicise its conviction and the details of the 
offence at its own cost (and to the satisfaction of the court, to prevent a corporation 
producing something that nobody will read), may be a useful sanction that rests on the 
stigmatisation effect of criminal conviction.  It has been argued that the impact of adverse 
publicity is too uncertain to justify its use,102 but, as Fisse, points out all sentencing 
involves uncertainties of impacts and this alone does not warrant rejection of the idea.103 
The advantages of adverse publicity orders are essentially the same as those of 
community service.104  There may be some doubt, however, as to Fisse’s claim that the 
overspill of adverse publicity to workers or consumers as a result of the company’s 
tarnished image would be minimised.  Given the extent of environmental consciousness 
today in certain countries, adverse publicity may well lead to consumers avoiding the 
company’s products, which may well have an impact on employees if loss of market 
share is significantly serious. 
Adverse publicity orders are not just an idea – they have been used in practice. In 
terms of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1987, a convicted offender may 
be ordered to publish the facts involved in the commission of the offence.  In the Bata 
case,105 the Court imposed, in addition to a fine, a probation order on the corporation 
                                                 
102  See, for example, Coffee op cit at 427-8. 
103  Fisse op cit at 1230-1. 
104  See Fisse op cit 1239-1243. 
105  (Supra). 
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requiring it to publicise in its newsletter the facts relating to its conviction.  On appeal, 
the Court restricted this order to apply only within Canada.106 
 
4.6 Redress Facilitation 
 
This measure envisages the offender being required to facilitate the provision of civil 
compensatory options to the victims of the offence.  Examples given by Fisse include 
punitive discovery orders and requiring offenders to give notice of conviction to 
victims.107  The likely criticism of this measure as being overly harsh can be met by the 
response that, as an alternative to a fine, it may not be harsh.  Moreover, if reserved for 
offences which call for harsh sentences, it may be a necessary measure to meet the 
deterrent aims of punishment. 
The United States Sentencing Guidelines do provide for an order requiring both an 
individual108 and a corporate defendant109 to provide notice of the offence to victims in 
circumstances contemplated by USC § 3555, which requires such notice in cases of 
‘fraud or other intentionally deceptive practices’.  This type of measure is ideal in such 
cases, where some victims may not know that they have been the victims of a crime, but 
it is difficult to think of instances where this would be relevant in the environmental 
sphere.  Redress facilitation, therefore, is likely to be of limited use in the context of 
environmental crimes.  
 
4.7 Equity Fines 
 
Coffee proposes the use of equity fines,110 which would operate essentially as follows: 
                                                 
106 Bata (supra n101). See Peter Bowal ‘In pursuit of original principle: Sentencing in R v Bata Industries 
Ltd’ (1994) 4 Jnl of Environmental Law and Practice 197. 
107  Fisse op cit at 1233. 
108  USSG § 5F1.4. 
109  USSG § 8B1.4. 
110  Coffee op cit at 413-424. 
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‘[W]hen very severe fines need to be imposed on the corporation, thy should be imposed not in cash, 
but in the equity securities of the corporation.  The convicted corporation should be required to 
authorize and issue such number of shares to the state’s crime victim compensation fund as would 
have an expected market value equal to the cash fine necessary to deter illegal activity.  The fund 
should then be able to liquidate the securities in whatever manner maximises its return’. 
In broad terms, the justification for equity fines Coffee offers are: 
 The overspill of corporate penalties onto workers and consumers is reduced, since 
the cost of deterrence will rest exclusively on the shareholders.111 
 As a result of the reduction of overspill, the nullification problem may be 
reduced.112 
 Significantly higher penalties may be imposed, ‘because the market valuation of 
the typical corporation vastly exceeds the cash resources available to it (with 
which a cash fine may be paid)’.113 
 It leads to better alignment of the manager’s self-interest with that of the 
corporation, since the decline in the stock will reduce the value of stock options 
and incentive compensation available to him or her.114 
 The creation of a large marketable block of securities makes the corporation an 
inviting target for a takeover.115 
 Stockholders would be inclined to take less of a short-term, profit-maximising 
view and would be likely to require better internal controls within their 
corporation.116 
On the other hand, Fisse identifies the following shortcomings of the equity fine idea:117 
 Managers’ self-interest may be affected only to the extent that they hold stock or 
stock options in their company at the time in question. 
                                                 
111  Coffee op cit at 413-6. 
112  Ibid. 
113  Coffee op cit at 413.  See also 419-20. 
114  Coffee op cit at 413-4 and 417-8. 
115  Coffee op cit at 414 and 418. 
116  Coffee op cit at 414 and 418-9. 
117  Fisse op cit at 1236. 
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 They suffer from a similar drawback to cash fines in that they do not guarantee 
the overhaul of internal policies and procedures relating to discipline and 
compliance. 
 They emphasise the price of crime rather than the social disvalue of crime.  This 
is a drawback that is also shared by cash fines. 
 They would ‘minimize the injustice of overspills to workers and consumers at the 
expense of maximizing the unjust distribution of costs to shareholders’.118  
These shortcomings, coupled with the fact that as a novel idea the implementation of 
equity fines would require compelling argument in favour of its advantages, suggest that 
their time has not yet come, particularly in South Africa where corporations are not 
currently prosecuted widely for environmental offences. 
 
4.8 Prohibition of indemnification of corporate officers 
 
Although not really a penalty to be imposed on a corporation, an order prohibiting the 
corporation from indemnifying corporate officers who have been sentenced to fines, 
could be imposed as a condition of probation.  This was done in the Bata case,119 and is 
prohibited in England by section 310 of the Companies Act.  While the objective behind 
such an order is a commendable one – payment of the corporation of its officers’ fines 
would undermine the sentencing objectives vis-à-vis the officer – there may well be 
insurmountable impracticalities as far as enforcement of the order is concerned that 
would serve to outweigh the value of such an order.120  While it is true that it may be very 
difficult for the authorities to ascertain whether, in fact, indemnification has been made in 
ways that are not obvious, the merit of such an order is, at the very least, to prevent 
blatant acts of indemnification that would serve to bring the law into disrepute. 
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120  Kathleen Kwan ‘Analysis of Bata’ (1994) 6 Jnl of Environmental Law 119 at 121-2. 
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4.9 Disqualification from government contracts 
 
Such a penalty could certainly have significant deterrent impact on offending 
corporations.  According to Cohen,121 firms convicted of crimes may be debarred or 
suspended from federal contracting, although suspensions and debarments are generally 
imposed by government agencies, not directly by the courts.   He reported that, in 1990, 
the Environmental Protection Agency had considered pursuit of such actions against 
firms convicted of environmental crimes, but the idea does not seem to have materialised.  
It could be argued that it is not the role of the court to distribute government largesse,122 
and, in addition, this may provide severe hardship for the government in a country with a 
relatively small economy if the only supplier capable of serving the government’s needs 
were so disqualified.  Perhaps such a measure would be useful not as a stand-alone 
sanction, but a condition of probation.  For example, a corporation ordered to implement 
a corporate compliance programme might be disqualified from government contracts 





Despite the criticism of corporate fines above, there is, it is submitted, still a role for 
corporate fines to play, but not as the sole sanction on an offending corporation.  The 
above analysis indicates that there are several creative sentencing ideas relating to 
corporations, a number of which are already being used.  These can be used in 
conjunction with fines.  Most of the sentencing options mentioned above are imposed as 
conditions of probation, a concept which is foreign to South African law, at least under 
that name.  It would be possible, however, to make use of (or adapt) the practice of 
                                                 
121 Mark A Cohen ‘Criminal law: Environmental crime and punishment: Legal/Economic theory 
and empirical evidence on enforcement of Federal environmental statutes’ (1992) 82 Jnl of Criminal Law 
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postponed or suspended sentences, which is already provided for in the Criminal 
Procedure Act.123  Section 297(1) provides – 
Where a court convicts a person of any offence, other than an offence in respect of which any law 
prescribes a minimum punishment, the court may in its discretion – 
(a) postpone for a period not exceeding five years the passing of sentence and release the person 
concerned – 
(i) on one or more conditions, whether as to – 
(aa) compensation; 
(bb) rendering to the person aggrieved of some specific benefit or service in lieu of 
compensation for damage or pecuniary loss; 
(cc) the performance without remuneration and outside the prison of some service for the 
benefit of the community under the supervision or control of an organization or 
institution which, or person who, in the opinion of the court, promotes the interests of 
the community (in this section referred to as community service); 
(ccA) submission to correctional supervision; 
(dd) submission to instruction or treatment; 
(ee) submission to the supervision or control (including control over the earnings or other 
income of the person concerned) of a probation office as defined in the Probation 
Services Act, 1991; 
(ff)  the compulsory attendance or residence at some specified centre for a specified 
purpose; 
(gg) good conduct; 
(hh) any other matter; 
and order such person to appear before the court at the expiration of the relevant period; or 
(ii) unconditionally, and order such person to appear before the court, if called upon before the 
expiration of the relevant period; or 
(b) pass sentence but order the operation of the whole or any part thereof to be suspended, for a 
period not exceeding five years on any condition referred to in paragraph (a)(i) which the court 
may specify in the order…’  
Although the section appears to be aimed at individual offenders, it could be easily 
adapted for corporate offenders to provide for the conditions imposing relevant forms of 
managerial intervention and adverse publicity orders.  Managerial intervention could 
require either the institution of internal disciplinary procedures relating to the incident in 
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question and/or the implementation of compliance procedures or programmes to the 
satisfaction of the court.  Failure to comply within a specified time would lead to the 
postponed sentence being brought into operation. 
A model provision catering for these ideas (referring to the Schedule 3 offences 
contemplated by the National Environmental Management Act) could read as follows: 
(1) Where a court convicts a corporation of any offence listed in Schedule 3, other than an offence in 
respect of which any law prescribes a minimum punishment, the court may in its discretion – 
(a) postpone for a period not exceeding five years the passing of sentence on one or more 
conditions, whether as to – 
(aa) compensation; 
(bb) rendering to the person aggrieved of some specific benefit or service in lieu of 
compensation for damage or pecuniary loss; 
(cc) the performance without remuneration of some service for the benefit of the 
community under the supervision or control of an organization or institution which, or 
person who, in the opinion of the court, promotes the interests of the community; 
 (dd) the implementation by the corporation to the satisfaction of the court of disciplinary 
procedures within the corporation in connection with the offence for which this 
sentence was imposed: Provided that the corporation shall compile a report setting out 
the disciplinary procedures followed, the findings arising out of such procedures and 
any disciplinary action taken by the corporation pursuant to such findings, which 
report shall be submitted to the court which imposed the condition; 
(ee) the implementation by the corporation to the satisfaction of the court of  policies and 
procedures designed to avoid non-compliance with the legislation contravened by the 
legislation that led to the conviction for which this sentence was imposed; 
(ff)  the placing of advertisements in a publication or publications as may be specified by 
the court either setting out the facts leading to the conviction and the findings and 
sentence of the court or containing whatever text as may be ordered by the court; 
(gg) good conduct; 
(hh) any other matter; 
and order such corporation to appear before the court at the expiration of the relevant period; or 
(b) pass sentence but order the operation of the whole or any part thereof to be suspended, for a 
period not exceeding five years on any condition referred to in paragraph (a) which the court 
may specify in the order…’ 
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The challenge for sentencing environmental crimes is to strike a happy medium between 
treating environmental offenders overly leniently, on the one hand, or too harshly, on the 
other.  Marais JA has summed up well what the courts’ attitudes should be towards 
white-collar criminals, and it is submitted that his comments are equally apposite to 
environmental offenders, many of whom are white-collar criminals, but perhaps in a 
slightly different context to those contemplated by the judge in his dicta in S v Sadler124 – 
 ‘So called “white collar crime” has, I regret to have to say, often been visited in South African 
courts with penalties which are calculated to make the game seem worth the candle.  Justifications 
often advanced for such inadequate penalties are the classification of “white collar” crime as non-
violent crime and its perpetrators (where they are first offenders) as not truly being “criminals” or 
“prison material” by reason of their often ostensibly respectable histories and backgrounds.  Empty 
generalisations of that kind are of no help in assessing appropriate sentences for “white collar” 
crime.  Their premise is that prison is only a place for those who commit crimes of violence and that 
it is not a place for people from “respectable” backgrounds even if their dishonesty has caused 
substantial loss, was resorted to for no other reason than self-enrichment, and entailed gross 
breaches of trust. 
These are heresies.  Nothing will be gained by lending credence to them.  Quite the contrary.  
The impression that crime of that kind is not regarded by the courts as seriously beyond the pale and 
will probably not be visited with rigorous punishment will be fostered and more will be tempted to 
indulge in it’.125 
On the other hand, the approach adopted in the United States seems to be out of 
keeping with what may be regarded as acceptable in South Africa.  Although there does 
seem to be a need to punish environmental offenders more severely, certainly in cases 
where there is deliberate wrongdoing, the sentences handed down in the United States 
often appear to be excessive in the circumstances. 
If the South African Law Commission’s proposals regarding sentencing guidelines 
come to fruition, the Sentencing Council will be faced sooner or later with the question of 
how to set guidelines for environmental offences.  As pointed out above, the lessons 
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learned from the United States guidelines would be to avoid setting sentences as harsh as 
those in the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  It is recommended that sentencing 
options such as compensation, reparations and community service should be retained and, 
indeed, made to apply with uniformity for all environmental offences.  Other sentences 
such as continuing fines, fines equal to advantage gained, fines equal to multiples of the 
value of the damaged item or animal and forfeiture should also continue to be used where 
appropriate. 
Furthermore, in deciding what factors to take into account in assessing the appropriate 
sentences under the proposed Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Council could do 
worse than follow the factors set out by the Court in the Canadian case of Bata, 
mentioned above, which was followed by the New Zealand High Court in Augustowicz v 
Machinery Movers Ltd.126  The four ‘key issues’ to be considered are: 
(1) the nature of the environment affected; 
(2) the extent of the damage caused; 
(3) the deliberate nature of the offence; and 
(4) the attitude of the accused. 
When it comes to corporate offenders, five additional considerations come into play: 
(1) the size of the corporation and the nature of its wealth and power; 
(2) the extent of the corporation’s attempts to comply with the law; 
(3) remorse on the defendant’s part; 
(4) the profits realised by the offence; and 
(5) any criminal record or evidence of good character on the part of the corporation. 
It has been argued that the commonly held perception that penalties for environmental 
offences in South Africa are inadequate is largely untrue as far as those provided for by 
legislation are concerned.  There has been cause for concern, though, when it comes to 
sentences actually handed down, although information available on this is sketchy.  There 
are two reasons for optimism on this score, however.  First is the perception that the 
judicial tide against lenient penalties is turning, as evidenced by the Western Cape 
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tortoise-smuggling case discussed above.  The second is that the implementation of 







The previous four Chapters are concerned with the manner in which environmental 
criminal law can be improved in South Africa.  The recommendations have focused on 
substantive issues in the criminal law, whereas the purpose of this brief Chapter is to 
consider some procedural aspects which would probably improve the situation relating to 
criminal prosecution of environmental offences.  The three issues focused on are all 
interrelated and the legal devices concerned are all provided for to an extent in South 
African law.  This Chapter, however, makes recommendations as to how to improve the 
operation of these provisions or to extend their ambit. 
 
1 Private prosecution 
 
Currently in South Africa, the process followed for a prosecution of an environmental 
offence is something like the process for prosecution of an offence under the 1956 Water 
Act as described by the Attorney-General of KwaZulu-Natal in an affidavit quoted in 
Feedmill Developments (Pty) Ltd and another v Attorney-General, KwaZulu-Natal:1 
‘The procedure adopted is that the Umgeni Water Corporation [which acts as an agent for the 
Department of Water Affairs] is responsible for taking samples and in instances where an alleged act 
of pollution appears to have taken place the Department of Water Affairs instructs the South African 
Bureau of Standards to test the samples.  The Department of Water Affairs then pursues the incident 
ultimately referring the matter, via their legal department, to my office.  An authorised member of 
my staff then considers the merits of the investigation, and, if it is felt that the matter deserves 
investigation, refers the said matter to the South African Police Services for investigation.  Upon 
conclusion of the investigation the docket relating to the police investigation is referred to my office 
where an authorised member of my staff evaluates the evidence and decides whether the case merits 
prosecution.  If it is decided that the alleged offender should be prosecuted the docket is referred to 
the appropriate Magistrates Court where it is given to a delegated prosecutor who instructs the 
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investigation officer on any outstanding issues which he/she considers relevant, drafts the charge 
sheet and issues summons’. 
The procedure described is a very cumbersome and time-consuming procedure and 
cannot help but be inefficient. It is important to bear in mind that this is currently the 
procedure followed for any breach of water legislation, and is unlikely to be significantly 
different for breaches of other legislation outside of the water sector, other than as regards 
the involvement of the agent of the Department of Water Affairs, Umgeni Water. 
It is apparent that the necessity for officials in various organs of state managing 
environmental issues to report any breaches of legislation to the South African Police 
Services can be problematic for various reasons.  First, the lack of experience of the 
average police officer in respect of environmental offences can result in the matter being 
ineffectively investigated.  Second, this is exacerbated by the fact that there is often 
inadequate communication between the departmental officer concerned and the police.2 
It is submitted that it would be far more effective in the prosecution of offences, as 
well as less of a burden on state resources, for contraventions of environmental 
legislation to be investigated and prosecuted by legal officers of the relevant organs of 
state, rather than having to rely on the time-consuming process of involving the South 
African Police Services and public prosecutor as outlined in the above quote.  In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the relevant environmental agencies do their own 
prosecutions. 
Technically, there is no need for South African law to be changed or for new law to be 
created to do this in this country.  Section 33 of the National Environmental Management 
Act,3 which provides for private prosecutions,4 can be used for these purposes.   It is 
unlikely, it is submitted, that the average member of the public who is concerned about 
environmental issues and breach of environmental legislation would make use of the 
private prosecution provision, since his or her goals would probably be more than 
adequately served by interdict proceedings.  In other words, there it very little to be 
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3  Act 107 of 1998. 
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gained, other than some satisfaction that an environmental offender has been prosecuted, 
by a member of the public by bringing a private criminal prosecution. 
On the other hand, this provision can be used by environmental agencies to bring ‘in-
house’ prosecutions, thereby ensuring that the persons involved in both investigation and 
prosecution of the offence have experience in the field.  With reference to the example 
given in the Attorney-General’s affidavit above, if the Department of Water Affairs legal 
office were to carry out prosecutions for breaches of water legislation after investigation 
by staff of that Department, the process would be far less cumbersome, less time-
consuming, and, probably, more likely to result in a successful conviction due to the 
experience of the persons involved in that particular legislation and its application. 
One of the possible counters to this suggestion is that the various organs of state do not 
have the resources to mount criminal prosecutions and that many environmental officers 
do not see themselves as enforcement officials and would be reluctant to assume this role.  
Dealing with the second objection first, this could be resolved by the relevant organs 
ensuring that they engage staff who have experience in enforcement specifically for this 
purpose, thus leaving the scientists and other officials to concentrate on areas for which 
they have the appropriate skills and experience.  This would obviously also have resource 
implications.  It is submitted, however, that ‘in-house’ prosecution of environmental 
offences could pay for itself if the following proposals are accepted and implemented. 
 
2 Recovery of costs of prosecution 
 
Several other jurisdictions have legislation allowing the recovery by means of a costs 
order against the defendant (accused) of the costs incurred by the prosecution in 
conducting the trial.  There is provision for this in South African environmental 
legislation, but it does not yet appear to have been used. Let us consider the foreign 
examples before making recommendations in the South African context. 
In the United Kingdom, section 18 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 provides – 
 (1)  Where – 
(a)  any person is convicted of an offence before a magistrates' court; 
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(b)  the Crown Court dismisses an appeal against such a conviction or against the sentence imposed 
on that conviction; or 
(c)  any person is convicted of an offence before the Crown Court the court may make such order as 
to the costs to be paid by the accused to the prosecutor as it considers just and reasonable. 
In New Zealand, the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 provides that, where any 
defendant is convicted by any Court of any offence, the Court may order him or her to 
pay such sum as it thinks just and reasonable towards the costs of the prosecution.5  New 
South Wales in Australia also allows for the recovery of costs in criminal proceedings.  
The Land and Environment Court Act 1979 provides – 
(1) Where a Judge: 
(a)  convicts any person of an offence punishable in the summary jurisdiction of the Court, … 
the Judge may, in and by the conviction or order, order the defendant … to pay to the prosecutor … 
costs of such amount as are specified in the conviction or order or, if the conviction or order so 
directs, as may be determined under subsection (2). 
(2) The costs payable by a prosecutor or defendant in accordance with a direction under this section 
are to be determined: 
(a)  by agreement between the prosecutor and defendant, or 
(b)  if no such agreement can be reached, in accordance with the regulations. 
Whereas the English and New Zealand examples are general criminal costs provisions, 
the New South Wales provision applies specifically to environmental offences which are 
within the jurisdiction of the Land And Environment Court. 
In South Africa, the National Environmental Management Act6 provides – 
Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 the court 
convicting such person may, upon application by the public prosecutor or another organ of state, 
order such person to pay the reasonable costs incurred by the public prosecutor and the organ of 
state concerned in the investigation and prosecution of the offence.7 
The scope of this provision is wide, given the offences listed in Schedule 3, and it is 
perhaps an indication of the paucity of environmental prosecutions in South Africa that 
the provision does not yet appear to have been invoked. 
                                                 
5  Section 4. 
6  Act 107 of 1998. 
7  Section 34(4).  Schedule 3 appears above at 192-4. 
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The attraction of such a provision can be argued quite simply.  The technical 
complexities of some environmental prosecutions, particularly those involving proof of 
breach of standards, results in costly, time-consuming trials.   If these costs could be 
recovered from unsuccessful accused, particularly those who plead not guilty in the face 
of solid evidence for the state in the hope that they can trip the prosecution up on a 
technicality, the apparent reluctance of authorities to prosecute could be reduced.  The 
objective of such a provision, therefore, is twofold.  The first relates to resources – if the 
state can recover the costs, these funds can boost enforcement efforts.  The second 
objective is to provide accused persons with an incentive to plead guilty.  A guilty plea 
would reduce the costs of the trial and, in addition, since the provision is permissive and 
not mandatory, it would be possible for there to be a practice guideline providing that 
costs will not be requested in cases where the accused has co-operated with the 
authorities and/or has pleaded guilty. 
There is, however, one important consideration which might militate against this 
provision and this is whether a measure that induces a person to plead guilty could be 
regarded as infringing the right to a fair trial.  It is submitted that the imposition of costs 
of prosecution on an accused person in such circumstances is not problematic for the 
following reasons.  First, there is, in effect, no difference between providing for payment 
of costs and a court’s taking into account an accused’s guilty plea or efforts to co-operate 
with the authorities as a mitigating sentencing factor, which is common practice.  In a 
similar vein, the imposition of a costs order could be seen, in effect, as an additional fine.  
Were the legislature to increase sentences for environmental offences by an amount 
equivalent to the costs of a trial, this would not attract any adverse constitutional reaction, 
so why should asking the accused to pay the costs of the trial?  Third, the fact that the 
provision is permissive and not mandatory means that the courts ought not to apply the 
provision automatically, but rather to impose costs on convicted person only where 
circumstances justify it.  In this regard, the NEMA provision could be improved by 
including reasons for a court to impose such an order – even if the reasons are expressed 
in relatively vague terms like those in the United Kingdom and New Zealand legislation 
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set out above.  Finally, the right to a fair trial in the Constitution does not provide for the 
right to a free and fair trial.  Several rights come at a cost and this is one of those rights. 
To conclude on this point, the existing NEMA provision could be slightly altered to 
provide for criteria for the exercise of judicial discretion as follows – 
Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any provision listed in Schedule 3 the court 
convicting such person may, upon application by the public prosecutor or another organ of state, 
order such person to pay the reasonable costs incurred by the public prosecutor and the organ of 
state concerned in the investigation and prosecution of the offence if, in the opinion of the court, it is 
just and reasonable to do so. 
 
3 Payment of fines for environmental offences to organs of state managing the 
environment 
 
The Natal Conservation Ordinance8 provides for payment to the Board of all fines or 
estreated bail moneys paid or recovered in respect of any contravention of the ordinance 
or the regulations.9  The extension of such a provision to all environmental offences 
would be advantageous in that it would ensure that the proceeds of prosecutions could be 
channelled into the enforcement efforts of the organ of state in question, instead of being 
subsumed by the gaping maw of the general fiscus.  It is difficult to conceive of any 
objections to this from the Treasury, especially since the extent of fines received for 
environmental offences, on current prosecution levels, must be all but insignificant in the 
overall scheme of things.  Since it is unlikely that there will be increased budgets for 
those organs of state that manage the environment for them to improve their enforcement 
efforts, such a measure can be invaluable in providing for the resources necessary to 
improve enforcement efforts. 
 
                                                 
8  Ordinance 15 of 1974. 
9  Section 216. 
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It is not only by addressing substantive issues of South African environmental criminal 
law that prosecution of environmental offenders will be improved.  The suggestions made 
in this Chapter will serve to improve the existing situation in that, first, they will provide 
a more efficient, less cumbersome and probably more effective alternative to the current 
messy procedure for prosecuting environmental offences.  Second, any increased 
enforcement role envisaged by the use of in-house prosecutions can be offset by 
providing for recovery of the costs of prosecution and channelling of fines to the relevant 





1 Summary of arguments 
 
This thesis argues that the main aim of criminal law in the environmental regulatory 
context is deterrence.1   Retribution is relevant to an extent, but only in cases where the 
community’s condemnation and disapproval would be an issue, which would not be the 
case with most environmental offences, which tend to be, in themselves, relatively minor 
and technical in nature.  Since there are alternatives to the criminal sanction that can 
provide for deterrence, usually more conveniently and cheaply, it would make good sense 
for these mechanisms to be used instead of criminal sanctions where the circumstances 
warrant their use. 
 An analysis of South Africa’s environmental legislation reveals that, for the most part, 
there is an overwhelming reliance on the ‘command and control’ paradigm of law 
enforcement, whereby citizens are essentially coerced into compliance by the threat of 
criminal sanctions.  With very few exceptions, the criminal sanction is the primary or 
default mode of enforcement in environmental legislation.  Whilst there are examples of 
alternative modes of enforcement, in some cases innovative measures, the general 
tendency even in those statutes that do provide for alternatives is to look at criminal 
sanctions as the main enforcement tool.2 
While the main strength of criminal sanctions, particularly in the South African 
context where civil law is not punitive in nature, is that it provides for punishment, there 
are a number of weaknesses in relation to the use of criminal sanctions, most of them 
relating to their efficiency.  It is argued here that, if alternative measures to the criminal 
sanction can be used to deter environmental offenders with less cost and burden than 
criminal sanctions, then those alternatives should be used.  The conclusion of the analysis 
                                                 
1  Chapter 2. 
2  Chapters 4-6. 
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of the strengths and weaknesses of criminal law is that criminal law should be reserved 
for the following cases – 
 cases where there is intentional wrongdoing; 
 cases where there has been persistent wrongdoing; 
 cases where an offender has caused serious harm to people or to the environment 
but only where there is mens rea on the part of the offender, at least in the form of 
negligence.3 
This would be difficult to provide for in legislation, but in order to allow this system to 
work, it would be necessary to provide for alternatives to the criminal sanction. 
A number of alternatives to the criminal sanction were mooted, including 
administrative measures and civil instruments.  Although there are examples of some 
such provisions in South African environmental legislation, they are used inconsistently 
and certainly do not currently present a set of viable alternatives to the criminal sanction 
as enforcement tools in many areas of environmental regulation.  The basic 
recommendation as regards enforcement measures is that a mix of alternatives (statutory, 
delict, civil, criminal, amongst others) should be used according to the nature and 
magnitude of the harm.4   
This, then, is the primary argument of the thesis – various measures should be used for 
purposes of enforcement of environmental law with criminal law being reserved for the 
most serious infringements in the circumstances outlined above. 
Given this first conclusion, the thesis then examines ways in which use of the criminal 
sanction, even in a far more reduced sphere than has been the case so far, can be 
improved.  In this regard, the issues of strict liability, vicarious liability, corporate 
liability, sentencing and some procedural matters are discussed. 
It is argued, first, that there is no need to use strict liability, despite the fact that is used 
fairly widely in other jurisdictions.5  The essential reason for this is that there are 
compelling reasons why strict liability ought not to be used in serious cases, which would 
                                                 
3  Chapter 7. 
4  Chapter 8. 
5  Chapter 9. 
The protection of the environment through the use of criminal sanctions       443 
Chapter 14   Conclusion 
 
 
be the only cases in which the criminal law would be used, if the recommendation of this 
thesis is accepted.  Less serious cases, which have been the traditional preserve of strict 
liability offences, would ideally be addressed by non-criminal measures. 
Vicarious liability is also argued to be unnecessary because its objective, ensuring that 
employers do not hide behind the sins of their employees, can adequately be addressed by 
imaginatively-drafted primary liability provisions.6 
As far as corporate liability is concerned, it is felt that both corporate liability and 
liability of directors are justified but that improvements can be made to the way that these 
are currently provided for in South African law.7  Attention is also given to the issue of 
corporate immunity against self-incrimination arising out of voluntary environmental 
auditing, which is a matter that will surely become important in the near future in South 
Africa.  Various proposals are made in this regard which, it is hoped, strike a balance 
between the aims of enforcement and the rights of the corporation and directors. 
The shortcomings of enforcement of environmental law in South Africa are often laid 
at the door of inadequate penalties, but the thesis argues that this position cannot be 
supported, since, at least on paper, sentences provided by environmental legislation are 
adequate on the whole.  There are, however, some improvements that can be made, 
especially in the context of corporate offenders.8 
Finally, there are some procedural matters that can be improved that, it is submitted, 
will result in criminal prosecutions being more efficient.9 
With these various recommendations in mind, concrete suggestions will now be made 
for legislative provisions to give effect to the proposals made in this thesis, although it 
must be borne in mind that several of the proposals can only effectively be implemented 
by means of administrative discretion – it would not be possible to legislate for the 
proposals effectively. 
 
                                                 
6  Chapter 10. 
7  Chapter 11. 
8  Chapter 12. 
9  Chapter 13. 
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2 Concrete proposals for legislative reform 
 
These suggestions contemplate replacement of sections 33 and 34 of the National 
Environmental Management 107 of 1998 and insertion of a new Chapter entitled 
‘Compliance and Enforcement’.10  It also envisages the creation of a new Schedule, 
called Schedule X below, which contains a list of all the environmental legislation 
surveyed in Chapters 4-6 of this work, where necessary specifying certain sections of an 
Act only.  In the proposed legislative provisions below, the proposals appear in Arial font 
(proposals look like this), with commentary in Times New Roman (the font for the rest of 
the thesis) where necessary following.  Section numbering starts at 1 for convenience. 
 
Chapter 7A 
Compliance and Enforcement 
 
Applicability of Chapter 
 
1. This Chapter applies to all legislation or parts of legislation specified in Schedule X, unless the 
context indicates otherwise. 
 
Environmental enforcement officers 
 
2. In this Chapter, reference to an ‘environmental enforcement officer’ means any of the 
following: 
[List all officials responsible for enforcing environmental legislation – for example, forest officers11 
envisaged by the National Forests Act and nature conservators envisaged by the Mpumalanga 
Nature Conservation Act.12  Alternatively, this could be done by means of a schedule.] 
 
                                                 
10  This would entail renaming the existing Chapter 7 and Part 2 of Chapter 7.  No proposals are made in 
this regard. 
11  Appointed in terms of section 65 of the National Forests Act 84 of 1998. 
12  Defined in section 1 of the Act, Act 37 of 1998 (Mpumalanga). 
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3. (1)  Where a person is alleged to have infringed any provision of any legislation listed in 
Schedule X, or where there exists on land a state of affairs the existence of which is alleged to be 
an offence in terms of such legislation, an environmental enforcement officer may inform the 
person who has infringed the legislation or the owner of land upon which an offence has 
occurred, as the case may be, by written notice of – 
(a) the nature of the infringement; 
(b) the steps which that person or owner must take to remedy the infringement; and 
(c) the period within which he or she must do so. 
(2) Failure to comply with a notice served in terms of subsection (1) is an offence. 
(3) Notice in terms of this section will be regarded as a directive in terms of section 28(4) of 
this Act and the provisions of section 28 shall apply to any person who fails to comply with such 
notice, with the necessary changes. 
(4) Any person or owner upon whom a notice under this section has been served may, within 
ten days of receipt of such notice, appeal to the competent authority against the allegation that an 
offence has been committed or the directive requiring steps to be taken or both such allegation 
and such directive. 
(5) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette determine such procedures to be followed and 
fees to be paid for appeals in terms of subsection (4) as he or she sees fit. 
 
Comment: The purpose of this provision is to provide one type of alternative enforcement 
measure in the form of an infringement notice requiring the alleged offender to redress 
the problem, failing which it will be regarded as a directive that has not been complied 
with as envisaged by section 28 of NEMA, which brings into effect the consequences of 
such default as contemplated by that section.  In other words, failure to comply with an 
infringement notice may result in the relevant authority taking the necessary steps to 
redress the problem and recovering the costs from any of the persons contemplated by 
section 28(9).  This notice, which combines elements of an abatement notice and a notice 
requiring positive steps on the part of the offender, can be a very effective way of 
addressing environmental offences, other than very serious ones, with a relatively small 
administrative effort and with potentially optimal consequences for the environment.  The 
use of such measures should, therefore, be encouraged.  Reference is made in subsection 
(4) to the competent authority.    The idea behind the ‘competent authority’ is that this 
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could be defined as including the Directors-General of the various departments concerned 
with environmental management, both national and provincial.  The competent authority 
for the National Water Act, therefore, would be the Director-General of Water Affairs 
and Forestry, whereas the competent authority for the Environment Conservation Act 
would be the Director-General of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
and so on. 
 
Cancellation and suspension of authorisation, licences and permits 
 
4. (1) If a holder of any authorisation, licence or permit in terms of any legislation listed in 
Schedule X— 
(a) has furnished information in the application for that authorisation, licence or permit, or has 
submitted any other information required in terms of the legislation which provides for such 
authorisation, licence or permit, which is not true or complete; 
(b) contravenes or fails to comply with a condition imposed in the authorisation, licence or 
permit; 
(c) contravenes or fails to comply with a provision of such legislation; 
(d) is convicted of an offence in terms of such legislation; or 
(e) fails effectively to utilise that authorisation, licence or permit, 
the competent authority may by written notice delivered to such holder, or sent by registered post 
to the said holder’s last known address, request the holder to show cause in writing, within a 
period of 21 days from the date of the notice, why the authorisation, licence or permit should not 
be revoked, suspended, cancelled, altered or reduced, as the case may be. 
(2) The competent authority shall after expiry of the period referred to in subsection (1) refer 
the matter, together with any reason furnished by the holder in question, to the relevant Minister 
for that Minister’s decision. 
(3) When a matter is referred to the relevant Minister in terms of subsection (2), that Minister 
may— 
(a) revoke the authorisation, licence or permit; 
(b) suspend the authorisation, licence or permit for a period determined by the Minister; 
(c) cancel the authorisation, licence or permit from a date determined by the Minister; 
(d) alter the terms or conditions of the authorisation, licence or permit; or 
(e) decide not to revoke, suspend, cancel, alter or reduce the authorisation, licence or permit. 
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Comment:  The administrative (as opposed to judicial) revocation or suspension of an 
authorisation, permit or licence ought to be provided for in legislation that provides for 
the issue of such authorisations.  This proposed provision is based on section 58(8) of the 
National Forests Act.13  It envisages a process entailing natural justice, as would probably 
be required by administrative law.   
The section in the National Forests Act requires the Director-General to carry out the 
tasks that the proposed section above gives to the ‘competent authority’.  This term is 




5. (1) If a person is alleged to have committed an offence in terms of any legislation listed in 
Schedule 3, an environmental enforcement officer may deliver by hand to that person (hereinafter 
referred to as the infringer) an administrative penalty notice which must contain the particulars 
contemplated in subsection (2). 
(2) A notice referred to in subsection (1) must— 
(a) specify the name and address of the infringer; 
(b) specify the particulars of the alleged offence; 
(c) specify the amount of the administrative penalty payable, which may not exceed fifty 
penalty units; 
(d) inform the infringer that, not later than 30 days after the date of service of the infringement 
notice, the infringer may— 
(i) pay the administrative penalty; 
(ii) make arrangements with the competent authority to pay the administrative penalty in 
instalments; or 
(iii) elect to be tried in court on a charge of having committed the alleged offence; and 
(e) state that a failure to comply with the requirements of the notice within the time permitted, 
will result in the administrative penalty becoming recoverable as contemplated in 
subsection (4). 
(3) If an infringer elects to be tried in court on a charge of having committed the alleged 
contravention or failure, the competent authority must hand the matter over to the prosecuting 
authority and inform the infringer accordingly. 
                                                 
13  Act 84 of 1998. 
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(4) If an infringer fails to comply with the requirements of a notice, the competent authority 
may file with the clerk or registrar of any competent court a statement certified by him or her as 
correct, setting forth the amount of the administrative penalty payable by the infringer, and such 
statement thereupon has all the effects of a civil judgment lawfully given in that court in favour of 
the competent authority for a liquid debt in the amount specified in the statement. 
(5) An environmental enforcement officer may not impose an administrative penalty 
contemplated in this section if the person concerned has been charged with a criminal offence in 
respect of the same set of facts. 
(6) No prosecution may be instituted against a person if the person concerned has paid an 
administrative penalty in terms of this section in respect of the same set of facts. 
(7) An administrative penalty imposed in terms of this section does not constitute a previous 
conviction as contemplated in Chapter 27 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 
1977). 
(8) Any person upon whom an administrative penalty under this section has been imposed 
may, within ten days of receipt of such notice, appeal to the competent authority against the 
allegation that an offence has been committed or the penalty imposed or both such allegation and 
such penalty. 
(9) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette determine such procedures to be followed and 
fees to be paid for appeals in terms of subsection (8) as he or she sees fit. 
 
Comment: This provision is based on section 122 of the Firearms Control Act,14 but 
simplified.  It also contains a right of appeal, which allows an initial, easy to use, 
safeguard against administrative abuse of power. 
Subsection (2)(c) refers to penalty units.  This is a concept used in Australia which 
obviates the need to amend legislation to update maximum fines.  The Minister may be 
empowered to declare by notice in the Gazette, the amount of one penalty unit, which 
may be amended from time to time to account for inflation by notice in the Gazette.  It is 
envisaged that at current penalty levels, one penalty unit would be one thousand rand.  
This means that the maximum administrative penalty that could be imposed in terms of 
this section would be R50 000, which is a not insignificant sum of money.  The Firearms 
Control Act, however, provides for administrative penalties of up to R100 000 (R50 000 
                                                 
14  Act 60 of 2000. 
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for first offences), so this amount does not seem to be out of kilter with that Act (which is 
currently the only South African legislation that can be used by way of comparison). 
The benefits of administrative penalties are discussed in Chapter 8 at §2.1.3.  In 
Chapter 4, it was noted that two Acts contained summary enquiry procedures which were 
commented on favourably in this work (the Marine Pollution (Control and Civil 
Liability)15 and the Marine Pollution (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act16).  
Although this is a curiously underutilised device which would serve to reduce some of 
the inefficiencies of the criminal law, the administrative penalty system mooted here 
would serve the same objectives with arguably greater efficiency. 
 
Interdict or other order by High Court 
 
6. A High Court may, on application by the relevant Minister or a competent authority, grant an 
interdict or any other appropriate order against any person who has contravened any provision of 
any legislation listed on Schedule X, including an order to discontinue any activity constituting the 
contravention and to remedy the adverse effects of the contravention. 
 
Comment: See Chapter 8 at §2.2.1 for discussion on this device.  This provision is based 
on section 155 of the National Water Act.17 
 
Common law civil liability not excluded 
 
7. Nothing in this Act shall be taken as excluding the common law right of any person to claim 
compensation for any loss or damage suffered by that person where such loss or damage arises 
out of an act that constitutes an offence in terms of any legislation listed on Schedule X. 
 
Comment: See discussion in Chapter 8 at §2.2.3. 
 
                                                 
15  Act 6 of 1981 – commentary at 116 (supra). 
16  Act 2 of 1986. 
17  Act 36 of 1998. 
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Strict liability for damage caused by hazardous activities 
 
8. (1) Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), any person who is convicted of an offence listed in 
Schedule H, whether or not there is intent or negligence on the part of that person, is liable for all 
harm or damage caused by or resulting from the act or omission which constitutes the offence for 
which that person was convicted. 
(2) Nothing in this section precludes a person from claiming a benefit in terms of the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 1993 (Act No. 130 of 1993), but such 
person may not benefit both in terms of this Act and the Compensation for Occupational Injuries 
and Diseases Act, 1993. 
(3) A convicted person contemplated in subsection (1) is not liable to any person for any harm 
or damage if that person intentionally caused, or intentionally contributed to, such damage. 
(4) Nothing in this section affects any right, which any person has in terms of any contract of 
employment, to benefits more favourable than those to which that person may be entitled in terms 
of this section. 
 
Comment: This provision is very loosely based on section 30 of the National Nuclear 
Regulator Act.18  The desirability of such a provision is discussed in Chapter 8 at §2.2.3. 
This section envisages a further Schedule, Schedule H, which is intended to 
incorporate all offences which involve hazardous substances or hazardous activities.  The 
justification for this measure is that persons who involve themselves in hazardous 
activities should, from the start, be aware of the possibility of harm occurring and be 
prepared to incur responsibility for such harm irrespective of their fault in respect of the 
occurrence of the harm in question.   The idea is somewhat like an extended negligence 
concept where a person who engages in hazardous activities is regarded as having a 
heightened duty of care towards other persons and to the environment, requiring conduct 




9. (1) Any person may— 
(a) in the public interest; or 
                                                 
18  Act 47 of 1999. 
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(b) in the interest of the protection of the environment, 
institute and conduct a prosecution in respect of any breach or threatened breach of any duty, 
other than a public duty resting on an organ of state, in any national or provincial legislation or 
municipal bylaw, or any regulation, licence, permission or authorisation issued in terms of such 
legislation, where that duty is concerned with the protection of the environment and the breach of 
that duty is an offence. 
(2) The provisions of sections 9 to 17 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977) 
applicable to a prosecution instituted and conducted under section 8 of that Act must apply to a 
prosecution instituted and conducted under subsection (1): Provided that if— 
(a) the person instituting a private prosecution does so through a person entitled to practice as 
an advocate or an attorney in the Republic; 
(b) the person instituting a private prosecution has given written notice to the appropriate 
public prosecutor that he or she intends to do so; and 
(c) the public prosecutor has not, within 28 days of receipt of such notice, stated in writing that 
he or she intends to prosecute the alleged offence, 
(i) the person instituting a private prosecution shall not be required to produce a certificate 
issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions stating that he or she has refused to 
prosecute the accused; and 
(ii) the person instituting a private prosecution shall not be required to provide security for 
such action. 
(3) The court may order a person convicted upon a private prosecution brought under 
subsection (1) to pay the costs and expenses of the prosecution, including the costs of any 
appeal against such conviction or any sentence. 
(4) The accused may be granted an order for costs against the person instituting a private 
prosecution, if the charge against the accused is dismissed or the accused is acquitted or a 
decision in favour of the accused is given on appeal and the court finds either: 
(a) that the person instituting and conducting the private prosecution did not act out of a 
concern for the public interest or the protection of the environment; or 
(b) that such prosecution was unfounded, trivial or vexatious. 
(5) When a private prosecution is instituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions is barred from prosecuting except with the leave of the court 
concerned. 
 
Comment: This is the current section 33 of NEMA, very slightly amended to remove the 
use of the inelegant phrase ‘person prosecuting privately’ and replacement of reference to 
the Attorney-General with Director of Public Prosecutions.   
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Prosecutions by organs of state concerned with environmental management 
 
10. (1)The Director of Public Prosecutions may delegate, indefinitely or for a specified period of 
time, to an organ of state that is responsible for the administration of any legislation listed in 
Schedule X the power to institute prosecutions in respect of any offence under such legislation. 
(2)  An organ of state instituting a prosecution under the power delegated in subsection (1) 
– 
(a) shall institute such prosecution through a person entitled to practice as an advocate or an 
attorney in the Republic;  
(b) shall not be required to notify the public prosecutor in writing of the intention to prosecute; 
(c) shall not be required to produce a certificate issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
stating that he or she has refused to prosecute the accused; and 
(d) shall not be required to provide security for such action. 
(3) The court may order a person convicted upon a private prosecution brought under 
subsection (1) to pay the costs and expenses of the prosecution, including the costs of any 
appeal against such conviction or any sentence. 
(4) When a private prosecution is instituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions is barred from prosecuting except with the leave of the court 
concerned. 
 
Comment: This is an amended version of section 33 of NEMA that empowers organs of 
state to carry out ‘in-house’ prosecutions as recommended in Chapter 13 (§2).  The idea 
behind the provision is to provide for ‘blanket’ permission from the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for an organ of state to carry out prosecutions without having to comply 
with all the formalities required by section 33. 
 
Compensation orders in criminal trials 
 
11. (1) Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any legislation listed in Schedule X 
and it appears that such person has by that offence caused loss or damage to any organ of state 
or other person, including the cost incurred or likely to be incurred by an organ of state in 
rehabilitating the environment or preventing damage to the environment, the court may in the 
same proceedings at the written request of the Minister or other organ of state or other person 
concerned, and in the presence of the convicted person, inquire summarily and without pleadings 
into the amount of the loss or damage so caused. 
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(2) Upon proof of such amount, the court may give judgment therefor in favour of the organ of 
state or other person concerned against the convicted person, and such judgment shall be of the 
same force and effect and be executable in the same manner as if it had been given in a civil 
action duly instituted before a competent court. 
 
Comment: This is taken directly from section 34 of NEMA.  The justification for such a 
provision is discussed in Chapter 12 (§2.2). 
 
Sentencing of environmental offences 
 
12. Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any legislation listed in Schedule X 
the court convicting such person may – 
(a) summarily enquire into and assess the monetary value of any advantage gained or likely to 
be gained by such person in consequence of that offence, and, in addition to any other 
punishment imposed in respect of that offence, the court may order the award of damages 
or compensation or a fine equal to the amount so assessed; 
(b) impose a fine in addition to that provided for in the legislation concerned equal to three 
times the commercial value of any animal, plant or other object in respect of which the 
offence was committed, provided that such fine may be imposed only in cases where, in 
the opinion of the court, the offence was committed with the purpose of exploiting the 
commercial value of the animal, plant or object concerned; 
(c) declare forfeit to the state any animal, plant, substance or object in respect of which the 
offences was committed; 
(d) declare forfeit to the state any object, including but not limited to any vehicle or vessel, 
used in connection with the commission of the offence; 
(e) where the court would impose a sentence of not more than five penalty units, sentence the 
convicted person to community service as envisaged by section 297(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), provided that the court must impose a form of 
community service which benefits the environment if it is possible for the offender to serve 
such a sentence in the circumstances; and 
(f) suspend or revoke any permit, licence or authorisation issued to the offender under the 
legislation infringed in the commission of the offence. 
 
Comment: This provision incorporates several of the sentencing measures already used in 
South African legislation (as discussed in Chapter 12 at §2).  The purpose of such a 
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provision is to make these sentences available across the board for environmental 
offences and not selectively, as is currently the case.  
 
Continuation of offence after conviction 
 
13. Any person convicted of an offence in terms of any legislation listed in Schedule X, and 
who after such conviction persists in the act or omission which constituted such offence, shall be 
guilty of a continuing offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one penalty unit or 
to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty days or to both such fine and such 
imprisonment in respect of every day on which he or she persists with such act or omission. 
 
Comment:  This provision, which provides for fines for continuation of offences, is 
adapted from section 29(6) of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989.  This 
device was discussed in Chapter 12 at §2.1. 
 
Costs of prosecution 
 
14. Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any legislation listed in Schedule 
X the court convicting such person may, upon application by the public prosecutor or another 
organ of state, order such person to pay the reasonable costs incurred by the public 
prosecutor and the organ of state concerned in the investigation and prosecution of the 
offence if, in the opinion of the court, it is just and reasonable to do so. 
 
Comment:  This was recommended in Chapter 13 and the provision is the one proposed 
in that Chapter, adapted from the NEMA section 34(4). 
 
Payment of fines 
 
15. All fines or estreated bail moneys paid or recovered in respect of any contravention of any 
legislation listed in Schedule X shall be paid to the organ of state which is responsible for 
administration of the legislation under which the prosecution in question was instituted. 
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Comment: This was recommended in Chapter 13 and is based on section 216(1) of the 
Natal Nature Conservation Ordinance.19 
 
Comment on proposed sections 16-20 below:  These provisions are all explained above, 




16. Any conduct engaged in on behalf of a corporation by a director, servant or agent of the 
corporation within the scope of his or her actual or apparent authority shall be deemed, for the 
purposes of a prosecution for an offence against this Act, to have been engaged in also by the 
corporation if the State can prove corporate mens rea in any of the following forms: 
(a) the corporation has a policy that expressly or impliedly authorises or permits the commission 
of the offence or an offence of the same type; 
(b) the corporation failed to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due precautions to prevent 
the commission of the offence or an offence of the same type; 
(c) the corporation has a policy of failing to comply with a reactive duty to take preventive 
measures in response to having committed the external elements of the offence; or 
(d) the corporation failed to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due diligence to comply 
with a reactive duty to take preventive measures in response to having committed the external 
elements of the offence. 
 
Liability of corporate officers 
 
17. (1) Every director or officer of a corporation that engages in an activity that may result in the 
contravention of any law concerned with the protection of the environment has a duty to take all 
reasonable care to prevent the corporation from causing or permitting such contravention. 
(2) Every person who has a duty under subsection (1) and who fails to carry out that duty is guilty 
of an offence. 
(3) A director or officer of a corporation is liable to conviction under this section whether or not the 
corporation has been prosecuted or convicted 
 
                                                 
19  Ordinance 15 of 1974. 
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Sentencing of corporate offenders 
 
18. (1)Where a court convicts a corporation of any offence in terms of legislation listed in 
Schedule X, other than an offence in respect of which any law prescribes a minimum punishment, 
the court may in its discretion – 
(a) postpone for a period not exceeding five years the passing of sentence on one or more 
conditions, whether as to – 
(i) compensation; 
(ii) rendering to the person aggrieved of some specific benefit or service in lieu of 
compensation for damage or pecuniary loss; 
(iii) the performance without remuneration of some service for the benefit of the community 
under the supervision or control of an organization or institution which, or person who, in 
the opinion of the court, promotes the interests of the community; 
(iv) the implementation by the corporation to the satisfaction of the court of disciplinary 
procedures within the corporation in connection with the offence for which this sentence 
was imposed: Provided that the corporation shall compile a report setting out the 
disciplinary procedures followed, the findings arising out of such procedures and any 
disciplinary action taken by the corporation pursuant to such findings, which report shall 
be submitted to the court which imposed the condition; 
(v) the implementation by the corporation to the satisfaction of the court of  policies and 
procedures designed to avoid non-compliance with the legislation contravened by the 
legislation that led to the conviction for which this sentence was imposed; 
(vi) the placing of advertisements in a publication or publications as may be specified by the 
court either setting out the facts leading to the conviction and the findings and sentence 
of the court or containing whatever text as may be ordered by the court; 
(vii) good conduct; 
(viii) any other matter; 
and order such corporation to appear before the court at the expiration of the relevant period; 
or 
(b) pass sentence but order the operation of the whole or any part thereof to be suspended, for 
a period not exceeding five years on any condition referred to in paragraph (a) which the 
court may specify in the order. 
(2)  The provisions of section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), other 
than subsection 91) of that section, shall apply with the necessary changes to a postponed or 
suspended sentence imposed on a corporate offender under this section.  
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Privilege of voluntary environmental audit reports  
 
19. (1) An Environmental Audit Report shall be privileged and shall not be admissible as 
evidence in any legal action in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding, except as provided 
in subsections (2) and (3) of this section.  
(2)(a) The privilege described in subsection (1) of this section does not apply to the extent that 
it is waived expressly or by implication by the owner or operator of a facility or persons 
conducting an activity that prepared or caused to be prepared the Environmental Audit Report: 
Provided that the release of an Environmental Audit Report by the owner or operator of a 
facility to any party or to any organ of state for purposes of negotiating, arranging or facilitating 
the sale, lease or financing of a property or a facility, or a portion of a property or facility: 
(i) is not a waiver of the privilege; and  
(ii) does not create a right for an organ of state to require the release of an Environmental 
Audit Report.  
(b) In a civil or administrative proceeding, disclosure of material for which the privilege 
described in subsection (2) of this section is asserted, shall be required if the competent 
authority or court, as the case may be, determines that:  
(i) the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose;  
(ii) the material is material contemplated by subsection (3); or  
(iii) even if subject to the privilege, the material shows evidence of noncompliance with 
legislation listed in Schedule X, appropriate efforts to achieve compliance with which were 
not promptly initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence.  
(c) A party asserting the environmental audit privilege described in subsection (1) of this 
section has the burden of proving the privilege, including, if there is evidence of 
noncompliance with legislation listed in Schedule X, proof that appropriate efforts to achieve 
compliance were promptly initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence. A party seeking 
disclosure under subsection (2)(b)(i) of this section has the burden of proving that the privilege 
is asserted for a fraudulent purpose. 
(3) The privilege described in subsection (2) of this section shall not extend to:  
(a) Documents, communications, data, reports or other information required to be collected, 
developed, maintained, reported or otherwise made available to an organ of state pursuant to 
any legislation listed in Schedule X;  
(b) Information obtained by observation, sampling or monitoring by any organ of state; or  
(c) Information obtained from a source independent of the environmental audit.  
(4) Nothing in this section shall limit, waive or abrogate the scope or nature of any statutory or 
common law privilege. 
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Privilege of environmental audits required by legislation 
 
20. (1) Any documents, communications, data, reports or other information required to be 
collected, developed, maintained, reported or otherwise made available to an organ of state 
pursuant to any legislation listed in Schedule X shall be privileged and shall not be admissible as 
evidence in any criminal proceeding, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section. 
(2) In a criminal proceeding, a court shall require disclosure of material for which the privilege 
described in subsection (1) of this section is asserted, only if the court determines that: 
(a) the privilege is asserted for a fraudulent purpose; or 
(b) even if subject to the privilege, the material shows evidence of noncompliance with 
legislation listed in Schedule X, appropriate efforts to achieve compliance with which were 
not promptly initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence. 
 
Comment on implementation of above proposed provisions: 
The proposed legislative provisions set out here offer a suite of measures that can be used 
by enforcement officials, but it is not possible to set out in legislation with the type of 
precision necessary for legislation, the precise circumstances when measure x or y ought 
to be used.   It is recommended that organs of state responsible for managing the 
environment draw up their own guidelines as to how to use the instruments at their 
disposal.  The shortcomings of criminal law discussed earlier in this thesis make it 
unlikely, it is submitted, that the criminal sanction would be used as the ‘default’ 
enforcement tool.  Whereas the existing situation is that frequently no enforcement takes 
place because the only enforcement tool is the criminal sanction, which there is a 
reluctance to use, the proposed situation offers a choice that makes it likely that the 
criminal sanction will be reserved for those instances recommended in the thesis and 
reiterated in the introductory section of this Chapter. 
 
3 Concluding Remarks 
 
It is somewhat sobering, after months of considering and writing about issues relating to 
enforcement of environmental law, to reflect on the fact that there is only so much that 
law, and especially domestic law, can do to address the environmental problems that 
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beset our planet today.  And yet this very fact makes it imperative that everything be done 
to ensure that what law is able to achieve, it does, in fact, achieve. 
This study has shown that there is much in current environmental law in South Africa, 
as provided for in legislation and as implemented in practice, that is inefficient and 
ineffective.  The proposals made in this thesis are intended to improve effectiveness and 
efficiency with the ultimate goal of optimal enforcement of environmental law.  
Returning to the sentiment expressed at the beginning of this section, however, the law 
does not operate in a vacuum and nor does it operate mechanically.  Having good laws on 
paper is no guarantee that the law will operate as intended and any proposals made as to 
how to improve the law, both in substance and in practice, will only be as strong as the 
officials who carry them out.  The political will to enforce environmental law vigorously 
in order to achieve the overarching goal of sustainable development is therefore of vital 
importance.  If this will is insipid, the law will not achieve much, however good it may be 
on paper. 
It is encouraging, therefore, to see various signs that officialdom is starting to adopt a 
stricter approach towards environmental offenders.  It is hoped that the proposals 
contained in this work will provide the tools for environmental managers and those in the 
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